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Introduction 
Prelude 
In 2008, when I started a project about revisionist history and post-New Order Indonesia, 
I imagined the death of former President Suharto early in that year would galvanize further 
historiographical reform. When the prophesied reforms failed to materialize, and when I 
repeatedly failed to engage Indonesians of my acquaintance in a meaningful dialog about the 
place and use of history, I moved in a different direction. My focus on history tended towards 
systemic analyses. I was interested in the structural logics that enabled and constrained political 
efficacy. My Indonesian interlocutors, however, voiced almost exclusive interest in agentive 
accounts. Asked what was the most grievous issue facing the nation, “corruption” was the usual 
reply. When I prompted for a solution, greater moral character was the almost-invariable 
response. I could not engage my friends in a debate about corruption without the need for 
personal moral accountability being the primary conclusion: my persistent wails of structural 
inducements were summarily unconvincing.  
Returning to conduct my fieldwork in 2010, I was pulled ever further afield from my 
historical queries. Instead I was drawn directly into the operations of two small-scale 
organizations dedicated to achieving the kinds of moral awakenings I had heard about in prior 
years. Moral growth would salve social ills, the argument seemed to go. This was frequently an 
element of my discussions at both Kahfi Motivator School (Kahfi) and Initiatives of Change 
Indonesia (IofC), the two aforementioned organizations. Looking at themselves and their society, 
my acquaintances in these groups advocated moral projects of personal transformation. 
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Structural interventions did not appear to be “live options,” in the sense that William 
James gives the phrase. When I say “agency” here I do so with a degree of deliberate naivety. 
Rather than a firm sociological category, by “agency” I intend the belief and prospect that 
individual humans can play a determining role in achieving desired outcomes, both within their 
own lives and in the lives of their socially-bonded fellow humans. This possibility is in dialogue 
not only with a notion of “structure,” but for many of my interlocutors with the “hard structure” 
of divine ordination. The fact that the following dissertation deals primarily with the experiences 
and perspectives of young, mostly twenty-something Indonesians of middle or aspiring middle-
class is hard to separate from the question of “agency.” At university and freed from familial 
constraints, or having just graduated but not yet bound to a new family of one’s own, the sense of 
personal possibility appeared to be dizzying. Along with virulent fears – the uncertainty of a 
career, the personal and financial prospect of marriage, the maturing debt to one’s parents – the 
intoxicating sense of efficacy evinced by my interlocutors owes something to their class position 
and life-stage. If there is an age-cohort for whom agency means anything, it is this one: young, 
educated, unattached. In the years since my research began, the horizons of possibility for many 
of these people, and for this author, have shifted. Former openings now appear considerably 
more bounded and aspirations often more humble.    
“Agency” as a category in this work is one I supply: neither it nor its possible glosses 
figures prominently in the conversations underlying the arguments of this dissertation. Thus 
although I make frequent recourse to an agentive framing in my prefatory remarks, the bulk of 
the analysis in the project proper relies on an equally fuzzy category of “change” (perubahan). 
“Change” proved to be a vehicle for incredibly diverse aspirations, a point I return to several 
times over the course of this project. Oftentimes the people employing the language of “change” 
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were not clear about what, precisely, it denoted. At a minimum it seemed to reference 
movement, improvement, and difference. Change was considered, absent other qualification, a 
likely moral good. And achieving change required some notion of agency – even if it were only 
tacit. This partially justifies my admittedly undertheorized use of the term. Furthermore, 
“agency” is not a wholly etic concern: In contemporary Indonesian social-science, key categories 
of analysis have been largely imported from the Euro-American canon. Thus a term like 
“subjectivity” is often expressed as kepribadian, a noun that in times past used to denote 
something more like “personality” or “identity.” In government publications and academic 
research alike, Indonesia is awash in the language of sosialisasi. A transliteration of 
“socialization,” the term carries senses of inculcating, spreading and disseminating. Sosialisasi 
also, however, produces kepribadian: this is the social construction of subjectivity. My 
interlocutors at Initiatives of Change Indonesia were keen advocates of the language of 
kepribadian. They desired to develop within themselves, and socialize within Indonesia, 
kepribadian that “cared,” (yang peduli), that was moral (yang bermoral), and that could change 
(yang dapat berubah). It is this final element of agentive possibility that gives this dissertation its 
title: “having change and making change.” In Indonesian, ubah, or change, is something that is 
either “had” (berubah) or “done” (mengubah). The first, according to grammarians, has a subject 
but no object: “climate changes” (iklim berubah). The second has a subject and an object: “I 
change the reflective thoughts of my neighbors” (aku mengubah pemikiran tetangga-
tetanggaku). Furthermore berubah doesn’t demand an explanation of change: it is descriptive 
rather than causal. Something has happened, berubah announces, without clarifying the doer, the 
done-to, or the rationale.  
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In Indonesian political discourse one abstract noun greatly predominates over the other: 
there is much more talk of perubahan (change, often without an object) than there is of 
pengubahan (change, always with an object and clear causality). When my friends and 
acquaintances translated “Initiatives of Change,” the word they used was perubahan. When a 
classmate at Kahfi, Tomo, spoke of wanting to become a more devout Muslim, the word he used 
was berubah.
1
 I belabor this point about “change” to complicate my own conceptual reduction in 
terms of “agency.” The very language of berubah obscures agency even when it contains an 
earnest desire to be efficacious. The people described in this dissertation are interested in 
acquiring the tools of change, and then of changing themselves and others. The details of this 
prospect, however, reveal the continuing complexity of human and divine efficacy, even 
understood in a political circumstance that tends to foreclose discussions of structure. Tools of 
change that work, then, might be a fairer characterization than “agentive technologies,” when it 
comes to my discussion of the discourses adopted and adapted in these groups. 
Acknowledged Misgivings         
Before beginning in earnest, I want to pause and recognize several pertinent criticisms. 
Firstly, I am aware that parts of this project rest uneasily alongside the materials they are 
designed to contextualize – pointedly so in terms of the historical chapter and the ethnographic 
arguments that follow it. As this project evolves, remedying this situation is my first priority – 
here I simply beg the indulgence of my readers. The notion of “adab” (a key Islamic concept I 
translate as “right relations”), suggests itself as a category with wider reach than the uses I have 
accorded it here, and may be one approach to bring added coherence to the project. Perhaps a 
theorization of “authenticity,” and the demands made of it, could add similar thematic unity. A 
                                                             
1
 Ingin berubah menajdi Muslim yang lebih taat.  
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final underdeveloped argument concerns the place and role of affect in the organizations I 
describe. The recent emergence of pronounced affect as a desired disposition and a marker of 
moral authority in Indonesia deserve a richer treatment than I have thus far managed to provide – 
tracking the genealogy of this phenomenon is either a necessary revision of the current project or 
a point of departure for the next.  
My observations throughout this project are limited by the setting for much of this 
research – at the State Islamic University and in its immediate environs. The Islamic State 
University Syarif Hidayatullah (UIN), located to Jakarta’s southwest in the city of Ciputat, has 
long been an important site of Muslim scholarship and activism. The flagship of the Indonesian 
Islamic State University system, UIN plays host to a diverse collection of students and faculty, 
drawn from across the archipelago and, increasingly, the world. Ideas developed in Ciputat have 
often echoed out into broader Indonesian society. Arriving on campus in the fall of 2010 I 
intended to embed myself amongst student activists, hoping to explore how historical narratives 
shaped political debates. I imagined I would be near the center of future changes in Indonesia 
and Islam. Instead of campus groups, however, I was quickly swept into the orbits of the two off 
campus communities I have already mentioned: Initiatives of Change and Kahfi Motivator 
School. Both organizations targeted the spiritual stature of their membership. Instead of history 
and politics, I suddenly found myself studying efficacy, ethics, and moral transformations. 
Although these weighty issues may resonate in other regions of the archipelago, the material I 
have direct access to remains that produced by or for young people in and around Ciputat.    
Both IofC and Kahfi are each dedicated to unique visions of “change.” Change is 
understood along at least two axes: as a process of personal moral reform or transformation; and 
as a vessel for re-imagined social and political possibilities. While IofC stresses both of these 
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aspects, Kahfi is often more circumspect about the latter. Kahfi promotes personal moral 
attainment, but in almost every formal sense leaves aside questions of social or political 
obligation. Later in the dissertation, I argue that the complex logics of change evinced within the 
practices of these groups can be profitably understood against long-term historical processes of 
managing change, and in particular, managing the potential changes wrought by Islam in the 
Indonesian archipelago. The partial quietism of Kahfi can be understood in this light – as part of 
a long-term de-politicization of Islam only ever unevenly achieved. Separate from their political 
ends, however, the moral interventions advocated within these two recently-established 
organizations reveal profound negotiations of efficacy and subjectivity. Tracking the diverse 
modalities of change conceived within these groups opens up complicated projects of categorical 
purification, cultural assimilation and social organization that exceed their particulars.  
Late in the drafting of this dissertation, I was alerted to several methodological concerns 
that had escaped more serious comment within the body of the project. The first concerns access: 
why Initiatives of Change Indonesia, why Kahfi Motivator School? Ideally the following pages 
suggest the significance of these organizations in understanding broad patterns of Muslim 
knowledge practices, moral possibilities embraced by contemporary Indonesians and globally 
circulating discourses of efficacious selves. However I do not address, other than through 
narrative happenstance, why I have selected these organizations. It was not purely what a more 
scientific procedure would consider “convenience sampling.” During the course of my fieldwork 
I liaised with a variety of groups, including prominent Muslim campus student organizations 
such as Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam; Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia; and Ikatan 
Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah. Although I was graciously received by these organizations, the 
preponderance of their activities often seemed directed at the intensely local politics of the State 
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Islamic University Jakarta campus. In addition to their political exploits, these large student 
groups comprised important social outlets for their membership. Unlike prior historical periods, 
however, they did not seem as invested in achieving outside social visions, at least, not in my 
cursory visits to their events. Once potent sources of activist energy (part of the birth of the New 
Order and part of its demise as well), their consolidated university form seemed most interested 
in institutional re-production. A similar criticism was relayed to me by other acquaintances, like 
my research assistant Abdul Fatah, who had transitioned his primary loyalty from Pergerakan 
Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia to Initiatives of Change Indonesia. He complained that “campus 
politics” (dismissively characterized as bolstering ones resume by election to various and 
frequently redundant student government bodies) distorted the possibilities of these movements. 
“Politics,” for Abdul Fatah and many others, was a dirty word. Its mere invocation, politiklah, 
was meant as a dismissive characterization of base, personal interest. He viewed his participation 
at IofC, as detailed in chapter three, as part of a socially meaningful project of personal growth 
and “familial” improvement. This was not possible in the more established student organizations.   
I also experimented with other organizations offering different sorts of moral 
possibilities. My brief involvement with Kesatuan Aski Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI) 
ended following my participation in a Palestinian solidarity event organized by the group. 
KAMMI is a mostly “modernist Muslim” student auxiliary of the “Islamist” Prosperous Justice 
Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera). The solidarity event was co-sponsored by a vast list of 
prominent Islamist media outlets and political organizations. For two-days I cast myself in the 
profoundly uncomfortable (in terms of audience, not idea) position of advocating for the basic 
humanity of Jews, who were not otherwise charitably characterized in the course of a number of 
speeches and seminars. I left frustrated, having generated the impression that I was at least a 
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Jewish stooge if not actually an American intelligence agent (my name didn’t help, for those 
literate in biblical history). For similar reasons, despite living immediately next door to 
Pesantren al-Umm, an important site for the tarekat Tijaniyah (a Sufi order most prevalent in 
Africa) in Indonesia, I did not avail myself of the opportunity to further study the organization. 
Pesantren al-Umm is also the spiritual home of Front Pembela Islam, a Muslim vigilante 
movement implicated in many recent violent clashes as they seek to express their vision of moral 
order. I struggled to imagine how I would be received as other than an intelligence agent, despite 
several acquaintances who were graduates of the institution. Limitations like this encouraged my 
focus on Kahfi Motivator School and Initiatives of Change. 
My interactions with Jamaah Tabligh (the Indonesian affiliate of a global Muslim 
proselytization network) were far more rewarding. However, folding in yet another organization 
felt like too ambitious a reach for this dissertation. Instead I leave open the possibility of 
revisiting my generous interlocutors at Jamaah Tabligh in the conduct of a subsequent project. 
The giants of Indonesian Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah held less 
appeal for me, not just because of their ample representation in scholarship, but also because 
their sheer size posed logistical difficulties in terms of access and meaningful analysis. Members 
of IofC and Kahfi are frequently also members of Nahdlatul Ulama or Muhammadiyah, although 
I seldom inquired directly about this fact. My understanding of Islam in Indonesia is beholden to 
many predecessors who have worked closely with either Nahdlatul Ulama or Muhammadiyah. 
Nevertheless, they are scarcely mentioned in the following chapters, except as proxies for 
“traditionalist” or “modernist” sympathies in terms of personal performance of Muslim religious 
obligations.   
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In place of these larger and more established organizations, I highlight Initiatives of 
Change Indonesia and Kahfi Motivator School. I characterize both as “small-scale.” The nature 
of that scale deserves fuller elaboration than it has received in the body of this dissertation. There 
are about fifty currently active members of IofC. To that number there are approximately two 
hundred peripherally involved individuals – people who have moved on to another stage in their 
life or who are only occasional attendees at IofC events by dint of their location (far from 
Jakarta). Another five hundred or so have been involved at one point of another. Some of these 
alumni maintain personal friendships with current membership, if diminished participation. 
Others appear as anonymous names on email lists – perhaps they went to one workshop, but 
elected not to continue their involvement, or perhaps they were vital members who have simply 
drifted away and are largely unknown to current participants.  
Kahfi has a larger reach than IofC, although it is sharply dwarfed by much more 
established Islamic pop-psychological or motivational outfits. There are approximately three 
hundred and fifty current students at Kahfi. To that number there is a further five hundred 
alumni, along with hundreds of others who did not meet the graduation requirements but 
maintain some ties to the institution. The obligatory first seminar on “Public Speaking in the 
Conceptual Era,” the first step to enrolling at Kahfi, is often attended by three-hundred to four-
hundred people, although less than half of that number ultimately registers for classes. It has 
been operating for twelve years, and from a first cohort of fifteen students, current classes admit 
one hundred and fifty. By comparison, Manajemen Qolbu, the television program that was one 
prominent manifestation of AA Gym’s media empire, was routinely watched by millions during 
its 2004-2006 heydays (AA Gym got his national start on RCTI’s morning program Hikmah 
Fajar, Manajemen Qolbu was originally a spinoff from this program, although it became the 
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name for the entire branded enterprise). Ary Ginanjar, the founder of ESQ an Islamic-business-
leadership and spiritual enhancement seminar program, has reached an audience of millions 
since he founded the organization in 2000 – tens of thousands of people attend ESQ workshops 
per month at the current rate. Even larger still, of course, are the tens of millions of people on the 
membership rolls of either Muhammadiyah or Nahdlatul Ulama. Om Bagus, the central figure at 
Kahfi, has probably directly addressed thousands of people, if not tens of thousands, across his 
various for-hire presentations, which are often broadly similar to materials covered at Kahfi. But 
Kahfi Motivator School is small, and it’s easy to meet people in Jakarta who have never heard of 
it.  
The lure of Kahfi and IofC was only partly a matter of convenience – although it was a 
fact that they were happy to have me, and welcomed me to participate in ways that student 
groups, understandably, did not (I was not a university student). Contrasted to established 
popular Muslim preachers like Yusuf Mansur, AA Gym or Arifin Ilham, Om Bagus was an 
aspirant on his way up. Having transitioned from a livelihood based on entertainment (as a 
commercial and commercial voice actor), Om Bagus is, as of this writing, acquiring the Islamic 
bona fides to bolster his authority in moral domains. Kahfi, along with its no doubt earnest 
altruistic commitment to empowering youth, is a useful testing ground for the theories and 
practices Om Bagus employs with other audiences. Joining the school, I had the distinct sense 
that I was witnessing a phenomenon a little closer to its genesis. It’s an open question how far 
that trajectory extends, but Om Bagus and many of his students aspire to the kind of media 
empire of more well-known public Muslim moralists. Although I wish them every success, 
observing this moment was meaningful to me regardless of its outcome – even if they don’t take 
over the world, they convincingly represent a certain set of historical possibilities.  
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There is another dimension to my interactions within these groups that bears mention – 
what I contributed to their efforts. What is often a tacit quid-pro-quo of research was explicit at 
Kahfi: I was given access to teaching materials and classroom time in exchange for services 
rendered. For this reason I translated a number of hypnosis scripts into Indonesian, lent my 
minor prestige as a foreigner to hired motivational performances and taught the occasional class 
on a subject with which I felt comfortable. My mere presence conferred greater rhetorical 
authority to the speakers to whom I listened. By contrast, at IofC, with its frequent hosting of 
foreign visitors, all that was expected was that I be a sincere participant – a role I was happy to 
fulfill. I nevertheless felt obligated to demonstrate greater gratitude for the access I was granted. 
Towards this end I also taught classes, but more usefully I made myself available to the many 
IofC members who aspired to travel abroad. I have edited many applications – both simple visa 
requirements and prestigious academic scholarships – for acquaintances from IofC.   
Despite the small stature of these groups, the participants within IofC and Kahfi have the 
potential to wield a disproportionate influence in the Indonesia of the future. Very few members 
(actually, none that I knew of) of either organization were part of the cosmopolitan ultra-wealthy 
Jakarta set that stands first in line to inherit ownership of Indonesia’s large businesses and the 
levers of its politics. However, as part of the slim Indonesian middle-class, the highly-motivated 
memberships of these organizations evince a strong possibility for upward mobility. As many of 
them enter the ranks of the civil service, a mammoth bureaucracy in Indonesia, they stand poised 
to rapidly advance to positions of real authority. One friend from Kahfi has been swiftly 
promoted within the Ministry of Fisheries. A former president of IofC is instrumental in the 
founding of a Tanri Abeng University, a new private university bankrolled by the eponymous 
industrialist. Another long-time IofC member is pursuing a Master’s degree in the United States 
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as he rises through the Ministry of Religion hierarchy. While both groups contain a 
disproportionate number of teachers (the State Islamic University was once a teacher’s college), 
there are a lot of projects undertaken on the side, some of which will probably meet with splashy 
success. Beyond the vastly improved material prospects of their membership, IofC in particular 
tries to cultivate a political ethic that links personal moral development to broad social 
responsibility. Among the Indonesian human rights lawyers of the future, I would be very 
surprised not to see IofC members. Already they have become important players in domestic 
efforts at interfaith peace and reconciliation – often through partnership with the Wahid Institute, 
the think-tank and foundation established by former President Abdurrahman Wahid.
2
 
 Initiatives of Change Indonesia and Kahfi Motivator School were founded after 
organizational regulations were relaxed following the collapse of the Suharto-led New Order 
government (1966-1998). Moral renewal is a dominant feature of the discourses employed at 
both organizations, reflecting the appeal of this prospect for many Indonesian audiences. 
Although they participate in broadly popular projects of moral argumentation, as I have just 
established, they are very minor players in a national scene. Yet despite their recent vintage and 
slim membership rolls, both have something vital to say about Islam, state, and subjectivity in 
the present era. The vast appetite for “change,” the absolutely ubiquitous presence of self-
improvement discourses, the marriage of spiritual and psychological literatures within the self-
help canon: these are phenomena not limited to Indonesia or the immediate past. Changes “done” 
and changes “had” both exert enduring appeal. Their tremendous salience has yet to receive a 
commensurate scholarly reckoning.  
                                                             
2
 Leadership at the WAHID Institute had worked with early IofC leaders under the auspices of Gerakan Pemuda 
Ansor, the youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (the massive traditionalist Muslim organization of which former 
Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid was also chairman). Thus Nahdlatul Ulama become a connection 
between IofC members and organizations with allied social commitments.  
 
 
13 
 
Initiatives of Change Indonesia and Kahfi Motivator School did not simply appear in the 
liberalized public sphere of the post-New Order world fully formed. Macro-historical changes in 
the Indonesian state helped generate the conditions for their emergence. Individual actors, too, 
played a part in founding the organizations, acting in accordance with their, no doubt, individual 
motivations. And although both organizations are committed to investing their activities with 
local meanings, they draw freely on globally circulating discourses of personal change. There are 
a lot of parts to this story. To tell it, then, requires some shared contexts. Thus I tell some of the 
other stories, in broad outlines, which have done so much to structure the very possibility of each 
of these organizations. This is also a tale about Indonesia, Islam and the Dutch.  
The More Things Change…   
Once upon a time Indonesia was said to have shuddered beneath the burden of three and a 
half centuries of Dutch colonial rule. This timeframe, tiga setengah abad, became a rote element 
of the standardized history taught in postcolonial Indonesia. Three and a half centuries – an 
erroneous but not an arbitrary claim. In the fresh dawn of Indonesian independence no less a 
figure of erudition than Pramoedya Ananta Toer framed the character of colonization in precisely 
these terms. In the perennial translators’ favorite, Tales from Jakarta (Tjerita dari Djakarta), the 
first story “Djongos + Babu” (“Houseboy + Maid”) caustically locates the history of the titular 
houseboy and nursemaid deep in the colonial past.
3
 Pramoedya writes, “Since Jan Pietersz Coen, 
the hereditary inheritance of the family was genuine slave’s blood. Not half-hearted slaves – 
loyal to the roots of their hair. And maybe not just since Coen. It is more likely the case already 
                                                             
3
 Benedict Anderson highlights this collection in Language and Power, and translates the opening passages of this 
story (221). James Siegel has published his own translation of “Djongos + Babu,” entitled “Flunky + Maid.” In the 
1999 publication of Tales from Djakarta, Julie Shackford-Bradley translated this story as “Houseboy + Maid.” 
Nancy Florida has also rendered this story as “House-Boy + Maid: A Very Long Family History.” I would argue 
that in addition to its literary merits, this repeated attention is occasioned by its historical probity. Thus I am unable 
to resist the temptation to translate this opening passage, once more, myself.  
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since Pieter Both or even at the time Houtman wandered across all the oceans (6).”4 In a helpful 
footnote to his translation of this passage, published in Language and Power, Benedict Anderson 
explains that “J.P. Coen was the founder of the Dutch East India Company stronghold of Batavia 
(Jakarta) in 1619. Pieter Both was the first governor-general in the Indies (1609-14). Cornelis de 
Houtman led the first Dutch naval expedition to the Indies, 1595-97” (222). By endorsing this 
particular historiography, Pramoedya locates the genesis of a colonial subjectivity from the very 
presence of de Houtman. The Dutch had merely to appear and servitude was instantiated. This 
nationalist narrative of immediate rupture finds the seeds of Indonesian-ness at the dawn of the 
colonial encounter – the writhing submission described in Pramoedya’s short-story is the mirror 
image of heroic resistance valorized by the historians of the independent state. Pramoedya 
himself, a true believer in a certain trajectory of nationalism, imagines the Native elites as static 
corrupted elements in the historical tableau. Indeed, both sides of this proposition cast the 
inhabitants of the archipelago in the static role of acted upon. Change, when it comes, flows from 
the dynamism of Europe into the supine bodies of the colonized. This argument suggests itself as 
the outcome of the processes it claims to describe.   
Three years before Pramoedya’s Tjerita dari Djakarta was published (1957), President 
Soekarno addressed Indonesia’s legislature on the ninth anniversary of the declaration of 
Independence. The speech is collected in the second volume of Dibawah Bendera Revolusi 
(Beneath the Revolutionary Flag). Repeating his frequent assertion that Indonesia suffered under 
three and a half centuries of colonial rule, Soekarno exclaims, “For three and half centuries we 
have paid the pricy penalty of our collective failure to safeguard the unity of the nation. For three 
                                                             
4
 Sejak Jan Pietersz Coen turun-temurun keluarga itu memang berdarah hamba. Hamba yang tak tanggung-tanggung 
– setia sampai bulu-bulunya. Mungkin juga bukan sejak Coen saja. Besar kemungkinan sudah sejak Pieter Both atau 
di saat-saat Houtman mengelana di semua samudera 
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and a half centuries we have carried out the sentence. Now we are independent because we have 
re-forged [menggembleng-kembali] the unified nation [kesatuan bangsa] (181).
5
 Nationalism 
anachronistically locates itself in an eternal past; this observation is not, of course, new: the very 
idea of nationalism is animated by a historicity and a futurity – a bi-directional projection of 
particular present circumstances into a universalized and atemporal narrative that nevertheless 
claims logical exigency. This is our famed nationalist teleology, which truly requires no further 
introduction. And so for Soekarno the idea of Indonesia as a return to a pre-colonial national 
unity has considerably greater appeal than to imagine it a largely arbitrary space, delimited by 
Dutch peregrinations and host to diverse ethno-linguistic communities on separate national 
trajectories. And thus those organized under the sign of Independence are also all those peoples 
who the wanderings of de Houtman touched – the territorial expanse of the Netherlands East 
Indies as the natural and right boundaries of Indonesian sovereignty. From Soekarno’s place at 
the podium, colonialism becomes an interregnum, albeit one extending across the better part of 
four centuries. Soekarno hoped to wrest the timeless essence of the nation from the grasp of a 
colonial story of Native stasis and enshrine it as a founding principle of the post-colonial state. 
As a result, the Indonesian revolution requires that nothing, really, change: it orbits on an axis, 
rotating in a fixed plane. 
If Soekarno’s revolution required an unchanging nation, its static features were 
transcendentalized in the heavy hands of the New Order propagandists. The New Order 
government, famously, stood at the levers of change and did everything possible to stymy their 
operation. The fantasy of simultaneous social stasis and economic mobility was brilliantly 
                                                             
5
 Tiga setengah abad lamanya kita membayar denda yang mahal atas kelalaian kita memlihara kesatuan bangsa. Tiga 
setengah abad lamanya kita menjalani hukuman. Sekarang kita telah merdeka karena dapat menggembleng-kembali 
kesatuan bangsa itu.  
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distilled by Mary Margaret Steadly in Hanging Without a Rope: “Change guarantees continuity, 
in other words: progress makes nothing happen” (75).6 Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. 
As Razif Bahari formulated it in “Remembering History,” the New Order, “used strategies both 
to suppress and to engender the past, that is, to arrest dissonance in the discourse of history as 
well as to assert continuity between the glories of Orde Baru prosperity and stability and the 
continued development of the modern nation-state that it purportedly ensured” (64).  The New 
Order objective was not, strictly speaking, just the preservation of a static society. Rather the 
elusive vision was a singular vector of progress – fixed identities, fixed languages, and fixed 
allocations of power, all traveling along a smooth continuum of economic advancement. To the 
extent that the New Order succeeded in securing one or of the other of these elements (rigidity of 
language, say, or formal maintenance of the nuclear-paternal family),
7
 it never accomplished the 
sum of its ambition. Yet in its drive to inoculate the population against the very possibility of 
change, Suharto’s government faithfully maintained its colonial legacy. 
The fall of the Suharto government in 1998 allowed for the public expression of 
previously foreclosed historical curiosity. Elements of the long-standardized national history 
became subject to fresh review. Contemporary Indonesians evince a vast appetite for change. 
The public fetish of pembangunan (development) has been supplanted in the yearning for 
                                                             
6
 Steedly castes a sharp gaze on both the New Order fantasy of development and stasis alike. Fixing the past as a 
static object of commemoration is imagined as a constitutive element of the future delivery of economic 
advancement. The passage from which the above quotation is drawn is worth citing at some length: 
Pembangunan (“development”), the New Order’s special mantra and its symbolic alternative to the 
uncontrolled and therefore destructive forces of politik, links the stability of “nothing happening” with the 
desirable national goal of economic progress. In the official rhetoric of the New Order, social stability is a 
prerequisite for orderly infrastructural transformation; the “directed” economic changes of pembangunan in 
turn promise to make national stability a future reality…New Order history is thus not so much a matter of 
events as of memorial. Election, anniversaries, monuments, museums, tombs, the monthly tujuhbelasan 
(“seventeenth”) commemoration of Indonesia’s August 17, 1945 declaration of independence—these 
endless spectacles and simulations of the Age of Development—are replicas of imaginary mileposts on the 
teleological Road to Order-Without End (75).  
7
 See, for an elaboration of this argument, Saskia Wieringa’s article, “The Birth of the New Order State in Indonesia: 
Sexual Politics and Nationalism.” 
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perubahan (change): and here we can see the desire for changes to occur, without necessarily 
supplying a subject and object for those changes. At the same time, dense suspicions about the 
attainability of “change,” in either configuration, pervade public discourse, expressing an earned 
cynicism reflecting the dubious prospects of agentive political activism. Yet despite the yearning 
for change, the same stories continue to be told. Flipping open the pages of a middle school 
history textbook, published “post-Reformasi,” I am struck by the claim that, “the people’s 
suffering under Japanese occupation for three and a half years was almost the same as the 
suffering under Dutch colonialism for three and a half centuries” (Prawoto, 11).8 The oft-
repeated rhetorical flourish of Soekarno has become canonical, a veritable state-sanctioned fact. 
In the face of such relentless cultural and historiographical dogma, it is unsurprising that 
Indonesians cast wide nets, beyond the reaches of the archipelago, in their search for sources of 
meaningful change. This, too, is not new: incorporating outside elements in dynamic 
reconfigurations of self and society is a long-standing practice, whether we start from Hindu 
kingdoms, the crucible of Islam or the pressure of a colonial state. It has only ever been partially 
managed by those aspiring to govern.   
A Litany of Change 
  This project is a story about change: who can perform it, how it is accomplished and 
what it means. Islam looms large in this telling. It was against the specter of Islam that the Dutch 
first mobilized the knowledge-making apparatuses of colonial rule (Chapter 1). This took place 
in the aftermath of the Diponegoro War (1825-1830), a bitter conflict that pitted vast swathes of 
Javanese society against a sliver of the native hierarchy and their Dutch allies. Mobilized, in part, 
                                                             
8
 “Penderitaan rakyat di bawah pendudukan Jepang selama tiga setengah tahun hampir sama dengan penderitaan di 
bawah penjajahan Belanda selama tiga setengah abad.” This ninth grade history textbook opens the discussion of the 
Japanese occupation with the conventional narrative: “the warm reception of the people towards the Japanese swiftly 
changed once it was known that the Japanese were the same as the Dutch” [sambutan baik rakyat kepada Jepang 
segara berubah setelah tahu bahwa Jepang sama dengan Belanda] (11).    
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by a project of Islamic renewal, the forces led by Prince Diponegoro were nearly victorious. 
Terrified of a similar eruption, Dutch colonial governance had at least two related motivations: to 
thwart the possibility of uprising and to maximize the extractive potential of their colonial 
holdings. Javanology and the Cultivation System (cultuurstelsel) comprise important elements of 
this twinned legacy.
9
 The Natives were brought into a globalized economy through rents secured 
by Dutch stewardship (ignoring the massive history of trade that predated European colonial 
expansion) at the same time as ossified and passive “culture” was carefully ascribed to the now-
subject population. Preserving this hard-won stability meant the neutralization of Islam, initially 
misinterpreted relative the imagined influence of the Ottoman Empire, itself understood in the 
shadow of the Dutch experience with the Catholic Church.
10
 For a long time, the Dutch didn’t 
need to know much to about Islam except its incomplete hold on the lives of the Natives. Buried 
in this characterization was the dark fear that Islam had already taken root in the souls of the 
subject, and together these possibilities comprise the all/nothing thesis of Dutch colonial 
scholarship.
11
  
When the Cultivation System gave way to the “Association Theory,” dramatized so 
adeptly in Pramoedya Ananta Toer's Bumi Manusia (This Earth of Mankind), the sudden interest 
in “associating” with natives was in the context of an emerging understanding of Islam.12 The 
                                                             
9
 See Kenji Tsuchiya’s “Javanology and the Age of Ranggawarsita” for an excellent introduction to the creation of 
the category of Javanese culture in this context. For its enduring postcolonial salience (especially as a totem of 
political quietism), see John Pemberton’s On the Subject of “Java.” 
10
 For an excellent history that rolls back some of the received wisdom on Dutch toleration and Protestantism alike, 
see Charles Parker’s Faith on the Margins.  
11
 This is precisely Nancy Florida’s argument in “Writing Traditions.” Setting the terms at the outset of the article, 
Florida observes, “Colonial scholarship on ‘the Javanese’ was thus often propelled by a desire to penetrate the 
private, inner recesses of native subjects in order to observe the presupposed falsity of these subjects’ Moslem 
claims and professions” (187).  
12
 Pramoedya credits much of the impetus behind the Association Theory to Snouck Hurgronje, but tends to obscure 
the significance of Islam in this story, for reasons probably reflective of his own strong humanist orientation. 
Hurgronje’s influence is taken up explicitly here, in chapter 1. For an Indonesian scholar’s discussion of Bumi 
Manusia in light of this history, see Yohanes Hartadi’s “The Colonial Doubling, or the Challenge for Colonial 
Authority." 
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Association Theory recognized, pace the post-Diponegoro maintenance of rust en orde, that 
change was coming to the Indies. If key Native elites could be enlisted in projects authorized by 
the wisdom of the Netherlands intelligentsia, perhaps the coming changes could be channeled in 
ways that presented a minimum of disruption. Coupled with a dawning sense of a moral 
responsibility for civilizational uplift, this theory gave birth to the “Ethical Policy” (Ethische 
Politiek), which theoretically obtained through the end of Dutch colonial rule (Ricklefs, 183-84; 
Vickers, 17-18). Islam was the fulcrum on which the changing policies towards change shifted. 
The great insight of Snouck Hurgronje was that Islam, of itself, might portend only individual 
(and thus harmless, interior, personal) transformation. Supporting a richer embrace of Islam, for 
Snouck, was the first step on setting the natives along a course of secular disenchantment. His 
argument, according to Harry Benda in “Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje,” was that the state’s 
tolerance could plant the seeds that would eventually blossom into Islam’s political and cultural 
irrelevancy. Instead of thwarting all things Muslim, the Netherlands East Indies government 
might cultivate ever greater Muslim devotional character amongst the Natives: that their Islam 
might be a tool of their pacification.
13
 Of course, only so long as the fundamental 
political/religious distinction could be honored. Divorced from this-worldly affairs, the colony 
was to be closed to the social imaginings encouraged within the Islamic tradition.   
 The establishment of a government agency directed towards administering religion, and 
above all Islam, was a culmination of the theories and policies flowing through the Indies at the 
end of the nineteenth and the outset of the twentieth century. Snouck Hurgronje’s first 
                                                             
13
 Snouck Hurgronje’s role in this is discussed in Eric Tagliacozzo’s The Longest Journey, a text directed to the 
history of Southeast Asians and the Hajj pilgrimage. Hurgronje is also the central character in Michael Laffan’s The 
Makings of Indonesian Islam, part of a dyadic Geertz-Hurgronje pairing that Laffan sees as key to the authorship of 
an “Indonesian” Islam.  See also Azyumardi Azra’s Islam in the Indonesian World for an account that also features 
prominent indigenous experts. This history also sets the stage for Luthfi Assyaukanie’s Islam and the Secular State 
in Indonesia. 
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government posting in the Netherlands East Indies, in 1889, was as an advisor for Arab and 
Islamic Affairs – a role his years in the Arab peninsula (1884-86) had left him well equipped to 
fulfill. Following his successful sojourn in Aceh, he became the Advisor in the Office for Arab 
and Native affairs (Kantoor voor Inlandsche en Arabische Zaken), an 1898 revision of the prior 
bureaucratic entity that became the Office of Native Affairs following Snouck Hurgronje’s return 
to the Netherlands in 1907.
14
 This office, in another incarnation, persists to the present. It is part 
of a vehicle for the maintenance of the categorizing impulse fully manifested in post-Ethical 
Policy colonialism. The contemporary Ministry of Religion (Kementerian Agama) is ceaselessly 
forced to enunciate the proper boundaries of religion and culture.
15
 Inheritor to the colonial 
project of religious management, the Ministry todays directs the bulk of its policies towards 
Islam. As the administrative unit tasked with ensuring the stable operation of religion as a 
category (and culture as religion’s “other”), the Ministry of Religion continues to influence how 
Islam is expressed in the public sphere and inculcated in educational institutions. The 
government is still in the business of channeling and directing religious aspiration, today bending 
the appetite for change along a nationalist arc. Massive shifts in the political orientation of 
successive administrations have meant little, in practice, for the ambit of the Ministry’s 
ministrations.   
The outline I have traced for this story of religious management, in its gross contours, is 
of course open to the criticism of being overdrawn. Here I recall Ann Stoler's insight late 
                                                             
14
 See especially Chapters 3 and 4 of Michael Laffan’s Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia for the full 
details of Snouck’s work at the helm of this office, as well as the result of his time in Jeddah. See also Howard 
Federspiel in Sultans, Shamans and Saints, for a particularly innocuous read of this office – “the office undertook 
studies designed to reveal the needs of various Muslim populations under Dutch control and give advice on 
upgrading the general welfare of those populations” (100). According to Federspiel, the dark machinations attributed 
to the office are mostly nationalist fantasy, since it really proved to be a temporizing influence on the more starkly 
anti-Islamic motivations of other colonial actors. This despite it acknowledged role in the intellectual enterprise of 
more fully categorizing and controlling the native population.    
15
 See Myengkyo Seo’s State Management of Religion in Indonesia.  
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in Carnal Knowledge, ascribed to colonial regimes but just as pertinent to their post-colonial 
inheritors:  
Colonial regimes were uneven, imperfect, and even indifferent knowledge-acquiring 
machines. Omniscience and omnipotence were not, as we so readily assume, their 
defining goals. More important, they were part of what I have called “taxonomic states,” 
whose administrations were charged with defining and interpreting what constituted 
racial membership, citizenship, political subversion, and the scope of the state’s 
jurisdiction over morality. (206). 
 
Stoler is interested in the manifold operations of this taxonomic impulse, but above all she 
understands the state’s jurisdiction over morality insofar as it consists of regulating sex, 
sexualities and bodies. For present purposes, however, the categorizing enterprise extends into 
moral reaches beyond bodies and the mingling of their parts. Exigencies of rule demanded that 
the colonial regime come to know the moral stature of its subjects, and just as importantly, 
regulate the moral inputs that were understood to galvanize those subjects’ actions. These efforts, 
in turn, have continued throughout the various configurations of postcolonial governance.  
The taxonomic operations of the state described by Stoler (and the structures that will be 
traced in Chapter 1 of this work) have served vital socio-political functions throughout history: 
The colonial regime had to teach itself to recognize religion or risk its irrational eruption. Islamic 
rebellion in Java was a harsh educator. And this task was hardly consigned to the past with the 
advent of indigenous rule. From the outset, the independent Indonesian state enrolled itself in the 
diligent demarcation of religion and culture, morality and politics, private rectitude and public 
admonitions. Receiving the categorizing baton from its colonial predecessors, the machinery of 
modern Indonesia maintained the legacy of definitional and divisional labor. Yet, like its 
forebears, in these regards its efforts were always “uneven, imperfect, and even indifferent.” Just 
as quickly as social forms were stabilized, the subjects constituted within these forms set 
themselves to re-arranging their constituent elements. The story that follows is thus never really 
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a tale of equilibrium. Animating changes have continued to emerge from within the very 
categories so assiduously stabilized by Dutch and Indonesian discourse alike. 
The history I have darted through above forms the conceptual background for a project 
that is, at its heart, insistently local and particular. This macro-history generates and constrains 
the possibilities for moral activism in contemporary Indonesia, in ways both hidden and exposed. 
My attentions will next turn from historical narratives to discrete manifestations of the profound 
desire for moral transformation found in an organization known as Initiatives of Change. The 
roots of this organization in Indonesia date to at least the 1950s. However changing political 
orders brought the formal exclusion of Initiatives of Change’s prior incarnation: the Moral Re-
Armament movement, outlawed in the twilight of Soekarno’s rule. Early in the post-Suharto 
years, President Abdurrahman Wahid lifted the ban on the Moral Re-Armament movement, 
allowing its successor organization (Initiatives of Change Indonesia) back into the country. 
Examining how this “foreign” organization was taken up, localized, and Islamized (Chapter 2) 
provides an initial introduction to shifting configurations of the concept of change. The kinds of 
change attempted within Initiatives of Change Indonesia rely on careful linguistic maneuvers that 
protect Islam from the possibility of corruption, while enabling Muslims to avail themselves of 
non-Islamic technologies. Their operation is best understood in the context of changing legal and 
administrative possibilities in post-New Order Indonesia. At Initiatives of Change Indonesia, 
Christian practice is rendered morally neutral and rhetorically available for Muslim personal 
transformation – despite the well-policed boundaries that should prevent this from happening.   
The further unfolding of this legacy regarding Initiatives of Change Indonesia is where 
Stoler’s taxonomic states meet the purifying impulse of modernity so central to Webb Keane’s 
Christian Moderns. Keane elaborates how a notion of efficacy or agency becomes recognizable 
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and isolated, a process Keane refers to as, “the sorting out of proper relations among, and 
boundaries between, words, things, and subjects” (4). A semiotic ideology is what allows for this 
sorting, as well as the sorted form. In this attention to “proper relations,” Keane has an 
unexpected ally in the Islamic notion of adab (Chapter 3), which can be understood as fulfilling 
a metapragmatic role. The “right relations” of adab, an insight linked to my observations of 
sociality at Initiatives of Change Indonesia, allow for different kinds of change from those that 
might be attributed to other models of agentive action. Adab allows for the hierarchal ordering of 
existence at the same time as it facilitates the negotiation of competing ethical injunctions. 
Notions of adab help explain plural models of Muslim sociality that are, I will argue, obscured in 
the recent scholarly emphasis of piety: although all relationships may ultimately point to the 
Divine, their local rights and responsibilities are still highly significant.     
Related politics of translation, adaptation and assimilation run through the practices and 
curriculum of the Kahfi Motivator School, an innovative institution that teaches public speaking, 
Islamic hypnotherapy and motivational practice, all free of charge. Despite the very different 
models of change advocated within this institution, there is a related flexibility in re-assembling 
the ostensibly purified categories of discourse. A particular kind of dynamism is especially 
evident concerning the practice of Islamic Hypnotherapy (Chapter 4). Here the story the west 
used to tell about itself (objective, scientific, morally neutral, secular) becomes an instrumentally 
vital story for the successful appropriation of hypnotherapeutic practice. The foreign is 
domesticated precisely through the epistemic neutrality ascribed to western technologies of inter- 
and intrapersonal change. In the course of assimilation, broadly salient patterns of guilt and 
redemption are used to anchor the featured technologies of change to their new audiences. This 
affective association furthers the degree to which knowledge and practice feel meaningfully 
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possessed by their new community. The process at work at Kahfi highlights the extent to which 
the policing of boundaries in the dominant forms of the Islamic tradition in Indonesia are 
concerned, above all, with preventing the misattribution of agency and misrecognition of origins 
– not in blocking the influence of the foreign. 
Islamic hypnotherapy represents a successful localization—and Islamization—of a 
technology of change. The theories of efficacy embedded in this practice resist the ready 
interpretation of globalized liberal subjectivity. The complexity of this agentive landscape comes 
into sharper relief by shifting from the study of hypnotherapy, as taught at the Kahfi Motivator 
School, to the concept of “motivasi” organizing motivational practice at the same institution 
(Chapter 5). The variety of selves convened in self-help discourses demonstrate the enduring 
desire to be changed, as much as to change oneself. Motivasi, in its Indonesian particulars, also 
carries a threatening potential concerning how it imagines collectivity. As I shall argue, whether 
mobilized by motivasi or exclusivist religio-political claims, Indonesian ideas of collective 
efficacy rely on the (post-1965) available model – the military. How we understand the 
widespread adoption of a militarized aesthetic, however, deserves the same caution with which 
we greet the seeming superficiality of self-help discourses: the uniforms and pageantry betray a 
complicated assemblage, an organizational aspiration not reducible to the violence of its 
borrowed social and sartorial framework. This final argument, an appeal to perplexity in the face 
of the too familiar, animates the ethnographic anecdote closing this project (Afterward).  
Accessing Change 
 As I claimed at the outset, this undertaking began as a study of history and 
historiography. Eventually, in place of “history,” moral transformations, ethical interventions, 
and efficacious change coalesced as the new center of gravity for my research. The exploration 
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of these phenomena was spurred by my partial assimilation into two communities located near 
my institutional perch at the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. The Kahfi 
Motivator School and Initiatives of Change Indonesia proved to be vital arenas for my 
introduction to the complex matrices shaping moral and social reform in contemporary 
Indonesia. In both organizations, the generous welcome of the membership enabled the 
observations that became the heart of this project.      
 Although the vogue for boilerplate disclaimers concerning positionality has largely 
elapsed, unmourned, I nevertheless feel compelled to partially revive this late twentieth-century 
scholarly convention. The arguments I make in this project are inextricably bound up in the 
configurations of access and participation that were available to me – and the “me” of this 
project was a moving target. If this is always already the case, it was still poignantly so within 
the communities convened at Kahfi Motivator School and Initiatives of Change Indonesia. I am 
cognizant of my role within the processes I identify, not just during the term of my fieldwork, 
but as I have maintained many of the relationships formed during that time. I didn’t just study 
how people conceive of change – to a considerable extent, I offered myself as the subject of 
change in concert with the transformations attempted by my interlocutors.  
As a married, white, male, foreigner, and especially as an American, I was imagined to 
bring certain innate qualities to each of these communities. At Initiatives of Change Indonesia it 
was assumed that I carried a native fluency in humanist and pluralist logics, both ideological 
positions heavily identified with dunia barat (the western world) in contemporary Indonesia. 
Initiatives of Change Indonesia positioned its moral work within a framework of pluralist values 
and so I was frequently asked to be a representative of those discourses, however ineptly. At the 
same time, I represented instant diversity. To the extent that an argument applied to me, it could 
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be assumed to be universal, given how fundamentally different I was imagined to be from my 
Indonesian acquaintances.  
At Kahfi Motivator School, the culturally specific models of sociality (especially 
assertiveness) affiliated with gaya barat (western style) were understood to be important 
elements of the discipline of public speaking. The related dispositions were automatically 
ascribed to me by dint of my whiteness and native use of English (it helps that I am also, already, 
loud and brash). Thus I was presumed not to be afraid of appearing angkuh (arrogant; 
overbearing) or sombong (inexcusably proud; aloof; mistakenly superior). To be white was 
already to be sombong – the least I could provide from such a vantage was insight into the 
effective registers of persuasive speech. The skills taught at Kahfi Motivator School demanded 
that the students re-examine privileged manners and etiquette. As the bearer of western norms, I 
was a ready and repeated example for my fellow students. I constituted both a subject and an 
object of lessons concerning efficacious public address. At the same time, my whiteness opened 
the doors to the institution, drew me to the front of the class, and ensured that, if nothing else, I 
would be heard.   
 In a project addressed to moral transformation, my own piecemeal awakening deserves at 
least passing mention. Over the course of conducting fieldwork I was changed in moral terms 
both meaningful and legible to those around me. As my religious dispositions became coherently 
Muslim, I came to constitute a different sort of lesson for audiences in both organizations. Now, 
not only was I the elite foreigner, but I was also a proof of the tradition. The power and appeal of 
Islam was imagined to be manifest in my formal entrance into the tradition – although this 
process of conversion had probably begun many years prior to my fieldwork with my first 
sustained exposure to classical Sufi literature. My new identification as a Muslim was easily 
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assimilated into the stories about Islam and moral suasion that circulated within Kahfi Motivator 
School.
16
 At Initiatives of Change, however, this was a more vexing development. If my 
presence before guaranteed a root minimum of diversity, in these new terms that diversity would 
demand separate enunciation. What did it mean, in an organization committed to religious 
pluralism, to witness a conversion to the internally dominant religious identity? We never really, 
collectively, answered that question. Even after the initial concern had been obviated – that 
becoming Muslim necessarily set me on course for an ardent Salafi position – a sense of unease 
persisted. For many Initiatives of Change Indonesia members my conversion narrative worked as 
the same sort of proof it was imagined to be at Kahfi Motivator School. But for some of the 
senior leadership I was now suspect: this was not the kind of moral awakening they envisioned in 
their proselytization efforts. Initiatives of Change could advocate interfaith moral renewal 
precisely because it didn’t encourage anyone to cross acknowledged boundaries of religiosity. 
Conversion threatened this status quo, since it of course also suggested out-conversion, a 
particularly fraught subject for Muslims in Indonesia. Probably as a result of these changes, my 
interactions within the organization began to skew towards the younger membership. Fewer of 
these newer members had grappled with the complexities of the organization’s own history as 
detailed in Chapter 2, below. This changing social location is ultimately reflected in my 
argument: I look at how the Christian genealogy of Initiatives of Change is negotiated in 
language and practice, but not really how it is discussed, since I was no longer included in those 
discussions.  
 I approached this project with the disciplinary posture of a historian despite the ample 
baggage of literary studies I carried from my formal training. My first thoughts were almost 
                                                             
16
 “Welcome to my everything,” one acquaintance proclaimed, exuberantly,  in English, greeting the news of my 
conversion..  
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always, and summarily, wrong. Years of anthropological reading had provided not a whit of 
ethnographic training. The bumbling, in time, became the method. I was relentlessly educated 
and re-educated, hailed by one set of ethical imperatives only to be upbraided for my ignorance 
of competing norms. At Initiatives of Change Indonesia, I presented materials on subjects I was 
familiar with, but I also enrolled in the Youth Camp as a neophyte participant. At Kahfi 
Motivator School I performed white male oratorical privilege, but I also spent multiple nights, 
weekly, duly recording the lectures of Om Bagus. I wasn’t an average member and I couldn’t be 
a typical student. Thankfully my arguments do not rely on assuming those subjectivities.  
My approach to these materials has been shaped by the work of my mentors – including 
those whose own work extends to shores well removed from Indonesia. At the outset of The 
Politics of Mourning in Early China, Miranda Brown sets forth her methodology in terms I 
would like to largely borrow here: “because language is not a transparent vehicle of meaning, 
and the past simply does not await recovery through a straightforward reading of sources, I will 
lavish much attention on the language of my sources, their provenance, and their 
interpretation…in actual practice, this means quoting rather than paraphrasing my sources so as 
to allow competing readings sufficient room to shape my story” (6). In several places, 
particularly as it pertains to the assimilation of “foreign” knowledge into the practices 
disseminated at Kahfi Motivator School and Initiatives of Change Indonesia, I will similarly 
expend much ink. The point is less a celebration of linguistic particularity and more an 
attentiveness to the multiple meanings present in particular articulations, a common-place fact 
rendered all the more important when it transpires against the shifting horizons of multiple 
languages. For this reason I ask the readers indulgence in places where the varied senses of key 
terms may seem a bit belabored.  
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   Throughout the ebbs and flows of my involvement with the two organizations introduced 
in these pages, I was also an active participant in the Universitas Islam Negeri community. 
Formally hosted by the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture, then under the able 
leadership of Dr. Irfan Abubakar, I nevertheless spent a disproportionate amount of time in the 
International Office at the administrative center of the campus. In exchange for office space I 
offered off-the-cuff translation services – which proved to be a useful way to ingratiate myself. 
The faculty and staff who peopled the International Office proved to be such gracious hosts that 
it was difficult to move on from their hospitality. As a result of that time well-spent, some of 
their thoughts have become incorporated in this material – in one case, in a recorded interview, 
but mainly through my liberal borrowings from their perspectives on my preliminary 
observations. In this way, even as I collected data, I tried to subject my analyses to the scrutiny 
of the people described within them, as well as to their peers from overlapping communities. I 
haven’t tried to import, wholesale, the narratives offered at either Initiatives of Change Indonesia 
or the Kahfi Motivator School. But my hope is that when my acquaintances from those 
institutions read this document, they will find a representation of their communities that is 
critical, charitable, and recognizable.  
Parting Remarks   
By way of closing this introduction, I want to anticipate the major arguments of the 
following pages. I list these in roughly reverse order to how they will appear in the text itself. 
The first is my sharp disagreement with the interpretative dominance of neo-liberalism. The 
partial and incomplete triumph of a certain globalized economic order need not be relentlessly 
re-inscribed as the “real” of so many discrete social and cultural phenomena. Against this 
conceptual crutch I will advocate a return to particularistic analyses that take seriously the 
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internal motivations others ascribe to their activities. Thus I see “motivasi” as not merely an 
ideological supplement to late capitalism (which remains one viable possibility), but it also as 
part of the surviving faith in the efficacy of language and the differential capacity of individuals 
to mark the souls and beings of others. My second argument concerns the over-representation of 
“piety” in current literature addressed to Islam. The corrective that piety once offered has 
become instead an obstacle to recognizing the existence and operation of other social and ethical 
obligations. Thus I will suggest that the term “adab” allows some of these other moral arguments 
back into scholarly frames. Mirroring parts of this project back to me, one critic characterized 
this orientation as an attention to “surfaces rather than depths.” This strikes me as apt – “adab” 
invites some of the natural ethical weight of social surfaces into discussions of the Islamic 
tradition. Rightly relating is not simply a matter of manners, it is the fulfillment of overriding 
Islamic imperatives: to be merciful and to be just.  
Throughout the dissertation I will attend to an argument that makes it appearance early in 
the second chapter. This concerns the rhetorical availability of discourse – the ways in which 
presumed moral neutrality makes ideas, knowledge and practice accessible to new audiences. 
Whether cast in terms of profane language or the amoral character of science, this framing is one 
way the contemporary Muslims (and indeed, their intellectual ancestors) incorporate new 
elements into the tradition. This kind of instrumental secularity deserves careful distinction from 
the political projects of secularism that seek to assert a related neutrality as the fundamental 
epistemological grounds for public discourse. In my research, amoral western science is nested 
within Muslim projects that locate the divine on all horizons. My first, and thus final, argument 
will be about historical continuity – the lasting impress of Dutch colonialism on the postcolonial 
state’s definition and management of religion. If this last story has been the best told by others 
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before me, it nevertheless provides the vital context for the rapid emergence and tremendous 
draw of the moral renewal movements at the center of my writing. Conceptual possibility, 
alongside legislative reform, allowed for the enunciation of groups like IofC and Kahfi in the 
aftermath of the New Order regime. Taken together, these four arguments will comprise the 
substance of my intervention into existing scholarship. On one final occasion I assume 
responsibility for the infelicities of their articulation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Chapter 1 
Managing Change: Islam, the Dutch and Postcolonial Indonesia 
Openings 
This chapter is addressed to the back story, as it were, of the Indonesian state’s 
relationship to Islam. Different tendrils of this story reach deep into the history of Islam in the 
archipelago and reflect social and philosophical developments unfolding on independent, if 
intersecting, global trajectories. In the face of such a complex web of relations, I chart a humble 
course: here I consign myself to an analysis of several shifts that exert an outsized influence on 
contemporary Indonesian possibilities, particularly as they pertain to Islamically-guided moral 
projects. Thus I highlight the years on either side of the Diponegoro War (1825-30), pursuing an 
understanding of the conflict’s impact on the formation of the colonial regime and attendant 
scholarship addressed to Islam. Next I revisit the “pacification” of Aceh (1873-1914, although 
pockets of resistance persisted past that point), a point of entry into the high colonial regime 
organized beneath the paternalistic philosophy of the Ethical Policy (1901). From here I skip past 
the formation of the early nationalist movement (important if well-charted terrain), focusing 
instead on the Dutch response to the mobilization of Islam during the Indonesian Revolutionary 
War (1945-49). Shifting from colonial regimes to postcolonial orders, I look at the formal place 
of religion in the newly independent state, as reflected in the official state ideology (Pancasila). 
Reviewing the changing political prospects of Islam during the New Order, I bracket this 
discussion with a detour into the legal status one of the organizations at the center of this study 
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(Initiatives of Change, previously Moral Re-Armament Movement).  I arrive finally at the 
conceptual terrain governing contemporary efforts to manage religion and its social potentials – a 
foundation, of sorts, for the ethnographic accounts that follow.   
I argue that the set of constraints within which contemporary Indonesian Muslims 
imagine personal, social, and moral efficacy are shaped by the above history, understood in 
concert with broad global currents of economic and political possibility. My contribution here is 
to see how a particular model of change (personal, non-structural) came to predominate in 
Indonesia. That model, I argue, has been extensively shaped by state-level interventions into the 
religious lives of the archipelago’s inhabitants. The genealogy of this concept, I contend, extends 
back well beyond postcolonial politics into the formative moments of Dutch colonialism. These 
continuities continue to exert significant influence in structuring the horizons of personal and 
social change. The observation that Islam manifests, in part, the impress of a particular colonial 
regime is hardly unique to my argument (Michal Laffan in The Makings of Indonesian Islam; 
Yudi Latif in Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power; and Nico Kaptein in Islam, 
Colonialism and the Modern Age all provide good places to start along this path). Rather than 
recapitulate that line of reasoning, my aim here is to trace how “change,” emanating from Islam, 
has been managed through successive political orders in the archipelago.   
“Change” is the organizing principle for two moral improvement organizations that 
comprise the heart of my larger study (Initiatives of Change Indonesian and Kahfi Motivator 
School). Both of these institutions emerged in the particular political and cultural climate that 
followed the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998. This context is essential for understanding 
the scope of their operations, the reach of their ambitions and the nature of their practices. A 
major element of the reforms inaugurated in the Reformasi era (the period following the 
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resignation of Suharto on May 21, 1998) was the relaxation (or at least, revision) of regulations 
governing the formation of political, social and religious organizations. These regulations were 
accretions dating not just to the New Order of Suharto, but to the “Old Order” of Soekarno, and 
before that, Dutch colonial administration. Despite the executive and legislative reforms of the 
post-Suharto era, for the modern Indonesian state, “religion” remains a force requiring careful 
management. The theories of religion that inform Indonesian governmental strategy are heavily 
indebted to the theories employed by their Dutch colonial predecessors. Islam, for reasons both 
demographic and orientalist, figures most prominently in the state management of religion. 
Before examining the contemporary conditions that frame the possibilities for moral renewal 
movements, it is useful to reflect back on the historical legacy that has done so much to shape the 
legal and cultural landscape within which they formed. Along with its criminal code and 
religiously administered family law, Indonesia inherited a peculiar tunnel vision from Dutch 
colonialism. This was a fundamental inability to recognize Islam as anything but one of two 
administrative possibilities: a lurking, omnipresent (and largely invisible) threat; or a superficial 
veneer masking deeper cultural truths: a false-consciousness easily manipulated in pursuit of 
more real aims.
17
 This sharp divide is maintained even as the state embraces all sorts of Muslim 
performances, whether to bolster its popular legitimacy or out of actual conviction. The 
management of Islam has been remarkably continuous, although the state ideological location of 
the tradition has been subject to massive revisions. For hopefully transparent reasons, I refer to 
this as the all/nothing hypothesis. For a richer understanding of this stark binary, I turn first to a 
crystalizing moment in the colonial encounter: the Diponegoro War.    
                                                             
17
 For the recognition of the stark terms of this divide, I am indebted to Nancy Florida in “Writing Traditions.” 
There Florida introduces a line of reasoning key to the argument in the next section of this chapter: that the 
Diponegoro War was the inauguration of politically motivated scholarship on Islam in the Netherlands East Indies. 
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The Long Shadow of Prince Diponegoro
18
 
 In the eighteenth century, the Dutch presence on the island of Java assumed new political 
significance. Whereas earlier the Dutch had been one trading force among many, during this 
period they began to consolidate direct control over increasingly large swathes of territory. A 
royal succession battle in the Islamic kingdom of Mataram left sovereignty splintered between 
two (and eventually three) forces. The Dutch, partially responsible for the ensuing chaos but still 
alert to the opportunity, intervened and brokered first the Treaty of Giyanti (1755) and then the 
Treaty of Salatiga (1757). The first of these treaties established two parallel sultanates, one in 
Surakarta and one in Yogyakarta. The Treaty of Salatiga further divided the Surakarta Court, 
carving out the new independent principality of Mankunegara (Ricklefs A Modern History, 129; 
Florida Writing The Past, 27; Andaya and Andaya A History, 257-8). Into this uneasy détente, 
the convulsive history of Western Europe intervened. First the long faltering Dutch East India 
Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) finally collapsed, pressured by the 
British and first nationalized by the Dutch Batavian Republic in 1796, then fully absorbed by the 
Republic in 1800.
19
 Thus just as indigenous political institutions were neutered, the “private” 
operation of colonialism became a state enterprise. After Napoleon Bonaparte swallowed up the 
Batavian Republic in 1806, a new Governor General was dispatched to the Indies. Herman 
Willem Daendals, serving in this capacity from 1808-1811, revolutionized the relationship 
between Dutch colonists and their native subjects (Carey Power of Prophecy, xi). It was a short, 
                                                             
18
 Throughout this section, except in verbatim quotations, I employ the current Indonesian orthography, thus writing 
“Diponegoro.” Old Dutch sources use “Diepo Negoro,” and due to different orthographic conventions other sources 
use “Dipanegara” and “Dipanagara” (open “A” vowels are vocalized as “O” in Javanese). All of these naming 
conventions obscure, somewhat, the fact that “Diponegoro” is a title rather than a personal name. Prince Diponegoro 
was given the birth name Bendera Raden Mas Mustahar (Carey Power, 69). He was next Raden Mas Antawirya. He 
came to be called Diponegoro only in the course of the eponymous war.  
19
 This synoptic history replicates the conventional account. Recent scholarship by E.M. Jacobs, published as 
Merchants in Asia, points to more local factors in the decline of the VOC, relating to the Asian spice trade as well as 
competition with the British in India. In either event, transfer of authority from the VOC to the Dutch state ushered 
in the dawn of a new colonial order, fully realized in the aftermath of the Diponegoro War.  
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brutal, reign, now incorporated in independent Indonesian historiography as a foundational 
national trauma. 
 The Napoleonic Wars provided a pretext for the British to launch an assault on Dutch 
holdings in Java. Sweeping to a swift victory in 1811, Thomas Stamford Raffles was installed as 
the Governor General. Departing from both the monopolistic trade orientation of the VOC and 
the short-lived economic rationalization of Daendels, Raffles initiated a project to know the 
inhabitants of Java, to better maximize the economic potential of the island.
20
 Published in two 
volumes shortly after the end of his tenure in 1815, The History of Java (1817) set a high mark 
for subsequent colonial knowledge production. Early in the second volume Raffles describes the 
relationship between his Dutch predecessors and the “Mahomedan natives.” Raffles first 
examines the impact of the Hajj pilgrimage on Javanese life, focusing on the institution that had 
most troubled colonial officials. Raffles writes that, “Pilgrimages to Mecca are common....As 
soon, however, as the Dutch obtained a supremacy, they did all they could to check this practice, 
as well as the admission of Arab missionaries, and by the operation of the system of commercial 
monopoly which they adopted, succeeded pretty effectually” (3). In Raffles’s telling, a 
previously widespread practice of Muslim pilgrimage is thwarted through the commercial 
controls on shipping instituted by the Dutch. This substantiates both the involvement of the 
                                                             
20
 The gap between the British conduct of colonialism and the Dutch was especially large, according to 
contemporaneous British observers. An anonymous review of the French translation of F.V.A. de Steur’s memoir of 
his service during the Diponegoro War, published in Cochrane’s Foreign Quarterly Review in 1835, captures the 
British response to the Diponegoro War:  
The valuable work of Sir Stamford Raffles, only tended to increase the general regret, that so fair a 
possession which had derived immense benefit from the more judicious an enlightened system of 
administration under the British government, had been restored to its former masters, who, there was every 
reason to apprehend, would replace it under the same narrow system of colonial policy which had so long 
oppressed the inhabitants, and cramped the resources of the island, by rendering everything exclusively 
subservient to the interest of the mother country (220). 
The remainder of this review is given over to de Steur’s striking portrait of Diponegoro, followed by the Review 
author’s synopsis of his capture and exile, described in some detail: how Diponegoro delayed negotiations, until the 
end of Ramadan, and how the administration of de Kock respected that desire, only to capture him once the parlay 
began. 
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Javanese in major Islamic circuits and the beginning of a concerted Dutch effort to manage the 
implications of that participation.  
The Dutch interference in pilgrimage was part of a defensive posture towards a source of 
political, economic and social legitimacy that they were ill-equipped to understand. Despite 
blocking “the admission of Arab missionaries” and Javanese pilgrims, however, the Dutch did 
not yet have a coherent policy towards the tradition. Raffles comments on the ad hoc character of 
the Dutch management of Islam and the blocking of pilgrims: “it does not, however, appear that 
this arose from any desire to check the progress of Mahomedanism on Java, or that it was with 
any view to introduce the doctrines of Christianity, that they wished to cut off the 
communication with Mecca; their sole objects appear to have been the safety of their own power 
and the tranquility of the country” (3). The Dutch response to Islam prior to the Diponegoro War 
suggested a reactive experiment in isolating the economic subjects of their colonial activities. 
Instead of a comprehensive approach to the place of Islam within the lives of their subjects, the 
Dutch repression of the pilgrimage stemmed from the observation that “Mahomedan priests have 
been found most active in every case of insurrection” (Raffles, 3). Preventing insurrection, then, 
was simply a matter of limiting contact with the outside world. The traumatic encounter with 
Prince Diponegoro would change all this. Controlling access to other geographical centers of 
Islam would not be enough – the Dutch would have to first truly know the character of the 
colonial subject and parse her Javanese interior from her Muslim exterior.   
The Diponegoro War broke out nine years after the Dutch were returned to power in 
Java. It was a consuming conflict that devastated Central Java, grinding through an estimated 
200,000 Javanese casualties, along with a further 15,000 casualties on the part of the Dutch – 
including, of course, native soldiers from elsewhere in the archipelago (Carey, “Origins of the 
 
 
38 
 
Java War,” 52). The arrested dynastic struggle that had splintered the Mataram Kingdom set the 
backdrop. Referred to as the “Java War” in colonial historiography, here I use the Indonesian 
emphasis on Diponegoro to better reflect the key role of the prince. In short, the conflict was 
motivated by Diponegoro’s effort to re-unify the kingdom, expel the Dutch and restore authentic 
Islam to the island. He was aided by aristocrats chafing under Dutch taxation, Muslim scholars 
offended by the institution of European rule, and peasants either sharing in his religious 
conviction or obligated by the terms of their servitude to support him. In the first year, 
Diponegoro almost won. By 1827, however, the tide had turned. In November 1828, one of 
Diponegoro’s key allies, Kyai Mojo (an important Islamic scholar married to Diponegoro’s 
cousin, the daughter of Prince Mangkubumi) was induced to surrender (van der Kroef “Prince 
Diponegoro,” 447-8). With dwindling support Diponegoro fought a rearguard action, eventually 
captured in the course of negotiations with the Dutch commander Generaal Merkus de Kock in 
March, 1830. From there he was sent into exile far to the east, in Makassar.   
Prince Diponegoro was born in the new (post-Giyanti Treaty) kingdom of Yogyakarta in 
1785. He was not directly in line for the throne, as his mother was a royal concubine. In his 
youth, he was educated by Islamic scholars under the tutelage of his famous great-grandmother, 
Ratu Ageng Tegalreja. According to Peter Carey, citing Diponegoro’s own autobiography Babad 
Dipanagaran, his great-grandmother was “renowned…for her Islamic piety and the pleasure she 
took in reading religious texts, as well as her firm insistence on preserving traditional Javanese 
adat (customs) at court” (Power, 75). This unity, between “adat” and “Islam,” was unremarkable 
at the time of Diponegoro. Adat, in colonial scholarship, came to mean the “non-Islamic” 
customs that predominated in an area, a source of systematic rules or laws outside the dictates of 
Islam. Within the Islamic tradition, however, adat like ‘urf denotes customs or practices of an 
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area that can be a supplement to Islamic jurisprudence (in fact, in some jurisprudential tradition, 
adat would trump rulings derived from qiyas or analogy, although, of course, explicit scripture 
or hadith would always obtain).
21
 We will return to this distinction, adat and Islam, time and 
again as it became a core filter through which the Dutch attempted to sever colonial subjects 
from the threatening potentials ascribed to the Islamic tradition. Inoculating the colonies against 
change required that that the colonial subjects be unchanging themselves, static bearers of an 
ancient culture. The exclusion of Islamic dynamism came through the valorization of presumed 
adat essences.  
 In post-Independence Indonesian historiography, the Diponegoro War is seen as a heroic 
struggle against the fundamental illegitimacy of colonialism. In Dutch colonial scholarship, 
however, it was the last quixotic gasp of an old order. Justus van der Kroef’ imagined  
Diponegoro to be advocating a “program of national purification with [an] emphasis upon the 
distinctive Hindu-Mohammedan antecedents… as opposed to the ‘contamination’ of Western 
civilization, brought in the wake of more than three centuries of Dutch rule over the East Indian 
Archipelago” (“Prince Diponegoro,” 424). The “Hindu-Mohammedan” past, of course, became 
just the “Hindu” past in the scholarship undertaken immediate after the Diponegoro War (see 
Kenji Tsuchiya, “Javanology”). As Nancy Florida argues in “Writing Traditions,” the Dutch 
division between “Java” and “Islam” filtered out into indigenous knowledge practices as well. 
Writing about a “native” Javanologist working late in the nineteenth century, Padmasusastra, 
Edwin Wieringa describes the extent to which Padmasusastra had become inhabited by Dutch 
philological conventions: “Padmasusastra was following Dutch norms; he had not only adopted 
their literary norms by writing in prose and not, as was usual in Javanese discourse, in metres 
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 For a basic introduction to this argument, see Gideon Libson’s "On the Development of Custom as a Source of 
Law in Islamic Law." 
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(tembang), but also had taken over their taboos. The majority of nineteenth-century colonial 
philologists focused on classical Old Javanese literature, quite deliberately neglecting New 
Javanese Islamic texts” (“Ethnoknowledge and the Sea of Progress,” 223). Fifty years after the 
Diponegoro War, even Javanese scholars interpreting Javanese texts were beholden to the 
colonial distinction between authentic Java and foreign Islam. The relentless search for pre-
Islamic Java ran in parallel to the promotion of contemporaneous adat as an authorizing tradition 
capable of resisting Islam. This would remain the case until colonial policy was re-imagined at 
the dawn of the twentieth century.    
The outbreak of the Diponegoro War, reflecting economic grievances, cultural myopia 
(the ill-fated road planned atop Diponegoro’s ancestors’ burial site), and religious reformism 
introduced colonial administrators to the vast organizing reach of Islam amongst the inhabitants 
of Java. The tenacity of the Javanese forces, coupled with a diverse alliance that incorporated 
religious teachers, court aristocrats and peasant vassals, took the Dutch by surprise. Some later 
scholars address this conflagration dismissively. Harry Benda, in an otherwise excellent piece on 
the colonial administration of Islam, mentions in passing “though the so-called Java War was 
easily suppressed by the Dutch, village unrest, fanned by Muslim scribes, continued to plague 
the colonial government on Java” (“Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje,” 338). However, according to 
Nancy Florida in Writing the Past, “the year 1830 is, then, a watershed year in Javanese history, 
marking the final end of indigenous royal political power, the defeat of the last serious military 
challenge to Dutch authority on the island (prior to the Indonesian national revolution), and the 
beginning of high colonialism in Java” (56). Only long after the fact would Dutch administrators 
talk about an easy victory, a perspective then reflected in the work of Benda. In 1830, the 
significance of the war was immediate and obvious. Revisiting documents produced during the 
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war suggests the extent to which the colonial narrative of easy victory and non-Muslim subjects 
was a post-facto achievement.  
General Hendrik Merkus de Kock (1779-1845), the lieutenant Governor General during 
the Diponegoro War and the military commander who eventually captured the prince, was a 
prolific writer of letters and notes. In one letter in the extensive de Kock archive kept at the 
Nationaal Archief in the Hague, written late in the conflict (June 1829), de Kock writes to the 
Commissioner General of the Dutch East Indies. Occasioned by the death of a young Dutch 
Major General named Bischoff, who died from an illness unrelated to the war, de Kock took the 
opportunity to re-appraise his audience of his Javanese opponents. De Kock characterizes 
Diponegoro’s ability to galvanize the masses on the basis of an Islamic appeal:  
[Diponegoro] takes enlightened [wakkere, awake] and enterprising [ondernemende] 
Natives, often from the low classes [lagere Volksklasse] and elevates them to a lofty 
status, then [they] issue judgments. He has placed the ancient Javanese government 
[aloude Javasche Regering] and institutions under his dominion [allenheersching], so as 
to revive [herleven] them, and especially to glorify [verheerlijken] the Islamic teachings 
[Mahomedaansche leer], so as to give himself an image [schijn] of exemplary [voorbeel] 
steadfast compliance [nakoming] with Islamic law [voorschriften], to give inexorable 
[onverbiddeljike] strength to the hordes [krijgsbenden, martial gangs] that follow him. He 
thus has assured the cunning tarekat [Sufi orders, tarijken] and the fanatic priests a state 
to be achieved soon in the indefinite near future, here, as in all lands and all times, by 
great upheaval [groote beroeringen] that the crowd [welkemenigte] so readily prays for, 
including Dipo Negoro. (“Rapporten van de luitenant-gouverneur-generaal De Kock,” 5). 
     
There are several instructive elements of this account. The first is the social revolutionary aspect 
of Diponegoro’s wartime rule. Instead of through purely hereditary claims, Diponegoro elevates 
leaders on the basis of their Islamic bona fides, here referred to as their “awake” and 
“enterprising” character, which is to say, something like “merit.” Furthermore, this one short 
passage highlights several of the core elements of Diponegoro’s coalition – the “low classes,” the 
“fanatic priests” and the tarekat, or Sufi orders.  There is also the repeated identification of the 
“ancient Government” of Java with the Islamic tradition. This replicates Diponegoro’s rhetoric 
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without disputing it. Whatever the historical merits of this position, it is at a minimum clear that 
the combatants in the Diponegoro War did not see a distinction between Javanese royal and 
cultural patrimony and Muslim convictions.   
August Willem Philip Weitzel, a Dutch military officer and statesmen, drafted De Oorlog 
op Java van 1825 tot 1830 (“The War on Java from 1825 to 1830”), published in two volumes in 
1852 and 1853. A massive history of the conflict, it is assembled almost entirely from the notes 
of de Kock. One early passage, where de Kock characterizes Diponegoro, is worth reviewing 
precisely because it differs so greatly from the post-Diponegoro War Javanological standards of 
knowledge (the separation of adat and Islam, Java and Muslim). De Kock writes:  
Mangkoe-Boemie [Prince Mangkubumi, Diponegoro’s uncle] and Diepo-Negoro stood, 
as it were, directly opposed to the royal adviser and the Resident [highest ranking Dutch 
administrator in the area]. Although [Mangkoe-Boemie] was of gentle disposition [zacht 
van inborst] and weak character [zwak van karakter] he was pulled along by the 
unmistakable superiority [meerderheid, majority] of Diepo-negoro. This [superiority] 
followed from the Prince of the House of Mataram himself, more so than any of his 
generation; he was Javanese above all, and he cherished adat with the holiest reverence 
[heiligsten eerbied], and held the most intimate hatred [innigsten haat] for the conquerors 
of his fatherland. As a Muslim in his soul [ziel], he was zealous [ijverig] and fanatically 
believing [geloovig tot dweeper], and he carried his contempt with him, for all who 
thought differently, and he had revulsion [afkeer] for all innovations [nieuwigheden]. (7-
8). 
        
This is a stunning characterization, insofar as de Kock holds his adversary in some considerable 
esteem.
22
 For our purposes, however, the key feature of this passage is the place of adat and the 
simultaneous attribution of essential Javanese-ness (“hij was Javaan boven alles;” “above all 
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 Elsewhere in Weitzel’s text, de Kock discusses the insurgents’ motives. Relating events in the Kedu Regency 
[Residentie Kadoe, a colonial administrative unit in Central Java extending from present-day Semarang south to 
Magelang], de Kock made a note at the end of September, 1825. De Kock characterized Diponegoro and 
Mangkubumi as in open rebellion against the legitimate monarch and the Dutch administration, and remarks that 
they have sent their emissaries across Kedu to communicate to district heads that they, “planned to invade the 
Regency, in order to expel the foreign usurpers [vreemde overweldigers], to restore the ancestral [voorvaderlijk] 
system of governance [regeringswijze]; morals [zeden] and customs [gebruiken], as well as the pure Muhammadan 
religion [zuivere Mahomedaansche godsdienst]” (85). Rather than a later accretion, as has sometimes been argued, 
de Kock at least acknowledged the Islamic reforming impulse from the very outset of the conflict.      
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Javanese”) and devotion to the Islamic tradition (“Als Muzelman in zijn ziel;” “As a Muslim in 
his soul”) As has been established in the work of Nancy Florida and others, adat becomes 
Islam’s opposite in the colonial scholarship written after the Diponegoro War. During the 
conflict itself, from the vantage of colonial administrators, adherence to adat and commitment to 
Islam were part of the same constellation of beliefs animating Muslim opposition to the Dutch 
presence on Java. The final line, too, calls out for attention. What were the innovations 
(nieuwigheden) that provoked such revulsion in the Prince? Perhaps we can read in this the 
fundamental Islamic reformist impulse to purge the tradition of the accretions and “unlawful 
innovations” (bidah) that are imagined to corrupt it. For the post-war scholar officials, it would 
take years of careful reading to find an “essential” Javanese identity separate and removed from 
Islam. 
 The long-term success of the Dutch project of de-Islamizing the conflict can be seen, in 
part, through its later rhetorical availability for other sorts of arguments. The Diponegoro War 
has become a highly frequent citation in studies of agrarian revolt and millenarianism, both 
understood in deconfessionalized and decontextualized terms. In a truly ambitious comparative 
book, Prophets of Rebellion, Michael Adas interprets Diponegoro, as the title suggests, under the 
sign of prophethood. Adas is invested in demonstrating that millenarian movements rely on a 
charismatic figure to anchor them: “Popular discontent and millenarian tendencies must be 
amalgamated and articulated either by a prophetic leader (or leaders) or by prominent figures in 
established socioreligious organizations, such as cult-shrine networks and secret societies” (93). 
This leads him, ultimately, to suggest that Diponegoro, under the influence of unnamed teachers, 
developed a “deep commitment to the syncretic, highly mystical variant of Islam that was 
characteristic of the religious school in central Java. Thus Dipanagara gained the extensive 
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religious training and youthful commitment that has been common to many prophets in the 
Islamic tradition” (94).23 Yet Diponegoro did not see himself as a prophet, even if he did see 
himself as reformer and possibly a “Rightly Guided ruler,” a Ratu Adil (Just King) as various 
formulations express it.
24
 This inability to see the motives of Diponegoro, despite the vast wealth 
of resources, Dutch and Javanese, attesting to it, is symptomatic of the manner in which Dutch 
historiography erased accounts at variance with the all/nothing hypothesis. This maneuver was 
so successful that scholars working almost 140 years later are still misrecognizing the Islamic 
aspirations at the heart of the war.    
The most complete account of Diponegoro is probably the recent publication of Peter 
Carey’s long-finished dissertation, published as The Power of Prophecy. Carey synthesizes a 
wealth of Dutch sources, along with some Javanese materials, to chart out the life and influences 
of the prince.
25
 Carey is incredibly sensitive to the Islamic aspirations expressed so clearly by 
Diponegoro, but still unable to escape the interpretative legacy of the conflict. Thus he reads the 
prince in terms of an opposition between “real” Islam (Islamic reformism) and “Javanese Islam,” 
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 There is considerable confusion here about Muslim leaders and Islamic prophets. For his argument, Adas relies on 
the German anthropologist Katesa Schlosser and her 1950 article, “Der Prophetismus in Niederen Kulturen,” 
(“Prophethood in Lower Cultures”). Schlosser explains that although “Islamic doctrine claims Muhammad as the 
Seal of Prophets,” which is to say the last Prophet, “this is not actually the case” (61). Figures like the Mahdi, the 
just ruler of the Islamic millennium, are understood as prophets by Schlosser and Adas. And here some of the 
precision of the term within Islamic discourse is eroded – Schlosser also claims that the Islamic tradition, in this 
regard, is purely derivative of the Jewish tradition it upholds. 
24
 Tucked amongst the notes by de Kock, the Nationaal Archief also contains a short Malay language précis of the 
Joyoboyo prophecies (one can imagine de Kock’s native informant poring over a Javanese manuscript, rendering it 
swiftly in market Malay). Probably dating to the decades before the Diponegoro War, the Ramalan Jayabaya 
prophesized the coming of a just ruler who would restore order to a world turned upside down. The Jayabaya of the 
title, a long-deceased monarch in Kediri, East Java, was the alleged author. This text served as one of the 
legitimizing cultural forms for Diponegoro’s claims of Islamic leadership and political dominion. It has remained a 
source of interpretation for times of political upheaval – the death of Suharto, in 2008, prompted a minor flurry of 
Joyoboyo prophecies to be re-circulated across the Indonesian Internet.    
25
 It is thus somewhat disappointing that this magisterial account relies so heavily on Dutch sources for its “history.” 
The Javanese literature incorporated is read against that history, and cited where it accords with the presumptively 
authoritative Dutch account. In this way Carey misses an opportunity to do what Nancy Florida does so clearly in 
Writing the Past, Inscribing the Future: to leverage the Javanese manuscript tradition not just against colonial 
historiography, but against many of the troubled conceits of normative history. This amounts to taking seriously the 
imagined efficacy of entextualization, the capacity for narrative to do things rather than merely relate them.  
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even as he expressly denies the salience of these categories for Diponegoro himself: “Dipanegara 
was no Islamic reformer. Instead, he was a traditional Javanese Muslim for whom there was no 
inherent conflict between the spirit world of Java, and membership of the international ummat 
(community of Muslim  believers) and its spiritual and politico-cultural centres in the 
Hadhramaut (present-day South Yemen) and Ottoman Turkey” (xvi). Carey, trying to bridge the 
adat/Islam distinction is forced, like all contemporary commentators, to contend with the terms 
introduced in the post-Diponegoro War colonial project. About the lasting influence of the 
conflict, however, he is less circumspect: “Dipanegara did not prevail in achieving his goal of 
restoring the high state of the Islamic religion in Java. His wider moral vision of securing an 
honoured place for Islam in the life of the nation, however, is still being negotiated…” (xvi). 
This claim is a little opaque, at least, insofar as Diponegoro figures in post-Independent 
Indonesian discussions about the place of Islam. Fully enlisted in a nationalist project that sees 
only anti-colonial resistance, the deep moral transformations imagined by the Prince have little 
bearing on contemporary discussions of Islam and the public sphere. 
Negotiating with Terrorists: from Diponegoro to Aceh  
Victory in the Diponegoro War ushered in new scholarly efforts to penetrate the lives of 
the “Natives.” It also wrought a new extractive regime designed to recoup the state’s expenses in 
prosecuting the conflict (and once those were recovered, maintained simply as an effective 
means of gathering rents). Called the “Cultivation System” (Cultuurstelsel), this policy 
demanded that a certain percentage of fields be given over to cash crops to be surrendered to the 
Netherlands Indies government. Colonialism in the Indies, as an articulated suite of economic, 
political and cultural operations, began in earnest from this period. Expanded efforts to 
understand the primeval origins of the subject population were often undertaken by the same 
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administrators who oversaw the new taxation schemes. As colonial officials became more 
enmeshed in this hybrid society, they emerged as patrons of Javanese arts (Florida, “Writing 
Traditions.”) The Cultivation System spurred the development of an “Indische” culture (“Indies-
ish”), part of the increasing reach of the state into the lives of its subjects (Milone “Indische 
Culture,” 420). One result was the increasing capacity of elite Javanese to access traditionally 
European domains. As they participated more fully in the cultural productions of the colonizers, 
new nuances entered into the narratives about the Indies. Raden Saleh, a famed painter from the 
Indies, even managed to affect the image of Prince Diponegoro. 
The capture of Prince Diponegoro, achieved by Merkus de Kock’s deception, has often 
been understood in context of the dueling images painted by Nicolaas Pieneman and Raden 
Saleh.
26
 Pieneman’s work, today housed in the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam, was commissioned 
by de Kock or his family. Meanwhile, Raden Saleh – European trained and patronized – has 
come to be understood as the author of a “proto-nationalist” counter-image, and thus today his 
image of Diponegoro hangs in the National Gallery of Indonesia. (According to Peter Cary in 
“Raden Saleh,” it had originally been given as a gift to King Willem III by the painter, but a 
Dutch cultural organization donated it to Indonesia in 1978).
27
 Yet even as these images have 
become central to the historical imagining of Diponegoro’s defeat and exile, their prominence 
greatly post-dates the conflict. Painted by Pieneman and Raden Saleh in 1835 and 1857, 
respectively, they reflect gradually coalescing narratives of Javanese surrender – cultured and 
submissive, on one hand, cultured but defiant on the other. However, there was a simpler sort of 
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 See Chapter 6 in Rajaram’s Ruling the Margins, for a discussion of the relative location of Diponegoro and de 
Kock in the two paintings. Rajaram’s interpretation is heavily indebted to Werner Krauss in “Raden Saleh’s 
Interpretion of The Arrest of Diponegoro.” Krauss, in turn, relies on Peter Carey’s “Raden Saleh, Dipanagara and 
the Painting of the Capture of Dipanagara at Magelang (28 March 1830).” 
27
 Lost in the near-universal celebration of Raden Saleh as an accomplished painter in the European fashion, at least 
in his own lifetime, was his extraordinarily auspicious lineage. Claiming descent from the Prophet both maternally 
and paternally, Raden Saleh was part of the important Hadhrami (from Hadhramaut in Southern Yemen) Arab 
community.  
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story told about Muslims, Diponegoro and surrender. Instead of images, it was this version of 
Diponegoro’s capture that proved so instructive for later colonial ventures.  
Shortly after the bitterly-won victory of the Diponegoro War, the Dutch recommitted 
themselves to the conflict known as the Padri War, then rocking the area covered by the 
contemporary province of West Sumatra, home to the Minang people. The Padri War was also a 
war of Islamic reform.
28
 It was spearheaded by a leader referred to as Tuanku Imam Bonjol and 
it pitted Muslim social revolutionaries against a traditionalist aristocracy and religious elite 
(although in that respect it was unlike the Diponegoro War, in that the overwhelming majority of 
the aristocracy in Java supported Diponegoro). The Dutch, originally “invited” by the 
traditionalist elite in 1821, achieved a temporary peace that disintegrated into renewed warfare, 
this time pitting both sides of the Minang divide against the Dutch and their Javanese soldiers. 
As Jeffrey Hadler argues in Muslims and Matriarchs, Imam Bonjol had succeeded in uniting the 
forces of “adat” and “Islam” in opposition to the Dutch. However, later Dutch historiography 
interpreted away this achievement and left the normative account one of local tradition versus 
foreign Islam, with the Dutch supporting the beleaguered forces of authentic local custom. And 
so the Dutch slogged back into the West Sumatran highlands in 1833, bringing the active phase 
of the conflict to a close only with the capture of Tuanku Imam Bonjol in 1837 (Hadler “A 
Historiography of Violence,” 978-980; 987). Imam Bonjol’s capture and exile were achieved in 
eerie parallel to Diponegoro’s. The Dutch general, having laid siege to Imam Bonjol’s base, 
invited the leader to sue for peace. Once Imam Bonjol entered into the protected custody of the 
negotiation, he was arrested and forced into exile (although according to Dobbin in “Tuanku 
Imam Bonjol” the aged guerilla surrendered himself, see p. 17-19). There is a pattern to this 
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 For a clear introduction to the theological and pragmatic motivations of the “Padris,” see Christine Dobbin’s 
Islamic Revivalism.  
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duplicity that suggests something about how the Dutch understood their Muslim adversaries. Its 
resonances emerge later, in the context of the Acehnese War (1873-1914), a grueling forty-year 
conflict. 
 Almost four decades after the capture of Imam Bonjol, the Dutch began their extensive 
military operations in Aceh, the independent sultanate located at the northern tip of the island of 
Sumatra. Operating with the flimsy pretext that the Acehnese were planning on forging a treaty 
relationship with the Americans, the Dutch sent successive military expeditions to the sultanate 
(Missbach “The Aceh War,” 44). This war would drag on until military supremacy was achieved 
with the assistance of the scholarly interventions of the famed Dutch Arabist and colonial 
administrator Christaan Snouck Hurgronje, a giant in the history of Indonesian Islam. The 
eventual strategy (in concert with Snouck Hurgronje’s cultural insights) prefigures contemporary 
counter-insurgency practices, and so it survives in the annals of military combat as well as in the 
Indonesian nationalist (and Acehnese) telling. Long before the Acehnese were subdued through 
the new insights of Snouck, however, a debate emerged amongst the colonial elite about the most 
practical approach to achieve their aims in the region.
 29
 A Dutch artillery officer G.F.W. Borel, 
present during the second Acehnese expedition (1873), returned to the Netherlands and wrote a 
scathing account of military mismanagement. Entitled Onze Vestiging in Atjeh (“Our Office in 
Aceh”), Borel’s book reserves its harshest judgments for the commanding general, Generaal Jan 
van Swieten (who published a rejoinder, De Waarheid Over Onze Vestiging in Atjeh – “The 
Truth about Our Office in Aceh”). About the Acehnese, Borel characterizes them as “haughty 
and proud, they will not admit defeat in the battle against the Dutch; they will never admit it, so 
                                                             
29
 Christaaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) is perhaps the most discussed figure in the history of Islam in 
Indonesia. Following convention, I refer to him as Snouck (the first part of his dual surname), a common practice 
also remarked upon in Kaptein’s Islam, Colonialism and the Modern Age (4).  
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long as they can carry weapons and their masters remain in fortified kampung, forests and 
jungles” (42). To this, Borel remarks, “honor to whom it’s due!” (eere wien eere toekomt!). 
Instead of cultural mastery, Borel advocates major revisions in military strategy to accomplish 
victory.   
 The book was not well received back in the colony, and an industrious publisher 
(normally responsible for the Semarang-based newspaper Die Lokomotif), collected a set of 
“letters,” or essays, attacking Borel’s critique, published as Open Brieven aan den Heer G.F.W. 
Borel. One of these letters presents an extended history of the successful prosecution of the Padri 
War. The author describes in approving detail how Imam Bonjol was deceived (63-65). Perhaps, 
the letter writer appears to be suggesting, this is the strategy most appropriate for Aceh as well. 
Aceh, then and now, is reputed to be a bastion of Islam. If Islam could be interpreted out of the 
“Natives” on Java, no such possibility was imagined for “the Verandah of Mecca,” as Aceh, long 
the sally-point for trips West across the Indian Ocean was known. Yet the very “Muslimness” of 
Aceh prompted the letter’s author to advocate similar duplicity as had achieved victory against 
Prince Diponegoro and Imam Bonjol.  In the Dutch imagination, their Muslim political 
opponents were beholden to systemized irrationality. Islamic law was thought to place its 
illogical demands upon Muslim subjects (who were always already hypocrites for their 
inadequate adherence to this law). However, because of the falsity of their faith, Islam, they were 
ineligible as targets of moral suasion. Impervious to rationality and morality, their false beliefs 
and misguided honor were the legitimate points of entry for Dutch military deceit. It was 
appropriate to deceive them because they were so committed to their own foundational 
deceptions. When dealing with Muslims, the Diponegoro War taught the Dutch, moral 
expediency wasn’t merely a matter of convenience; it was a matter of necessity. And so, 
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beginning their Acehnese campaign, colonial elites imagined that the same unsubtle trickery 
would work again – since their opponents were once more irrational Muslims.   
Ethical Colonialism and Secular Islam 
The Acehnese War was not, however, brought to a swift conclusion. Instead of a singular 
figure galvanizing political and moral aspirations, the Dutch encountered a militarized populace 
resisting their advances. There was no Diponegoro or Imam Bonjol to capture and exile – the 
death of a leader resulted only in the selection of a new leader. Even sacking the palace was 
pyrrhic, in that the sultan and his associates had already fled to outside the city, thus beginning 
decades of guerilla warfare (Bakker “The Aceh War,” 60). The interventions of Snouck 
Hurgronje, a story already well-told in Benda’s “Christian Snouck Hurgronje,” Laffan’s The 
Makings of Indonesian Islam, Latif’s Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and elsewhere, proved 
pivotal. Snouck brought a rich understanding of the Islamic tradition, built on years of Arabic 
study as well as years of passing himself off as a Muslim in Mecca, coupled with a deep 
contempt for actual Muslims. His core contributing conclusion was that Islam wasn’t the 
problem, politics were. Writing in Nederland en Islam years after his return to the Netherlands, 
Snouck observed, “Its true, that the overwhelming majority of the Native Muslims find no reason 
to entertain higher political questions; they have enough before them with their village 
authorities, district heads, regents or princes and their European administrators and so stay 
indifferent to the division of power in the larger world” (69). Snouck saw little reason to fear 
rank-and-file Muslims. What his experiences in Aceh had taught him, however, was that local 
elites must be cultivated and brought over to a way of thinking amenable to Dutch supremacy.   
Snouck recognized that the categorical opposition between adat and Islam could not be 
maintained. He didn’t dispute this distinction, forged after the Diponegoro War. Rather, for 
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Snouck it was a question of efficacy – he doubted that adat elites were adequate to the task of 
resisting Islamic political aspirations. Harry Benda distills Snouck’s conclusions on this front: 
“though adat institutions formed the traditionally most powerful barrier against Islam and though 
their representatives were thus the obvious allies of the colonial power, the adat, because of its 
intrinsic conservatism as well as local particularisms, could not be expected to stem the 
expanding influence of the dynamic and universalistic faith of the Prophet” (“Christaan Snouck 
Hurgronje,” 343). Beyond the inability of adat to thwart further Islamic consolidation, Snouck 
imagined “adat” to be imperiled: “Additionally, the reception of [Islamic] law, achieved 
voluntarily, is partial and incomplete, and many adat, in places between those where the sacred 
law has penetrated, raise claims for official protection” (Nederland en de Islam, 62). For adat to 
be protected, of course, it had first to be more fully elaborated.  
A major arena where the relationship between adat and Islam came to be negotiated was 
law. Snouck’s influence here was widely felt, although much of the development of an “adat 
law” canon took place in the hands of other scholars. “Adat law” was the further refinement of a 
long-term governing logic in the Netherlands East Indies. In the plural juridical regime of the 
colonies, wholly distinct legal systems obtained for different classes of colonial subjects. Daniel 
Lev has written, evocatively, about the period in which these systems coalesced as well as about 
their enduring influence on postcolonial orders. Reflecting on the extraordinary complexity of 
plural law, Lev writes, “it recorded accurately the economic and political arrangements fashioned 
by Dutch power from the eighteenth century onwards. But the picture presented above is 
unadorned, lacking any of the ideological patina that developed with the colony and its legal 
establishment” (“Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian State,” 62). The “ideological 
patina” that developed, according to Lev, was at least internally consistent: “Once engaged, the 
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gears of the legal system spun their own logic, often quite genuine in the way of legal logic, 
serving to legitimate and excuse a less gratifying reality underneath” (ibid). To translate this 
critique into less poetic terms, concerted Dutch efforts were applied to the problem of how the 
archipelagic inhabitants should relate to one another, in legal matters. Yet these massive efforts, 
and the careful legal rhetoric they supported, served only to obfuscate real and abiding colonial 
and local interests alike. This was all the more insofar as one of the legal systems was “adat 
law.”  
Of particular concern, for Lev, was the way that “adat law” erased from view the 
conditions of its articulation. About “adat law” Lev writes, “the treatment of local customary 
(adat) law is one of the most perplexing and ambiguous themes in Indonesia’s colonial history, 
and deserves serious reconsideration” (63). The core illogic of the adat law regime, according to 
Lev, has been replicated in scholarship addressed to it: “the chief difficulty with most analyses of 
the adatrechtpolitiek [adat law policies] is their isolation of it from the rest of colonial policy, as 
if it were somehow an issue apart in the colonial environment” (ibid.). Adat as a pure articulation 
of authentic native customs – if such a thing had ever existed – certainly was no longer possible 
inasmuch as “native customs” now took place within a colonial order. This becomes less 
perplexing if we imagine some of these colonial scholars not envisioning “adat” separate from 
the Dutch presence, but discrete from Islamic influences.   
The formulation of the “adat law” regime was a joint production. Taking inspiration from 
the pioneering insights of Snouck Hurgronje, back in the Netherlands Cornelis van Vollenhoven 
set out to document positive law for all of the identified “adat” in the Indies. Snouck, despite his 
sometimes tempering influence on colonial policy, was solidly invested in a project of continued 
Dutch superiority. According to Lev, van Vollenhoven cuts a considerably more tragic figure: 
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“Out of a genuine respect for Indonesian cultures, he nevertheless helped to imprison them in a 
cage of elegant policy that rendered them ever more vulnerable to outside manipulation… 
Committed religiously and philosophically to a world of cultures different but equal, he came, I 
think, to see the modern state as a terrible threat to local history, imagination, and law” (64). For 
van Vollenhoven, the taxonomic impulse came from a place of paternalistic concern. Lev is less 
clear, however, about how van Vollenhoven’s project fit into the ongoing colonial effort to 
manage Islam. For this, somewhat counter intuitively, we can turn to the work of Franz and 
Keebet Benda-Beckmann, as it relates to the insights of Peter Burns on these questions. 
Peter Burns, in “The Myth of Adat,” undertakes a devastating historical and legal 
deconstruction of the category “adat law.” Published almost thirty years ago, this remains the 
defining revisionist account of Dutch legal policies in the Netherlands East Indies. Written with a 
firm command of the Dutch sources and a wandering gaze across key legal questions, Burns 
punctures the holistic view of “adat” maintained within colonial scholarship. Adat law provided 
a quasi-scientific idiom, according to Burns, for the continued ascription of native stasis to the 
archipelago’s inhabitants. Adat for the colonial legal scholars was an essentialist vision of 
quiescent subjects: “An Indonesian community constituted a whole. It was not to be regarded as 
just a collection of individuals. Its internal relationships were organic. Moreover, that sense of 
organic relationship extended to the environment in and from which the community derived its 
life” (56). Nevertheless, Burn’s methodical critique of “adat” as a colonial fantasy has, itself, 
been subject to revisionist arguments. Writing in “Myths and Stereotypes about Adat Law,” 
Franz and Keebet Benda-Beckmann suggest that van Vollenhoven’s legacy deserves to be 
reviewed once more. Describing contemporary Indonesians efforts to leverage “adat law” in their 
negotiations, the Benda-Beckmanns argument is against a totalizing vision of colonial 
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dominance. They dispute both the extent and the effects of the colonial effort to codiy adat law. 
They further dispute the genealogy of “adat” that foregrounds its colonial genesis. Where they do 
concede to the “adat law” critics is in terms of Islam: “[van Vollenhoven’s] greatest weakness is 
his treatment of Islamic law, although his elaborate summary and analysis of materials on 
religious law in the Dutch East Indies show that he paid more attention to Islamic law than later 
scholars of adat law” (175). For the Benda-Beckmanns, this amounts to an oversight. But if we 
take seriously the tragic figure described by Daniel Lev, it becomes easier to imagine that van 
Vollenhoven intended to protect the simple village natives not only from the ravages of the 
modern state, but from the universalizing claims of Islam.
30
 Diverting aspirations anchored in the 
Islamic tradition became a full time job in the colonies. 
Whether in terms of “adat” law or just adat, colonial efforts to separate Muslims from 
Islamic politics were not purely intellectual endeavors. Snouck addresses the violent parallel to 
his scholarly pursuits in the introduction to The Achehnese (1906), the English translation of a 
text produced shortly (1893-94) after the conclusion of his “work” in the restive former 
sultanate. Snouck first angrily rejects the “European” narrative of Dutch failure in subjecting the 
Acehnese to their rule (vi-vii). Then he characterizes the Acehnese themselves as only 
superficially, and violently, Muslim: “From Mohammedanism…she really only learnt a large 
number of dogmas relating to hatred of the infidel without any of their mitigating concomitants; 
so that the Achehnese made a regular business of piracy and man-hunting at the expense of the 
nieghbouring non-Mohammedan countries and islands” (vii). Here, of course, is the famed 
civilizing mission with its repressive commitments. Snouck ends his re-cap of the history that 
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 Zezen Zaenal Mutaqin writes about his confusion when he encountered “adat law” for the first time. Familiar with 
“adat” from Islamic jurisprudence, he confesses considerable surprise at the notion of a non-Islamic body of positive 
law. His account is instructive, in part for its gentle refutation of Benda-Beckmanns’ claims about the continued 
salience of “adat law” for contemporary Indonesians. (“Indonesian Customary Law and European Colonialism.”  
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has transpired since the Dutch publication of his work by remarking that, “Now no one any 
longer doubts that the dogmas of Islam on the subject of religious war, so fanatical in their terms, 
supplied the principal stimulus to this obstinate rebellion…that only a forcible subjugation 
followed by orderly control over the administration could bring about peace” (xvii). Where the 
“fanatical dogmas” have taken root, only “forcible subjugation” can bring about peace. Snouck’s 
insights into Acehnese culture did not, in any way, temper his firm belief that only violent 
repression could succeed in thwarting Islamic political ambitions. This established a template 
that obtains into the postcolonial order: if the violence threatened and wrought by the state since 
Independence took on a more arbitrary and uneven character, it was still linked closely to the 
theories of Islam that demanded its subjugation to a civil(izing) authority.             
When Snouck Hurgronje left Aceh for Batavia in 1899, he assumed leadership of the 
newly-created “Office of Native and Arab Affairs” (Kantoor voor Inlandsche en Arabische 
Zaken), later just the “Office of Native Affairs” (Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken). Although 
there had been an “advisor” position fulfilling this role (indeed, Snouck himself was originally 
the “Advisor for Arab Affairs,” on arriving in the Netherlands East Indies in 1889), now there 
was an office (kantoor) (Laffan, Makings of Indonesian Islam). According to Indonesian 
nationalist history, this office was interested, above all, in thwarting the political aspirations of 
Muslims (and later, all communities in the Indies). Harry Benda characterized Snouck’s mission 
in exactly these terms: “the ultimate defeat of Indonesian Islam, the freeing of its adherents from 
what Snouck Hurgronje called the ‘narrow confines of the Islamic system, was to be achieved by 
the association of Indonesians with Dutch culture” (“Christaan Snouck Hurgronje,” 344). From 
this angle, the office’s task was to defeat Islam from within, to sow seeds of secular liberal 
modernity that would preempt the eruption of Islamic political and moral orders.  This was the 
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“Association Theory,” the novel notion that enhanced assimilation of Native elites to the Dutch 
intellectual and social order would filter down, as progress, to the rest of the colony.   
Recent revisionist accounts have challenged the conventional history of the office. 
According to Howard Federspiel, the “Office of Native Affairs” had an anodyne role: “[it] 
undertook studies designed to reveal the needs of various Muslim populations under Dutch 
control and give advice on upgrading the general welfare of those populations” (Sultans, 
Shamans, and Saints, 100). Given this valuable service orientation, Federspiel continues, “it 
became highly attentive to the rise of the nationalist and communist movements in the first 
quarter of the century, which led Indonesians involved in these movements to view the office as 
a security arm of the government” (ibid).31 According to Federspiel, the office was a sometimes 
bumbling but largely good-willed effort to assess and serve the subjects of the colonial regime. 
This reading, of course, ignores the history of the colonies that preceded the establishment of the 
office, as well as Snouck’s central role in subduing the Acehnese insurgency. Snouck’s explicit 
writing, in conjunction with the long-term projects initiated after the Diponegoro War, suggests 
that Benda’s narrative retains its analytic acuity. The “Office of Native Affairs” was, then, part 
of a strategy to control the political potentials of the Islamic tradition.  
 The deliberate revision of colonial policy, of course, wasn’t targeted only at Muslim 
political aspirations. As the extractive colonialism of the Cultivation System had worn out its 
welcome for Dutch liberals in the homeland, moral uplift became the new fantasy. Thus these 
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 Elsewhere Federspiel has greeted these colonial efforts with greater skepticism:  
In the latter half of the nineteenth century the study and general observations of the Dutch scholars G.A. 
Wilken, C. Van Vollenhoven and C. Snouck Hurgronje on the role of religion and custom in the lives of 
Indonesians resulted in the adoption of an official policy designed to encourage some aspects of religious 
activity, but giving custom clear precedence. The pilgrimage and Muslim social and educational activities 
were encouraged, since they were considered to increase standard religious belief and lessen the chances of 
adopting fanatical religious beliefs inimical to Dutch rule (Islam and Ideology, 14-15). 
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new policies were not only pragmatic political maneuvers designed to foreclose the possibility of 
Muslim political activism, but also reflected a felt civilizational burden.
32
 Thus was born the 
Ethical Policy. One of the far-reaching consequences of the Ethical Policy, a pointed practice of 
secularizing Muslim elites (and “de-adat-ifying” them), was the insertion of a new category into 
the adat-Islam divide. This was the notion of western scientific modernity. The possibilities 
offered by the epistemic neutrality promised in the language of science have survived all manner 
of ideological assaults. Disparate constituencies still rely on the immense pragmatic potentials of 
science’s supposed moral neutrality. Although Snouck imagined this would deliver the elites to 
the self-evident rightness of the cause of the Dutch, it instead proved to be a catalyst for 
nationalist aspirations. And by inserting a third pole in the adat-Islam spectrum, Snouck 
unwittingly offered up conceptual tools that still exert considerable appeal to Indonesians 
struggling to articulate coherent visions of change.   
 The Ethical Policy has long been understood as a sea change in Dutch colonial 
administration of the Netherlands East Indies. Equally, in the hands of Snouck Hurgronje and a 
stable of similarly-oriented (if not similarly trained and equipped) administrators, it became the 
vehicle for the promotion of Islam, narrowly understood as an interior, personal, tradition. We 
have already alluded, in the Introduction, to Snouck Hurgronje’s vision for Islam: apolitical, 
quiescent, secular, and eventually, irrelevant. Snouck Hurgronje was skeptical about the 
enlistment of Native allies in this quest, however. Adat and Islam, the opposition first identified 
                                                             
32
 The identification of practical politics does not obviate the moral weight Snouck and his compatriots attached to 
their efforts. These values had a decided domestic hue that has re-appeared in postcolonial policies. As Elsbeth 
Locher-Scholten writes in Women and the Colonial State:  
In line with this liberalism, Snouck Hurgronje encouraged a middle-class Western family lifestyle for 
Indonesians of the elite. Or, as he maintained in 1911: as a result of Western education Javanese women 
would cooperate with their priyayi husbands “to bring the Native family to an association with our family 
system”. He also appealed to Europeans to accept Javanese girls as boarders in their homes and family in 
order to stimulate monogamy and to improve the education of their future children. (190). 
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after the Diponegoro War, and steadily reified across the nineteenth century, was inadequate to 
the task of policing Islam. Instead, to govern Muslims, according to this theory, it would be 
necessary to delve into their world and parse its constituent elements for those most amenable to 
secular modernity. The Muslims must be given scientific modernity if there was any hope of 
continued Dutch influence on their lives. Adat, as adat, would not survive this development – the 
application of social sciences to the Indies populations generated ever-more particular adat 
identities, and so the holistic vision of an Indies-adat imagined by figures like van Vollenhoven 
perished with the advances of science.   
Misrecognition at the End of an Era 
It is during World War II that we next pick up our thread of Islam and change. The 1920s 
and 30s saw the successful Dutch suppression of Indies nationalism, although Muslim political 
activists, like their erstwhile communist allies, remained connected to global networks (See 
Roff’s “Indonesian and Malay Students” for a discussion of the important circuit to Egypt at this 
time). Just as it had for the 19
th
 century rebels before them, opposition to Dutch rule meant exile 
to the eastern reaches of the archipelago for imprisoned leaders – whereas Imam Bonjol and 
Prince Diponegoro were sent to Sulawesi, now the destination was Boven Digoel.
33
 Although 
hardly static, the 1930s were relatively quiet on multiple fronts.
34
 This momentary idyll was 
pierced, sharply and irrevocably, by the swift Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies. 
Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor the first Japanese forces landed in the archipelago. By 
early March 1942, Japanese military supremacy was complete throughout the Indies, and the 
troops were often welcomed as liberators.    
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 See Mrazek’s “Boven Digoel and Terezín” for a typically poetic excursus on the modern technology of the penal 
colony 
34
 This should be understood in contradistinction to the teens and twenties, the period discussed by Takashi 
Shiraishi’s An Age in Motion. 
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The Japanese quickly established an extractive regime that excelled the Dutch: petroleum 
from East Kalimantan and labor from Java. These new rulers were initially uninterested in the 
political ambitions of their subjects, but by late 1944 halting preparations for eventual 
independence were begun (Benda “The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation”). Harry Benda, 
in The Crescent and the Rising Sun, has persuasively argued for a fuller recognition of the 
massive influence exerted by the Japanese in their brief three-and-half year rule. In concert with 
broad nationalist projects, this was especially visible in their success at re-mobilizing Muslim 
political aspirations. Japanese influence on Muslim political activists, in the context of the 
“all/nothing” hypothesis, became a marker of the falsity of these Muslim actors during the 
revolutionary period that followed the surrender of the Japanese to allied forces on August 15, 
1945. In the turmoil of the revolutionary war, the Dutch found themselves consistently unable to 
understand the role played by Muslim forces, blinded by an interpretive legacy of their own 
device. 
 At the level of gross propaganda, an inability to acknowledge the motivations of their 
opponents led to the Dutch publication of documents like Japansche Intrigues: Da Nasleep van 
de Japansche Bezetting (“Japanese Intrigues: the aftermath of the Japanese Occupation”). 
Written by a pseudonymous “Mas Slamet” in 1946, this book laid out the case for a Japanese 
conspiracy behind Indonesians’ anti-colonial ardor. Written from Jakarta, but published in the 
Netherlands for a Dutch audience, this slim pamphlet documents Soekarno’s extensive 
collaborations with the Japanese. The same author, or someone using the same pseudonym, 
addressed the Japanese role in the independence movement for Indonesian audiences as well; 
publishing another 1946 pamphlet entitled Tipoe Moeslihat Djepang (“The Subtle Trickery of 
Japan”). And for good measure, there was the 1946 English and Indonesian publication of The 
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Holy War ‘made in Japan’ (Perang Sabil Bikinan Djepang). Texts like these read like 
transparent propaganda today. But their original audiences may have found them more 
compelling – their emphasis on the falsity of Muslim political motivations reflects sincerely held 
belief on the part of colonial administrators. This latter fact becomes evident when we review 
some of the “secret” memos produced by intelligence agents operating in revolutionary-era 
Indonesia. Even in the halls of Dutch colonial power, administrators who had spent decades in 
the colonies (or even been born in them, as was the case with Ch O. van der Plas), could barely 
discern the relationship between Islam and the political demands of their restive former subjects. 
It was utterly inconceivable that Muslims would imagine political justice and accountability 
within an Islamic idiom. It simply must be outside agitation. Islam was, echoing Nancy Florida’s 
reading of the Louis Couperus novel The Hidden Force, literally unseen.
35
   
The exigencies of the Dutch military effort to regain control of the colonies threatened to 
undermine the conceptual advances pioneered by Snouck Hurgronje. The rejection of the 
blanket, if inept, mental repression of the realities of Islam, launched in the wake of the 
Diponegoro War, had allowed for new nuance in the management of Islam.
36
 The scholar-
officials of the Office of Native Affairs had a rich and complicated understanding of the 
practices and theologies dominant in the colony. Nevertheless, they were forced to contend with 
a colonial bureaucracy too long trained in the reactive policies of the post-Diponegoro War 
period. Despite the pioneering analyses of figures like Snouck Hurgronje and D.A. Rinkes, work 
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 Discussing the colonial anxieties evidenced in this novel, Florida writes, “On the one hand, [Islam] inspired 
suspicion as a dangerous reality that, it was feared, could and perhaps would appear anywhere and everywhere. On 
the other hand, Islam remained a phantom whose presence was denied, in a nearly exorcistic gesture, to genuinely 
Javanese realities. Islam represented danger, but a danger that a spectrum of colonial authorities needed to 
understand, and hence saw, as foreign, alien, and intrinsically un-Javanese” (190).  
36
 The sophistication of the Office of Native Affairs had quickly born fruit: Douwe Adolf Rinkes, one of Snouck’s 
successors in the Office of Native Affairs, was instrumental in undermining Sarekat Islam in the 1910s, a Muslim 
proto-nationalist movement, at least if Pramoedya in Sang Pemula is to be believed. Rinkes’s training, however, 
included the serious philological study of some of the Muslim saints instrumental in bringing Islam to Java. 
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continued to the end by G.W.J. Drewes and C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, Dutch authorities were 
largely unable to recognize Islam as other than a vast seething horde, waiting to erupt, or an 
irrelevant garnish on a deeper cultural inheritance, easily manipulated. This interpretation was 
perhaps so persistent not merely because of its usefulness, but because of its concordance with 
then-dominant understandings of secular modernity as an unfolding historical inevitability. The 
ferment of the Indonesian revolution all but guaranteed that these sophisticated analyses of 
Indonesian Islam would be shunted aside in favor of the more familiar all/nothing hypothesis.
37
         
With the defeat of the Japanese in the Pacific War, the Dutch state re-emerging from Nazi 
rule was desperate to retain its overseas holdings. The stuttering unfolding of Indonesian 
Independence challenged Dutch politicians and colonial administrators to reconcile their 
assumptions about native passivity with the militancy of the Revolution. As the Indonesian 
revolutionaries debated the relationship of Islam to the state, their erstwhile colonial observers 
did the same. The European confusion is a near palpable presence in the archives. A trove of 
intelligence documents now accessible in the Dutch Nationaal Archief demonstrates the 
remarkable endurance of this analytical impasse. The story we turn to now is one of a native 
informant, Major Radenmas Sardjono Soerio Santoso.
 38
 Major Soerio was one of the first 
peoples of the Indies to attend the elite Dutch Royal Military Academy (Koninklijk Militaire 
Academie) in Breda (Matanasi KNIL, 36). He was precisely the sort of figure Snouck imagined 
could spearhead the secularization of the archipelago. Of noble birth (denoted by the title 
“Radenmas”), Major Soerio was given the opportunity to associate with Dutch elites during his 
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 Ismail Goksoy, in "The Policy of the Dutch Government Towards Islam in Indonesia,” convincingly argues for 
the continuities between the colonial era and the Dutch approach to Islam during the revolutionary period.  
38
 In the archives and scholarly accounts, the same individual appears as Suryo Santoso, Soeryo Santoso, Soeria 
Santoso, Soerio Santoso, and additional permutations related to the spelling of his surname as Santoeso. From his 
signature on a variety of archival documents, it appears that he referred to himself as Soerio/Soeria.  He ended his 
career in the KNIL in 1950 with the cessation of hostilities – accounts differ whether he remained in Jakarta or 
retired to the Netherlands.  
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years at the military academy. Here was a scientific and modern man, beholden to neither adat 
nor Islam. And he was loyal to boot.    
Fleeing to Australia in the face of the conquering Japanese, the colonial government-in-
exile sought to keep watch on both the Japanese and their former subjects. In Melbourne, these 
intelligence operations were re-formed under the banner of the Netherlands East Indies Forces 
Intelligence Service (NEFIS, an English acronym reflecting its Australian location).
39
 One of 
their assets in the former capital Batavia was our friend from above, still on active duty as a 
Major in the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger or 
KNIL). During the Japanese occupation, Major Soerio diligently filed his reports and appears in 
the literature shepherding nationalist leaders through the occupation. Rudolf Mrazek, in Sjahrir: 
Politics and Exile in Indonesia, places Soerio firmly in the frame of a study club associated with 
the future Prime Minister Sjahrir. Mrazek writes, “Major Santoso, as far as we know—as the war 
fronts moved towards the islands sometime late in 1943—became very close to Sjahrir’s people 
and to Sjahrir personally” (244).40 He opened his doors to the earnest young men that made up 
Sjahrir’s clique, in Mrazek’s telling through the persuasion of his son Iwan Santoso, who shared 
their nationalist enthusiasms.
41
 In point of fact, Soerio never quit working for the Dutch, and 
there is good reason to view his hospitality with a little more skepticism. Quite likely Soerio was 
keeping this non-collaborating nationalist cohort under supervision. Later in the same work 
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 See Bob de Graaf’s “Hot Intelligence” for a thorough characterization of NEFIS and its operations. For a dated 
but still accurate description of the NEFIS archive, see Yong Mun Cheong’s “The Dutch Archives.” 
40
 The closeness of Soerio to Sjahrir, a key political figure in the nascent state, explains in part the pronounced 
Dutch preference for Sjahrir. Along with Soerio, Mrazek documents a number of connections between “liberal” 
nationalists and the major proponents of the ethical policy in prewar Dutch East Indies.  
41
 Petrik Matanasi, in Knil, his history of KNIL, reports a similar observation: “Soeriosantoso was connected to the 
Syahrir crowd through his son Iwan. About Soeriosantoso, Syahrir claimed ‘that Major was watched closely by 
Japanese police, he was nevertheless active amongst the Indo-Dutch, the Ambonese, and former members of the 
military’” (98). The constituencies Matanasi incorporates from Syahrir’s quotation are all groups presumed loyal to 
the Dutch – people from Ambon, by dint of their Christianity, the Indo-Dutch in terms of blood loyalty, and of 
course the military.   
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Mrazek discusses the attendees of a wedding held in Batavia during the Revolution in 1947. 
Sjahrir and Soerio are both on the guest list, and Mrazek remarks on the strangeness that the 
guest list included, “Major Santoso, one of the mentors of the same young people during the war, 
a veteran of the prewar Dutch colonial army, and now again, as a major in the Dutch army, on 
the opposite side” (340). Soerio (Major Santoso) wasn’t just on the opposite side then – there is 
every reason to believe he had always been on the opposite side of the nationalists, working as an 
active member of an intelligence unit.  
In late 1945 NEFIS was folded back into the postwar colonial administration and Major 
Soerio received a promotion, becoming Het Hoofd van de Afdeeling Intelligence en 
Loyaliteitsonderzoek (“the Head of the Intelligence Division and Loyalty Research”), first for 
West Java, and then for the Indies as a whole. Major Soerio’s new role had him responsible for 
determining who amongst the nationalists had been collaborators under Japanese rule.
42
 In his 
capacity as an intelligence officer, he was also a major adviser to the acting Governor General, 
van Mook. Van Mook relied on Major Soerio’s insights to assess whom the Netherlands could 
negotiate in good faith with – who were the real partners for political dialogue in a fragmented 
and frighteningly disorganized nationalist movement. In keeping with this mandate, Major 
Soerio set his sight firmly on those Islamic leaders who had risen to prominence during the 
Japanese administration of the archipelago. The loyalty of these figures was doubly suspect – as 
the recipient of Japanese patronage and as public advocates of Islam. In the analyses Major 
Soerio wrote to this effect he strongly evinced the all/nothing hypothesis of Islam in the Indies. 
A model modern of the Snouck mold, his scientific observations were unable to apprehend 
Islamic politics as other than smoke screens for deeper motivations.  
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 This “loyalty research” and zeal for uncovering collaborators was a strange export from the Nazi-obsessed 
postwar Netherlands that deserves more attention than can be offered here.  
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Having drafted a document exposing, in his view, the enduring Japanese influence on 
Muslim organizations, Major Soerio came in for a rebuke from Charles O. van der Plas, a long-
time colonial administrator and ardent advocate of the ethical policy. The back and forth between 
Major Soerio and van der Plas adopts the form of close textual commentary. Van der Plas writes, 
of the various figures Major Soerio had indicted in an earlier memo, “the penultimate paragraph 
is unfair. They are not all Japano-philes, those that occupy [positions in] mosques, langgars 
[small prayer halls] and religious schools.” In the next document in the archive, Soerio excerpts 
this remark, reprints it on the left, and reiterates the point of his original memo:  
It was my intention to argue that the kyais [Islamic scholars] that Japan elevated to 
official positions still perform those functions in the Kementerian Agama [Ministry of 
Religion] and all the offices of the residencies [administrative unit]. (For example Imam 
Zarkasji, Z. Djambik, S.S. Djaman, Al Makmoer and the others mentioned in the report). 
These governmental institutions oversee mosque committees and keep watch over the 
langgars and madrassas. In former times, under the Netherlands Indies Government, these 
kyais were “pemimpin agama” [religious leaders] but under the Japanese they were 
“pemimpin rakjat” [leaders of the people], whispered with the sense the words have come 
to hold. Again, what I want to communicate is that the organization of Japan is still 100% 
intact, but now in service of the Republic.  
  
For Major Soerio, the two colonial narratives ultimately collapse on top of one another. Major 
Soerio endorses both the all and the nothing side of the Indonesian Islamic proposition. Islamic 
mobilization is still wholly under the sway of the Japanese propaganda. And at the same time, it 
represents the enduring and hidden long-game of Muslim activists.  
The exchange doesn’t end there. Later, when van der Plas criticizes Major Soerio’s 
analysis, writing “the report also lacks the acknowledgement of the huge loss of prestige for the 
kyai who worked for the Japanese,” Major Soerio responds with a breathless rebuke, worth citing 
in full: 
I am certainly in disagreement with this note. The kyai-latihan [kyai training] still forms 
the back-bone of Masjoemi [the pan-Islamic political party], a statement I can establish 
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with facts and names. I have in my possession the actual attendance records from the 
kyai-latihan; they are no less influential and fanatical now than before.   
The evidence is that now anyone who falls in battle is “mati sjahid” [dies a martyr], 
which didn’t used to be the case. Japan was very clever to set “Kemerdekaan” 
[Independence] as the final stage of victory. Japan was just a means to that end and now 
the struggle continues. “Losing-face” is broadly (except for some very servile elements) 
not even mentioned!! [underline and double exclamation original]. Far from dismissing 
them, the Republic attaches even more importance to the kyais than the Japanese did, and 
from the Office of Religious Affairs (including all the collaborators) they have made a 
Department with a cabinet-level Minister, they still make use of the kyais (including 
those who did kyai-latihan) in regional and local government (pemerentah daerah – 
regional government) and seat them in the K.N.I. [Komite Nasional Indonesia, the 
revolutionary forerunner to Indonesia’s legislative body].   
I would like to very sharply correct this matter and I draw your attention to the role of 
Masjoemi in the Popular Front and the presence of H. Agoes Salim
43
 in the inner circle of 
Sjahrir. (“Japanse Islambleid”). 
For Major Soerio, religious elites have been molded by the Japanese wartime efforts and are still 
under their thrall. The “kyai-trainings” were propaganda seminars run by the Japanese to bring 
traditional religious authorities into the fold of the Japanese war effort. Major Soerio assumes 
that all participants in these exercises (and there were many) are necessarily still beholden to the 
Japanese. This interprets the whole anti-colonial struggle as a long shadow cast by a rising sun: it 
is an argument that relies on a view of Islam as at once monolithic (ignoring the insights of 
Snouck Hugronje) and utterly superficial (ignoring more of Snouck’s insights). The association 
theory has worked too well: Major Soerio’s analysis can admit no information not already 
ideologically available to politically-motivated colonial scholarship that “cannot see” Islam 
beyond its familiar binary. At precisely the same time, Major Soerio is still convinced that 
scheming Muslim political aspirants have adopted the patronage of the Japanese as part of their 
                                                             
43
 Haji Agoes Salim was a key nationalist figure – first in Sarekat Islam and later in the Republic. He served as an 
early mentor to Soekarno and later had a pivotal role in securing Indonesia formal recognition from Arab states as 
the new Republic’s foreign minister. For Major Soerio, and allied colonial administrators, H. Agoes Salim 
represented an Islamic fifth column, a particularly suspect wing of the nationalist alliance. See Formichi’s Islam and 
the Making of the Nation for a glancing discussion of Salim’s role in the prewar nationalist movement, especially p. 
22-28. Note too that Major Soerio is still keeping tabs on Syahrir.  
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long-term strategy – an analysis that appears contradictory today, but exemplified the logical 
endpoint of Dutch colonial scholarship on Islam.       
At the same time as Charles O. van der Plas was engaging Major Soerio in this debate, he 
was also drafting intelligence assessments to reflect the deep threat (or opportunity) represented 
by “The Mystical School” he claimed typified Indonesian Islam (“De Mystieke School”). 
Counting the adherents to different “mystic” traditions, van der Plas tries to assess what role 
these communities are playing in the rebellion. Van der Plas identifies two schools – a “Quranic” 
and a “kedjawen” school. Although they appear separate, van der Plas reveals on the second 
page that since the time of Diponegoro they have constituted a homogenous entity. This fact is, 
however, very secret: “The organization is very secret, in this understanding, so that only 
initiates (tjantriks) knew this.”44 The internal translation of ingewijden (initiates) for cantrik is 
also revealing. Cantrik, rather than a technical term in Javanese Sufism, is a general Javanese 
word for disciple, student, follower or servant of a “spiritual” teacher. Even explicitly addressing 
Islam, van der Plas falls prey to the categorical confusion that is the legacy of colonial 
scholarship on the tradition. Nevertheless, van der Plas is trying to collapse the adat-Islam 
distinction that has obscured so much Muslim political activitiy from the eyes of their colonial 
observers. His cumbersome efforts in this regard, while terminologically confused, probably 
reflect a genuine commitment to understanding the various expressions of Islam within Java as 
“authentic” to the tradition.   
Among many other interesting features, a truly curious element of this document is the 
speculative theological typology it endorses. Van der Plas creates a chart, ostensibly showing the 
relationships between “kedjawen” and “Quranic” oriented Muslim groups in the Indies (his 
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 De organisatie is zeer geheim, in deze verstande, dat slechts ingewijden (tjantriks) hiervan afwisten. 
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attributions in this regard are also suspect). In the center of the chart are four levels, or stages 
[Dutch staps]. These four levels are instantly recognizable to anyone with a passing familiarity 
with a wide variety of Sufi traditions – shariah, tariqa, haqiqa and ma’rifat. These 
conventionally denote the four ascending stages of a seeker’s relationship to the Divine (the path 
or law; the way or order; the reality or truth; intimate knowledge or being subsumed in the 
divine). Van der Plas describes, beneath the chart, how different organizations (tarekat chiefly, 
along with what today might be considered “new religious movements”) operate on different of 
these levels (“De Mystieke School”). Instead of the obvious holistic relationship, it’s clear that 
van der Plas imagines the normative Sufi progression as comprising separate and discrete 
religious traditions. He goes on to analyze the sum of the nationalist leaders as “gurus,” 
explaining that kijai is a technical term for leaders of pesantren (Islamic schools), whereas 
“gurus” like Ir. Soekarno are mystic leaders not attached to a single institution. This is the “all” 
side of the proposition – the dark seething mass of Islam, shaping all political demands in the 
archipelago. That the intelligence officials writing and responding to these documents could be 
so clueless is really less astounding than it seems. Despite growing up in Surabaya, van der Plas 
knows even less about Islam than Major Soerio – and indeed, why would he. Recall that he was 
an ardent proponent of the Ethical Policy. The modern trajectory Snouck launched was supposed 
to leave Islam behind in the past. Its persistence was either false foreign manipulation (and 
finally, in the Japanese the Dutch saw their long prophesied threat of the Ottoman Empire), or 
deep, penetrating irrationality.   
Pancasila and the Secular State 
Independent Indonesia inherited the categories of adat, Islam and science. Although 
Muslim political activists comprised core cadres of the nationalists who proclaimed 
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independence, their political visions were but one source of the achieved state form. The 
negotiation amongst these different constituencies has often attracted outside attention, 
frequently framed within the post-World-War II languages of political science, especially as it 
pertains to the political entanglements of religion. In this the Indonesian case is far from unique. 
Contemporary accounts of religious life and experience frequently explore their formation 
adjacent to notions of secularity and secularism. By “secularity” I mean a set of epistemic 
conditions that forbid access to “religious” logic, whereas by secularism I intend a political 
project oriented towards the inscription of secularity as the basis for civic engagement. In the 
Indonesian case, I’m not sure how analytically useful either category proves itself to be.  
There is an important story behind the imagined relationship between Indonesia and the 
secular. The drafting of the Ethical Policy and the ministrations of Snouck Hurgronje were 
explicitly conceived as efforts to shift the political aspirations of Muslim natives towards liberal, 
secular modernity. The postcolonial inheritors of this legacy, while greatly altering the details, 
retained the same approach towards Islam: something to be carefully managed lest its potentials 
spill too far into the domains rightly governed by the state. In the recent past, since the fall of the 
New Order government, Indonesia has persistently excited outside observers given its status as 
the country with the “largest Muslim-majority population.” Ensuing discussions have often 
centered on the relative weakness of so-called political Islam (measured by proxy in the form of 
political parties) despite the apparent deepening religiosity of the archipelago’s inhabitants.45 The 
question is often framed with some variant of: “why does Indonesia’s secular democracy 
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 Robert Hefner’s Civil Islam is the most nuanced of these accounts. Saiful Mujani and William Liddle’s 2004 
article, “Politics, Islam and Public Opinion” is a representative example of the more straightforward, “why aren’t 
Islamist parties more successful” approach. This is replicated in their 2009 piece, “Muslim Indonesia’s Secular 
Democracy.” For a more historically grounded interpretation of Indonesian political-religious possibilities, see 
Arskal Salim’s Challenging the Secular State. Chiara Formichi’s Islam and the Making of the Nation also belongs to 
this discussion, although it charts a biographical approach centered on the figure of Kartosuwiryo.   
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persist?” But this invites the further question: How is Indonesia possibly secular? A brief detour 
into one chapter of the history of the Indonesian state delivers us to the doorstep of the 
organizational ethnographies that follow in later chapters. Their projects of moral transformation 
are indebted to ongoing efforts to manage the place and influence of religion in public life.   
The declaration of Independence issued by nationalist leaders on August 17, 1945 was 
notable for its confidence and its brevity. Made under duress (Vickers A History, 95), the 
proclamation in its entirety read, “We the nation of Indonesia hereby declare the independence of 
Indonesia. Issues concerning the transfer of power, etc. will be organized with care and in as 
short a time period as possible.”46 The language of the proclamation contrasts with that 
employed in the first constitution adopted by the nascent republic in 1945. The constitution was 
composed between June and August of 1945, under Japanese direction, and “adopted” one day 
subsequent to the declaration of Independence (but not ratified by a legislature until February of 
the following year, see Ricklef’s A History, 249). Repeatedly in post-Independence Indonesia 
successive political regimes have returned to the terms of the 1945 constitution, and the bulk of it 
remains in effect today. The constitution begins with a global rebuke of colonialism: “That in 
truth independence is the right of every nation and for that reason colonialism must be wiped 
from the earth, because humanity and justice cannot abide it.”47 After a short paragraph 
describing the joyful opportunities awaiting the nation, the authors of the constitution invoke the 
divine: “By the blessings and mercy of Allah the All Powerful and propelled by noble desires, in 
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 Two “originals” of the proclamation have been maintained. A handwritten copy reads, “Kami bangsa Indonesia 
dengan ini menjatakan kemerdekaan Indonesia. Hal
2 
jang mengenai pemindahan kekoeasaan d.l.l., diselenggarakan 
dengan tjara seksama dan dalam tempoh jang sesingkat-singkatnja.” In a typed variant, the only difference is that 
“hal2” is written “hal-hal” and the signature line is amended from “wakil2 bangsa Indonesia” to “atas nama bangsa 
Indonesia.” (From “representatives of the Indonesian nation” to “in the name of the Indonesian nation”).  
47
 In the new orthography, reflected in the current iteration of the constitution, this reads, “Bahwa sesungguhnya 
kemerdekaan itu ialah hak segala bangsa dan oleh sebab itu, maka penjajahan di atas dunia harus dihapuskan, karena 
tidak sesuai dengan peri-kemanusian dan peri-keadilan." 
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order that a nation may live free, with this the people of Indonesia declare their independence.”48 
With this third paragraph of the preamble, then, Indonesia re-declares independence, this time 
enveloping it within the bounds of Divine mercy. Muslims are exhorted to commence almost any 
endeavor with an invocation of the Divine, and the presence of this paragraph reflects the 
delicate compromise between the different parties of the independence movement, including 
Muslim, Christian and leftist-humanist groups. Independence has now been multiply enunciated, 
within the world-view idioms of the various independence constituencies.
49
  
The compromises that make up the preamble to the constitution reach their apogee in the 
Pancasila, or “Five Bases.” A positive description of state ideology, Pancasila were drafted in 
late May 1945 at a Japanese orchestrated pre-Independence convention. Their first articulation in 
the authoritative list of five (although not the final order) was by soon-to-be President Soekarno 
on June 1, 1945, in a speech now known as Lahirnya Pancasila (The Birth of Pancasila). This 
speech closed the convention. The text of Pancasila, as it was appended to the founding 
constitution, follows in the paragraph below. Pancasila was later accorded a transcendental force 
during the New Order, enforced both legally and pedagogically through mandatory trainings on 
its meaning, begun in primary school and continuing throughout one’s adult life.50 Following 
this, the New Order declared in the early 1980s that the official ideology would be the “sole 
basis” (asas tunggal) of all organizations and collectivities in Indonesia. The unintended 
consequences of this decision form the basis of the next section of this chapter. For now, it is 
                                                             
48
 Reading, again in the new orthography, “Atas berkat rakhmat Allah Yang Maha Kuasa dan dengan didorongkan 
oleh keinginan luhur, supaya berkehidupan kebangsaan yang bebas, maka rakyat Indonesia menyatakan dengan ini 
kemerdekaan.” 
49
 This multiple enunciation prefigures a model of pluralism that allows for difference without recourse to 
exchangeability or other corollaries of the ostensible neutrality at the heart of secularity. This manner of negotiating 
amongst difference will be taken up in greater detail within IofC and Kahfi practices.  
50
 See Morfit’s “Pancasila: the Indonesian State Ideology” for a basic introduction to Pancasila pedagogy during the 
New Order. 
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sufficient to remark that only during the brief presidency of B.J. Habibie, following the 
resignation of Suharto, were the regulations dictating the “sole basis” rescinded (Azra Indonesia, 
Islam and Democracy, 14). I review the seventy-year path of Pancasila to suggest that an 
inordinate amount of the attention given to questions of religion and state in Indonesia has 
circulated around this text, a conceptual crutch that this project will also be unable to avoid.   
The Pancasila are articulated in the fourth paragraph of the preamble and have been the 
subject of enduring, intense and still unresolved debate.
51
 The relevant paragraph of the August 
18
th
 1945 Constitution reads,  
Then in order to form a Government of the State of Indonesia that protects the entire 
Indonesian nation and all of the Children of the Motherland [tumpah darah], and in order 
to advance the general welfare, educate the life of the nation, and participate in the 
achievement of a world order based on freedom, enduring peace and social justice, so the 
Freedom of the Indonesian Nation is arranged within the Constitution of the State of 
Indonesia formed by the State of the Republic of Indonesia with sovereignty vested in the 
people on the basis of [1] Absolutely Unitary Divinity [Ketuhanan yang maha esa],
52
 [2] 
Human-ness that is just and rightly related [beradab], [3] Unified Indonesia, [4] popular 
sovereignty led by wise governance within representative council,
 53
 with a bringing into 
being of [5] Social Justice for all the people of Indonesia.
54
   
                                                             
51
 For an account that looks at the post-New Order constitutional revisions, see Nadirsyah Hosen’s “Religion and the 
Indonesian Constitution.” See also the already cited work of Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State. For a 
Christian perspective, see Eka Darmaputera’s Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity. 
52
 Ketoehanan Jang Maha Esa, in the old orthography, is an exceedingly strange construction. The “ke-an” form of 
Toehan (God/Lord) makes it akin to the English “divinity,” while the “maha esa” asserts a radical unicity typified by 
the normative Islamic understandings of God. Far more typical would be “maha kuasa,” all powerful, omnipotent, 
as indeed the preceding paragraph of the preamble employs. Furthermore, the authors’ insistence on capitalizing 
“yang/jang” (a relative pronoun meaning who/which/that) draws even more attention to the construction. 
Toehan/Tuhan, selected to include Christian and Hindu communities alienated by the word “Allah,” is partnered 
with a relative clause that uses Old Javanese “Maha Esa” to make an exceedingly Islamic theological claim. Tuhan 
entered Malay, from tuan, Lord or Master, in the hands of early bible translators (according to Susanne Schr ter in 
Christianity in Indonesia, a Dutch translator named Melchior Leijdekker may have added the “h” infix to tuan in an 
effort to make it more courtly). The Arabic rabb also denotes Lord, and so even though referring to the divine as 
“Tuhan” has a Christian genealogy, there is a ready Islamic parallel.    
53
 Again there is a doubling that takes place between Islamic/Arabic terminology and Sanskrit/Javanese – “hikmat 
kebjiaksanaan” is largely redundant. Hikmat is wisdom, conventionally understand with reference to the Divine. 
Kebijaksanaan, too, could be glossed as wisdom, another “ke-an” construction enwrapping bijaksana, or wise, even 
if in this case kebijaksaan denotes something more like governance. The seeming redundancy allows the multiple 
audiences of the document to give greater weight to the term with greater sectarian salience.      
54
 Kemudian daripada itu untuk membentuk suatu Pemerintah Negara Indonesia yang melindungi segenap bangsa 
Indonesia dan seluruh tumpah darah Indonesia dan untuk memajukan kesejahteraan umum, mencerdaskan 
kehidupan bangsa, dan ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi dan 
keadilan sosial, maka disusunlah Kemerderkaan Kebangsaan Indonesia itu dalam suatu Undang Undang Dasar 
 
 
72 
 
The history of the Pancasila reflects the enduring tensions between religious frameworks – 
chiefly those supplied by normative Sunni Islam – and alternative models of political 
organization and legitimacy. Even the order of the above five points contains these struggles: in 
Soekarno’s famous “Birth of Pancasila” speech, Ketuhanan yang maha esa (Absolute Unitary 
Divinity) was the final principle. When Muslim nationalist leaders failed to enshrine the 
obligation of shariah upon all Muslims (the so called Jakarta Charter, or piagam Jakarta), 
Ketuhanan yang maha esa was moved to the front of the list as a compromise (Anshari Piagam 
Jakarta, 4-5).  
Discussions of Pancasila have been largely devoted to the neologism that anchors the 
state in radical, if idiosyncratic, monotheism. However Soekarno’s theological dexterity extends 
beyond the much remarked “Absolute Unitary Divinity.” Soekarno also employs an Islamic 
idiom in articulating the democratic constitution of the idealized state. The fourth basis reflects 
this in its positing of “popular sovereignty led by wise governance within representative council” 
(Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam Permusyawaratan). Key to this is 
the “representative council” or permusyawaratan. This latter term derives from the Arabic shura 
(consultation). As many members of the Pancasila’s audience were well-aware, the Quran 
directs the Prophet to consult his companions when making decisions affecting the community, 
and also directs the community to use the same deliberative process (3:159; 42:38).
55
  
Soekarno’s Islamic triangulation is even more visible in the “Birth of Pancasila” speech, 
where permusyawaratan is repeatedly interpreted in light of mufakat (unanimity). Soekarno 
elevates these Islamic concepts to a transcendental position even as he disavows Allah as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Negara Indonesia yang terbentuk dalam suatu susunan Negara Republik Indonesia yang berkedaulatan rakyat 
dengan berdasarkan kepada Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, Kemanusiaaan yang adil dan beradab, Persatuan Indonesia 
dan Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam Permusyawaratan/Perawakilan serta dengan 
mewujudkan suatu Keadilan Sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia. 
55
 For more on shura, see Shafiq’s "The Role and Place of Shura in the Islamic Polity." 
 
 
73 
 
signifier under which to organize the “godly” state of Indonesia. Mufakat and permusyawaratan 
readily reveal their Arab-Islamic genealogy. The former derives from the Arabic radical wafiqa 
(Ar. to be right or fitting, in this form, to be in accord or unanimity), just as shura arrives from 
“consultation.” In the speech, however, Soekarno casts both as the “traditional” deliberative 
strategy of Indonesian village-level governance. Sukarno mobilizes these terms to name 
something quintessentially Indonesian, but the terms themselves harken to an idealized time in 
Islamic history, when the community organized around the Prophet also used these principles to 
guide decision making. In articulating mufakat and permusyawaratan as pillars of the Indonesian 
state, Sukarno mobilizes Islamic transcendental values in the service of the new nation. 
Something traditionally Indonesian appears as also already fundamentally Islamic – or the 
inverse, foundational Islamic practices are imagined as eternally Indonesian.
56
 This posture 
recalls precisely the “adat” and “Islam” marriage evinced so strongly by Diponegoro. However 
Soekarno arrives at this position not only through his Islamic grounding, but also through his 
liberal nationalist education, imagined in secular scientific terms – he is an engineer, after all, as 
Rudolf Mrazek would insist we acknowledge. A brave soul might argue that Snouck Hurgronje’s 
ethical policy gave rise to a new Diponegoro, a more strident version of the now-accepted 
prospect that changes in Dutch colonial policy hastened its end.  
In Indonesian historiography, there has long been a splintered account of the early 
nationalist movement.  Islamic nationalists point to the establishment of Sarekat Dagang Islam 
(Islamic Traders Union) while the official state history refers to Boedi Oetomo (Noble 
Endeavour; Paramount Philosophy) as the nationalist progenitor. While the first was a Muslim 
organization, the second was peopled by the striving aristocrats Snouck Hurgonje sought to 
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 Indeed, this kind of rhetorical maneuver was highlighted by Shiraishi in his analysis of the proto-nationalist 
movement Sarekat Islam conducted in An Age in Motion. 
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cultivate in the context of the Association Theory. Pancasila as initially formulated by Soekarno 
was an attempt to reconcile these competing trajectories as much as to describe a positive 
political philosophy. The state ideology of Pancasila underwent substantial revisions in the 
crucible of the Independence movement and was subsequently subject to frequent re-
interpretation – a considerable body of scholarship charts this history. Of interest here is how this 
fraught relationship between competing nationalist actors allows for the later misrecognition of 
secularity within the putative core of the state. This misrecognition is part of the legitimating 
rhetoric that supports the continued state management of religion. 
57
 
That Indonesia is a secular democracy has become a commonplace assertion, despite the 
flimsiness of the ascription. This is built on reading Pancasila as non-Islamic, as if Islamic 
theocracy and secular liberalism were the only institutional alternatives (Jeremy Menchik, in 
“Productive Intolerance” complicates this picture, suggesting a “third way,” what he calls “godly 
nationalism”). Careful political observers still frequently publish accounts that posit a secular 
state as a historical achievement rather than a contested political aspiration (for example, Luthfi 
Assyaukanie’s Islam and the Secular State; or Greg Barton’s “Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular 
Democracy and Islam”).58 The popular secular reading of Indonesia’s political institutions 
continues, in part, because it is so effective a vehicle for a variety of allied interests. This is true 
both inside and outside the country. Consider a fairly representative example. I do not introduce 
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 For more on this line of argument, see Seung-Won Song’s 2008 dissertation, “Back to Basics in Indonesia.” 
58
 Conventional accounts of secularity fit uneasily with these ascriptions. I turn first to the conservative philosopher 
and professional contrarian Remi Brague. Brague, in an interview published as “Secularity vs Secularism,” provides 
a definition that seems to cover some of the main features of “the secular” in common scholarly usage:   “Secularity 
qualifies a certain realm of things on which unaided human reason can, in principle at least, reach an agreement that 
enables cooperation towards the common good.” Nor, I think, do political scientists intend what Charles Taylor 
announces at the outset of A Secular Age: “the change I want to define and trace is one which takes us from a society 
in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is 
one human possibility among others” (3). Taylor’s is ultimately a very personal quest, wherease the “secularism” of 
Indonesia is a conceptual short-hand for “non-Islamic state.”  
 
 
75 
 
this passage to vilify political science, but to better understand the how “Islam-secular” replaced 
“Islam-adat” (after a brief triangular spell) as the framework for analyzing Indonesian realities. 
This account, written by Greg Barton, considers why radical “Islamists” have failed to gain 
electoral office in significant numbers:  
This is a very significant outcome [that radical “Islamists” weren’t voted into office] 
because the secular character of the state remained the central unresolved issue regarding 
political legitimacy in the nationalist movement and during the period of parliamentary 
democracy in the 1950s. This issue reemerged in the wake of the collapse of the Suharto 
regime in 1998. It was unclear whether secular democracy had sufficiently broad support 
in the world’s largest Muslim majority country to ensure the legitimacy of both the 
secular state and the elected government or whether Western style secular democracy 
needed to evolve into a more uniquely Islamic form of democracy to achieve enduring 
legitimacy ("Indonesia: Legitimacy, secular democracy, and Islam,” 475). 
 
My intention here is not to castigate unwitting political scientists, to unfairly challenge their 
uncomplicated enlistment of reductive categories. Rather the point of this exercise to make the 
hopefully commonplace observation that “secular” carries a lot of different waters for a lot of 
different actors. In the hands of Barton, “secular democracy” means something like an elected, 
representative government capable of negotiating between different interested parties without 
prima facie deciding in favor of a particular faith tradition. This limited notion of secular 
democracy, focused on the operation of the government rather than its rhetorical constitution (the 
sources of its legitimacy, the conceptual logics that rest beneath its efforts) doesn’t require the 
secularity of Taylor in the above footnote. The existence of Islamic pluralism attests to this, as I 
will argue in the case of President Abdurrahman Wahid’s relaxation of the regulations governing 
Indonesian organizational life, taken up below. And Snouck Hurgronje’s vision of enlightened 
elites rested on cultivating Barton’s manner of secularism, imagined to be particularly amenable 
to continued Dutch rule. This is to say, a “technology” of secularism partially freed from 
secularity – a way of arbitrating disputes that insists on its own formal neutrality. This 
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impoverished vision of the secular retains tremendous currency – it’s a great way to do things, an 
efficacious epistemological stance to adopt.    
From Arvind-Pal Mandair in Religion and the Specter of the West, there is the call to 
divert our attentions from the religious or secular towards the discursive constitution of subjects 
and articulations as religious or secular. Following this logic, it becomes possible to rethink the 
ways in which the Indonesian state enunciated secular and Islamic attributes, embedded within 
the institutions conceived and promoted by the state or its agents. These operations were also 
about managing change – about controlling access to the public and channeling demands made 
of the state. This logic of enunciation returns in the strange history of the Ministry of Religion 
(Kementerian Agama) that closes this chapter. The Ministry, as a bureaucratic state organ, 
contains so many of the contradictions produced in the competition between different visions of 
religious life in Indonesia. Before discussing the Ministry’s enduring fantasy of docile nationalist 
religiosity, however, we should follow the imposition of the state ideology, Pancasila, to its 
zenith during the New Order.  
Pancasila and its Discontents 
 The New Order, seventeen years after its official passing, has remained at the center of 
Indonesian historiography. Only in its wake, however, were the bloody origins of the regime 
allowed to return from the margins of public memory. Since its collapse in 1998, renewed 
attention has been directed at its operating myths and foundational deceits (see Zurbuchen’s 
“History, Memory and the ‘1965 incident;’” see also Asvi Warman Adam’s Pelurusan Sejarah¸ 
especially the latter half which consolidates various counter-historical accounts). This is not the 
place to recapitulate that history. Instead I will introduce one small piece of the New Order’s 
legitimizing practices: its sacralization of Pancasila and how that figured in the efforts of the 
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state to manage religion and maintain a singular vector of change. The New Order’s promise of 
economic development demanded that the masses remain static – only their material prospects 
were to change. It marshaled a fantasy of the nation’s past as an ideological supplement to its 
repressive apparatuses (see Pemberton’s On the Subject of “Java,” for what is still the best 
critique of this strategy). In Rifle Reports, Mary Margaret Steedly characterizes the articulation 
of this ideology: “Mass citizenship was thus ideally figured in terms of collective responsibility, 
docile support for the actions and guidance of others, and acceptance of a hierarchy of political 
authority explicitly derived from a particular (Javanese, colonial, elite) notion of patricentric 
domesticity” (204). Almost from the inception of the regime, Pancasila was imagined as the ideal 
vehicle for the transmission of these values to its subjects.  
 On October 1 1965, the assassination of six generals and a first lieutenant, part of a coup-
counter-coup cycle of still obscured origins, signaled the end of Soekarno’s Old Order. In the 
months that followed, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of communists, leftists, and other 
unlucky folk were murdered in mostly intimate neighborhood settings. The sometimes military-
led purges were carried out in plain sight, while a fierce struggle for the levers of powers 
unfolded outside of public view. By early 1966, if not sooner, General Suharto had consolidated 
power, although he would not formally assume the presidency until March 12, 1967 (although on 
March 11, 1966, Soekarno was forced to delegate complete authority to Suharto in a humiliating 
public spectacle of the transfer of power). And so, on the first anniversary of the military dead 
(the public dead were not, and have not been, openly remembered), Suharto elected to organize 
solemn observances under the sign of Pancasila: on October 1, 1966, “Hari Kesaktian Pancasila” 
(Miracle of Pancasila Day) was born. A counter-coup leading to a military dictatorship became 
memorialized as the miraculous survival of the founding ideology of the Indonesian state. In 
 
 
78 
 
time, Pancasila would assume ever-greater significance, a project of sacralization that sought to 
assign all possible social, political and cultural legitimacy to the state.  
 There was another important dimension to the first recognition of “Hari Kesaktian 
Pancasila.” Katharine McGregor describes how the New Order sought to erase the marks of 
Soekarno that still adhered to the Pancasila. By memorializing the slain generals, and formally 
recognizing the counter-coup against those alleged to have killed them, as a miracle of Pancasila, 
the regime hoped to “ensure that Pancasila would be more closely associated with its savior, the 
New Order, than with its creator, Sukarno” (“Commemoration of 1 October,” 45). The rhetorical 
removal of all possible sources of dissent was part and parcel of the mythic self-fashioning of 
Suharto’s regime, a logic of monuments and memorials unwound so adeptly in John Pemberton’s 
On the Subject of “Java.” However I don’t revisit these moments to skewer the corpse of the 
authoritarian order from a safe historical distance. Instead my interest lies in how Suharto 
imagined a reconfiguration of Islam, adat and science, identified with the state and centered in 
his person.   
 Suharto’s speech that first Miraculous Pancasila Day was also printed in the weekly 
political journal, Majalah Mimbar. Amidst the paeans to what would soon be the New Order, 
Suharto employed several compelling locutions. A third of the way through the speech, he shares 
two lessons learned from the events of the prior year: 
a) The positive aspect, that is that Pancasila as a life philosophy [falsafah hidup], as an 
ideology comprises an inexhaustible [jang tidak kering2nja] source of moral, spiritual 
and physical strength [kekuatan2 moril, spiritual dan fisik], ceaselessly emerging as 
the vastly superior ideology during the struggles and conflicts of the past, and as a 
result it is always preserved [diselamatkan] by God [Tuhan] from the efforts of any-
and-all ideologies that would destroy it. 
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b) The negative aspect, that is that the penetration [penetrasi] and infiltration [infiltrasi] 
of foreign ideologies that succeed in sowing division as well as material [materil] and 
spiritual [spiritual] losses in their attempts to undermine Pancasila, and were enabled 
by our collective negligence [kelengahan], incaution [ketidakwaspadaan], and 
because of the wiliness [lihai] and slipperiness [litjinnya] of the P.K.I [Communist 
Party of Indonesia] in tricking some of the Indonesian people [rakjat Indonesia]. 
(4).
59
 
My first thought, reading the speech, is that the bluster of the rhetoric rightly belongs in a school 
yard (my ideology can beat up your ideology), if only it weren’t delivered as the capstone on a 
year-long project of brutal ideological purification.  My next observation is that Suharto is 
speaking English. He characterizes Pancasila as a reservoir of “moral, spiritual and physical” 
(moral, spiritual, dan fisik) strength, using transliterated English for each of these categories. 
Discussing the nefarious consequences of the communist party’s opposition to Pancasila, he 
describes a portion of the people as suffering from “material and spiritual” (materil maupun 
spiritual) losses or deficits, resulting from the penetration and infiltration (penetrasi dan 
infiltrasi) of foreign ideologies. This reliance on English suggests that although Suharto (like 
Soekarno before him) locates the roots of Pancasila in an eternal Indonesian past, he conceives of 
the political project organized under its sign as a fundamentally modern operation. Suharto 
closes the speech with a supplication, imagined as a collective entreaty: “On this memorial 
evening let us request strength [kekuatan] and patience [kesabaran] from Tuhan Jang Maha Esa, 
may we preserve [mengamankan] and carry out [mengamalkan] the revolutionary teachings and 
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a) Aspek positipnja, ialah bahwa Pantjasila sebagai falsafah hidup, sebagai ideology merupakan sumber 
kekuatan2 moril, spiritual dan fisik jang tidak kering2nja, senantiasa keluar sebagai ideologi jang djauh 
lebih unggul dalam perjuangan dan pertentangan dimasa lampau itu, oleh karena itu selalu diselamatkan 
Tuhan dari usaha2 ideologi manapun jang hendak menghanjurkannja 
b) Aspek negatipnja, ialah bahwa penetrasi dan infiltrasi ideologi asing jang berhasil menimbulkan petjah-
belah dan kerugian2 materil maupun spiritual dalam usaha perongrongannja terhadap Pantjasila, telah 
dimungkinkan oleh karena kelengahan, ketidak waspadaan kita sendiri dan karena lihai dan litjinnja P.K.I 
menipu sebagaian rakjat Indonesia 
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aspirations along the lines that He has blessed [jang diridhoiNja]” (6).60 Co-opting even the 
language of the revolution, here it becomes subservient to the deconfessionalized unitary divinity 
of Pancasila discourse.   
In 1978 the New Order launched an ambitious program of mandatory education for civil 
servants. These trainings were called the Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila (or 
P4 for short), a cumbersome title Morfit translates as “Upgrading Course on the Directives for 
the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila” (“Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology,” 
838).
61
 This program, begun for senior civil servants, was then spread progressively down the 
Indonesian socio-political hierarchy, arriving eventually in the simple classrooms of primary 
schools. In concert with this effort, other governmental agencies rededicated themselves to 
Pancasila. In a 2002 Master’s Thesis written at Jakarta Theological Seminar (STT Jakarta), Beril 
Huliselan analyzes the changing place of religion in the New Order during this period. 
Employing a Marxist framework that emphasizes the economic motivations of government 
policy, Huliselan works largely from the Departemen Agama’s (the predecessor to today’s 
Kementerian Agama – Ministry of Religion) history of itself. He writes, “At this time, compared 
with the previous situation, the effort to employ all the elements of religion in shoring up 
[menopang] national development was increasingly concentrated [kental] ” (“Manusia, Agama 
dan Keterasingan).” This pressure was especially pronounced given the tasks set for the agency 
by Suharto. The first of these was to, “stabilize [menetapkan] the ideology and philosophy of 
Pancasila within the lives of religious communities [ummat beragama]” (ibid.). Here, however, 
the Department of Religion was forced to confront what would soon become a major source of 
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 “Marilah kita pada malam peringatan ini memohon kekuatan dan kesabaran kepada Tuhan Jang Maha Esa, 
semoga kita dapat mengamankan dan mengamalkan adjaran dan tjita2 revolusi sesuai dengan garis jang 
diridhoiNja” (6). 
61
 We might just as easily gloss P4 as “Guidance for Appreciating and Carrying Out Pancasila.” 
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conflict in Indonesia – the New Order’s overreach in inscribing Pancasila at the heart of 
everything. 
Along with Noorhaidi Hasan (Laskar Jihad), van Bruinessen (“Genealogies of 
Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia”) persuasively traces the shifting fortunes of Islamic 
political aspirations to a period of tremendous ferment in 1980s Indonesia. Galvanized by Saudi 
money, the Iranian revolution, and small-scale study groups (the so-called tarbiyah movement), 
re-politicized Muslim activists set forth on a quiet revolution. Both of these scholarly accounts 
emphasize changes in the late New Order, although van Bruinessen, like Chiara Formichi after 
him (Islam and the Making of the Nation), follows these threads back in time to the late colonial 
period, and especially the years of Japanese Occupation (1942-45). However there was another 
more immediate precipitating factor: the New Order’s cumbersome advocacy of Pancasila. It 
was the doctrine of asas tunggal (singular basis), first launched in 1978 that set the immediate 
stage for the Tanjung Priok massacre.
62
 The Tanjung Priok incident, in turn, has loomed large in 
the political imagination of Muslim activists in Indonesia ever since. These activists were quiet 
in the face of the military annexation of East Timor and relatively untroubled by the “anti-crime” 
assassination of the “mysterious shooter” incidents.63 But young Muslim activists were 
traumatized when the guns of the state turned on their brethren in north Jakarta.   
The sudden insistence on the part of the New Order that Pancasila, alone, must provide 
the basis for all collective activities provoked confusion and resistance. In Dhofier’s excellent 
institutional history of “traditional” Islam in modern Indonesia, The Pesantren Tradition, there is 
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 See Prawiranegara “Pancasila as the Sole Foundation” for a brief history of this policy.  
63
 Freek Columbijn looks at these two examples in conjunction with one another in “Explaining the Violent 
Situation in Indonesia,” see especially p. 52-54. Justus van der Kroef has written about the “mysterious shooter” 
(petrus = penembak misterius) assassinations of suspected gang members in “Petrus: Patterns of Prophylactic 
Murder.”  
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a minor anecdote to this effect. Dhofier reports on his attendance at a monthly meeting organized 
by Nahdlatul Ulama in Jombang in 1978, to address matters of jurisprudence. He lists some of 
the questions posed by the public, including this exchange: “Q) There have been frequent 
requests from the public that the ulama should explain clearly the meaning of the first principle 
of the Pancasila. Does the belief in Oneness of God fit the Islamic belief in Allah? A) The 
question was not answered in the meeting or in the two following meetings that I attended” 
(162). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Pancasila was ubiquitous, but directly reconciling its 
arcane language with normative religious belief was more fraught than ever. 
The Tanjung Priok sub-district [kecamatan], located adjacent the ports of north Jakarta, 
played host to one more incident in Indonesia’s troubled legacy of state violence.  In September 
1984, vocal Muslim activists, contesting the state’s intransigence on the doctrine of asas tunggal 
(singular basis), attracted attention to one of their venues. A sub-district military liaison 
[koramil] entered Mushala as-Sa’adah, a prayer hall in the neighborhood, on September 8, 1984. 
He allegedly removed some fliers advertising an anti-Pancasila speech. He was, additionally, 
known to be Catholic, rumored to have left his shoes on, and said to have insulted the Quran. In 
an ensuing scuffle, the koramil was beaten and his motorcycle burned. Four members of the 
Mushala community were arrested over the next several days, and soon an angry cohort 
approached the military complex where the four men were being held. Listening to a preacher 
inveigh against asas tunggal, as well as against the military’s interference in their religious 
practice, the burgeoning mob attacked and killed a Chinese family (who happened to be Muslim) 
en route to the military base. Arriving at the complex they demanded the release of their 
compatriots. Instead the protesters were met with live bullets, officially killing twenty-four, but 
more likely accounting for hundreds of casualties. The dead and dying were bundled off to mass 
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graves and fire-trucks sprayed the blood from the streets. Initially, it seemed like there would be 
no repercussions, but the long-term consequences dramatically re-organized the New Order 
regime.  
In the aftermath of the massacre, a number of Muslim activists were rounded up and put 
on trial for incitement. One of the key preachers amongst the protesters was killed the night of 
the massacre, but the authorities managed to find associates or at least people articulating similar 
critical messages towards the doctrine of asas tunggal. The eventual demise of the New Order 
brought the details of the Tanjung Priok Massacre back into the public domain. With renewed 
discussion came the publication of historical documents pertaining to the events, including the 
fascinating volume Pancasila, de-Islamisasi dan Politik Provokasi (“Pancasila, de-Islamization, 
and Political Provocation”). Written by Syarifin Maloko, one of those tried in the wake of the 
shootings, it is a strong contributor to the post-New Order genre of pledoi (“pleas,” or 
“defenses”), published testimony from politically motivated trials. In his introduction to the text, 
Abdul Munir Mulkhan provides some context for the re-printing of this particular plea. Abdul 
Munir Mulkhan writes, “the riots and violence that spread with the fall of the New Order 
government on May 21, 1998, have roots in two related problems, national citizenship on one 
hand and religious citizenship on the other, that since Independence haven’t been 
unified/reconciled, except in artificial forms serving transient political interests” (xxi). 
Interpreting the sectarian violence that stalked the New Order as a problem of “religious 
citizenship,” (kewargaan keagamaan) replicates the rhetorical strategy Syarifin Maloko adopts 
in the plea itself, as we shall see shortly.  
Late in his trial, having reviewed the history of independent Indonesia, the role of 
Muslim activists in defending the state (read slaughtering leftists), and the course of the New 
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Order, Syarfin Maloko issues a damning indictment of New Order policies, borrowing the 
mantle of Pancasila:  
The idea of “the Singular Basis of Pancasila” is a deviation from [penyimpangan] and 
betrayal of [pengkhianatan] the founders of the state, and a further betrayal 
[pengkhianatan] of Pancasila and UUD 1945 [the founding constitution]. Secondly, the 
idea of “the Singular Basis of Pancasila” carries the sense [membawa arti] that the Basis 
of Islam is narrower, even though Islam is a heavenly religion whose truth values are 
absolute and universal.  
Thirdly, the idea of “the Singular Basis of Pancasila” represents a repudiation 
[pengingkaran] of the contributions of the Muslim community in the liberation of 
Indonesia and the rise of the New Order. Fourthly, the idea of “the Singular Basis of 
Pancasila” is a violation [pemerkosaan; rape] of the true values [nilai-nilai hakiki] of 
democracy. Fifthly, the idea of “the Singular Basis of Pancasila” is the slaughter 
[pembantaian] of civil and social rights [hak-hak warga dan masyarakat]. (171).
64
  
This speech, nominally delivered to the judges hearing the trial, demonstrates a mastery of the 
Pancasila rhetorical forms. By accusing the state of betrayal (pengkhianatan), Syarifin Maloko 
invokes the potent language of the New Order’s own origins, the “pengkhianatan” of the 
Indonesian Communist Party. Employing the sexualized idiom of New Order domesticity, the 
authentic tradition of democracy is “raped” (pemerkosaan). And the rights asserted by the 
accused are “slaughtered,” recalling the New Order’s founding slaughter. Instead of disputing the 
terms of the New Order, Syarifin Maloko occupies them, marshaling their legitimizing features, 
endlessly reproduced in state ritual. Here Islam has swallowed up the state and is outdoing it in 
its democratic commitments.  
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Ide Asas Tunggal Pancasila adalah sebuah penyimpangan dan pengkhianatan terhadap para pendiri Negara 
dan pengkhianatan pula terhadap Pancasila dan UUD 1945. Kedua, ide Asas Tunggal Pancasila membawa 
arti bahwa Asas Islam lebih sempit, walau Islam adalah agama samawi yang nilai kebenarannya mutlak dan 
universal. 
Ketiga, ide Asas Tunggal Pancasila merupakan pengingkaran terhadap andil umat Islam dalam “Indonesia 
Merdeka” dan kebangkitan Orde Baru. Keempat, ide Asas Tunggal Pancasila adalah pemerkosan akan 
nilai-nilai hakiki demonkrasi. Kelima, ide Asas Tunggal Pancasila adalah pembantaian terhadap hak-hak 
warga dan masyarakat. (171).  
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The Tanjung Priok massacre wouldn’t simply go away. Eventually Suharto hung 
responsibility around the neck of the senior General Leonardus Benjamin (Benny) Moerdani, a 
Catholic. And Suharto himself tried to bolster his Islamic credentials, undertaking a much-
remarked Hajj in 1991, allowing the formation of new Muslim organizations, and reaching out to 
Muslim political constituencies in the search for enduring popular legitimacy. On the activist 
front, however, the sudden violence of the state encouraged greater caution (and a wave of 
retaliatory bombings in Jakarta and at the temple Borobudur). The low profiles of the tarbiyah 
movement and the creeping spread of underground organizations bore the traumatic mark of the 
Tanjung Priok massacre. In assuming sole possession of change – the asas tunggal of Pancasila – 
the state had finally provoked a response it could not contain. The shifts in the internal 
composition of the New Order, accomplished throughout the 1990s, demonstrated either the 
victory of Islam in occupying the state, or the successful appropriation of Islamic authority by 
state actors. What was clear, after Tanjung Priok, is that the state and Islam could no longer 
remain apart. 
Old Order, New Order, Moral Order 
The long-term consequences of the Tanjung Priok affair include the organizational legacy 
left by emboldened Muslim activists contesting the New Order’s ideological monopoly on 
Pancasila.
65
 Changes in the New Order government, responding to this building pressure, also 
contributed to its eventual downfall – although the immediate causes were its sudden exposure as 
a hollow paragon of economic development, an unveiling wrought in the Asian Financial Crisis 
of 1997. In this section we bracket off the New Order, exploring a slice of the executive history 
                                                             
65
 Of course, their efforts did not end with the challenge to the New Order. Multiple observers have traced the 
Reformasi era emergence of highly mobilized Islam to the turmoil of 1980s Indonesia. See, for example, Noorhaidi 
Hasan’s Laskar Jihad; and van Bruinessen’s “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism.” For a much longer historical 
trajectory of reformist impulses, see Michael Laffan’s “The Tangled Roots of Islamist Activism in Southeast Asia.” 
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of President Soekarno that preceded it, and then returning to this thread in the Reformasi period 
that followed in the New Order’s wake. I chart the changing legal prospects of an organization 
known first as the Moral Re-Armament Movement and today as Initiatives of Change Indonesia 
(IofC). Its current iteration is a creature that could only exist in the much-changed legal 
landscape of the Reformasi era. The practices of IofC put much larger social phenomena from 
this period into relief, a prospect that will be explored in Chapter Two below. Here, however, I 
want to focus on how the state has negotiated perceived challenges expressed in moral idioms. 
Before Reformasi, IofC was forbidden.
66
 More accurately, the Moral Re-Armament Movement 
(MRA) was banned, but that is only because the international Initiatives of Change movement 
didn’t yet exist – it rose from the ashes of MRA in 2001.  
Initiatives of Change is the direct descendent of the now-defunct MRA, a history 
explored in far greater detail in Chapter Two. The story of Initiatives of Change Indonesia, or 
how an evangelical Christian group became a Muslim network for social and spiritual self-
improvement, is also the story of the changing relationship between the State and Islam in 
independent Indonesia. Put another way, the recent history of IofC sheds light on an evolving 
idea of the secular forged within Indonesian social and political institutions. This is the purported 
secularism that characterizes the Pancasila state – an always uncertain prospect, as we have 
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 In this sense, it shared a fate with other groups that flourished during Reformasi – prohibited during the New 
Order, triumphant in its wake. For example, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), a local iteration of a global movement 
calling for the re-establishment of unified Islamic political sovereignty (although formally eschewing violent means 
towards this end) seemingly exploded onto the scene in 2000, but its roots extend at least to the same moment in 
which the tarbiyah (Islamic education – “self education” in small study groups) movement of the 1980s emerged. In 
this respect HTI is like Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party – an Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood 
affiliate), part of a global resurgence in interest in Muslim politics (Daminak Fenomena Partai Keadilan; Munabari 
“Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia,” see also Rachel Rinaldo’ “Muslim Women, Middle Class Habitus, and Modernity in 
Indonesia” for an ethnography set amongst PKS supporters). IofC, while voicing very different politics than PKS or 
HTI, deserves to be understood as part of the same organizational efflorescence.  
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demonstrated. The institutional history behind the expulsion of MRA from Indonesia has 
everything to do with how the state arrogated the task of managing change to itself.  
Because the Moral Re-Armament Movement had been outlawed by President Soekarno 
in 1962, Initiatives of Change Indonesia only became a possibility with Presidential Edict 69 
(henceforth PE 69-2000) signed by President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) on May 23, 2000. 
This decree reversed President Soekarno’s Presidential Edict 264 of 1962 (PE 264-1962). PE 
264-1962 had consolidated a number of presidential decrees issued over the preceding three 
years that sought to legislate against the perceived influence of foreign organizations, 
particularly those associated with or imagined to be associated with the Freemasons. Included in 
this list were: the Vrijmetselaren Loge (Freemason Lodge); the Rotary Club; the Moral Re-
Armament Movement; the Divine Life Society; the Ancient Mystical Organization of Rucen 
Cruisers (sic Rosae Crucis or Rosicrucian, AMORC); the Democracy League (Liga Demokrasi); 
the Baha’i Faith; and the Raden Saleh Foundation.67 In addition to stemming the influence of 
Western conspirators, represented by the Freemasons, the decree also served to block the 
proselytizing efforts of new mystical-religious movements, like AMORC and the Divine Life 
Society, the latter springing from the teachings of Swami Sivananda Saraswati in India. A purely 
domestic enemy was seen in the Liga Demokrasi, the consortium of religious and non-
communist parties opposing the expanded influence of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) 
                                                             
67
 The Freemasons Lodge and the Rotary Club probably require no introduction. The Divine Life Society is yoga-
centered tradition founded in 1930s India that assertively promotes its model of spiritual attainment. AMORC is an 
early twentieth century organization, although it locates its own origins in ancient Egpyt, which is dedicated to 
“humanistic” spiritual exploration. The Democracy League was a consortium of religious and right-leaning 
organizations and political parties that opposed the expanded influence of the Indonesian Communist Party during 
the “Guided Democracy” period of Soekarno’s rule that began with the suspension of the legislature in 1957. The 
Baha’I were presumptively suspect according to both the Muslim members of Soekarno’s constituency and to the 
communists, who had little patience for yet another groups proclaiming salvation through moral work, rather than 
structural equality. Yayasan Raden Saleh, or the Raden Saleh Foundation, took its name from the painter discussed 
above in the context of Diponegoro’s capture. The historical Raden Saleh had been inducted into a Freemason lodge 
in the Netherlands, and this organization was the Indonesian iteration of the Theosophical Society, a sometimes 
Masonic-allied “spiritual” movement that had enormous traction in late colonial Dutch East Indies.   
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and advocating for a return to parliamentary democracy. The inclusion of the Moral Re-
Armament Movement is linked to the broader MRA organization’s avid anti-communist 
activities as much as it is connected to the fear of (not wholly unrelated) masonic conspiracies. 
 The organizations prohibited through PE 264-1962 were a diverse collection, and 
Soekarno articulated several overlapping reasons to account for this grouping in the consolidated 
edict Peraturan Penguasa Perang Tertinggi Republik Indonesia Nomor 9 Tahun 1962 (Regulation 
of the Supreme War Commander of the Republic of Indonesia Number 9 Year 1962; henceforth 
PP 9-1962). Firstly and damningly, they were held to be “unwilling to accept and sustain the 
Political Manifesto” (yang tidak mau menerima dan mempertahankan Manifesto Politik), which 
is to say they opposed the official governing principles enshrined by Soekarno under the auspices 
of Guided Democracy, the regime inaugurated in 1957 establishing executive supremacy as the 
political order. In the preamble to PP 9-1962, the document refers to the “prohibition against 
organizations that aren’t consistent with the Indonesian identity, obstruct the fulfillment of the 
revolution or oppose the socialist Aspirations [caps original] of Indonesia” (Larangan adanya 
organisasi yang tidak sesuai dengan kepribadian Indonesia, menghambat penyelesaian revolusi 
atau bertentangan dengan Cita-cita sosialisme Indonesia…). The language here is instructive, 
since it demonstrates the moral force of the nationalist project. Soekarno is advocating 
revolutionary prospects that flow exclusively through the organs of the state. The mere presence 
of possible sources of change outside of the state constitutes an obstruction. All organizational 
life in the archipelago must accede to this logic – although leftist-internationalist organizations 
were still tolerated in the Republic.  
 Both the revolutionary boilerplate and the strange construction of “Indonesian identity” 
(kepribadian Indonesia; also Indonesian character) add to these rhetorical effects. Far more 
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typical in post-Independence Indonesia is the formulation “kepribadian bangsa Indonesia,” or 
the “Indonesian national character,” a phrase usually connected to the governing ideology of 
Pancasila, discussed at length above. The elision of bangsa, in this edict, ascribes to the state 
qualities typically linked with the nation or with individuals: Indonesia has an identity, rather 
than “Indonesians.” This introduces an ambivalence to the construction – it means at once the 
character of (the state of) Indonesia and Indonesian identity, an implicit idealized set of attributes 
possessed by some imaginary exemplary citizen. MRA, with its emphasis on individual moral 
uplift (the explicit aim of the organization) and its propagation by cells (along with itss anti-
communist advocacy), probably “obstructed the fulfillment of the revolution and opposed the 
socialist aspirations of Indonesia.” It also might not have been consistent with the character of 
Indonesia(ns). Its focus on personal moral efficacy was at odds with the collectivist winds 
blowing across the Islands; its muddled Christian heritage (see below) obscuring the easy 
legibility of a known denomination and thus state recognition. And so it was banned. 
The expulsion of MRA from Indonesia was related to me on several occasions during the 
time I spent at IofC, fieldwork at the heart of Chapters Two and Three. In the narratives shared 
with me, IofC was the anachronistic object of the ban, and the ban was attributed to President 
Suharto rather than President Soekarno. Given the emancipatory associations (re)imagined with 
respect to Soekarno post-Reformasi, the prohibition of IofC (MRA) felt more like the repressive 
handiwork of Suharto. This kind of sleight-of-history was common in my conversations with 
interlocutors on a variety of subjects. Perhaps most tellingly, krismon, the “monetary crisis” that 
precipitated the fall of Suharto was reimagined to have taken place after said fall, during the 
Reformasi period. In this way the development rhetoric of Suharto was protected from the 
ravages of history, and the economic uncertainty that occasioned (and followed) his fall was 
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given fuller affective weight: Suharto’s ouster caused the monetary crisis. The political 
instability, easily accessed in living memory, that followed Suharto’s resignation thus came to 
max the economic fear that preceded it, as the two became conflated. This defense of the Suharto 
legacy seemed to reflect the interior depths to which the state’s narrative had penetrated rather 
than any volitional assent to its propaganda. Even when I pressed on these points, most people 
could provide the “correct” chronology, but also quickly reverted to the more “felt” relationship 
between events. The narrative die so cast, seldom broken. 
By the time of Gus Dur’s presidency (1999-2001), the socialist aspirations of Indonesia 
had long since been entombed in unmarked graves, littered across the archipelago. The 
revolution had been concluded (the revolutionaries lost), and so its obstruction no longer 
represented a compelling state interest. Only the idea of an Indonesian Identity remained from 
Soekarno’s Regulation as Supreme War Commander, PP 9-1962. This final concern had been, 
however, subject to considerable revision during the intervening years of the New Order. The 
characteristics rejected as inconsistent with an Indonesian identity in 1962 may not have felt so 
threatening in the year 2000.  Even though in repealing PE 264-1962 Gus Dur articulated an 
altogether different set of interests, he echoed the language of the original edict in one important 
respect – that of “not fitting,” or “inconsistent” (tidak sesuai). The logic of the repeal was laid 
out in four points in the preamble:   
a) that the establishment of civic and religious social organizations, in its essence, comprises 
a fundamental right of every Indonesian citizen 
b) that the prohibition of the organizations intended by Presidential Decision Nomor 264 
Tahun 1962 [PE 264-1962], is considered to be no longer consistent with democratic 
principles 
c) that although in reality [PE 264-1962] is no longer in effect, for the purpose of providing 
greater legal certainty it is necessary to unequivocally repeal said decree  
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d) that on the basis of the assessment undertaken in points a, b and c above, it is considered 
necessary to repeal [PE 264-1962].
68
 
Whereas Soekarno warned against organizations that were “not consistent with Indonesian 
identity,” Gus Dur rues prohibitions that are “no longer consistent with democratic principles” 
(emphasis mine). The first deals with timeless essences – be it state or individual – the second is 
time-limited and contingent. Gus Dur’s is a historical argument about state exigencies, rather 
than a transcendent ontological claim. The text suggests an expanded understanding of 
“democratic principles,” or perhaps a more imperative application of the same. The revolution, 
the aspirations, and indeed the Indonesian identity are no longer invoked. In subtle shifts like 
this, President Gus Dur attempted to dictate a vision of Islamic pluralism. Foregrounding the 
historical (human) nature of state law set up an implicit contrast with the eternal injunctions of a 
divine order. This becomes clearer with a closer look at some of the language of the edict. 
 The word I have glossed as “essence” in point (a) is hakekat, a loan word from Arabic 
that appears frequently in contemporary Indonesian discourse. An Indonesian transliteration of 
haqiqa, the radical, haqqa, means “to be true,” but also “to be imperative or necessary.”69 One of 
the Divine names, al-Haqq, or The Truth/Real/Reality is another variant on this root. There are a 
variety of synonyms that could have been employed in the decree here to mean, “in essence; at 
its core, in reality.” Instead the specific valences of hakekat smuggle in a variety of associations 
                                                             
a. 68 bahwa pembentukan organisasi social kemasyarakatan dan keagamaan pada hakekatnya merupakan hak 
asasi setiap warganegara Indonesia; 
b. bahwa larangan terhadap organisasi-organisasi sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Keputausan Presiden Nomor 
264 Tahun 1962, dipandang sudah tidak sesuai lagi dengan prinsip-prinsip demokrasi; 
c. bahwa meskipun dalam kenyataannya [PE 264-1962] sudah tidak efektif lagi, namun untuk lebih 
memberikan kepastian hukum perlu secara tegas mencabut Keputusan Presiden tersebut 
d. bahwa berdasarkan pertimbangan sebagaimana dimaksud huruf a, b, dan huruc c di atas, maka dipandang 
perlu untuk mencabut [PE 264-1962]  
 
69
 Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, 191. 
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that belie a seemingly affirmative declaration of (democratic, secular) rights. In normative Sufi 
discourse, hakekat/haqiqa is the third stage of the seeker’s progress, following shariah (the 
road/the law/the manifest way), tarekat/tariqa (the path/the initiated order/the internal way) and 
preceding makrifat/ma’rifa (unified knowledge/gnosis). Gus Dur, with his background as the 
leader (and grandson of the founder) of the traditionalist organization Nahdlatul Ulama is 
intimately familiar with this trajectory. Through his word selection, Gus Dur appears to be 
recognizing universal democratic principles, while simultaneously casting them as divine in 
origin through reference to Ultimate Reality. Again, hakekat is the stage at which the seeker sees 
things as they really are, makrifat being the level at which the distinction between the seeker 
seeing and the things seen is annihilated. The fundamental right to association, in Gus Dur’s 
telling, is nothing less than part of the nature of Reality. And so, in addition to the organizations 
listed above, Gus Dur lifted the ban on the Baha’i enacted in PE 264-1962 since the rights of this 
religious community to congregate are also ultimately divine.  
 In this decree, Gus Dur was asserting a vision of the state that allowed for the existence 
of previously threatening organizations – that acknowledged sources of change beyond the ambit 
of the state and out of reach of its regulations.  In PE 264-1962 Soekarno was striving to protect 
several constituencies – established religious organizations that resented new ethico-mystical 
proselytizers; the Communist Party; and a national project threatened by foreign intervention. 
Anti-communist advocacy is still state dogma (Gus Dur’s efforts to repeal the legislation 
outlawing Communist ideology met stiff resistance in 2000), and the fear of foreign intervention 
and new spiritual movements remain pertinent for core constituencies of the post-New Order 
political spectrum. Gus Dur rejected these fears with the language of rights (hak), and the 
procedural force of law. If one could simply disregard the esoteric baggage of hakekat above, 
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Gus Dur could be interpreted here as acceding to a secularizing impulse. In this telling, 
transcendent democratic values, fundamental rights and the attendant assumptions of a certain 
genealogy of political philosophy triumph. But Gus Dur’s position is altogether more 
complicated than that. Rather than the recursive re-inscription of the secular (the neutral base 
always located at the foot of public discourse), Gus Dur’s move aspires to a pluralist ideology 
that relies on an acknowledgement of the divine. This ideology was articulated in the language of 
the Pancasila, re-investing this foundational contract with renewed legitimacy and undermining 
the official interpretation of the ideology inculcated during the latter two decades of the New 
Order government. Gus Dur’s bold pluralism restored the central philosophical document of the 
independent state to its status as a primary site for the contest of public meanings, precisely by 
re-enfolding it within a divine embrace. Gus Dur’s heroism notwithstanding, the Indonesian state 
project has continued to trundle along in pursuit of managing change, evincing the long shadow 
of the colonial encounter with Islam.   
The Autobiography of the Ministry of Religion 
The current Ministry of Religion, heir to the colonial Office of Arab and Native Affairs, 
is still tasked with defining the boundaries of religion in the archipelago. This means that the 
state, along with ensuring the smooth operation of religious projects, still has a vested interest in 
the soulcraft of individual moral attainment. Managing change is a key feature of the 
bureaucracy’s operation – changes within the educational institutions it oversees, but also 
changes in theology and practice as they are instantiated throughout the populace. How the state 
anticipates change emanating from religion can be seen in how it curates its own past: the history 
of the state management of religion, as imagined by the state. Conveniently, the Ministry 
commissioned precisely such a history. Different regional branches of the Ministry of Religion 
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maintain this text on their websites, as does the central website for the national office of the 
Ministry, where it sits right next to the “Mission and Vision” of the bureaucracy. It is a 
kaleidoscopic account, worth exploring in detail. If individual political actors like President 
Abdurrahman Wahid imagined a pluralist society anchored in the Islamic tradition, the Ministry 
suggests some of the barriers to that vision: a narrow vision of Islam obsessed with its own 
boundaries. 
The author of “Sejarah Kementerian Agama” (the History of the Ministry of Religion), 
starts by writing,  
The Indonesian nation [bangsa] is a religious [religious] nation. That fact is well 
reflected in social life [kehidupan bermasyarakat] as well as in political life [kehidupan 
bernegara; the life of statehood]. In community settings the ever increasing radiance and 
solemnity of religious activities [kegiatan keagamaan] are visible, both in the form of 
rituals and in the form of religious sociality [sosial keagamaan].
70
 
 
Here the character of the nation, its inhabitants, and the life within the actual state (kehidupan 
bernegara) are all characterized as religious. The fact, then, is enhanced by state policy, in 
particular by the realization of the official ideology of Pancasila: “In carrying out national 
development the aforementioned religious ardor [semangat keagamaan] was strengthened by the 
formal articulation [ditetapkan] of the bases [asas] of faith [keimanan] and God-consciousness 
[ketaqwaan] towards Tuhan yang Maha Esa [Absolutely Unitary Divinity] as one of the 
foundations [asas] of development.”71 The density of this ideological formulation is breath-
taking. The New Order and post-New Order mantra of development is linked to the 
deconfessionalized (Islamic) divinity of Tuhan yang Maha Esa, which is simultaneously re-
                                                             
70
 Bangsa Indonesia adalah bangsa yang religius. Hal tersebut tercermin baik dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat 
maupun dalam kehidupan bernegara. Di lingkungan masyarakat-terlihat terus meningkat kesemarakan dan 
kekhidmatan kegiatan keagamaan baik dalam bentuk ritual, maupun dalam bentuk sosial keagamaan. 
71
 Dalam pelaksanaan pembangunan nasional semangat keagamaan tersebut menj adi lebih kuat dengan 
ditetapkannya asas keimanan dan ketaqwaan terhadap Tuhan yang Maha Esa sebagai salah satu asas pembangunan.  
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Islamized by the ascription of iman and taqwa, faith and God-consciousness, respectively, core 
Islamic values concerning the relation between the worshipper and the divine. The proliferation 
of meanings allows the reader to “get off the train of signification” at the right spot – national 
development, for those so-inclined; Tuhan yang Maha Esa for the non-Muslims; and iman and 
taqwa for the majority of the (Muslim) audience.  
The document continues its Muslim-not-Muslim dance, providing a synopsis of 
Indonesian history that almost fully elides the involvement of non-Muslim actors. After speeding 
through a one-sentence history of Hindu kingdoms, the author pays tribute to the Buddhist 
empires in the archipelago, pausing to brag that even Chinese students of the tradition ventured 
there to study. Then Islam arrives, and shortly thereafter, the Dutch. The author first writes, “In 
the history of the national struggle against Dutch colonialism, many kings [raja] and nobles 
[kalangan bangsawan] rose against the colonists,” followed by a list of such figures. All are 
Muslim, and the Acehnese are particularly well represented (Teuku Umar, his spouse Cut Nyak 
Dien, Panglima Polim, Iskandar Muda [who fought not the Dutch, but the Portuguese], and 
Teuku Cik Ditiro). Conveniently, this is a list of recognized “national heroes,” who here become 
advocates of the not-yet existing Indonesian nation, defended on the basis of Islam. The author 
then describes what unites the diverse figures of his list, employing the titular formulations used 
in the Islamic kingdoms of Central Java.   
All of these national heroes, according to the author, occupied positions in their 
respective governments (a somewhat spurious claim, given that many were Acehnese guerillas 
opposing the Dutch after the fall of Banda Aceh, sacked in January 1874 during the Second Aceh 
Expedition). These governments, in turn, are imagined to share certain features. The Ministry’s 
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history reads, “the systems of governance of the above kingdoms, in general, always contained 
and conducted the following functions:”72 
1. A general governmental role, a fact reflected in the title “His Royal Highness the 
King” [Sampean Dalem Hingkang Sinuhun]73 as the executor of general 
governmental roles 
2. A religious leadership role reflected in the title “Master of Religion, Vice-Regent of 
God” [Sayidin Panatagama Kalifatulah]74  
3. A security and defense role, reflected in the kingly title “Commander on the 
Battlefield” [Senopati Hing Ngalogo].75 
The ascription of these very particular Central Javanese royal titles to all sorts of figures who 
opposed the Dutch is strangely ahistorical for a document headed by sejarah (history). These 
titles, used by Central Javanese Islamic kings, become instrumental descriptions of idealized 
governance that apply even to Acehnese guerillas fighting an invading Dutch army. In this way, 
Islam gets read back into the core of a nationalist historiography while the whole nationalist 
constellation becomes subsumed under the signs of Javanese kingship (Benedict Anderson 
would be proud!).  
 The idiosyncratic blending of highly particular historical forms with broad nationalist 
conceits continues throughout the document. Immediately following the description of the shared 
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 Pola pemerintahan kerajaan-kerajaan tersebut diatas pada umumnya selalu memiliki dan melaksanakan fungsi 
sebagai berikut: 
73
 The full phrase, Sampean dalem Hingkang Sinuhun Kangjeng Susuhunan, could be rendered “Beneath the Royal 
Foot of the Exalted Revered/Worshipped One,” according to Nancy Florida. This phrase, used by the Surakarta 
Court in Central Java, denotes something like political sovereignty, and thus the author of the Ministry history uses 
it as the exemplar of a particular function. 
74
 Nancy Florida suggests “The blessed upholder of the faith, Caliph of God” for Sayidin Panatagama Kalifatulah in 
an effort to reflect the richer sense of this Arabic-Javanese formulation.  
75
  
1. Fungsi pemerintahan umum, hal ini tercermin pada gelar “Sampean Dalem Hingkang Sinuhun” sebagai 
pelaksana fungsi pemerintahan umum.  
2. Fungsi pemimpin keagamaan tercermin pada gelar “Sayidin Panatagama Kalifatulah.”  
3. Fungsi keamanan dan pertahanan, tercermin dalam gelar raja “Senopati Hing Ngalogo.” 
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roles of nationalist religious heroes, the author introduces the following historical aside, which 
warrants being excerpted in its entirety: 
During the Dutch colonial era, from the 16
th
 century until the middle of the 20
th
 century, 
the Netherlands East Indies government also “managed” [mengatur, scare quotes 
original] services for religious life [kehidupan beragama]. Of course, said religious 
“services” [pelayanan, quotes original] weren’t free from the strategic interests of Dutch 
colonialism. Dr. C. Snuck Hurgronye [sic], a Netherlands East Indies government 
advisor, in his book “Nederland en de Islam” (Brill, Leiden 1911), suggested the 
following: “In all truth the right principle holds that the interference of the government in 
religious domains is wrong; however one shouldn’t forget that within the Islamic system 
(of state forms) are found many issues that cannot be separated from their relations with 
religion, so an effective government cannot be at all hesitant to administer them.”76 
 
The latter half of this claim, the citation of Snouck Hurgronje, precedes a brief institutional 
history: the document next introduces the administrative divisions responsible for religion in the 
colony followed by their successor units during the Japanese Occupation. However the inclusion 
of Snouck is unstable: the quote asserts that, although the general principle of non-interference is 
sound, because Muslims are insufficiently secular they must be closely governed. Is this an 
example of the misadministration practiced by the Dutch, or is Snouck imagined as a neutral 
authority legitimizing the continued state management of religion? Given the purview of the 
Ministry of Religion, I suspect it is the latter. By invoking the figure that did as much as anyone 
to shape Islamic political horizons in Indonesia, the Ministry of Religion adopts the mantle of 
colonial religious administration.  
                                                             
76
 Pada masa penjajahan Belanda sejak abad XVI sampai pertengahan abad XX pemerintahan Hindia Belanda juga 
“mengatur” pelayanan kehidupan beragama. Tentu saja “pelayanan” keagamaan tersebut tak terlepas dari 
kepentingan strategi kolonialisme Belanda. Dr.C. Snuck Hurgronye, seorang penasehat pemerintah Hindia Belanda 
dalam bukunya “Nederland en de Islam” (Brill, Leiden 1911) menyarankan sebagai berikut: “Sesungguhnya 
menurut prinsip yang tepat, campur tangan pemerintah dalam bidang agama adalah salah, namun jangan dilupakan 
bahwa dalam sistem (tata negara) Islam terdapat sejumlah permasalahan yang tidak dapat dipisahkan hubungannya 
dengan agama yang bagi suatu pemerintahan yang baik, sama sekali tidak boleh lalai untuk mengaturnya.” 
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After sourcing its legitimacy to the late colonial order, this history finally delivers the 
reader towards the Independence of the Indonesian nation promised throughout the document: 
“Philosophically, socio-politically and historically, religion to the Indonesian nation is something 
in the sinews and roots of its life as a nation. This is the reason why religious leaders and figures 
always appear in the vanguard of the movement and the struggle for independence, whether 
through political parties or other methods.”77 Thus the nationalist enterprise is re-conceived as a 
religious project, riddled with Islamic markers but expressed in the deconfessionalized idiom of 
“agama.” Then the Ministry finally dates its own birth: “The establishment of the Department of 
Religion [precursor to the Ministry] on January 3, 1946, roughly five months after the 
proclamation of Independence, is rooted in the aforementioned foundational attributes [sifat 
dasar] and characteristics [karakteristik] of the Indonesian Nation, while also realizing and 
instantiating the ideology of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.”78 Thus from its founding, 
the Ministry of Religion is imagined to be a manifestation of the timeless universal ideology 
expressed in the Pancasila, and simultaneously a bureaucratic form capable of guaranteeing the 
rights enumerated in the founding Constitution. The document ends with a citation of that 
constitution, specifically Article 29 as it relates to the grounding of the nation in Tuhan yang 
Maha Esa, coupled with the right of free exercise of religion accorded to the inhabitants of 
Indonesia.  
 I introduce this particular document, at such length, because of its unique perspective as a 
bureaucratic autobiography. The elements arranged within this history, varying from the 
                                                             
77
 Secara filosofis, sosio politis dan historis agama bagi bangsa Indonesia sudah berurat dan berakar dalam 
kehidupan bangsa. Itulah sebabnya para tokoh dan pemuka agama selalu tampil sebagai pelopor pergerakan dan 
perjuangan kemerdekaan baik melalui partai politik maupun sarana lainnya.  
78
 Berdirinya Departemen Agama pada 3 Januari 1946, sekitar lima bulan setelah proklamasi kemerdekaan kecuali 
berakar dari sifat dasar dan karakteristik bangsa Indonesia tersebut di atas juga sekaligus sebagai realisasi dan 
penjabaran ideologi Pancasila dan UUD 1945  
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nationalist general to the ethnic and Islamic particular, are highly suggestive of how the 
postcolonial state understands its role in regulating religion. Islam becomes a potent source of 
dynamism, but it is directed exclusively towards the ends of the Nation. Incredibly diverse 
Muslim actors are recast as the secular liberal Muslims of Snouck’s imagination. Imam Bonjol, 
one of the listed heroes of the Ministry’s history, is no longer fighting for Islamic reform in the 
Minang heartland. He is now a harbinger of the united Indonesian state, a paragon of the 
transhistorical governing logics of sovereignty, religion and security. Whereas the colonial state 
fantasized about recruiting Islam into a project of docile modernity, the postcolonial state sees in 
religion only the advocates of the nation. The all/nothing hypothesis survives into the present. 
Projects of moral transformation remain constrained by this legacy: with structural intervention 
foreclosed, the changes promised by diverse discourses remain resolutely located in the hearts of 
individuals.    
The Possibilities of Change 
Understanding how "change" came to be marshaled – constrained and produced, 
moderated by the efforts of a state – demands that we return to the history of the state 
management of religion. Islam has been imagined as a potent reservoir of change by colonial and 
postcolonial powers alike.  In essence, the first concerted effort by the Dutch to manage the 
social, political and moral force of Islam was repression. By abstracting Islam from the life of the 
Indies subjects, its transformative potential was imagined to be neutralized. This process was 
greatly accelerated and consolidated by the Dutch trauma resulting from the Diponegoro War. 
After the attempt to “interpret out” Islam became untenable, a recognition galvanized by the 
Aceh War, the next approach to managing change saw Islam as a source of personal import, but 
expressly forbade its social and political potentials. The effort to interiorize Islam can be 
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understood as an attempt to secularize the tradition. This new development did not overturn the 
hard distinction between “native” tradition and “foreign” Islam, so much as it imagined a third, 
mediating pole. Thus the purified category of Islam, ostensibly opposed to local custom, was 
enlisted as a moral vehicle for a vision of modernity that denied religion broader social 
implications: they would do it to themselves, organically, once the seed of western modernity 
had been planted within their hearts. 
The Japanese, arriving in the archipelago on their own imperial project, sought to restore 
the political aspirations of Islam, although bending them to the Japanese vision of pan-Asian 
dominance. Once loosed, of course, these aspirations were not easily marshaled. The returning 
Dutch, fresh from liberation from their own Nazi occupiers, came back to highly mobilized 
Islam, a core column in the incredibly diverse anti-colonial Independence forces. Unable to 
recognize a thing as itself – too invested in a hundred year history that either denied Islam or 
relegated it to moral inferiority – they interpreted these movements as symptoms, evidence 
of other "real," base motivations. Thus Islamic political activism became read as variously, 
continued Japanese machinations, or (however implausibly) as a front for communist agitation. 
Newly independent Indonesia re-calibrated the governance of religion once more. Islam was no 
longer (just) a foreign tradition, but its entrance into political domains still required careful state 
management, a process complicated by the state’s uneasy compromise of deconfessionalized 
religion.  
Successive regimes responded differently to this impulse, ultimately yielding 
circumstances where the transformative potential of the Islamic tradition resided principally in its 
personal moral effects. Islam and the possibilities of change became more fraught. Internal to the 
tradition, the sources of change are imagined as the conformance of an individual to the 
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exemplary character of the Prophet and the explicit obligations of the scripture. The revelation is 
the revelation because of its unchanging character and authenticated ahadith are a finite resource 
– change, then, must often come from without, but only insofar as it does not corrupt or alter 
either the revelation or the recorded traditions. Islam is thus imagined as an unchanging vehicle 
for change. Meanwhile, the vast exterior of the tradition (not cognized as such in prior epochs), 
became its own reservoir of change for Muslim actors accessing it in the present. Borrowing 
from "non-Muslim" tradition, provided it remained marked as such, became one more means of 
attaining desired changes.   
Muslims acting in Indonesia today, envisioning a change in their subjectivity, 
relationality or society, are thus encouraged to look beyond their borders. Outside of the national 
territory of Indonesia and beyond the theological domain of Islam. The cosmopolitanism of the 
nationalist tradition ensures that whatever is found can be made meaningfully Indonesian, while 
the flexibility of the Islamic approaches to knowledge promise, similarly, that providing the 
knowledge is not misrepresented as Islam, it too can be incorporated into the repertoire of the 
believers. The inheritors of this legacy interact with its discursive effects – interiorized religion 
and objectified tradition as real and natural categories. That is not to say, however, that they 
merely replicate their structures. At Initiatives of Change Indonesia and Kahfi Motivator School, 
religion, tradition and science are reassembled into novel configurations. The product of their 
hybridizing discourse deserves serious attention as something new, with new features and new 
arcs, while maintaining the frame of its historical antecedents. The following chapters set out to 
pursue the “newness” of the phenomenon alongside an abiding interest in the “strangeness” of 
the seemingly familiar. 
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Chapter 2 
Changing Hearts and Lives at Initiatives of Change Indonesia 
Moral Re-Armament has the tremendous uniting power that comes from change in both East and 
West. It gives the full dimension of change. Economic change. Social change. National change. 
International change. All based on personal change. It creates a personal opinion that can change 
the fate of nations. It presents a force adequate to remake the world. It shows how to unite nation 
and nation, and creates inspired democracy in families, industries, cabinets and nations. It is the 
inspired living that makes nations think and live. It has God’s mind. 
-Frank Buchman, addressing the World Assembly for Moral Re-Armament.  
Caux, Switzerland June 4, 1949 
The genuineness of religion is thus indissolubly bound up with the question whether the 
prayerful consciousness be or be not deceitful. The conviction that something is genuinely 
transacted in this consciousness is the very core of living religion. As to what is transacted, great 
differences of opinion have prevailed. The unseen powers have been supposed, and are yet 
supposed, to do things which no enlightened man can nowadays believe in. It may well prove 
that the sphere of influence in prayer is subjective exclusively, and that what is immediately 
changed is only the mind of the praying person. But however our opinion of prayer's effects may 
come to be limited by criticism, religion, in the vital sense in which these lectures study it, must 
stand or fall by the persuasion that effects of some sort genuinely do occur. Through prayer, 
religion insists, things which cannot be realized in any other manner come about: energy which 
but for prayer would be bound is by prayer set free and operates in some part, be it objective or 
subjective, of the world of facts. 
-William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 466  
 
 I went to Indonesia, in no small part, to better understand how history and historical 
narratives were employed by young people as they voiced political and moral aspirations. This 
required access not only to young people, but to young people waging (acknowledged as well as 
 
 
103 
 
naturalistically observable) moral and historical arguments.
79
 Given my formal institutional 
sponsorship at the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah (UIN), it made sense to first look 
for this in the vicinity of the campus. So it was particularly serendipitous when, having just 
arrived in Jakarta, I was invited to participate in the Initiatives of Change Indonesia community 
(IofC).
80
 Here was a collective intensely concerned with broad social interventions predicated on 
personal moral transformations. Of course at the time I had no idea (a) who they were; (b) what 
they wanted; or (c) from where their organization came. Answers to these questions emerged 
only piecemeal through my interactions with IofC. As I gained a greater understanding of IofC I 
was also alerted to other, ultimately more compelling, questions: what was meant by change, 
what kind of subjectivity was conceived in change and who was the agent who could accomplish 
change?  
In this chapter I introduce two arguments central to the larger project. The first is an 
ethnographic and rhetorical analysis of the processes by which knowledge and practices become 
meaningfully localized.  This enterprise departs from the organizational history and operations of 
Initiatives of Change Indonesia. I argue that discrete practices of translation augment inventive 
framing to allow something of acknowledged “foreign” and “non-Islamic” provenance to 
become recognizably Indonesian and Islamic. By examining what is, and what is not, translated 
within IofC we can witness the unfolding of these practices as well as the presumed epistemic 
neutrality of English as a (non-sacred) language of science and commerce. In a sense, this is a 
                                                             
79
 That is to say, I was interested both in arguments that I elicited and those that I observed, overheard or were 
related secondhand to me.    
80
 Throughout this chapter I distinguish between “Initiatives of Change” and “Initiatives of Change Indonesia” 
(IofC). Although the international parent organization also frequently refers to itself and its membership as “IofC,” it 
is useful to preserve a distinction between the primarily English-language doctrines, practices and spaces of 
“Initiatives of Change” and the primarily Indonesian-language iterations of this movement here referred to as IofC. 
Thus the abbreviated form should always be taken to denote the Ciputat, Indonesia-based chapter of the larger 
organization. 
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study of how a knowledge or a technology is “changed” to enable “change.” This delivers us to 
the second, related argument: that the subjective changes envisioned within these procedures 
reflect deceptively complicated models of agency and efficacy. The idea that, because of its 
genealogical evangelical linkages, IofC is already known to us must be attacked along two 
fronts: a) that the “original” tradition is not as familiar to us as we might think; b) that novelty 
and hybridity inhere to the processes of localization and adaption and demand a fuller account. 
The novel synthesis at IofC draws on the categories of ostensibly morally-neutral science and 
objectified Islam familiar to us from our historical discussion in the previous chapter. However 
the results of this synthesis exceed the sum of its constituent elements, demonstrating an 
enduring vitality in defiance of colonial and postcolonial projects of carefully managed change.   
Joining Initiatives of Change      
 My first introduction to IofC came from one of their members. This young man was also 
a volunteer at the International Office in the Rectorate (central administration) of UIN. The 
International Office at UIN handles the administrative needs of both the growing number of 
foreign students attending the institution and the foreign travels of students, faculty and staff 
from the university. The IofC member had only recently started volunteering in the office when I 
stopped by for advice on securing near-campus housing. An administrator suggested that he help 
me find a kos (rented room) near campus, and so the two of us departed on his motorbike. As we 
toured different rental units, he mentioned that he was part of an organization – IofC, although I 
didn’t catch the name at the time – and that I was welcome to attend their weekly gathering, to be 
held two days later on Saturday. In keeping with my overarching methodology (the anthropology 
of “sure”), I assented with the promise to text message him for a lift come Saturday. Shortly 
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thereafter we found a fitting unit, just northeast of the UIN campus, in the neighborhood of 
Kampung Utan. And so I had a friend, somewhere to live, and a meeting to attend. 
 My new friend picked me up just after Ashr, afternoon worship, on Saturday.
81
 We 
traveled the short distance to the organizational headquarters of IofC (via text message, I now 
knew at least the contraction of its name). We crossed the main north-south artery that divides 
UIN’s primary campus from its graduate and medical schools and traveled through a residential 
neighborhood arriving at an unassuming pale green house. Midway down a street just wide 
enough for a single car, the single-story dwelling already had several motorbikes parked on the 
tile verandah within its gates. I was led first into a small anteroom. The walls were adorned with 
framed photographs of previous events with names like “Youth Leadership Conference” and 
“Asia-Pacific Youth Conference.” A small wicker love seat and two wicker chairs completed the 
furnishings. A heavy-set man of about my age greeted me, introduced himself, and welcomed me 
to the “Secretariat of Initiatives of Change Indonesia.”  
 The Secretariat, in addition to the anteroom, comprised a large meeting room devoid of 
furniture, a kitchen, three bedrooms, a bathroom, and a small loft. An adjoining structure added 
two more bedrooms and an additional bathroom. Senior members of the organization occupied 
the various bedrooms, although other people often stayed over. That day’s gathering began, 
however, before I could fully orient myself to the space – my grand tour came later. Six or seven 
women, seven or eight men including myself were seated around the perimeter of the large 
meeting room. A banner (spanduk) hung on the wall, announcing in English, “Initiatives of 
                                                             
81
 Throughout this project I default to Indonesian Islamic terminology. Thus Ashr is written, in lieu of Asr, and 
Subuh refers to morning worship instead of Fajr. Additionally, throughout I identity obligatory worship cycles 
(salat, sholat or shalat in Indonesian, ṣalāt or ṣalāh in Arabic) as such, which is to say, not as “prayer.” To avoid 
confusion, doa is glossed as prayer or supplication. Doa can be performed by anyone, anywhere. Performance of 
salat is obligated at set times, forbidden at others, and has ritual requirements that distinguish it from free-form 
entreaties directed to God.   
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Change Indonesia: Change Begins with Me” (and this is the “change,” perubahan, that need not 
take an object). More photographs ringed the room, along with several framed quotes. One 
quote, in English, attributed to William Arthur Ward stood out: “God gave you a gift of 86,400 
seconds today. Have you used one to say ‘thank you’?”82 My thoughts on the matter were 
interrupted as the man who had greeted me at the door opened the meeting. 
 The gathering began with a generic greeting (selamat sore, assalamu’alaikum) followed 
by a specific welcome for the visitor from the United States (me). Then the leader directed all of 
us to do several minutes of “quiet time,” to be followed by “check-in” (both quoted phrases were 
spoken in English, although the other directions used Indonesian). Quiet time made intuitive 
sense, and so I missed the genealogy of the practice at first introduction. Its centrality within the 
gathering only became clear much later, once I had been exposed to the larger organizational 
history. At the time, I was most struck by relaxed, confessional atmosphere of post-quiet time 
IofC. Broad American traditions valorize unilateral self-disclosure and the public embrace of 
emotion-driven narrative. However I wasn’t familiar with these modes of interaction appearing 
quite so prominently in Indonesia. Participants in the gathering spoke with candor about personal 
challenges they were currently facing, using direct emotional language. Reserved comportment, 
elliptical speech, and delicate euphemism typify Indonesian intersubjective norms – or do so at 
least if you ask an Indonesian to essentialize Indonesian character in keeping with national 
ideologies. The intimacy of the struggles revealed during “check-in,” coupled with the level of 
disclosure, made this unlike other group interactions in Indonesia in which I had participated. 
The check-in was followed by updates on several different ongoing projects, the details of which 
                                                             
82
 The name seemed familiar. Perhaps I had seen this popular 20
th
 century Christian-aphorist’s work before? Or 
might I have even then vaguely recalled his namesake, so central to what Arvind-Pal Mandair refers to as, “the 
Anglicist construction of Hinduism” in Religion and the Specter of the West (64-66; 182). That William Ward, a 
“proto-ethnographer,” observed religion as adherents practiced it. William Arthur Ward, here, supplied a different 
kind of prompt: the exhortation to gratitude.    
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eluded me. Then, as the Maghrib, sunset, call to prayer sounded, the gathering was closed with a 
brief supplication (doa). Most of the participants readied themselves for prayer. I occupied 
myself with the careful study of the William Arthur Ward quote. Following the observance of 
Maghrib, I accompanied several members of IofC to a nearby establishment for dinner. From 
there, back to my kos, its creaking internet, and an initial survey into the background of IofC. 
Frank Buchman and the Seeds of Change 
 “Change begins with me,” the spanduk at the Secretariat proclaimed. And individual-
oriented moral transformations, it turns out, are the heart and soul of the Initiatives of Change 
program. Vast aspirations for social, political, and economic reform are imagined to follow in the 
wake of personal moral improvements. I picked up these two insights by an initial visit to the 
organizational website: “Initiatives of Change International (IofC International) is a non-
governmental organization (NGO) working to inspire, equip and connect people to address 
world needs, starting with themselves” (“IofC International,” emphasis original). Although the 
group I had attended was not an official charter of the international Initiatives of Change 
movement (nor are most national groups), it had sought and received formal affiliation with the 
organization, headquartered in Caux, Switzerland. This international organization was itself the 
latest iteration of an evangelical movement begun almost a century ago by an American Lutheran 
Minister, Dr. Frank Nathan Daniel Buchman. In the previous chapter parts of this history 
received glancing coverage insofar as it was reflected through the Indonesian state management 
of religion. IofC, prior to 2002, was known as the Moral Re-Armament movement (MRA), and 
was prohibited during President Soekarno’s “Old Order” government in 1962. This ban was only 
lifted during the administration of President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2000. The recent history of 
IofC in Indonesia dates to shortly after the ban was rescinded. The longer history stretches back 
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to early twentieth century Pennsylvania. Before re-arriving on the shores of Indonesia in 2002, 
IofC had been on a long journey, accumulating and spending spiritual and material capital as it 
morphed from a Christian mission to a global organization dedicated to fostering moral 
awakenings. Along the way it had developed an ecumenical spirit that, joined to linguistic 
ideologies that stressed moral neutrality, paved the way for its relatively easy embrace by State 
Islamic University Students in Jakarta.   
 Frank Buchman, founder of the movement that would become Initiatives of Change, has 
been the subject of multiple biographies. The verdict on his life has been far from unanimous. 
Some of these treatments, like Garth Lean’s 1985 Frank Buchman – A Life and Peter Howard’s 
1962 Frank Buchman’s Secret, might reasonably be considered hagiographies. Howard, a trusted 
confident of Buchman, rushed his book to print in the immediate aftermath of Buchman’s 1961 
death. His (lack of) critical distance to his subject should be understood, in part, by the fact that 
he was Buchman’s chosen successor at the helm of Moral Re-Armament. Lean, also a trusted 
disciple, goes to greater lengths to convey a sense of the controversies that dogged Buchman’s 
work, while repeatedly re-asserting the clarity of the guiding figure’s moral vision. These 
posthumous biographies follow works published during Buchman’s life, like Robert Case 
Mowat’s 1951 The Message of Frank Buchman. Mowat, an ardent proponent of Buchman’s 
projects as well as an academic historian, was eager to establish Buchman within a lineage of 
moral reformers – a project that continued at least until his 1994 volume Modern Prophetic 
Voices: From Kierkegaard to Buchman.   
Against these glowing tributes, stand sharply contrasting accounts. Tom Driberg—a 
British Member of Parliament, one-time Chairman of the Labour Party and avowed 
communist—wrote an absolutely blistering history, published in 1965: The Mystery of Moral Re-
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Armament – a Study of Frank Buchman and his Movement. Driberg began his career as a 
journalist in the 1920s by publishing reports on the excess of the then “Oxford Group” 
movement. In this regard, Driberg had many allies, from early religious detractors (appearing 
especially frequently in the Dominican Order’s British magazine New Blackfriars, see below) to 
sharp denunciations in the popular press from various quarters.
83
 Frank Buchman came in for 
criticism as emotionally manipulative,
84
 a political naïf,
85
 obsessed with sexuality,
86
 and as a 
purveyor of purely derivative and lightweight theology.
87
 Renewed scholarly attention, 
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 These calls became especially strident during the World War II era as Buchman’s ambiguous relationship to 
fascism rose to the fore. For instance, A.P Herbert, a British MP representing Oxford University tried to ban 
Buchman from England during WWII, for Buchman’s insufficient renunciation of fascism, (“A.P. Herbert Urges 
Commons Place Ban on Buchmanites, ” 1).    
84
 Describing a Buchman House Party in the pages of the New Blackfriars, a British journal of the Dominican Order, 
a former Oxford Group member denounces the methods of moral transformation advocated within the movement. 
These methods, derived from Buchman’s personal ministry, are derided as demagoguery: “The appeal is a purely 
emotional one, in suggestibility, in imaginative emphasis, in narrowed consciousness. Much of this is achieved by 
imitation, which is the strongest impulse governing any crowd. Perfectly normal people are made to act impulsively, 
the leader suggests, the initial steps are taken by those having the least inhibitory control over nerves and emotions” 
(Post, J. Schrady. “What Happens at a Buchman House-Party?”, 721).  
85
 In Hadley Cantril’s 1941 The Psychology of Social Movements, an entire chapter is devoted to the Oxford Groups. 
Cantril summarizes the 1930s politics of the movement, citing Buchman’s (now infamous) remark that Hitler is a 
godsend in the battle against communism and that dictators represent the swiftest means through which a population 
can be brought into submission to God: “If one could only get the leaders, particularly the dictators, to listen to God 
the millennium would appear. This would obviously be the most efficient procedure. Instead of changing millions of 
citizens, the only requisite would be to change the relatively few people who run governments” (152).  
86
 Writing in the newly merged The Forum and Century, Ernest Mandeville characterizes “Buchmanism” as having 
“done much that is good, as well as a great deal that is harmful to spiritual, mental, and physical health.” He 
continues, claiming that, “It has introduced thousands of frivolous adults and thoughtless adolescents to a religion of 
transforming power. But by its intolerance, its overemotionalism, its morbid and hyper-sensitive interests in sex and 
sexual problems, it has worked many abuses in the name of religion” (289).  These relatively early criticisms (1931) 
would reverberate through other accounts of the movement over the next three decades. Alva Johnston profiles 
Frank Buchman in the April 23, 1932 issue of the New Yorker, writing, “Eighty-five or ninety per cent, Buchman 
computes, of all sins are sex sins. He finds that it affords spiritual relief to the sinner to confide his missteps to a 
select group of listeners” (22).  Johnston’s piece reflects awe at Buchman’s efficacy coupled with sneering disdain 
for his supposed simplicity, ostentatious piety and awkwardness.  
87
 The eminent theologian Reinhold Niebuhr weighs in, editorializing in The Observer in the aftermath of a report 
issued by the Church of England that sharply castigated MRA. Niebuhr champions the report, in that, “The section 
on theology is superb because it does not criticize the movement for straying from the niceties of Christian doctrine, 
but for failing to understand or emphasise parts of the Christian truth which are necessary to understand the nature of 
man and society, and the realities of the redemptive process which makes the renewal of life possible” 
(“Buchmanism Under Scrutiny,” 10).  Publishing a synopsis of the same Church report, The Glasgow Herald quotes 
extensively from the document: “In their introduction the council [the Social and Industrial Council of the Church 
Assembly] state:--‘we have at times been haunted by a picture of the movement, with its hectic heartiness, its mass 
gaiety, and its reiterated slogans, as a colossal drive of escapism from the full force of the difficulty in detail of 
responsible living in the world’” (“Church Report On Moral Re-Armament: ‘Psychologically Dangerous,’” 6). Not 
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meanwhile, has resulted over the last decade in both critical reassessments of Buchman 
(Boobbyer, The Spiritual Vision of Frank Buchman) and the movement most associated with the 
figure (Sack, Moral Re-Armament: The Reinventions of an American Religious Tradition). From 
these myriad and often irreconcilable accounts, certain composite features of Frank Buchman’s 
life are almost uniformly attested. 
Frank Buchman was born in Pennsberg, Pennsylvania on June 4, 1878. Buchman’s 
Swiss-German parents, in keeping with the “Pennsylvania Dutch” community in which he was 
raised, introduced him to an austere Protestant tradition. However his father was far from a 
model Lutheran, operating first a restaurant and saloon and then a liquor distributor once the 
family had moved to Allentown (Lean, 5-6). Buchman’s ancestors had lived in Pennsylvania for 
more than a century, but according to Garth Lean, Swabian German was still spoken at home (3-
4). Graduating from Muhlenberg College and then Mount Airy Seminary (in the comparatively 
cosmopolitan setting of Philadelphia), Buchman was ordained as a Lutheran Minister in 1902. 
His first posting was in a Philadelphia suburb, Overbrook. When a congregation failed to 
coalesce, Buchman set sail for Europe, probably through the generosity of his parents (Lean, 19). 
Returning to Overbrook, Buchman attempted to establish a “hospice,” administered by the 
Overbrook Lutheran Church. (Hospice, here, was understood as a group home for troubled men). 
Failing to secure adequate funding (Buchman blamed the six members of the board), Buchman 
set out for the Keswick Convention in Keswick, England in 1908. He left behind, in his 
recollection, several aggrieved parties to the failed enterprise in Overbrook – although the board 
members, in their letters, attest to a failure of the hospice to make up a budget deficit, rather than 
an unwillingness to fund it (Driberg The Mystery, 30-32). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
only was the theology of the MRA found to be lacking, but its emotional atmospherics suggested a dangerous 
gullibility and lack of serious concern for the perils of the modern world: it was at once plastic and pre-modern.  
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The Keswick Convention is an evangelical conference started in 1875 by an ordained 
Anglican, T.D. Harford-Battersby and a Quaker, Robert Wilson. This conference aspired to 
fulfill the prospect laid out by the American pastor William Boardman in his 1858 work, The 
Higher Christian Life. Boardman envisioned a life purified of sin as the worshipper sanctified his 
or her profane existence. The goal was live in a state of constant grace, not only cleansed of sin 
but protected from future sin. Harford-Battersby, in a piece of writing excerpted in a memoir 
published in 1890, describes the convention Boardman inspired: “In one respect there was no 
difference between these meetings and others of a religious character which are commonly 
attended by Evangelical Christians, in that no new and peculiar doctrines were enforced, and that 
the Word of God and prayer…were the sole instruments employed for securing the desired end” 
(154). However, into this conventional evangelical setting, Harford-Battersby introduced a new 
moral urgency. Beyond the normal acts of worship and study, “there was a definiteness of 
purpose at these meetings, and a directness of aim in the speakers, which were very remarkable. 
That purpose was…the promotion of Scriptural holiness…The promises of a condition of 
abiding holiness; examples of the manner in which it had been sought and attained” within the 
lives of some attendees (ibid). This prospect held tremendous appeal for the young Frank 
Buchman, and replicating its promise became the guiding aspiration of his life’s mission. By the 
time Buchman visited the Keswick Convention in 1908, it had assumed immense stature in the 
evangelical world. In a volume published one year prior to Buchman’s visit, Rev. Evan Hopkins 
details the history of the Keswick convention and its transformative potential: “The spiritual up-
lifting that so many experienced as the result of a clear and definite setting forth of the believer’s 
present privileges, and the possibility of faith, produced a profound impression” (in Harford, Ed., 
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The Keswick Convention, 25). Buchman went to Keswick to discover the possibility of faith, a 
way to realize divinely guided living on a this-worldly plane. And he found it. 
Frank Buchman had a transformative spiritual experience in a small chapel on the 
margins of the Keswick Convention on a Sunday in July, 1908. Buchman, in an often-cited 
characterization (Driberg, 36; Lean, 31; Boobbyer, 12; Kee, 98),
88
 described his experience as “a 
dazed sense of a great spiritual shaking-up.” In Lean’s account (attributed to personal 
conversation with Buchman), Buchman continues, “There was no longer this feeling of a divided 
will, no sense of a calculation and argument, of oppression and helplessness; a wave of strong 
emotion, following the will to surrender, rose up within me…and seemed to lift my soul from its 
anchorage of selfishness, bearing it across that great sundering abyss to the foot of the Cross” 
(31). This intense affective experience of salvation became the centerpiece of Buchman’s later 
efforts. In the immediate aftermath of his stunning vision, Buchman reached out to the 
individuals associated with his failed hospice venture back in Overbrook. He sought to make 
restitution and restore moral order, the better to live in this world enveloped in his new personal 
notion of grace. Buchman had felt a divine solution to his interpersonal and subjective woes. 
Over the course of the next five decades, Frank Buchman would start multiple groups and 
organizations dedicated to realizing the lived testimony of his personal vision of Divine agency. 
The initial mission Buchman launched was known as the First Century Christian Fellowship 
(FCCF). As his appeals from within this group targeted up-and-comers (university students at 
prestigious institutions), one such mission to South Africa became characterized as “the Oxford 
Group,” referencing the university from whence the mission volunteers had come. By most 
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 It seems likely that Buchman developed a relatively stable narrative of this event, given the consistency of the 
accounts and the verbatim text that appears in these various authors (despite the fact that Lean’s seemingly 
authoritative account is seldom included as the source for this particular version).  
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accounts Buchman delighted in this characterization, and to many at Oxford University’s 
enduring frustration, “the Oxford Groups” were born as a movement from the only just-founded 
FCCF. Here was a force for re-shaping the moral life of moderns, one saved person at a time.
89
  
As the Oxford Groups proliferated, chiefly in England, the United States and Canada, but 
also in South Africa, China and India, Frank Buchman achieved greater and greater public 
attention.
90
 The sneering rebukes published in the New Yorker and The Forum and the Century 
(cited above) were balanced by earnest appraisals and endorsements from sundry ministers, 
canons, university presidents and politicians. In addition to spawning the Oxford Groups, re-
imagined as the “Moral Re-Armament Movement” in 1938 (as Europe prepared for war, 
Buchman declared his movement a salve to the spiritual ills precipitating war), Buchman’s 
ministry gave rise to the popular self-help modality for the treatment of alcoholism known as 
Alcoholics Anonymous. Thus a disproportionate volume of the materials addressed to Frank 
Buchman address his legacy from this perspective – whether defenses of “twelve-step 
spirituality” or criticisms of its “crypto-religiosity.”91 So effectively were the core principles and 
practices of Buchman’s ministry communicated, however, that fawning tributes and dismissive 
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 In Harford-Battersby’s Memoir, we learn that the first Keswick Convention had, in fact, been held in Oxford. 
Thus there is a certain added historical validity to the “Oxford Groups” given the genesis of their evangelical 
tradition. The Oxford Groups here should be distinguished from the many unrelated enterprises sharing the name, 
from the contemporaneous Oxford Inklings writers to the Ohio-based Oxford Society.  
90
 Rapidly characterizing the shifts from Buchman’s first vision to the present, Daniel Sack writes,  
[Buchman] turned the Oxford Group into an increasingly secular and political organization called moral 
Re-Armament (MRA)…MRA’s official histories claim many accomplishments in the years after World 
War II, including settling labour battles in England, reconciling Germany and France, and ending racial 
strife in the American South, but it increasingly became an anti-Communist crusade. Under the name 
“Initiatives of Chage,” the movement now focuses on reconciliation among individuals and nations, 
working from headquarters in Switzerland and offices in Washington, D.C. (“Men Want Something Real,” 
274). 
The evolution of MRA into “anti-Communist” crusaders, along with its muddled theological origins, probably goes 
some distance in explaining the Soekarno regime’s antipathy to the movement.  
91
 See B, The Oxford Group and Alcoholics Anonymous; O’Halloran Talking Oneself Sober; Bufe, Alcoholics 
Anonymous: Cult or Cure?. 
 
 
114 
 
takedowns alike agree on its key features. The “Buchmanite” program, as its detractors typically 
referred to it, consisted of:  
1) both public and private confessions of sin, especially sexual sin; 2) reception of divine 
“guidance” during “quiet times”; 3) complete surrender to this “guidance”; 4) the living 
of a “guided” life…; 5) the practice of the Buchmanite “four absolutes”—purity, honesty, 
love, unselfishness; 6) making restitution to those one has harmed; and 7)carrying “the 
message” to those still “defeated.” (Bufe, 40).   
In important respects, these features of Buchman’s Oxford Groups remain alive in the practices 
of Initiatives of Change today. However the program has not been immune to local inflection, 
shifting emphases and the development of an ecumenical spirit that exports these impulses far 
beyond their initially Christian sites of articulation. IofC, as I interacted with it, contained 
sophisticated re-imaginings of Buchman’s vision.   
 Buchman’s was a movement dedicated to changing hearts and lives. Its message 
resonated on affective registers. Participants sought dizzying experiences of possibility. They 
wished to be changed, as much they yearned to affect change in the world. The emphasis on 
moral restitution was understood as transactional: by clearing away the detritus of moral failing, 
the grace of divine agency could be hosted by the practitioner. Perhaps the suspicion of 
contemporary critics reflected this re-investment in self (and material) efficacy. Insofar as 
individuals could “activate” divine grace, this was not “purified” religion as we have been taught 
to recognize it – the re-location of agency wholly outside of human and material domains. Of 
course, perhaps no one is surprised that Protestants, too, have been insufficiently 
“protestantized.” Paul Johnson, writing about a contest between “traditional” ritual performers 
and new evangelicals in Diaspora Conversions, highlights some of the appeal of the evangelicals 
in terms that resonate with Buchman group practices. Having established similarities in Garifuna 
ritual performers work and that of evangelical pastors, Johnson writes, “though both paradigms 
address the needs of everyday life, evangelicals focus their sermons and songs on radical 
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transformation and systemic change. Significantly, conversion for cristianos must be manifested 
not only in person piety but also in public, institutional shifts” (118). For Buchman, as well as for 
Johnson’s cristianos, it is less a novel form of agency and more the demand for a public 
instantiation, for legible institutional transformations, that distinguishes their practices. These 
public performaces were anchoered to individual moral attainment – but personal piety was 
never the sole object. Still, moral absolutes not-withstanding, Oxford Groups and Moral Re-
Armament were far from an ascetic ideal. Instead of meticulous self-cultivation, the presence of 
the divine was sudden and overwhelming. This fact, too, probably contributes to its appeal for 
contemporary Indonesian participants in the movements Buchman has left behind.  
Central to Charles Bufe’s summation of Oxford Group practice, cited above, is the notion 
of “moral absolutes” structuring a divinely guided life. Although Charles Bufe attributes the 
“four absolutes” to Buchman, Buchman himself was quite clear in tracing them to the 1902 
publication of Robert E Speer’s The Principles of Jesus Applied to Some Problems of Today. In 
Chapter Six of this latter work, Speer traces out the moral principles that he ascribes to Jesus, 
understood as guidance in the place of law (if the Jews were given the Mosaic law, the Christians 
were given orienting principles). These were Speer’s distillation of the Sermon on the Mount, 
providing the practical and theological guide rails for a divinely inspired life.  Over the course of 
the sixth chapter, Speer introduces twelve points or principles. Speer’s 6th through 9th principles 
are the absolute moral demands of truth, unselfishness, purity and love.
92
 For instance, on purity 
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 In the relevant passage, Speer offers the first point as: “Jesus did not attempt to issue a code of laws to guide 
human conduct. He put men in possession of great moral principles which they would have to apply themselves” 
(33). Speer’s second principle is a reaffirmation of the first: “It might seem from Jesus’ teaching that He was not 
doing this, but rather dealing with points of application of principle to practice,” however this view is false, a victim 
of the quality of Jesus’ illustrative examples (ibid). The third principle establishes their absolute character: “these 
standards were absolute, the more boldly absolute because Jesus intentionally framed His teaching in direct 
opposition to the casuistical method of the scribes” (ibid). The fuller elaboration of these principles continues for 
another two pages. 
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Speer interprets Mark 7:15 as establishing that, “Jesus set up an absolute standard of purity. He 
tolerated no uncleanness whatsoever. The inner chambers of imagery and desire must be pure” 
(35). For Buchman’s Oxford Groups, and the later work of Moral Re-Armament, these absolute 
principles provided not just guidance but an evaluative metric – was any given decision in accord 
with their moral dictates? Speer’s selection of purity provided the theological rational for 
Buchman’s emphasis on sexual sin as a core spiritual deficit requiring remedy. Sexual sin 
extended to the “inner chambers of imagery and desire.” Sin was not simply matters of the flesh: 
the moral reckoning must extend to the imagination. As we have mentioned, this feature of the 
moral program was a frequent target of detractors, who ridiculed the open disclosure of sexual 
fantasy and imagery. Nevertheless, it was maintained throughout Buchman’s time at the helm of 
MRA.  
By the time IofC returned to Indonesia, in 2002, the four moral absolutes had been 
largely shorn of their Christian heritage. This process began in the aftermath of World War II 
when Buchman deliberately tried to internationalize his movement, moving it away from the 
anglosphere into the newly independent states of the third world. The post-war MRA was 
interested, above all, in thwarting the anti-spiritual machinations of communism. MRA 
promotional materials published in the 1950s stressed the universality of the moral appeals, 
rather than their Christian authenticity. Filtered through time and space and re-imagined in the 
Indonesian setting, these four moral absolutes became subject to a suggestive process of 
translation. As Speer’s distillation of the Sermon on the Mount was de-confessionalized and re-
universalized, it became rhetorically available to the principally Muslim members of IofC. There 
were multiple stages to this operation – altering the genealogy of the four moral absolutes was 
the first step, followed by localized translations across not just linguistic but theological 
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domains. The existence of the four moral absolutes in English, too, was significant for how they 
were received, communicated and interpreted.   
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The Purity of Translation 
Initiatives of Change, the current iteration of the Moral Re-Armament Movement, retains 
its emphasis on person-to-person transmission. Although Buchman’s “House Parties” are no 
longer the chief means of disseminating moral awakenings, the procedures that have emerged in 
their stead maintain many of the features of Buchman’s original small-group work.93 In concert 
with the broader popularity of “training” and “human resource development” (see Chapter 5 
below), Initiatives of Change (globally) now employs workshops and youth leadership camps as 
the means for inviting new members into the fold and enhancing the moral commitment of those 
already involved. In Indonesia, these camps provide a space for those interested in joining to 
learn about the history of IofC, the guiding principles of the larger movement, and the practices 
of its members. Just as at the house parties of old, participants in youth camps are exposed to 
both lectures and small group discussions. These small discussions are referred to as “family 
groups,” where a facilitator assumes the role as “head” of the family and solicits moral 
confessions and moral commitments. IofC’s (roughly) annual Youth Camps have become central 
to the organization’s operation and recruitment efforts.  These camps also provide a venue for the 
localization of Initiatives of Change materials and oftentimes highly idiosyncratic translations of 
the larger movement’s mission.  
From December 3, 2010 until December 5, I took part in the 7
th
 IofC Youth Camp. 
Despite pushing the margins of youth, I was welcomed as a participant. In a brochure sent to 
prospective attendees, the youth camp and its goals were described, in English: 
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 Drawing on then-current YMCA methods of proselytization, early Buchman groups relied on both “person-to-
person” transmission and “House Parties.” The latter method were pretty much what they sounded like – a 
Tupperware party for the soul, where someone already active in the movement invited friends and acquaintances 
imagined to be receptive to the appeal. The sharing of testimony, in the intimate setting of a house (instead of the 
institutional setting of a church) was intended to stress the affective immediacy of the moral awakenings presented 
to those in attendance.  
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Youth Camp is an annual camp organized by Initiatives of Change Indonesia. This camp 
invites young people from various background [sic] to share and learn together in order to 
empower the self-capacity to be the agent of change. This camp is part of IofC Indonesia 
activity to promote mutual understanding among young people and prepare the youth to be 
the future leader and dare to make a change that start from ourselves. “Change starts with 
Me” is the main principles of this camp. The camp is conducted for three days and the 
participant will learn, share and experience the power of inner listening and life’s universal 
values, therefore they deserve to be a better person to contribute for the world betterment. 
Core elements of IofC continue to reflect their genesis in, first, MRA, then, Oxford Groups, and 
ultimately, Frank Buchman’s First Century Christian Fellowship. Whereas FCCF highlighted the 
Divine speaker of “quiet time,” in current Initiatives of Change material “inner listening” 
emphasizes the subjective practitioner. I will return to the actual practice of quiet time shortly – 
here only the “de-confessionalizing” is noted. While Buchman’s four moral absolutes were 
barely removed from Speer’s summation of Jesus’s teachings, they have now been re-framed as 
“life’s universal values.” The logical order mentioned in this brochure: social (and world) change 
predicated on personal transformation, however, remains pragmatically unchanged. In part, these 
adaptations reflect an ecumenical spirit that Buchman embraced in the aftermath of World War 
II.  
The newly acknowledged global specter of communism, MRA’s imagined post-war 
opponent, motivated Buchman to build on his prior relationships with figures including Gandhi 
and Tagore and reach new audiences in the third world. Buchman made overtures to President 
Magsaysay in the Philippines (“President of Philippines Backs Moral Re-Armament”), and 
established a personal connection with the King of Morocco just as formal independence was 
navigated in Morocco and Tunisia (Boobbyer, 125; Lean, 454). In the late 1950s, MRA 
promotional material reported that Indonesians, too, were getting in on the possibilities of moral 
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uplift.
94
 The attempt to reach “new and different” audiences also excited the frequent critics of 
MRA, who saw in the abandonment of Christian missionizing further hypocrisy on the 
organization’s part. As Tom Driberg acidly characterizes this shift, “we find that in MRA 
propaganda designed for the oriental market there is practically no mention of Christianity: 
Christ, if named at all, is sandwiched unobtrusively between Gautama the Buddha and Mahatma 
Gandhi” (163). By the 1950s, at least, MRA no longer felt the need to declare the specific bases 
of the moral awakening it promised – a universalization that continues in present-day Initiatives 
of Change.
95
 IofC reflects the parent organization’s re-imagining of its own history, at the same 
time as it extends this revisionist license in pursuit of localization.  
MRA, the earlier iteration of Initiatives of Change, was banned by President Soekarno in 
1962. Possibly motivated by a desire to shield the Muslim community from a Christian 
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 In a story that ran in the Milwaukee Sentinel on June 16, 1958, with the headline “MRA eyes Dutch, Indo Unity,” 
the MRA vision for Indonesia is clear:  
Albert Sillem, a member of the committee of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, apologized for “superiority 
and selfishness of the Dutch towards Indonesia.” He said selfishness has divided his nation but “MRA will 
mean unity in Holland.” Sillem said: “A united Holland will Help Indonesia to unite. A divided Indonesia 
will go behind the Iron Curtain and a divided Holland will do the same. And this is the strategy of 
communism.” A response to Sillem’s remarks was given by Mohammed Saleh Mattjik, treasurer of the 
Coordinating Body of Moslem Organizations in Indonesia. (39). 
In another story that ran in the Milwaukee Sentinel, an Indonesian Christian leader attending an annual MRA 
conference at Mackinac island is quoted as attesting to the tremendous impact of the organization:  
Darius Merpaung, president of the Indonesian Christian Trade Union Association, Sunday credited moral 
re-armament for opening doors between Holland and Indonesia once thought forever shut. He told the 
Assembly of Moral Rearmament that the change came about in just a year. “All was deadlocked,” he said, 
“but today there is an open door. Out of the impossible Moral Re-armament has created the possible.” 
Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed last year after 350 years of Dutch colonial 
rule. (“Moral Re-Arm Move Praised,” 2). 
Dutch-Indonesian unity, then, is imagined as part of a bulwark against communism. Thus in the first article we have 
a Dutch stock-broker joining forces with and Indonesian Muslim organizational head, allied in their belief that only 
forgiveness for the (personal, psychological) failings of Dutch colonialism can prevent the spread of communism. In 
this pursuit, the moral possibilities offered by MRA are emphasized (as in the second citation).    
95
 In The Bougainville Land Crisis of 1969, Nigel Cooper assesses the role of the Moral Re-Armament movement in 
negotiation the Papuan crisis of the title. In some ways, MRA’s involvement in this dispute was a mark of how far 
the organization had fallen by the late 1960s. In the aftermath of WWII, MRA tried to facilitate détente between 
France and Germany. In the 1950s it was active on the side of anti-communist forces in assisting newly independent 
states. By the late 1960s, however, its straightforward moral appeals, imagined as political tools, struggled to capture 
first world audiences. Instead it had to seek ever smaller venues in the hopes of gaining traction – although in 
Cooper’s assessment, it was a significant force in preventing bloodshed  on Bougainville Island.  
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missionizing organization (as Soekarno’s support from religious parties evaporated in the lead-
up to his overthrow), Soekarno was certainly interested in blocking the activities of a group that 
now defined itself principally in terms of its moral opposition to communism. Already by 1957, 
a former Indonesian diplomat was being recruited by MRA in its quest to make inroads into the 
country (“Indonesian Sees MRA Producing World Unity.”) The threat to Soekarno’s backers in 
the communist party was even clearer two years later, when the Washington Post and Times 
Herald ran an article announcing, “Moral Re-Armament to Train Indonesians,” which reported 
that “Fifty Indonesian leaders are scheduled to arrive here [Mackinac Island, at an MRA retreat 
center] soon for training in the ideology of Moral Re-Armament. They will study principles of 
the MRA movement designed to promote unity among Asians” (18). What was meant by “unity 
among Asians” is made clearer in a contemporaneous address by Frank Buchman, delivered to 
those fifty Indonesians (and other attendees) and printed in The Observer. After describing 
MRA’s role in finding forgiveness for the Japanese in the Philippines, Buchman claims, echoing 
a Japanese politician, “in the last two years Moral Re-Armament wrested control of the largest 
single political organization in Japan from Communist hands, established new relations with 
Indonesia and Viet Nam, ended a dispute between South Korea and his country [Japan]” (9). It 
was the “wresting of control” that alarmed Soekarno, no doubt, and added legitimacy to his fears 
that Western organizations aimed to infiltrate Indonesia. The unity of Asia was imagined in 
terms of stopping the contagion of communism. 
MRA remained a forbidden organization until, as discussed in Chapter 1, President 
Abdurrahman Wahid rescinded the ban. Nevertheless, Suharto’s New Order government looked 
the other way when an Indonesian student organization invited MRA back into the country, 
shortly into the consolidation of New Order rule. A newspaper article from 1967 describes the 
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event: “Djakarta, Indonesia – The Moral Re-Armament Asian Sing-Out force, which includes 
nine young Americans, was greeted at their first performance here by 10,000 persons in the 
Olympic Sports Arena as thousands more were turned away. The Moral Re-Armament force has 
been invited to Indonesia by KAMI…” (29). KAMI, Kesatuan Aski Mahasiswa Indonesia 
(Unified Action of Indonesian Students) was the umbrella student organization uniting disparate 
Islamic, Catholic and “Socialist” (in the fascist sense) student associations, formed in the 
aftermath of the October 1
st
 1965 coup that launched the widespread slaughter of leftists in the 
country. The newspaper article authors helpfully provide some of this history, mentioning 
elliptically that, “[MRA] are the first large foreign student groups to be invited to this country in 
ten years, and the presence of the Americans in the party is especially significant,” (ibid) without 
actually delimiting the significance. KAMI are then defined as, “this is the group that has been in 
the forefront of the political upheaval smashing the recent attempted Communist coup to take 
over the government” (ibid). Thus without acknowledging the ban, or providing its context, this 
newspaper article manages to justify Soekarno’s decision to outlaw the organization. Despite its 
anti-communist ardor, however, Suharto never saw the point in opening to the gates to MRA in a 
more comprehensive fashion, and so the ban remained. This very brief historical detour is 
necessary to suggest that just as Initiatives of Change was able to deconfessionalize its Christian 
origins, the organization was also able to shed its previously defining political sensibility 
(indeed, today Initiatives of Change has a thriving chapter in “Communist” Vietnam). Christ 
receded from the language of universal moral values and communism disappeared from the calls 
from moral re-engagement with politics: both conspicuously absent in the organizational 
autobiography I was provided at Youth Camp.    
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 The Youth Camp I attended was held at one of the ubiquitous conference and retreat 
centers that dot the hills to Jakarta’s east and south. The gender breakdown was roughly even 
and participants ranged in age from 17 to 29. All but four of the forty participants were Muslim – 
one Hindu student from Indonesia’s premier technical university, Institut Teknologi Bandung, 
and three Christians from the Jakarta area. UIN and Ciputat were heavily represented, but there 
was one participant from South Kalimantan, several from Central Java and two from East Java. 
Not all of the participants were university students – one was a journalist, one a travel agent, and 
several worked or owned small businesses. The vast majority were, however, current students. In 
addition to my own status as a foreigner, one of the Jakarta-based Christians had grown up 
within the Indonesian diaspora in Australia and had attained citizenship there. For a Youth Camp 
assembled entirely by volunteers and charging 135,000 Rupiah (roughly USD 10.30 at time of 
writing), it was a plausibly diverse group. The overwhelming majority of students (myself, the 
Indo-Australian, possibly several others excepted) belonged to Indonesia’s narrow middle-class: 
typified by university students whose own parents had pursued formal education. There were 
almost twenty organizers and facilitators in addition to the forty attendees, and the camp was 
imagined as a comprehensive introduction to both IofC and Initiatives of Change. At least 
theoretically, English was the language of Youth Camp, which occasioned near constant acts of 
translation across the camp activities. These translations reveal, in part, how Initiatives of 
Change becomes IofC.  
 IofC has worked diligently to render core Initiatives of Change materials legible to 
Indonesian audiences. These translations, however, have been neither officially authorized by the 
parent movement nor standardized by the various translators. Even key concepts like the four 
moral absolutes have been rendered in a variety of forms. The current version of the IofC 
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website (and there have been many across the last decade) provides a frequently asked question 
section, the tenth item of which reads (in Indonesian): 
Why does Initiatives of Change advocate moral values? 
Buchman was divinely graced [dianugerahi] a special capacity [kelebihan] to express 
spiritual truths [kebeneran rohani] in non-religious language [bahasa non-agama]. His 
experiences meeting and speaking with people from every religion and varied cultural 
backgrounds, demonstrated to him that from one community to another, one culture to 
another, that the principles of honesty [kejujuran], purity [kemurnian], unselfishness 
[tidak egois] and love [cinta] are universal values that must be advocated [diperjuangkan, 
advanced; struggled for] (“FAQs”). 
In this telling, not only is the Christian lineage of the four moral absolutes erased, but the actual 
order of Buchman’s moral mission is reversed. Although Buchman is marked as a special 
recipient of “divine grace” (dianugerahi), the Christian imprimatur under which he operated is 
rendered invisible. Instead of a Divine push to inculcate the four moral absolutes within the 
hearts of people, here Buchman discerns these universal values only through his extensive inter-
cultural dialogues. Thus a Divine mandate is replaced by an ethical injunction of indeterminate 
origin. These values must be advocated because they contain transcultural spiritual truths, but 
they belong to no one. My point here is not that IofC are stealthily obscuring their Christian 
origins. Rather, in this particular translation the website author adopts a framing of the four 
moral absolutes most amenable to the currently deconfessionalized character of the larger 
organization. Different sorts of mediation governed other instances of translation.  
A much earlier version of the IofC website listed the four moral absolutes as, kejujuran 
(honesty); ketulusan (sincerity); kepedulian (other-oriented care); and kasih sayang (non-
romantic love). In this iteration, without any term denoting “absolute,” the four moral absolutes 
are stripped of their absolute stature, becoming instead moral qualities. Furthermore, “purity” 
here is glossed as ketulusan (sincerity). Tulus is a quality attached to hearts (tulus hati), to love 
(cinta tulus) and even to ikhlas in the construction tulus ikhlas (wholeheartedly sincere) – and 
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ikhlas itself becomes the preferred gloss at a different site of translation discussed below. In none 
of these instances is the “purity” of tulus immediately associated with the sexual discipline and 
chastity imagined by Buchman in the use of “absolute purity.” Buchman’s notion of purity was 
closely related to the one promulgated by the Yale Divinity School theologian Henry Wright, 
whose 1924 text The Will of God characterized purity as the abstention from sex outside of 
marriage, uncleanness and evil desires – the same uncleanness of mind and imagery condemned 
by Speer. Tulus invites reflection on intentionality rather than sexuality.
96
  
The proliferation of divergent translations is reflected not only across time (on different 
iterations of the organization’s website) but between translators or instances of translation as 
well. Elsewhere on the current IofC website, for instance, tidak egois (unselfish) is written as an 
abstract noun ketidakegoisan (unselfishness) and cinta (love) is written as cinta/kasih sayang 
(romantic/familial love), emphasizing both the romantic and the filial-maternal dimensions of 
different concepts of love (“Pendekatan”). These minor nuances suggest a flexibility and 
interpretive openness that distinguishes IofC materials from the relative fixity of scripture. There 
are few efforts to stabilize meaning in the IofC context. Even more suggestive of the importance 
of translation in the adoption of Initiatives of Change materials are the local and shifting 
translations that emerged within one youth camp workshop. 
 On Saturday December 4, 2010, the first full day of the youth camp, a young facilitator 
addressed the assembled participants in the aula (auditorium). He briefly recapped how 
Initiatives of Change used to be known as Moral Re-Armament. Next he identified, in English, 
the four moral absolutes core to the MRA’s and now Initiatives of Change’s mission. Then he 
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 Interestingly, suci (pure) was never used as a gloss for purity. Suci has both a technical meaning in Indonesian 
Islam – ritually pure, as in the border of a mosque or the water used to perform ablutions, and a generalized 
Indonesian sense of “free from sin or corruption,” this latter sense also obtaining in Islamic contexts.   
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translated these into Indonesian and explained their centrality: kejujuran yang absolut (absolute 
honesty); ketidakegoisan yang absolut (absolute absence of selfishness); kasih sayang yang 
absolut (absolute non-romantic love); and, most interestingly, keikhlasan yang absolut (absolute 
ikhlas).  Unlike many of the Indonesian translations of the four moral absolutes to which I was 
exposed, here the speaker retained the absolute character of these moral values – instead of just 
abstract nouns denoted by the ke-an construction, this speaker used the relative clause yang 
absolut (that [are] absolute).
97
 Furthermore, in selecting keikhlasan to replace the English 
“purity,” the facilitator opened his explanation to a range of theologically significant concepts 
associated with the Indonesian root ikhlas. 
Absolute Ikhlas  
 On its face, ikhlas might seem an apt gloss for “purity,” at least given its Arabic 
etymology. Derived from the radical kh-l-ṣ, khalaṣa is usually translated as the past tense of “to 
purify.” However the movement of this term into Indonesian is freighted with theological 
implications. Ikhlas is much more than “purity” in contemporary Indonesian. It is very seldom 
the “sexual purity” to which Buchman’s emphasis on chastity demanded. Instead it is typically 
rendered “sincerity” when translating out from Indonesian. The “purity” of ikhlas relies on the 
purity of intentions of an actor rather than on the sinlessness of a sexual being. To be free from 
ulterior motives is to be sincere.
98
 Even beyond “sincerity,” different dictionaries suggest 
“whole-hearted;” “heartfelt;” and “whole-souled” as acceptable translations. In normative 
Indonesian Muslim discourse, ikhlas is a central concept. Popular entertainers sometimes enjoin 
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 And as noted with suci, I never heard mutlak (total, unlimited, necessary) as a gloss for absolut, despite the strong 
Islamic valences of mutlak. 
98
 Alexander Knysh, in Islamic Mysticism: A Short History, likens ikhlas to integrity in its common usage: “the pair 
sidq/ikhlas, which many Sufi authors defined as a complete agreement of one’s inner convictions with one’s 
outward acts, was held to be an indispensable condition of true worship of God and a hallmark of the genuine Sufi” 
(307).  
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an audience to tepuk tangan dengan ikhlas (give a heartfelt round of applause).
99
 When a 
donation or a “loan” is offered without the expectation of its return, “ikhlas” is often the word 
accompanying the gestural display of open palms. Insisting on paying a dinner tab, too, is 
demonstrated through a clear pronunciation of “ikhlas.” Ikhlas suggests an absence of personal 
motive – in some senses, it resembles more the “absolute unselfishness” of Speer than the 
“absolute purity” of Buchman. 
Dr. Ahmad Sadiq, a professor of Sufism at UIN Jakarta and a local shaykh in the tarekat 
Qadiriyya wa Naqsyabandiyya (a popular Indonesian Sufi order, merging two otherwise distinct 
lineages, the Qadiriyya and the Naqshabandi), explained to me in greater depth the primacy of 
ikhlas.
 100
 According to Dr. Sadiq, ikhlas was the highest motivation for human beings, the purest 
(self-erasing) impulse to which the worshiper could aspire. In its fully realized form, ikhlas 
meant the utter absence of motivation besides God. In the examples he provided for me, 
contributing charity to help others was laudable, but not ikhlas. Contributing charity for the sole 
purpose of pleasing God, of fulfilling God’s injunction, without a thought of the worldly 
consequences or the after-worldly benefits… this was ikhlas (baru ikhlas nih). If one were to fast 
on a Monday, with the aim of emulating the Prophet and bringing to life the Prophetic tradition, 
this was worthy of esteem. But not yet ikhlas. To fast with the sole object of God, this was 
ikhlas. At higher levels of reality, absolute ikhlas requires the dissolution of the subject, the self-
abnegation of the worshipper leaving only the single Independent Cause, God acting, for God.  
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 Dik Doank, the stage name for the actor, singer and entertainer Raden Rizki Mulyawan Kartanegara Hayang 
Denada Kusuma, frequently used this formulation in events held at his “natural school” (sekolah alam) in South 
Tangerang. The “natural school” is a free facility for area youths teaching music and creative arts within an 
atmosphere of familiarity and piety. Dik Doank frequently peppered his speeches to the students with Islamic 
exhortations and endorsed a view of ikhlas as a high aspirational value. I am grateful to Ismail Alatas for reminding 
me of a coercive dimension of ikhlas. In Joshua Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing, a local tough walks through a 
shopping center, extorting the shopkeepers for protection money. As the Chinese store owner hands over a thin 
envelop of bills, the gangster prods him: ikhlas, ya. Here, of course, ikhlas denotes the absence of a quid pro quo, 
although it inverted the typical emphasis on something given with a threatening focus on something taken.  
100
 Personal communication April 2011.  
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What Dr. Sadiq explained corresponds closely to other observations in the literature. In a 
careful and insightful ethnography focusing on moral personhood and social cohesion in 
Bukittinggi West Sumatra, Caged in on the Outside, Gregory Simon devotes a final chapter to 
shalat or ṣalat, the obligatory worship cycles marking the rhythms of Muslims’ daily devotional 
activities. Simon, discussing the mutually constitutive nature of conviction and practice, notes 
that “the practices of submission strengthen a person’s disposition to continue carrying out those 
commands and cultivate the ikhlas (sincerity or wholeheartedness) with which a person performs 
them” (195). This is a telling gloss, reflecting the theological baggage of the term in 
contemporary Indonesian. Whereas other words from this same radical pervade contemporary 
Arabic speech – khalaṣ (done; empty; colloquial, stop!), in Indonesian ikhlas almost always 
invites consideration of the divine. Mark Woodward discusses the normative status of this 
understanding of ikhlas in his article, “Textual Exegesis as Social Commentary.” Addressed to 
the pragmatic usage of hadith in Indonesian religious, social and political argumentation, 
Woodward writes, “while Indonesian Muslims of all theological orientations stress the 
importance of ikhlās and niyah [intention], conservative scholars [those associated with 
Nahdlatul Ulama] and kejawen mystics understand them as elements of the mystical path 
leading to direct experience of Allah” (570). Woodward goes on to clarify both the Quranic 
usage of ikhlas (“absolute devotion to Allah”) and the specific inflections it assumes in Sufi 
practice: “an effort to approach Allah which demands selflessness even in ritual acts. 
Conservative scholars and Javanese mystics explain that one who is truly ikhlās does not seek 
Allah’s blessing, but worships and loves him for his own sake, eventually losing awareness even 
of ikhlās itself” (ibid.) Contrast  this account with Clifford Geertz’s in The Religion of Java: 
“Ikhlas I have already discussed, in connection with death, as meaning detachments from the 
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contingencies of the external world so as not to be disturbed when things go awry in it or if 
something unexpected occurs. It is ‘not caring,’ on the premise that if one does not care about 
worldly things they cannot hurt or upset one” (240-1). Whereas Geertz emphasizes the impulse 
to hold the world at a distance, an understanding of ikhlas as a further buffering of the self, Dr. 
Sadiq and the traditionalists discussed by Woodward conceive of ikhlas as the self-effacement of 
human subjectivity: not self-preservation, but self-surrender. Neither of these semantic ranges 
would seem to correspond closely to the sexual modesty prized by Speer and Buchman.       
When the IofC facilitator selected “ikhlas” to stand for “purity” he was not making an 
argument about their equivalence. Prescriptive sexual ethics are already a baseline assumption in 
the Indonesian context (however extensively they might also be transgressed). Searching for the 
salience of purity, this IofC translator latched onto a key theological concept within Islam – not 
only the ultimate unreality of human agency, but the absolute unicity of God (tauhid).
101
 With 
this one translation the IofC facilitator invokes both a human aspiration (to act with ikhlas) and a 
transcendent truth of God (the absolute purity of the divinity). Yet this is a contingent universal: 
recall that there are no agreed upon translations of Initiatives of Change material and that the 
same speaker would employ different glosses at other moments. The translation calls attention to 
itself through its instability – which reasserts the safety of the target language as much as it 
reifies the stability of the source. The English original of purity is stabilized, by its repeated 
invocation. But the spiritual significance of Indonesian is protected from the meanings of English 
by the refusal to coalesce around a one-for-one substitution. Indonesian, itself imagined not as a 
                                                             
101
 The theological insistence on unicity is located, among other places, in the 112
th
 surat, conventionally referred to 
as Sūrat al-Ikhlāṣ or by its first ayat, qul huwa. This is a radically important place in the Qur’an: where the absolute 
“purity” of God from all other elements is established. 
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language of interiority, is held aloof from the potential moral corruption of English through the 
multiple-translations of a key term.    
In Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty sets himself the task, among others, of 
figuring out how to “handle this problem of the presence of the divine or the supernatural in the 
history of labor as we render this enchanted world into our disenchanted prose” (77). A partial 
solution proposed within the text are translations that “take for their model of exchange barter 
rather than the generalized exchange of commodities, which always needs the mediation of a 
universal, homogenizing middle term” (85). Chakrabarty further characterizes these bartered 
exchanges as “based on very local, particular, one-for-one exchanges” (ibid.). While aspiring to a 
similar impulse as Chakrabarty – the need to take seriously others accounts of themselves and 
the agents they (we) recognize in their (our) lives – the notion of barter and exchange may not 
get us there. The translations I identify at IofC are not one-for-one exchanges: part of the 
ingenuity of their operation is their denial of the very possibility of exchange.  Rather than a 
failure to coalesce around stable and agreed upon translations, the proliferation of “four moral 
absolutes” in Indonesian reflects an interest in contingent universals – transcendental values 
reflective of potentially differing local and immediate concerns. This cuts against the long 
running project of linguistic stability associated with the former regime in Indonesia,
102
 but also 
a rejection of the “religious” grounds of the broader Initiatives of Change movement. Whereas 
Chakrabarty’s examples suggest a mutual hedging, a reciprocal contingency, the suggestion of 
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 The language politics of the New Order have been subject to frequent scrutiny (See Errington’s Shifting 
Languages, especially Chapter 4; See Anderson’s “Cartoons and Monuments” in Language and Power; see also . 
One memorable characterization comes from James Siegel’s Solo in the New Order. Here Siegel writes about the 
apogee of the quest to fix and secure meaning in reproducible language:  
During the ceremony [commemoration of 30
th
 of September murder of the six generals] the President said 
very little, and what he said was entirely formal. Like the Indonesian schoolteacher, he made his voice into 
a reflection of established texts as though he spoke only in quotations. He was not Suharto the locus of 
unique feelings and idiosyncrasies, but Suharto the embodiment of texts, the one whose acknowledgements 
made the event into a ceremony, something formal and repeatable (279).  
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“ikhlas” for “purity” serves to protect the former from the latter (while ascribing denotational 
transparency to the English original). By refusing to stabilize Initiatives of Change terms with 
scriptural corollaries, IofC participants are able to maintain the more ultimately real epistemic 
foundations of Islam. Initiatives of Change practices and teachings are thus not threatening 
because they are not fixed in language – the fluidity of the translations enabling the fluidity of 
the interested appropriations. The four moral absolutes remain in English, demonstrated by the 
rejection of a unified translation. And here a particular kind of language ideology, the subject of 
the next section of this argument, rears its head.   
I have argued that acts of translation enabled the transformation of “Initiatives of 
Change” into “IofC,” that is to say, made possible the meaningfully local iteration of a global 
movement. That this movement is focused on change, variously conceived, is not accidental. The 
contemporary global appetite for “change” is voracious, and IofC promises to provide the tools 
for its accomplishment in its Indonesian particulars. This is part of an abiding faith in the 
efficacy of technology linked to projects of global scientific modernity – that these words, these 
actions, properly organized, do things. My attention has been on the contingent translations of 
Initiatives of Change doctrine—the negotiations between deconfessionalized Christian discourse 
and Muslim theological norms. However there is a further element that makes these formerly 
Christian discourses available to begin with: their articulation in English. English is both the 
language of desire – associated with global movement and consumption – and the medium for 
the dissemination of scientific and “scientistic” truth. English is understood and imagined to be 
morally neutral.
103
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 I need to thank Stuart Strange and Ismail Fajrie Alatas for bringing the longer genealogy of this phenomenon to 
my attention. As they were quick to remind me, this particular language ideology was once a story English tried to 
tell about itself, or at least, attempted to do so in the hands of Fancis Bacon and John Locke. For this argument about 
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The status of English as presumptively neutral is key to the performance of what I call the 
“making safe” of IofC discourse. IofC materials, since they are directed at souls and speak to 
morals, must be both presented and understood in ways that close the possibility of their 
rejection vis-à-vis Islam. This is accomplished through the relationships between vernacular 
languages, Arabic, English, and Indonesian. As Webb Keane has cogently argued in “Public 
Speaking,” Indonesian is perhaps more like Swahili or Filipino than it is like Gaelic, Hebrew or 
Tamil. By this he intends to highlight the self-conscious instrumentality and cosmopolitanism of 
the language. Instead of pure origins, Indonesian is imagined to be a creature of communicative 
convenience, one result of which is the “pattern of glossing backward that seemingly views the 
language from the position of a hypothetical English-speaker” (504).104 The transparency of 
Indonesian, coupled with the fact that a huge number of archipelagic inhabitants encounter it first 
from the perspective of a regional vernacular, makes it, too, morally neutral. These are the two 
axes that Keane, following James Siegel and Joseph Errington, identifies: “One is biographical: 
for most of its speakers Indonesian was acquired as a second language…The second is cognitive. 
In contrast to…even to such second languages as are picked up say, in playgrounds, plantations 
or marketplaces, Indonesian is encountered as relatively objectified, something one learns by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
linguistic purification, cogently expressed, see Chapter 2 of Richard Bauman and Charles Brigg’s Voices of 
Modernity. It is somehow fitting that Francis Bacon’s attack on the poetic potential of language (ibid 22-24) would 
become part of the poetic appropriation of evangelical discourse by contemporary Muslims hoping to occasion 
personal moral transformation in Indonesia.   
104
 I am grateful to Paul Johnson for pointing out the sometimes Baudrillardian effect of this relationship to English. 
Between 2006 when legislation was introduced and October 30, 2008 when a much amended draft was passed, 
Indonesia’s parliament played host to sharp debates concerning RUAPP (Rancangan Undang-Undang Anti-
Pornografi dan Pornoaksi, or “Draft Statutes on Anti-Pornography and Pornoaction”). This debate spilled out onto 
the streets in sometimes violent clashes between Muslim organizations supporting the bill and cultural and political 
constituencies that feared its overly broad language (it potentially criminalized “traditional” dance). The original 
statutory definition of the latter category, pornoaksi, was “efforts to profit from pornography, whether through 
trading in it or displaying [causing it to be performed] it” (upaya mengambil keuntungan, baik dengan 
memperdagangkan atau mempertontonkan pornografi). Pornoaksi, was a neologism masquerading as English – a 
compound formed from “porno,” which means roughly in Indonesian what it does in English (although “porno” in 
Indonesian is also an adjective, meaning pornographic) and aksi, which enters Indonesian simultaneously from the 
English action and the Dutch actie. Thus the simulacrum precedes the real – where the real is both the real of 
English and the real of pornography.    
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way of explicit rules” (505). Indonesian is thus not imagined as a language of interiority, as a 
dimension or locus of the self that needs protection.
105
 Even as this is ever less the case – as more 
Indonesians grow up and speak Indonesian in their family of origin – Indonesian is still imagined 
to be a transparent language relative the “subjective” depth of vernaculars. This latter 
observation is attested by the deep insecurity repeatedly voiced by individuals who can no longer 
access their ancestral vernacular, or, as a product of mixed marriages, are unsure even what that 
vernacular might be.   
In Indonesia as elsewhere, Arabic is the language of Islam. However for most of my 
Indonesian interlocutors – as has been often observed – Arabic was not a language of 
reference.
106
 Nor, for many of them, was Indonesian a primary language of Islam. Instead, for 
traditionally educated Muslims, Islam was studied in Arabic by way of their vernacular. Thus 
pesantren (non-State Islamic school) graduates from West Java learned in Sundanese, while 
those who attended institutions in Madura studied classical Islamic texts (the yellow-books or 
kitab kuning) in Arabic with line-by-line Madurese commentary. Thus a mediation of a spiritual 
practice that takes place between English and Indonesian (IofC teachings) is at least one, if not 
two, orders of remove away from internalized Islamic subjectivity. This does not need to be the 
historical case (as it wouldn’t be for a person fluent in English, educated about Islam in 
Indonesian) to still be pragmatically operational. This is because Islam doesn’t need to be 
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 James Siegel, talking about Melayu, the predecessor to Indonesian, remarks on the ways that, “the weightlessness 
of a language that is severed from culture makes it less intimidating. One can chance speaking it without the fear 
that it is the tongue of Racine, Shakespeare, Doestoyevsky, or the Gouverneur Generaal of the Dutch East Indies. It 
offers one the opportunity for a certain excursion if not into a new identity, at least away from an old one” (Fetish, 
15). If the terrible weight of matching Doestoyevsky did not seem to weigh heavily on the minds of my friends, the 
distance from “an old identity” offered by Indonesian certainly seemed salient.  
106
 Anxieties about one’s uneasy grasp of Arabic pervade Indonesian Muslim society (although, in truth, a similar 
anxiety is present even in Arabic-speaking parts of the world, from the vantage of traditionalist scholars). There are 
numerous jokes to this effect, from those that focus on phonic imperfections (“Who says Sundanese can’t say “f?” 
That’s pitnah! [fitna – dissension]) to those that emphasize lack of referential facility (the many versions 
dramatizing this fear revolve around some poor rube who responds to Arabic ad-copy or the like with earnest aamin, 
aamin [amen, the appropriate response to any entreaty directed towards God].  
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defended from outside influence – instead the prevailing Muslim logic concerning the integrity 
of the tradition is about protecting Islam from misattribution and misrecognition. Bidah, or 
unlawful innovation, isn’t forbidden because it is foreign. It is forbidden because it takes 
something emerging from the creation (something with human authorship) and accords it to the 
tradition of Islam (something with divine authorship). Where the authorship is not in question – 
as indeed, it isn’t in an English-to-Indonesian context (which is clearly human), this fear is not 
nearly as substantive. Thus the policing of the proper boundaries of Islam in Indonesia is often 
much more excited by a novel praise poem in Arabic than it is by adoption of a foreign practice 
that explains itself in Indonesian. As long as the foreign practice isn’t suggested to be 
fundamentally Islamic, it is unlikely to provoke sharp criticism. Where “Islam” itself is 
negotiated, the debate tends to be more strident.
107
 
The adoption of the foreign traditions of IofC in Indonesia looks plausibly like the 
inverse of the process described by Paul Johnson in Diaspora Conversions. Johnson is charting 
the movement of Black Caribbean Garifuna ritual performers and their ritual performances to a 
new diasporic context in New York City. The maintenance of ritual is differently enunciated as it 
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 Precisely this tension played out in the Indonesian press as this chapter was being revised. Habib Rizieq, the 
leader of Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front, see Jajang Jahroni’s Defending the Majesty of Islam) 
lashed out at the Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, the largest “traditionalist” Muslim organization in Indonesia) 
after the latter, in an event marking the beginning of Ramadan at Masjid Istiqlal (the largest mosque in Jakarta), 
stated that NU “would continue to advocate [memperjuangkan] and shepherd [mengawal] the archipelagic model of 
Islam [model Islam Nusantara]. Habib Rizieq responded in writing, posting a piece entitled “Jemaat Islam 
Nusantara (JIN) Paham Sesat Menyesatkan.” (The Archipelagic Islam Group (JIN)’s Understanding is Misguided 
and Misguidance). Besides a minor victory in a war of words (achieved anytime you can name your opponent 
“Jin”), Rizieq’s argument concerns the “Islam-ness” of “archipelagic Islam” (Islam Nusantara). Insofar as the 
category “archipelagic Islam” considered Islam to be an immigrant (pendatang) tradition, instead of the original 
(asli) religion, it refuted the tenet of Islam that holds Islam to be the original human relationship to the divine. When 
archipelagic Islam historicizes the tradition, Habib Rizieq argues, it subjects it to a foreign epistemology that is 
tacitly supposed to be more fundamental than Islamic epistemologies – it suggests an outside of the tradition that is 
an effect of secularity, rather than a celebration of local particularity, as its advocates might maintain. Both sides of 
this argument, despite the easy caricatures of their position, enjoy widespread currency in contemporary Indonesia. 
Even within an organization like IofC, some members explicitly endorse Habib Rizieq’s argument here, although the 
leadership of the organization tends to echo the NU position. See “Habib Rizieq: Inilah Kesesatan Jemaat Islam 
Nusantara (JIN)” for an eight-point refutation of the archipelagic Islam position.   
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undergoes the objectification necessary to be carried to new shores: “In diasporic Garifuna ritual, 
then, representations of the ancestral past are more mediated by symbolism, stereotypy, and the 
language of authenticity, of culture and diaspora” (238). For committed members of IofC, the 
rituals they receive from Initiatives of Change are already steeped in the language of 
authenticity, symbolism and stereotypy. Thus for proponents of Quiet Time, for instance, the 
concern is how to take an objectified ritual and give it the living status of local tradition – how to 
make it allowably Indonesian and Muslim, without representing any constituent element as 
(illegitimately) Islamic. As I have contended, the special features of English, in conjunction with 
innovate logics of translation, figure prominently in the achievement of this possibility. In the 
hands of IofC members, core Initiatives of Change practices come to feel meaningfully 
possessed by their new practitioners. In this way, a prospect of berubah (having change) delivers 
the IofC participants to the possibility of mengubah, making change.    
English is the Language of IofC 
When I asked current IofC members why they take part in the organization, there was a 
remarkable uniformity of response. More so than any other explanation, IofC members shared 
with me that they were motivated by a desire to improve their English language capabilities. 
Closely followed by the opportunity for foreign travel (itself imagined to require facility in 
English), English language competency was a key inducement to participation in the Initiatives 
of Change movement. Embedded in the desire for English are class and status aspirations in 
addition to access to privileged materials that are assumed to circulate within the ever-more-
international anglosphere. Indonesian language ideologies allow for the epistemic neutrality of 
English. One key difference between “traditional” and “modern,” religious schools, for instance, 
is the use of vernacular and Arabic languages at the former and Arabic and English at the latter. 
 
 
136 
 
Since English is understood as a technical capacity, in keeping with the overriding 
understandings of technical capacities as divorced from ideological or spiritual commitments, 
English proficiency alone tells us little about the spiritual character of another human – other 
than their classed access to foreign knowledge and opportunity. The spiritual status of the 
English speaker is presumptively unchanged. What matters is what is done with this technical 
ability.   
Frank Buchman directed his early mission activities towards elites, with an eye towards 
leveraging their status into greater influence. According to Daniel Sack, this was modeled on 
contemporaneous YMCA evangelism (among Buchman’s first postings was a Philadelphia 
YMCA). Sack describes this method: “YMCA evangelism approached men both as individuals – 
through intense personal work – and in large groups – in rallies and revival meetings. To attract 
as many men as possible, its evangelists often began by reaching ‘key men,’ prominent leaders 
of a community whose involvement might attract others” (“Men Want Something Real,” 262). In 
contemporary Indonesia, Initiatives of Change does not have access to many “key men.” What it 
does promise, however, is access to foreigners, foreign travel, and the English language abilities 
that make it all possible. It does so even as IofC appeals to less instrumental motivations such as 
moral enhancement – and this personal emphasis can be explained, in part, by the historical 
context in which IofC was re-founded in 2002. 
A pervasive sense of disappointment lingered in the aftermath of the Abdurrahman 
Wahid presidency, brought down by machinations in the legislature in July 2001. Amongst the 
former students I spoke with in Ciputat, the early post-Reformasi era is recalled as a time of 
political disenchantment, economic constraint and pernicious social instability. For students of 
an activitist bent, these were trying times. They were barely too young to have participated in the 
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euphoric overthrow of the old regime, and after years of sectarian violence and elite-manipulated 
protest, political prospects seemed bleak. As the promise of collective efficacy waned, there was 
fertile soil for the individual-oriented practices of Initiatives of Change. IofC dates its founding 
to the attendance of several UIN Jakarta students at the 2002 Asia Pacific Youth Conference in 
Kuala Lumpur, organized under the auspices of Initiatives of Change. Their participation in the 
conference followed a presentation made by an “action team,” comprising mostly Malaysian 
volunteers, which re-introduced the Initiatives of Change message to Indonesia in 2001. From 
these first members enduring leadership of the organization emerged, passed on to a new 
generation of leaders only in 2011-2012. Inaugurated with travel and foreign exchange, IofC 
promised something new to the broader Ciputat and Jakarta student communities.  
Time and again in interviews and conversations my interlocutors stated the importance of 
these twinned appeals in accounting for their initial attraction to the organization. One of the 
leaders of IofC during my research explained his rationale for joining in 2003: “Firstly I wanted 
to learn English [pingin belajar Bahasa Inggris], maybe similarly with the majority of my 
friends, secondly, and this was equally important, there was an opportunity to travel outside the 
country, with the assistance of friends.”108 Another IofC member, who started participating in 
2008, explained how a classmate who was active in IofC convinced him to start attending its 
events. It was the lure of the foreign and the promise of travel that did it:  
I met with someone, a woman, and she introduced me to her ability to travel outside the 
country, to see something new outside of the country and that became something like a 
focus for me, because I had never gone outside of West Java and Jakarta, I had never left 
that area, I had never gone to Central Java, East Java, never mind Sumatra, Kalimantan, 
Papua, I never had, not even once. So I wanted to see something new, something far from 
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 June 4
th
 2011 Interview with Nur. [P]ertama saya pingin belajar Bahasa Inggris,  mungkin sama dengan teman-
teman yang kebanyakan, dan yang kedua, ini yang paling penting juga, ada kesempatan bisa ke luar negeri juga, 
dengan dibantu teman-teman. 
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what I knew. [suatu hal yang jauh di fikiran saya] […]. And she gave us photos from her 
time in the Philippines.
109
 
 
Yet another senior member of the group during my fieldwork explained how he came to be 
affiliated with IofC five years earlier after a leader in the organization told him, “if you want to 
talk English, just come to IofC and you will see the real foreigner, and you can improve your 
English. At the beginning I just want to learn English and I want to go abroad.”110 The promise 
of English was very real. But once the participation shifted from the lure of the exotic to the 
embrace of moral transformation, the arrival of those moral prompts was still in English. 
 English is not only the language of travel and foreign commerce. It is the language of 
science and thus also the language of scientific truth. One of the other ways IofC was localized 
was through its use of this scientific language of truth. English, by the early 2000s, represented 
not just privileged access to global culture, but also epistemic neutrality.
111
 This latter 
achievement, in part, allowed for the one-time Christian evangelical movement of the FCCF to 
be adopted, in deconfessionalized form, as Initiatives of Change. IofC was available to its 
Indonesian audience because it promised English language fluency and denied any specific 
"religious" content in its moral mission. In Indonesia, English is not a sacred language. As 
Robert Hefner points out in Civil Islam, "since independence, most of the clergy in the Christian 
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 May 28
th
 2011 Interview with Abdul Fatah. Saya bertemu dengan seseorang, perempuan, dia memperkenalkan 
saya dengan kemampuan dia yang bisa pergi ke luar negeri, bisa melihat suatu hal yang baru di luar negeri dan itu 
menjadi satu hal yang mungkin bagi fokus saya karena saya sama sekali nggak pernah ke luar dari jawa Barat dan 
Jakarta, saya nggak pernah keluar dari situ, saya nggak pernah ke Jawa tenggah, Jawa Timur, apalagi ke Sumatera, 
Kalimantan, Papua, saya nggak pernah, nggak pernah sama sekali. Jadi saya inggin melihat suatu hal yang baru, 
suatu hal yang jauh di fikiran saya. […]. Dia kasih kita foto-foto ketika di Filipina.  
110
 June 4
th
 2011 Interview with Burhanuddin. English original.  
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 Of course, an added dimension to English use, as per Joseph Errington’s argument in “Continuity and Change” is 
precisely its opacity: “other recently borrowed words do not contribute in any obvious way to standard Indonesian’s 
communicative efficiency. Taken from sources little known within the community of Indonesian speaker at 
large…their use may, on the contrary, render speech more obscure, limit the audience that may understand messages 
in which the words are used, and so impede communication” (341). This use, however, conforms with “traditional 
indigenous conceptions of elite speech and speakers” (ibid), that is to say, the inaccessibility of elite speech. By 
mastering the idiom of IofC, the membership gains access to a certain kind of presumed English elite.  
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churches had been indigenized, diminishing the identification of Christianity with European 
identity" (107). Long before European identity ceased to map onto Christianity, Christianity had 
already shed much of its association with European languages (with the obvious, and important, 
exception of pre-Vatican II Catholicism). Where religious boundaries collided in Indonesia, they 
did so chiefly in indigenous languages. 
Early in the Suharto regime, proselytizing amongst recognized religious practitioners was 
officially banned by the consensual agreement of religious leaders. Muslim exceptions, however, 
proliferated under the sign of dakwah, or “calling,” a missionizing-impulse that has become an 
ever-more important feature of global Muslim discourse. The Protestant contingent also later 
rejected these new rules, explaining that, "they could not accept the declaration because it is the 
duty of all Christians to evangelize" (Hefner, 109). When renewed fears of Kristianisasi 
(Christianization) swept Indonesia in the 1990s (continuing through today),
112
 theories of large-
scale conspiracies to accomplish this maneuver resonated in elite Muslim circles (Hefner, 140). 
However, these alleged conspiracies relied on local knowledge and regional languages: on things 
hidden, by the resemblance of the Christian missionaries to their target population. IofC, with its 
clear embrace of English and internationalism, didn't fit the acknowledged template of Christian 
activity. Core IofC practices were maintained in English: Quiet time (QT) and “check-in.” Since 
these activities were left untranslated, they remained safe from the suspicion of Christianization 
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 See, for instance, Robigusta Suryanto’s report in Hidayatullah.com on the “viral video” of a woman in a head-
scarf being allegedly proselytized by a Christian: “Heboh “Video Kristenisasi”: “Kenapa Ibu Pakai Kerudung 
Disuruh Percaya Tuhan Yesus?” Or consider the recent article published online in Republika, “Kaligrafi Doa Non-
Muslim Memiliki Tujuan Pemurtadan?” In this latter instance, the existence of Arab lettered (calligraphy) “Our 
Father” prayers is being cast as an effort to encourage apostasy. To the obvious fact that Arab Christians (and Jews) 
use Arabic as a liturgical language, the critic (the local chairman of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) quoted in the piece 
would argue, “That writing says Abana (our father), there is no term “our father” in Islam. We say God (tuhan) not 
that term.” Of course, tuhan has its own unremarked lineage, stretching back to early Christian missionaries 
translation of “Lord” as Tu(h)an.   
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– despite their very clear Christian genealogy. A poignant internal concern of Islam, still vital 
and dating at least to the debates between the Hellenistic rationalist mu’tazilah and the ahlul 
hadith who opposed them, isn’t with the foreign or the different; it is with the potential to 
(mis)recognize in the foreign or the different divine authorization. This explains the stakes 
behind debates, in Indonesia, about “Indonesian Islam” or “Islam Nusantara” (Archipelagic 
Islam). These fierce discussions are very much alive and reflect different understandings of what 
is meant by “Indonesian” (is it local color or authorizing tradition) as much as what is meant by 
“Islam.”       
Quiet time (QT), as I was inducted into it, consists of silent meditation. Before beginning, 
one may pose a question to the divine, but for the duration utter external and internal silence 
must be maintained. This is “inner listening,” or the “divine guidance” of the early Buchman 
movements. A soul that has been successfully purified of sin is fit to receive direct admonitions 
from God. The process of clearing away the moral blockage between an individual and god relies 
on an exteriorization of internal dispositions (out-loud acknowledgement of failings), thus QT 
has a social element as well. It is not sufficient to redress material and interpersonal wrongs 
within oneself alone. For the most avid Oxford Group, MRA and Initiatives of Change 
practitioners, the self must be held externally to account for all its potential perversions. Here the 
Oxford Group was part of a twentieth century Euro-American (and now global) shift from the 
language of “sin” to one of deconfessionalized psychological maladies, a movement long since 
accomplished by the time IofC returned to Indonesia. Alison Falby, in “The Modern 
Confessional,” writes about the role Oxford groups played in the transition towards the currently 
dominant idiom of the therapeutic in middle and upper class Euro-American capitalist cultures 
and those they heavily influence globally. Falby describes the emergence of QT as a practice: 
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“the smaller groups met for ‘Quiet Time,’ or periods of meditation that were intended to open the 
members’ minds to God’s will. The more public testimonials usually took place at Group house 
parties” (259). QT and House parties were the twinned institutions anchoring the early Oxford 
Group. The collective nature of these pursuits was very important to Buchman. Falby relates, 
“Buchman emphasized the importance of individual surrender to the spirit of the group as well as 
the ‘confession of sins either in public or in private,’ a process it called ‘sharing for witness’” 
(259). Sharing for witness, transformed into the institution of “check-in” at IofC, allowed what 
was once confession to instead become therapy, to move from the moral to the psycho-spiritual 
(much as it has for twelve-step groups, who share a similar lineage).   
At IofC “check-ins” fulfilled a valuable role genealogically linked to confession but 
conceptually divorced from the Christianity of the institution. Check-ins allowed the practitioner 
the opportunity to assess their internal and manifest compliance with the dictates of the four 
moral absolutes. Less austere practitioners, of course, use QT to relax, to reflect or just to zone 
out. And sometimes check-ins were just a venue for sharing information – developments in an 
ongoing project or personally salient events from one’s life. But in the transformed practice of 
House parties, now called “family group,” check-ins were used to full and devastating moral 
effect. At Youth Camp I was part of a family group of five individuals. The parental role was 
played by a long-standing member of the organization, while four of us “children” comprised the 
rest of the group. Our “parent” prompted us to reflect on grave moral failings – particularly in 
our family of origin. And then he modeled IofC appropriate disclosure of that past: he spoke 
frankly about deceit, substance abuse and adolescent irresponsibility. None of us children were 
prepared to pierce our own reservoir of error so candidly, but the pattern was clear. At 
subsequent family groups, I (and I imagine the others) came ready to disclose tightly-held or 
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distressing secrets, lapses and weaknesses. Pursuing this model of moral disclosure required 
serious sensitivity, given the very Christian genealogy of the sacrament of confession, and of 
particular silent meditative practices. Maintaining the practices in English (even where their 
contents were expressed in Indonesian) was an initial step in making them theologically safe for 
a predominantly Muslim audience.    
 The four moral absolutes became local by the instability of their translation – by shifting, 
contingent glosses that reflected immediate concerns – while “quiet time” and “check-in” 
remained viable precisely by being named in English. There are myriad available glosses for 
quiet time, but to suggest, say, zikir (Ar. dhikr. remembrance [of God]) would be to substantively 
alter the practice in ways that drew attention to the alteration. Similarly, the practice of “check-
in” invites doctrinal dispute. In a flowing and highly accessible intellectual history of Islamic 
jurisprudence, Sadakat Kadri discusses, in several places, the open/hidden or public/private 
distinction.
113
 Writing in a footnote, Kadri explains, “Discretion in the wake of wrongdoing is 
explicitly sanctioned in several hadiths: see, for example, al-Bukhari, 8.73.95, which has the 
Prophet declaring that every sinner is forgivable ‘except those who commit a sin openly or 
disclose their sins to people [mujahirin]” (295). The hadith cited by Kadri came up several times 
in my discussions with IofC members, who were quick to characterize IofC activities as not 
constituting a membership within the mujahirin, the group designated within the hadith and 
conventionally described as open sinners or those who discuss openly their sins. In part, this took 
the notion of IofC spaces and accorded them a “private” character. The prohibition against 
                                                             
113
 Kadri characterizes this element of the tradition as a “don’t ask don’t tell policy,” writing, “the sense that 
wrongdoers compound transgressions against God by talking about them is ancient. Ever since the Prophet 
reportedly discouraged confessions for adultery, jurists have warned that flagrant sinning can corrode the social 
fabric and produce copycat crimes” (230). Thus part of the prohibition against disclosure is the social ramification of 
sin, the possibility of contagion. IofC members would argue that their disclosures are oppositely motivated, and thus 
not subject to the same restrictions.   
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“open” disclosure, I was told, mean disclosures “in the public eye.” The intimate spaces of IofC 
were private; among family.  
The injunction to speak only good extends even further than the prohibition against 
disclosing sin. Speech is understood as a morally perilous act, requiring conscious regulation by 
the worshipper. There are numerous hadith attesting to the importance of remaining silent. 
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, a long-standing organization typically held to be 
theologically austere and politically conservative (Hefner, 109-112; Hasan, 39), publishes a 
weekly pamphlet for distribution at Friday congregational worship observances. The Buletin 
Dakwah thrust into my hand outside the main UIN mosque on March 25, 2011 was entitled 
“Guard Your Tongue” (“Jagalah Lisanmu”). The author, Abdul Hafidz, collected a variety of 
Quranic verses and hadith attesting to the importance of this principle.  Amidst the exhortations 
to not speak ill of others was a proverb attesting to the moral peril of speech: “some scholars say, 
‘If you were the one buying the pages on which the angels record your deeds, you would 
undoubtedly spend more time in silence than speech” (2).114 Excessive speech, independent of its 
content, is already suspect. Policing language barriers lowered the stakes of individual utterances 
– the moral neutrality of English suggested, at a minimum, that one’s speech in that register 
wouldn’t count against one. Insofar as Quiet Time stayed quiet time, there was little risk that it 
might constitute unlawful innovation (bidah). Check-ins, similarly, pre-empted criticism by their 
presumed distance (English) from moral selfhood, coupled with their “private” (family-style) 
practice.   
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 Sebagian ulama berkata “Seandainya kalian yang membelikan kertas untuk para malaikat yang mencatat amal 
kalian, niscaya kalian akan lebih banyak diam daripada berbicara.”  
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 Just as English was very important for the internal operations of IofC, the lure of travel 
remained a potent source of inspiration structuring individual’s involvement in the organization. 
On its face travel represented a prohibitively expensive prospect for most of the membership. 
Global Initiatives of Change events, however, facilitated individual’s participation in yet more 
future events. Through participation in Initiatives of Change gatherings abroad, IofC members 
gained access to fund-raising apparatus, partial foreign sponsorship, and coveted letters of 
invitation that helped smooth the often difficult acquisition of travel documents. (Travel within 
Southeast Asia was greatly eased by ASEAN treaties, but travel to Australia, Switzerland, the 
United States and elsewhere often presented significant barriers in terms of visas, even after the 
costs of travel and lodging was accounted for). I return to this fact to acknowledge that the 
individuals who became members in IofC were also motivated by various considerations well 
outside the group’s emphasis on personal moral transformation. Once involved, however, most 
came to espouse the values and practices taught within the larger organization. This, too, is part 
of the Buchman legacy. The initial inducement is deemphasized in favor of the ultimate moral 
end – they don’t care what gets you through the door, as long as you stay to change. Coming to 
be inhabited by the moral transformations promised by Initiatives of Change often entailed a 
narrative dimension. Crafting a story that described an individual’s awakening into deeper moral 
consciousness was both a proof of that transformation and a technology towards its fuller 
realization. The structure of the narratives at IofC hewed closely to the “transformation” 
narrative of Frank Buchman himself.
115
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 I am strenuously avoiding the language of “conversion” in keeping with IofC’s own emphasis on 
deconfessionalized moral enhancement. Coupled with the Islamic insistence that all souls originally entered into a 
covenant with God, it makes more sense to reflect the language of transformation (transformasi) and awakening 
(pembangkitan) – to better maintain the notion that individual subjects already contain within them essential moral 
ingredients that are activated by themselves or outside agents with divine approval.  
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Narratives of Moral Awakenings: From Great Shakes to Shared Seats 
 Moral transformation of the sort advocated by Initiatives of Change can also be 
understood as a narrative project. To the extent that a practitioner can assume the narrative role 
of the penitent seeker, within whom the divine intercedes, she is eligible for a life of divine 
guidance. Unsurprisingly, the archetypal narrative is provided by Frank Buchman himself. 
Above Buchman’s “dazed sense of a great shaking up” was cited. Throughout his life Buchman 
described the sudden awakening that overcame him at the Keswick convention as the key 
moment of spiritual insight galvanizing his missionary work. Having met with only middling 
success in his efforts to establish a hospice mission house in Philadelphia, Buchman was feeling 
disillusioned with his calling. As he listened to the speaker describe the personal nature of 
Christ’s sacrifice, Buchman was struck with the realization that he must first prepare the way for 
divine intervention. Until he had acknowledged and mitigated his sins, he wasn’t eligible for the 
divine agency of change. And so he wrote to the six board members who were involved in 
operating the Philadelphia mission house to frankly admit his failing and assure them of his 
intent to amend his behavior. The moral clarity that resulted from this course of action felt nearly 
overwhelming to Buchman, and many of the practices that sprang up in the organizations he 
founded were designed to deliver other seekers to the same “shaking-up” experience. Reviewing 
the various versions of this story, the Buchman critic Driberg offered this assessment: “Whatever 
the full explanation of this experience, whether it was a genuinely paranormal manifestation or 
purely subjective – a return, in a less disagreeable form, of that hysteria latent during the crisis of 
the previous months—Buchman himself sincerely believed that his whole life had been changed 
in that moment” (36). Even in the hands of ardent critics, the sincerity of Buchman’s experiences 
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is seldom questioned. The markers of sincerity, in turn, are disseminated through authoritative 
accounts of Buchman’s transformation.  
The actual moment of change is described in some detail in Lean’s account, Frank 
Buchman—a Life, and my brief re-telling above is drawn from a composite of that text and oral 
versions I heard at IofC: facilitators shared deconfessionalized versions of this story at Youth 
Camp, where the Christianity of Buchman’s realizations was deemphasized and the moral 
universality asserted. The parent Initiatives of Change organization has published hundreds of 
personal testimonies that conform to its basic structure. Lean reports Buchman’s first person 
narrative, 
I began to see myself as God saw me, which was a very different picture than the one I 
had of myself. I don’t know how you explain it, I can only tell you I sat there and realized 
how my sin, my pride, my selfishness and my ill-will, had eclipsed me from God in 
Christ. […]. I saw my resentments against those men standing out like tombstones in my 
heart. I asked God to change me and He told me to put things right with them (30-31).  
 
In this moment the central moral impulse of the First Century Christian Fellowship, the Oxford 
Groups, Moral Re-Armament and eventually Initiatives of Change was born: before addressing 
any other ills in the world, each individual must first amend her or his moral transgressions. The 
structure of this awakening experience has been re-articulated throughout the various iterations 
of Buchman’s movements. The logical priority has always remained constant – change begins 
with me.  
When Indonesians began participating in Initiatives of Change they, too, began to 
generate narratives of moral transformation. Here is an excerpt from an account written by a 
then-leader of Initiatives of Change Indonesia in 2010.
116
 The author first describes his 
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 The shaky digital footprint of IofC means that it has gone through at least six different websites in its 13 years of 
operation. Some of the contents of those websites are accessible via internet archives, but some of the hosted 
materials are no longer available on the Internet. All three of the following stories were posted to an earlier iteration 
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experience riding a train without paying the fare, followed by his eventual acknowledgement 
doing so constituted a moral transgression. We pick up the story as he tries to amend for this 
transgression: 
Despite already acknowledging my error, I still felt a lingering sense of sin. While 
conducting quiet time (reflection), I felt a strong impulse within me to apologize and 
return the ticket price to PT Kereta Api [the National Train Company]. I thought, 
acknowledging [menyadari, being aware of] and regretting aren’t enough, there needs to 
be action to correct the past mistakes. 
I abided by that strong impulse by writing a letter addressed to the Pasar Senin Jakarta 
office of the national train company. The letter contained an apology as a citizen of 
Indonesia and my regrets that I couldn’t be a good citizen. At the end of the letter, I wrote 
my personal commitment to become a good and disciplined person. And I included 
sufficient money to cover the cost of a ticket. 
I am also aware that the consequence of “free loaders” (penumpang gelap, dark 
passengers) is a decline in annual revenues at PT Kereta Api Indonesia, which indirectly 
harms (merugikan, induces loss) the State. So it’s no surprise that the State is unable to 
enhance the services at public facilities such as hospitals, schools, roadways, because the 
State doesn’t have the money to develop and preserve them because of the ignorance of 
the citizens who take trains without purchasing tickets or don’t pay taxes.  
These deep ruminations ushered me to the firm commitment to undergo a change from 
within myself. To change Indonesia into a place that is peaceful, prosperous and 
courteous (beradab, with manners, right-relations) is unrealizable without individual 
changes from its citizens. By way of my mailed apology, I am convinced it will deliver 
an amazing outcome for me and the State. Now my life is more serene, peaceful and full 
of hope to see Indonesia change for the better.
117
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the IofC website. They have been re-posted to the group’s Facebook page and I locally archived them on my 
computer – but they are otherwise no longer available. Digital ephemera persist and disintegrate according to uneven 
and unknowable logics.  
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 Kendati sudah menyadari kesalahan, saya masih merasa ada perasaan berdosa yang belum hilang. Saat 
melakukan quiet time (refleksi), terasa ada dorongan kuat dari dalam diri saya untuk meminta maaf dan 
mengembalikan uang tiket ke PT. Kereta Api. Pikir saya menyadari dan menyesal tidak cukup, butuh tindakan untuk 
mengoreksi kesalahan di masa lalu. 
Dorongan kuat itu saya ikuti dengan menulis surat yang saya alamatkan ke PT. Kereta Api Pasar Senin Jakarta. 
Surat itu merupakan ungkapan permohonan maaf atas nama warga Indonesia dan penyesalan karena tidak bisa 
menjadi warga yang baik. Di akhir surat, saya menuliskan komitmen pribadi untuk menjadi orang yang baik dan 
disiplin. Sejumlah uang seharga tiket kereta saya lampirkan pada surat tersebut. 
Saya juga menyadari, dampak penumpang gelap sangat berpengaruh pada menurunnya pemasukan PT. Kereta Api 
Indonesia tiap tahun yang secara tidak langsung merugikan negara. Hal ini wajar jika negara tidak mampu 
meningkatkan pelayanan fasilitas umum seperti rumah sakit, sekolah, jalan raya, karena negara tidak memiliki uang 
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In the first paragraph, the author of this account internally translates “quiet time” as refleksi, 
itself a loan word from Dutch and/or English. In keeping with the discussion above, this suggests 
that the author is uncomfortable providing a clearer gloss – that the exterior status of quiet time 
is retained, even as it denotes a process of plumbing interior depths. Whereas Buchman’s 
perennial concern was stemming the advances of communism, this author conceives of his moral 
progress in incredibly nationalistic terms. Paeans to the state are an important component of 
organizational life in many instances in Indonesia. Invocations of the nation that might induce 
this observer to cringe in the United States are relatively ubiquitous in Indonesia. This author is 
seizing important rhetorical grounds to legitimate his message: the alliance between moral 
improvement and national advancement. If this seems an uncomfortable echo of “national 
development” rhetoric formerly espoused by the New Order regime, we should be quick to note 
that here it accompanies a frank admission of wrong-doing, hardly a feature of the Suharto 
government’s civil religion.  
 Considering the language ideologies that underpin the use of English at IofC, I have 
argued that the untranslated status of “quiet time” and “check-in” were important to their 
viability in becoming meaningfully local, and Islamic, practices. Bearing in mind the hadith 
forbidding self-disclosure cited in the course of that argument above, authors of these 
transformation narratives relied on specific rhetorical framings to make their texts safe for their 
audiences. The broad suspicion of public disclosure of sin could be effectively preempted by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
yang cukup untuk membangun dan memelihara akibat warganya miskin kesadaran seperti naik kereta tanpa beli 
tiket atau tidak bayar pajak.  
Perenungan yang dalam mengantarkan saya pada tekad kuat untuk melakukan perubahan dari diri sendiri. Perubahan 
untuk Indonesia yang damai, makmur, dan beradab tidak akan terwujud tanpa ada perubahan individu dari 
warganya. Melalui permohonan maaf lewat surat, saya yakin akan membawa dampak yang luar biasa bagi saya 
sendiri dan negara. Kini hidup saya lebih tenang, damai dan penuh harapan melihat perubahan Indonesia yang lebih 
baik.  
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these techniques. This framing is clear in the account of another highly active member of IofC. 
She penned her experiences about a more elemental set of personal failings. Instead of a 
relatively innocuous stint as a fare-dodger, she related deep interpersonal strife and familial 
breakdown. She published this essay with a title draw from a familiar Indonesian gloss of a 
Prophetic narration: “Surga di Bawah Telapak Kaki Ibu [Heaven is Beneath the Soles of Your 
Mother’s Feet] (Sunan an-Nasa'i 3104). In the sahih hadith, the Prophet grants a dispensation to 
a young man who comes wishing to join the jihad. Inquiring if the man still has a mother, the 
Prophet directs him to, “stay with her, for Paradise is beneath her feet.” This invocation of a 
prophetic saying partially guards against the seeming waywardness of the narrative that follows, 
considering it openly discloses things that should remain secret. 
The author begins by introducing her family, and describing her transformation from a 
“cheerful girl, full of jokes and smiles” (gadis periang, penuh senyum dan canda) into a young 
woman marked by “sadness, reserve and emotionality” (kesedihan, diam dan kelabilan). 
Describing how business reversals and the death of her father plunged her family into disarray, 
the author relates the cumulative blow: “As the saying goes, when it rains it pours” (sudah jatuh 
tertimpa tangga, struck by the ladder having already fallen). This leads to a moral collapse: “In 
short, jealousy (kecemburuan), rage (kemarahan), and a feeling of loss (perasaan kehilangan) 
drove me to attempt suicide by consuming more than fifty sleeping pills I got from a doctor. It 
turns out that God (Allah) still cares (sayang), I awoke after four days in my Islamic academy 
(pesantren) room.” In keeping with IofC norms, the author attaches emotional reasons to her 
chosen course of action. The explicit emotional labels are then affixed to the confessional 
account of an attempted suicide – a moving degree of openness and self-disclosure, particularly 
as articulated by this devout young woman. The emotions themselves, as for Buchman, are 
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symptoms of a kind of heedlessness. The author characterizes the years following her suicide 
attempt as time spent as a “girl in rebellion” (gadis pembangkang). Resolution, when it comes, is 
through her involvement in IofC. 
 The author tells us that she took part in Youth Camp IV in 2008. It was there, that “for 
the first time I learned about the four values of a moral life that I had never before studied; 
honesty (kejujuran), love (cinta), sincerity (ketulusan) and unselfishness (ketidakegoisan).” The 
mere study of these four moral absolutes provokes a kind of opening in her. The camp ended 
with the exhortation that participants write a letter to themselves detailing a moral commitment. 
And so she took the opportunity to work out an apology to her mother. Once she received the 
letter in the mail, she approached her mother for a private heart-to-heart (berbicara empat mata 
dengan serius). She describes what happens next: “I looked at her face with its ever increasing 
wrinkles from reflecting on the lives her children were living. I prostrated myself at her feet 
(bersujud di kakinya) and my mama hugged me with a warm embrace the likes of which I had 
not received in who knows how long.” And so, the author concludes her story of moral 
transformation by reflecting that, “it is undeniable (tidak perlu diragukan lagi) that heaven is 
beneath the soles of a mother’s feet.” Thus the narrative arc delivers us back to the title, the 
authorizing Islamic resonances attempting to place this account of transformation beyond 
reproach. Despite its explicit emotional disclosure, the story is framed as testimonial 
endorsement of Prophetic tradition. Simultaneously, internal to the transformation are the 
pronounced affective experiences, the crushing agony and tearful forgiveness, which authorize 
the experience of change. The affective weight is the mark of divine intercession. Buchman’s 
great shaking-up becomes this author’s harrowing tearful prostration. 
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  The first narrative, written for public dissemination by a then-leader of IofC, showcases 
both the core value of honesty and the necessity of restitution in pursuit of a moral life. The 
second suggests the depths of pain and discomfort which can be addressed through the 
application of the moral principles taught at IofC. Both of these are attempts at moral suasion, 
projected into the digital expanse of the internet in the hopes that they resonate in the hearts of 
some reader who chances upon them. Less personal is the testimonial of another IofC member 
that stresses the cultivation of consideration for others, although it is directed at the same 
undesignated audience. After writing in detail about his morning commute to campus as a 
student, the author describes the final leg of his journey and closes with an earnest entreaty in 
keeping with the values he discovered at IofC. However nowhere does the author actually 
mention IofC or locate his moral commitment within its teachings. Instead, peppering his 
account with obvious markers of Islamic commitments, this author delivers a generic moral 
exhortation.  
 We pick up the account as the author transfers microbuses en route to campus:  “While 
reciting Bismillah (in the name of God) my right foot entered KB 510 and Alhamdulillah (all 
praise belongs to God) I could see empty seats. I sat right in the middle of the last seat with the 
intention of making it easier to disembark.” The sacralization of personal gain (getting a seat on 
a crowded bus) is implicitly criticized as a lazy or inauthentic spiritual posture. Having marked 
himself as pious in language, the author concedes that he quickly busied himself with 
heedlessness: “sitting there peacefully with my heavy bag on my chest. My body reclined, and 
my eyelids heavy with drowsiness. Pop songs played on a hand phone.” Into this blissful 
disengagement intrudes the image of suffering in the form of an unseated passenger: “her eyes 
flashed with illness and fatigue. Periodically she rubbed her sweating brow: overheated. 
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Everyone knew (tahu) she was old, everyone knew she was exhausted, ill and almost spent, but 
not everyone was aware (sadar) enough to stand and give her a place to sit, meaning, exchange 
her suffering (menukarkan penderitaan) for our own.” Here the author contrasts knowledge—
what was known (tahu)—with awareness (sadar). Knowledge, in his account, is insufficient. 
Moral being requires awareness, which is to say, efficacy. When facts galvanize action, only then 
do things change. As the author himself relates, “for me this wasn’t the first time I’d seen this 
sight, I’d seen it tens or maybe even hundreds of times.” What was different was the moral 
awakening that overtook him in this moment. Sitting on the bus he suddenly remembers that, 
“there is a culture of mutual assistance (saling tolong) for those in need that I want to promote 
(biasakan, normalize).” This recollection, too, is part of a project of moral consciousness-raising.   
The author compares his minor awakening with a longer genealogy of altruism. He 
recalls that, “as recorded in history, if the Prophet Muhammad acted selfishly (berlaku egois) 
then it would have been impossible for him to carry out his mandate as the Messenger in 
spreading truth (kebenaran) to his community, even though lives were at stake (walau nyawa 
menjadi taruhannya).” The author cites the Prophet as a moral exemplar, although he indigenizes 
the sirah (Prophetic biography, Ar. Al-sīra), using the generic introduction “as written in history” 
(tertulis di sejarah). This is a telling example for the virtue of unselfishness, since it locates 
selfishness (egois) as a clear obstacle to salvation. Despite the fact that this takes place in 
explicitly Islamic terms, the structure of the narrative, the dawning awareness relayed within it, 
closely tracks to Buchman’s own signal contribution to the genre.  
The ultimate realization here, for our author, is that “change really happens not because 
of you or her doing it, but because I begin” (perubahan itu terjadi bukan karena kamu dan dia 
yang melakukannya tapi saya yang memulai). Although this last narrative does not clearly locate 
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the value of unselfishness within the body of IofC teachings it was originally published on the 
(now defunct) website of the organization. Personal moral awakening is not simply temporally 
prior to social transformation – it is where the latter aspiration is first realized. “Change begins 
with me,” the oft-cited mantra of Initiatives of Change, is here understood as “change can only 
begin with me.” And yet of utmost importance is that the agent of change is not first the self. The 
first to act is the divine.  
The Subject and Agent of Change 
 Frank Buchman was struck in a small chapel on the margins of the Keswick convention, 
overwhelmed with a vision of the crucifixion and sensory insight of a “great shaking-up.” God 
changed Frank, once Frank was willing to make some changes himself (the six letters written to 
the board of the failed Overbrook Pennsylvania hospice house). So who changes the participants 
of IofC Indonesia? Superficially, the hollowed out theology of of Initiatives of Change defers the 
answer to the participant. Pragmatically, however, agency is limited to specific actors. Divine 
will creeps in and around the Secretariat of IofC, embodied in ritual worship, expressed in 
evocative supplication. Yet the evangelical tools for accessing this will rest in the hands of the 
membership writ large: the community of IofC as a second-order agent of divine change. The 
tertiary agent, the self, can only act in circumscribed respects, preparing the grounds of 
subjectivity for the intervention of the Other. And these processes of agentive change are 
embedded in the histories – Islamic, archipelagic and local – that construct their specific 
possibilities.    
In Christian Moderns, Webb Keane reflects on a process of Latourian purification in the 
wake of an encounter between Dutch Calvinists and Sumbanese marapu traditionalists. As he 
clarifies in the introduction, “their collective story starts as an encounter between two sides, but 
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its postcolonial consequences produce a tangle of relations and possible positions that is far more 
complex” (4). To a considerable extent the subjects of this chapter (and indeed, this dissertation 
as will be discussed in context of Kahfi Motivator School later), members of Initiatives of 
Change Indonesia, grew up within a “tangle of relations and possible positions.” As they grapple 
with moral impulses within frames provided by IofC, they are inheritors of stabilized and reified 
concepts of religion and culture. IofC members grow up with frequent formulations of 
“religion.” It is attested to in school, promulgated in national discourse and maintained through 
social norms that rely on its repeated invocation. Agama, religion, is constantly made to say its 
name. And yet their story is not merely the negotiation of the constraints this legacy entails. My 
predominantly Muslim interlocutors at IofC re-assemble these ostensibly purified forms: 
borrowing the assumed epistemic neutrality of English and the technical-spiritual means of 
Initiatives of Change, they mount moral projects that blend domains of subjectivity and agency. 
Sharply informed by postcolonial projects of linguistic and religious purification, they 
nevertheless demonstrate an enduring capacity for novel organization and motivation. In this 
they are surely not unique. The longer I spent reflecting on IofC, the more obvious this 
secondary insight became. The evangelical genealogy of IofC, with its promise of familiarity, 
obscures the continuing presence of Divine agency in other instantiations of Initiatives of 
Change and theologically allied movements. So comfortable with treating the purifying fantasy 
of modernity as a fact, we stand at risk of missing notions of linguistic, material and personal 
efficacy that exceed that particular narrative. 
The criticism of IofC as derivative and vacuous has shadowed its parent movements 
almost from their inception. In a sharp review published in The Guardian, Alasdair MacIntyre 
weighed in on the mid-century phenomenon of MRA. Criticizing the organization’s naivety, he 
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writes about the individuals drawn to the movement, “Those who felt themselves in a complex 
and ambiguous universe suddenly find themselves poised between two simplicities: the world 
needs a new spirit of co-operation to defeat communism; they themselves need a new spirit in 
their lives to defeat sin. To produce the second it will be to produce the first” (8).118 This has 
long been the rebuke: that the emphasis on the affective experience of transformation precludes 
the possibility of structural interventions in society. Yet this was manifestly not the case at IofC. 
Although the language of individual moral stature permeated the organization, the commitments 
of its membership extended to a variety of socially interventionist activities. Some were 
decidedly small scale (tutoring neighborhood children), others (like the interfaith stands taken in 
concert with the Nahdlatul Ulama Youth Wing to protect the rights of Christian minorities to 
worship in Bogor) bear a family resemblance to relatively classical social activist goals. The 
subject of change at IofC is not satisfied with platitudinous moral pronouncement – rather, these 
simple rules are imagined as tools to unlock potentials stored within individuals and to access 
divinely ordained capacities.   
IofC constituted new kinds of subjectivity from largely familiar parts. The aspirational 
character of change, the yearning to be different, better, restored, pervades the organizational 
activities of IofC. The subject of this desire is produced on an Islamic substrate of submission to 
divine will, scientific efficacy promised by English, and the religio-nationalist appropriation of 
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 MacIntyre’s criticism hardly stops there. He goes on to castigate the aesthetic vacuity of the movement: “Moral 
Re-Armament is quite unlike traditional religion in its disregard of reason and of taste. It will do anything to put 
across its fundamental message, use films and plays of quite extraordinary banality and so on.” MacIntyre rejects, in 
part, the crudeness of MRA’s demagoguery – the “extraordinary banality” that characterizes its didactic moralizing. 
Nothing so blunt and emotionally driven, he seems to argue, could possibly have much value, and its very populism 
is an indictment of its intellectual merits. His final analysis is even more damning: “This [MRA], then, is to provide 
democracy with its ideological clothing…And yet in fact, of course, this religion is not a moving force like the 
Calvinism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: it is a means of accepting a made world, not a means of 
change” (ibid). Of course, for contemporary IofC participants, the organization provides a concrete means of egress 
from the quietism of Indonesian political life.   
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“cultural” practices. She is endowed with novel possibilities for the future precisely because she 
has become optimally outfitted to host divine agency. She doesn’t change herself, but she does 
agentively construct the conditions on which divine change is predicated. The moral force of that 
change radiates out through her family and social relations, penetrating up through systems of 
economic and political exclusion. Remaking her heart, she remakes the world. That the tools of 
this project are prefabricated doesn’t lessen their appeal – it guarantees, through their very 
reproducibility, their scientific efficacy. This kind of logic might appear foreign and bizarre to 
disparate Indonesian constituencies, but for the university educated, increasingly well-traveled, 
middle-class Jakarta residents of IofC, it felt natural and real. Social change really was as simple 
as individual moral attainment. And as her moral improvement galvanizes moral action, she is 
forced to contend with a rich array of relational possibilities. Navigating these relations, with 
precision, comprises part of the response to a very clear ethical injunction, the focus of the 
subsequent chapter: have adab!         
What Changes, After Me? 
This chapter has detailed how a Christian evangelical movement dedicated to living a 
divinely inspired life has come to be adopted and appropriated in the shadow of the State Islamic 
University Syarif Hidayatullah in contemporary Jakarta.
119
 Alongside a push to 
deconfessionalize the larger movement filtering down to its Indonesian instantiation, innovative 
local translations of organizational materials are an important means through which Initiatives of 
Change becomes viable to the mostly Muslim-Indonesian membership of IofC. Core Initiatives 
of Change activities like quiet time and check-in, meanwhile, are left intentionally untranslated. I 
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 The State Islamic University system, too, is the outgrowth of a particular historical trajectory. As part of the 
process by which the Indonesian state sought to “capture” Islam, there is something to be said about IofC’s 
emergence in relation to this institution. If the state sought to “Islamize” the university, some of its students looked 
outside of both Indonesia and Islam in their efforts to Islamize themselves.  
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argue that this safely segregates still Christian-seeming elements of the movement from their 
new Muslim practitioners: that untranslated English, with its presumed epistemic neutrality, 
remains non-threatening to the spiritual interiors of IofC participants.  
IofC is a movement through which young Indonesians explore their own moral impulses 
and seek novel framing for their personal and social aspirations. The moral but 
deconfessionalized atmosphere of IofC, carefully cultivated, enables members to safely explore 
different forms of sociality including fraught gendered intersubjective experiences. Rather than a 
“liberal” exterior to Islam, I contend that this social flexibility is indicative of ethical mandates 
that demand sensitive interpersonal compromise. As IofC members seek to change (berubah), 
beginning with themselves, they do so by adjusting to the perceived needs of those surrounding 
them and opening themselves to the possibility of divine agentive transformation. In the 
teachings and doings of Initiatives of Change, the young IofC participants seek to access the 
“energy” that William James delineates in the epigraph opening this chapter. A century after 
Frank Buchman was thrown to his knees and thrust into his mission by a great moral awakening, 
new Muslim recruits for this Moral Re-Armament take up the call. The change that begins with 
them, radiating through economies, societies, and nations, is not done by them: only divine 
mercy is sufficient to intercede. Its locus is hearts. Thus change “had” by IofC members is 
“done” to them by God.   
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Chapter 3 
The Banquet of Change: IofC and Adab 
Adab is the discipline of body, mind and soul; the discipline that assures the recognition and 
acknowledgement of one’s proper place in relation to one’s physical, intellectual and spiritual 
capacities and potentials; the recognition and acknowledgement of the reality that knowledge and 
being are ordered hierarchically according to their various levels (marātib) and degrees 
(darajāt)…Adab, concisely defined, is the spectacle (mashhad: دهشـم) of justice as it is reflected 
by wisdom.  
Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas in The Concept of Education in Islam, 11-12 
The Place of Adab   
This chapter asserts that adab is usefully understood as “right relations.” As such, it is a 
key analytic category for exploring contemporary Indonesian Muslim sociality. Of the many 
available senses discussed below, I translate adab as “right relations” to stress the relational and 
social dimensions of the term. In doing so, I am not translating from Indonesian, or from the 
Arabic “original.” Instead I appropriate the term as it is used in Arabo-Indonesian discourse, the 
hybrid linguistic register in which many moral arguments are framed by contemporary 
Indonesian Muslims. Thus it retains senses drawn from its usage in both languages. Instead of a 
privileged focus on “piety” or its ostensible glosses (takwa; kesalehan), I argue that horizontal 
ethical injunctions (one axis of adab, even as it demands recognition of hierarchy) remain a 
primary and seemingly competing feature of moral relationality. This argument emerges from an 
investigation of the social mores structuring intersubjective intercourse at Initiatives of Change 
Indonesia (IofC) and amongst its participants. IofC is not only a site of moral transformation – it 
also is a space within which different models of sociality are subject to experimentation. These 
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experiments, part of the suite of procedures implicated in “change,” reveal different 
commitments to, and negotiations of, Indonesian Islamic norms. These negotiations are 
especially prominent in terms of cross-gender interaction. Despite the abiding egalitarian ethos at 
IofC, the micro-politics of sociality insistently demand that participants discern the “right 
relation,” and attendant hierarchal ordering, of every interaction.   
Adab is an important sign under which “change” is imagined and attempted. The 
authorization for change in the IofC context demands that it be undertaken in the correct manner. 
Personal and social transformation also, always, involves a recalibration of relationships. 
Attending to the structures of those relationships allows for a richer understanding of the 
flexibility of the interactional modes at IofC. Participants in these encounters justified the 
overlapping and diverging social norms of their interactions by emphasizing the centrality of 
“right relations,” a mandate they located squarely within the Islamic tradition. As I participated 
in the organization some of the “rules” enabling IofC social experimentation became apparent. 
These structures, in turn, alerted me to the metapragmatic role of adab. Adab determines not only 
the “right” way to relate, but it enables the recognition of the existence of a relation, within 
which there is a “right.” Both of these features (recognizing relationships, attending to them 
correctly) are central to the kinds of transformative moral changes attempted within IofC. 
IofC Members and Their Adab 
I assert that IofC provides a space for experimentation – that within the organization the 
membership actively explores different models of sociality. This is particularly apparent within 
the context of Islamic social ethics. In addition to prescriptive norms derived from the canonical 
sources of the Qur’an and hadith, adab is a key consideration in these processes. Adab 
encompasses recognition of relations and micro-alignments of social intercourse within those 
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relations. This latter facet, an orienting of self with respect to the standards of an other, depends 
on the rights ascribed to those relations (rights of mannered interaction; rights of hospitality; 
rights of mercy and forbearance; other rights). Negotiation between and among these rights is 
partially facilitated by the moral rhetoric of the organization. Understood as advocating a broad 
project of personal and social transformation, IofC affords its members greater flexibility in their 
social interactions: the loftiness of the overarching goal smooths over discrepancies in 
individual’s conduct. In an effort to move this discussion away from abstract process and into the 
grounded experience of IofC participants, the following biographical sketches introduce some of 
the social elements negotiated within the organization.  
 Differing norms were apparent at the very top of the IofC hierarchy, evidenced in the 
social commitments of one IofC leader, Nur. The grandson of a renowned Madurese Kyai 
(scholar, Islamic boarding school headmaster), Nur was a central figure in IofC during the period 
I worked with the organization. Strongly oriented towards populist politics, Nur was well into a 
decade-long political and religious transformation when I met him. IofC armored him with both 
a community and a set of minimalist spiritual practices to undertake this transformation. Moving 
away from normative Indonesian Sunni Islam, Nur was active in interfaith work and frequently 
endorsed a broad humanist philosophy. Through his years in the organization, Nur had traveled 
abroad on several occasions, including an extended stay in India and a visit to the world 
headquarters of the parent Initiatives of Change organization in Caux, Switzerland. He was frank 
about the initial appeal of IofC: an opportunity to practice English and the means to travel to 
foreign lands.  Over time, those private desires had given way to social aspirations of fairness, 
equality and pluralism.  Along with his IofC activities, Nur was employed as a freelance 
translator, working just enough to maintain his spare lifestyle. 
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Nur had fulfilled a variety of leadership posts within IofC, but also struck somewhat of a 
remote figure from the current generation of IofC members.  Nur was almost a decade older – at 
the time of writing, in his mid-thirties. He was, during my fieldwork, furthermore unmarried, and 
unmotivated to alter that status. He espoused a different set of aspirations than the normative 
emphasis on career, family, Islam that predominated amongst the group’s membership. 
Interpersonally Nur could came off as a little directive – he was used to being in charge. This 
generated little friction, however, probably because of his stature within the organization and his 
relative age.  Unable to square his humanist commitments with a discrete religious position, Nur 
used the IofC community as a site to explore a spiritual identity other than Muslim. After the 
conclusion of my fieldwork, Nur took to social media to characterize himself as no longer 
Muslim, claiming for himself a universal humanist tradition instead. I never heard another 
member criticize or even critically comment on this ongoing transformation. Nur policed the 
pluralist commitments of IofC members, but without recourse to pluralist traditions in Islam 
(other senior members of the organization shared his pluralist values but traced their genealogy 
within the Islamic tradition). He often did so by voicing Initiatives of Change arguments, usually 
cast in a universalist register. There was ample room at IofC for such a figure, even as he worked 
alongside Muslims advocating for more narrowly Islamic moral renewal.  
 Abdul Fatah, the individual who first introduced me to IofC and eventually my research 
assistant, came from a background seemingly at odds with the social activism of IofC. His father 
had been part of the tarbiyah movement in Indonesia,
120
 and had participated in the founding of a 
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 The tarbiyah movement dates to the 1970s and 80s, emerging among university students returning from overseas 
studies at centers of Islamic learning (Rinaldo, “Muslim Women,” 28). Rather than explicit political engagement, 
members of this movement sought to educate themselves on modernist Islam, often working in small study groups. 
Borrowing the model (and the theological orientation) of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, these study groups 
conceived of themselves as setting the stage for future advocacy and religio-political organization. See Damanik’s 
history of the one outgrowth of this movement, the Partai Keadilian (Justice Party), Fenomena Partai Keadilian. 
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pesantren (non-state Islamic school) in Bogor.
121
 This school dedicated itself to fostering the 
moral character necessary for future leadership, while encouraging its students to refrain from 
political engagement until they had sufficient moral stature. When Abdul Fatah enrolled at the 
State Islamic University, his father told him, “go and study, but don’t join any organizations!” 
Abdul Fatah wasn’t sure if this was because of these organization’s corrupting influence or just 
because they presented a distraction from the swift conclusion of his studies. In any event, the 
advice went unheeded. After his father passed away in his sophomore year, Abdul Fatah became 
active in Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (The Indonesian Muslim Students Movement, 
a campus Muslim organization).
122
  It was there that Abdul Fatah met a young woman who 
painted an attractive portrait of IofC. And so he violated his father’s prohibition for a second 
time. One of his first involvements with IofC was representing it at a Youth Congress in 
Malaysia, an experience that nurtured a fervent desire for more travel. While participating in 
IofC, Abdul Fatah was completing his university degree in the English Language Education 
program at UIN. 
Abdul Fatah had grown up in an austere and sheltered community – he attended the 
school his father helped found and lived in a neighborhood dominated by people affiliated with 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Also van Bruinessen’s “Genealogies” covers, in brief, the rise of this movement and its later political implications. 
See also Anies Baswedan’s “Political Islam in Indonesia.”  
121
 The doctrinal landscape of Indonesia is relentlessly complex. Abdul Fatah’s family claimed affiliation with 
tarekat Ghazaliyah. Unlike other tarekat (Sufi orders) active in Indonesia, tarekat Ghazaliyah had no formal 
structure of initiation or master-disciple relationships. Instead it meant that participants in this tarekat would follow 
both the “external-manifest” (lahir) and “hidden-interior” (batin) practices and traditions detailed in the corpus of 
Imam Al-Ghazali, the eleventh and twelfth-century Persian scholar and great synthesizer of Ash’ari theology, Sufi 
cosmology and normative Sunni practice. Abdul Fatah’s family are a compelling example of what Julia Day Howell 
describes in “Indonesia’s Salafist Sufis,” which is to say, Sufi devotional practice married to reformist zeal and 
rhetorical reliance on the authoritative (and authorizing) role of pious predecessors.    
122
 Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia(PMII)  dates to 1960. Founded by university students from Nahdlatul 
Ulama (the largest “traditionalist” Muslim organization in Indonesia), PMII is the direct competitor to Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Muslim Students’ Association), which is conventionally associated with Muhammadiyah, 
the largest modernist Muslim organization in Indonesia. In the State Islamic University system, these affiliations are 
often jumbled, but the popular division between HMI/Muhammadiyah and PMII/Nahdlatul Ulama tends to stand – 
this despite the fact that Muhammadiyah has a formal campus wing, the Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (The 
Muhammadiyah Students League).  
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that school, both in Bogor. Other than his maternal relatives in Bandung, he had little contact 
outside of this insular world prior to attending university. He recalled that as an elementary 
school student, he closed out every school day with prayers for the destruction of Israel and the 
United States (in solidarity with Palestine, as taught by their principal), a practice that did little to 
negatively dispose him towards either Jews or Americans in adulthood.  Abdul Fatah was a vocal 
proponent of what he considered Islamic values at their broadest social level. At the same time, 
he was tremendously flexible about particulars – I never heard him comment on or attempt to 
direct other’s individual performance of religious obligations, although he had many opinions 
about the ideal role of government in shaping public morality. A joking presence within the 
organization, his jocularity never came in for rebuke at IofC – for Abdul Fatah, IofC was 
fundamentally a social outlet, rather than a source of morals. This, too, was an acceptable 
relationship to the community.    
 Lia joined IofC at the same time as Abdul Fatah (2008). Invited by a friend to participate 
in that year’s Youth Camp, Lia was surprised to find an organization that would help her 
personally assimilate some of the difficulties of a troubled family background. Lia envisioned 
her participation in the organization as allied to a simultaneous effort to more fully manifest 
Islamic teachings – she was engaged in being what she understood to be a better Muslim at the 
same time as she availed herself of the moral changes promised at IofC. Whereas many IofC 
participants took seriously the opportunity to groom themselves for future leadership positions, 
Lia remained a quiet presence around the Secretariat. Friendly and demurring, Lia was 
uncomfortable taking a leadership position, even within Women Creators of Peace, an initiative 
spurred by IofC’s parent organization, and in the process of gathering steam during the period of 
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my research. Lia was self-conscious about her education, having graduated from a diploma 
program at a polytechnic rather than with a B.A. from UIN. 
 Lia, by self-characterization, had not been a very devoted Muslim growing up. One of the 
ways she remarked on this was through her easy familiarity with cross-gender sociality. Lia felt 
the need to remind herself, publicly, about the importance of maintaining appropriate gender 
segregation. Precisely as some women entered IofC and shed gendered norms of separation, Lia 
was actively trying to cultivate them. Lia was a willing interview subject, although at the last 
minute she remembered to make sure we were chaperoned when the interview was recorded. The 
result is my favorite personal example of the foibles of recorded interviews – at the end of a hot 
day of fasting, I was unable to ask a revealing question and Lia was unwilling to provide a direct 
answer. An hour-long conversation consisted primarily of disavowal, delicate refusal, and non-
committal responses: what had her experiences in middle-school been like? Lumayanlah (okay; 
decent; really closest to the contemporary “whatever”), came the response. Was coming to 
university challenging? Nggak begitu (no; not so much).  How about your experiences at IofC? 
Biasalah (the usual). The recorded result contrasts so sharply with the level of disclosure shared 
in other conversations, that it communicates to me the perils of conducting an interview with a 
chaperone, at an institution, and with a recording device, all at once. From the balance of our 
interactions, it seemed like Lia used IofC to explore what a more devoted Muslim life might look 
like, in the context of abiding social commitments. In keeping with a familiar IofC trajectory, 
once Lia married she largely withdrew from the organization.
123
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 This was an enduring difficulty for IofC. Although Initiatives of Change, the parent organization, boasted many 
life-long members, IofC tended to attract its most active adherents in the busy university years of Indonesian 
middle-class independent living. Attending university, for many IofC members, was the first time they had lived 
outside of a family member’s care (or a religious institution). Assuming responsibility for a whole social world, 
organizational life held many attractions. If they followed the normative trajectory, within three-to-six years of 
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 Fitria, who joined IofC around the same time as Lia, used the space for a very different 
sort of experimentation. Reserved bordering on taciturn, Fitria was nevertheless very interested 
in exploring the theological possibilities of pluralism: for her, this was the challenge facing 
Indonesia in the future. She did not disclose to me from where this interest originated, but she 
clearly found IofC a productive space for exploring its contours. Over the course of five years of 
contact with IofC members that began during my fieldwork, I watched Fitria rise to a position of 
ever-greater prominence, particularly within women-led initiatives like Women Creators of 
Peace (a conflict-resolution program that helped women lead social change in the aftermath of 
sectarian or political violence). Fitria had a guiding moral role in the organization – once she 
consented to something, other members took it as a cue that the proposed activity was 
Islamically acceptable. She tended to wait and see and only offer her approval once an activity 
had fully disclosed its implications to her.     
Fitria was aided in her role as moral arbiter by a background in the traditional Islamic 
sciences, attained through years of primary schooling at Islamic institutions. She was confident 
in her foundational understanding of the tradition and vocal in her interventions. Nevertheless, 
with me at least, she was quite guarded. Although propriety (one aspect of adab) was very 
important to Fitria, just as important was the freedom that properly maintained propriety 
afforded. By this I mean the conversational range and theological flexibility that Fitria cultivated 
while policing the surface norms of idealized Muslim sociality. The one time I gave her a ride 
home from the IofC Secretariat, she insisted that I drop her off at the outermost boundary of her 
residential neighborhood: “so as not to give rise to fitnah [In Arabic “dissension,” in Indonesian, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
graduating university, they had married and begun a family life. This tended to signal the end of their involvement at 
IofC. So typical was this path that foreign Initiatives of Change facilitators, visiting Indonesia, remarked on it , and a 
running joke at IofC, when a member married, was that we should say goodbye, since we wouldn’t see her or him 
again.   
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usually “gossip” or “slander”].”124 Sensitive to moral perception as well as moral weight, Fitria 
modeled social engagement simultaneous to personal rectitude, precisely the sort of negotiation 
facilitated by adab. 
Dewi, a recent graduate of UIN employed at UIN’s graduate school, was another 
compelling figure in the organization. Very comfortable with the frank disclosure prided at IofC, 
Dewi seemed to model another dimension of idealized sociality.  She was very astute but often 
irreverent. Despite sharing some very dark experiences from her family of origin, she was one of 
the most outspoken and funny regular visitors to the Secretariat. She provided a feature 
necessary to almost all organizational life: the perspective that, really, we shouldn’t take 
ourselves too seriously. Dewi maintained this levity in concert with a number of very clear 
political commitments concerning gender equality. In point of fact, her “joking” demeanor 
allowed her to transgress others’ personal boundaries without seeming to cause any offense. This 
appeared strategic, as much as innate. Although I never saw her take a formal role in the 
organization, she was a long-time friend of senior members and a reliable presence at events.      
 Luthfi entered IofC towards the end of his time at university and continued his 
involvement post-graduation. Employed as a middle-school teacher, Luthfi took seriously the 
Islamic obligation expressed in Indonesian as amar ma’ruf nahi mungkar (this is an Indonesian 
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 “Agar tidak menimbulkan fitnah.” The practice of giving someone a ride on the back of a motorbike (bonceng, 
originally to get a ride on a bicycle) is said to have been a source of social scandal in the recent past. The intimacy of 
riding in such close proximity announced, publicly, the existence of an intimate relationship. Perhaps owing to the 
proliferation of motorcycles, itself the result of innovations in a credit-economy at the end of the 1990s, the social 
stigma of bonceng has largely dissipated. In rural communities giving a ride might raise eyebrows, but in Ciputat the 
only criticism such rides generated was from ojek (motorcycle taxi) drivers, who clearly resented the business loss 
they represented. Fitria’s unwilling to be seen, by neighbors, indicated an abundance of caution – perhaps for her 
reputation (foreign white men are notoriously morally deviant in terms of sex), but if we take seriously her 
argument, this caution emerged from  her concern that other people, in discussing her reputation, would be sinning.  
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transliteration of a repeated Quranic injunction to “enjoin the good and forbid the evil”).125 This 
meant that Luthfi often “called” to the good within IofC, reminding other members of obligatory 
worship, encouraging them to watch their speech when it veered towards gossip, and generally 
policing his understanding of Islamic social norms. Luthfi traced his investment in amar ma’ruf 
to a troubled adolescence. After the death of his father and his elder brother’s involvement in 
criminal activity, Luthfi found respite from the chaos of home at a nearby mosque. There he 
began memorizing the Qur’an and became involved with Jamaah Tabligh.126 Luthfi remained 
grateful for his participation in Jamaah Tabligh, even as he moved away from the organization’s 
narrow understanding of Islamic values. IofC armed Luthfi with a moral language to accomplish 
this critique – he saw himself as remaining constant in his moral advocacy, but developing a 
more nuanced understanding of moral progress.  
 Luthfi was initially quite wary of my participation in IofC. Understandably, he didn’t 
want to be the object of someone else’s research. Developing a relationship with Luthfi entailed 
demonstrating that I shared some of his central moral commitments. The biographical 
information above came from a single extended conversation, where Luthfi disclosed much of 
his personal history in terms he thought would be helpful for my research. He did so, pointedly, 
outside of IofC. Our recorded interview conducted within the Secretariat is another masterpiece 
of indirection and cliché. It was very important to Luthfi that I understand that his devotional 
                                                             
125
 This injunction is found in 3:104; 3:110; 9:71; and in the inverse, 9:67. In much commentary, “evil” is 
understood as that which is socially harmful or corrupting. 
126
 Jamaah Tabligh is the Indonesian iteration of Tabligh-e-Jamaat, a Muslim prosetylizing organization dating to 
the 1920s in South Asia. The name, in Urdu and Arabic, denotes “the collectivity/congregation of the 
transmitters/conveyers.” Taking a pan-Sunni juristic and theological position (Tablighis do not adhere to a particular 
school of law or theology), Jamaah Tabligh (in Indonesia as elsewhere) sees its primary obligation as the moral 
reform of the Muslim community – bringing genuine “Islam” to people who are nominally “Muslim.” As such, the 
organization is formally quietist, taking no position on doctrinal disputes or this-wordly political aspirations. 
Nevertheless, it has a somewhat mixed reputation given the ardent nature of its calls and the earnestness with which 
its adherents carry on their activities. For an excellent recent history of the organization in Southeast Asia, see Farish 
Noor’s Islam on the Move.  
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ardor was an achieved state, not a birthright. His family was not like him – he had been the 
recipient of divine grace that allowed for his fuller manifestation of Islamic values. Luthfi 
understood IofC as a medium for spreading those values, for continuing the work of calling to 
the tradition that he had begun at Jamaah Tabligh. He maintained his faith in IofC even as 
members like Nur used the organization to facilitate their exit from Islam – Luthfi was fatalistic 
about the capacities of an individual to agentively change another’s spiritual state, even while he 
insisted on the moral obligation to attempt to do so. At IofC Luthfi and Fitria were allies, of 
sorts, in related projects of Muslim norming. Sometimes this meant that Luthfi averted his eyes – 
his non-participation communicating disapproval that adab insisted he not verbalize. The 
epistemic neutrality of IofC discourse, filtered through the ethical injunction to have adab, 
allowed for fruitful social engagements across marked spiritual divides.   
Sources of Adab 
In contemporary Bahasa Indonesia, adab like its relative adat has coalesced around a 
general, deconfessionalized meaning – frequently it is glossed in English as civilization, 
customs, etiquette or manners. The Indonesian Department of Education’s Kamus Besar Bahasa 
Indonesia (KBBI) defines the term as “refinement and goodness of character [budi pekerti]; 
politeness [kesopanan]; character [akhlak]” (“adab”). The deconfessionalized status of adab is 
asserted in this definition by the selection of budi pekerti (a compound we could render 
“native/natural reason/intellect”). This compound, in turn, arrives in Indonesian by way of 
Javanese from Sanskrit. This heritage allows for the translation out from Islam into “neutral 
Indonesian,” at the same time as the third entry, character (akhlak) restores the term to its Arabo-
Islamic heritage. Interestingly, this is also possible in Arabic itself, since the Arab grammarians 
consider Adab to be a pre-Islamic category. Given this provenance, adab has developed a 
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technical use within certain Islamic traditions at the same time as it retains a general sense 
ostensibly outside of those traditions. The author of the entry on adab in the Brill Encyclopaedia 
of Islam claims that, “in its oldest sense, it may be regarded as a synonym of sunna, with the 
sense of ‘habit, hereditary norm of conduct, custom’ derived from ancestors and other persons 
who are looked up to as models” (“Adab”). This author traces the etymology to da`b (custom), 
although acknowledges that, “indigenous lexicographers connect it with the root `db meaning 
“marvellous thing’ or ‘preparation, feast.’” This latter etymology was shared with me in 
Indonesia – that adab descended from the right conduct appropriate to a banquet or feast. The 
encyclopedia author, meanwhile, follows the path of the term to its classical sense of “the sum of 
knowledge which makes a man courteous and ‘urbane’” (ibid). From here it came to more 
narrowly denote “literature” and refined humanistic enterprise. This final sense is also expressed 
in contemporary Indonesian within the State Islamic University system: Fakultas Adab 
corresponds closely to a “School of the Humanities.” 
Adab also figures in nationalist discourse, in the form beradab, enshrined in the second 
pillar or “base” of the Pancasila, the explicitly formulated state ideology (see Chapter 1 above): 
kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab. Typically this is glossed as “just [adil] and civilized 
[beradab] humanism,” although “human-ness that is just and has propriety,” while cumbersome, 
helps communicate some of the further senses. The epigraph opening this chapter suggests the 
theological significance of adil (justice) and adab in relation to one another – as part of idealized 
relationality stipulated within the Islamic tradition. From this perspective, even the most 
“humanistic” of the Pancasila pillars also reveals an Islamic genealogy. Beradab (literally 
“with/having adab” invites, through phonetic resonance, its opposite biadab (barbarism; 
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cruelty).
127
 This latter term also features in nationalist discourse – both the internal others who 
must become subject to the state (for instance, West Papuans are biadab, and must be colonized, 
the rhetoric goes) and the inhuman others whose cruelty threaten the integrity of the nation 
(communists are biadab and thus their blood is permissible). These usages suggest that the 
opposite of adab isn’t just “ill-mannered,” it is “barbaric.” In the KBBI, the three senses of 
biadab are, “uncivilized or not yet civilized;” “ill-mannered or ignorant” (tidak tahu sopan 
santun; kurang ajar); and “cruel” or “sadistic” (kejam).128 Lacking adab is dangerous – it makes 
one the legitimate target of both civilizing missions and state violence.      
The association between proper adab and Islam is core to the story Islam tells about its 
own origins. In the Thematic Encyclopedia of the World of Islam (Ensiklopedi Tematis Dunia 
Islam), a standard Indonesian-language reference work on Islam, the ignorance and heedlessness 
of the pre-Islamic Arabs is characterized with reference to adab: “In these circumstances, 
Jahiliah (heedless ignorance) isn’t actually the opposite of knowledge (‘ilm), but of graceful 
gentility (ḥilm [lemah lembut]), patience (ṣabr [sabar]), and mannered culture (adab [budaya])” 
(18).
129
 Working from Arabic to English, translators often stress the “forbearance” or “social 
maturity” of ḥilm, although the internal translation provided by the encyclopedia stresses the 
sense of social grace (lemah lembut). Patience (sabar) is more straightforward, transliterated as 
much as translated in the encyclopedia entry. Interestingly, the authors stress the “cultured” 
sense of adab, by translating it as budaya. Here, this is less the social scientific category of 
                                                             
127
 Biadab is derived from Persian, where the bi prefix denotes an absence or lack. 
128
 Although there are definitely worse insults, the height of polite outrage is publicly expressed in an exclamation of 
kurang ajar: “ignorant” (under-taught).    
129
 “Dengan kenyataan seperti itu, Jahiliah sebenarnya bukan lawan dari ‘ilm, tetapi dari ḥilm (lemah lembut), ṣabr 
(sabar), dan adab (budaya).  This Encyclopedia is edited by a “who’s who” of Islamic Studies in Indonesia, 
including the current head of the State Islamic University (Komaruddin Hidayat), and is officially endorsed by the 
Ministry of Religion.  
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“culture” and more the older sense of “cultivated bearing, manners, refined etiquette” (one can 
be without budaya, it is hard to have no culture in the anthropological sense). Exposure to 
revelation brought the Arabs from a state of heedlessness to one of civilization – to cognizance 
of right relations. Indonesians carry on this trajectory, and according to nationalist discourse, the 
state becomes the agent responsible for the continued promotion of adab. This brings us to yet 
another form of adab in Indonesian usage – as peradaban, civilization. The notion of 
“civilization” celebrates the achievement of social forms and institutions, while allowing for 
multiplicity (there are different peradaban). Indonesians, employing the idiom of adab, are thus 
always re-synthesizing Islam and nationalist discourses of ideal sociality.    
The moral weight of adab in describing right relationality emerged very early in the 
Islamic tradition. J. Mark Halstead writes about adab in his introduction to a special issue of the 
Journal of Moral Education: “The second term for morality is adab, which combines two 
different but related ways of understanding good behaviour – on the one hand, politeness 
courtesy, etiquette, good upbringing, culture, refinement, good breeding and good manners, and 
on the other, morality and values” (285). Halstead further elaborates on the term for the purposes 
of his introduction, reminding the reader that, “Adab comes from the same root as one of the 
main Arabic words for education, ta’dib, which refers primarily to the process of learning a 
sound basis for social behaviour within the community and society at large” (285). Muhammad 
Abū Rīda corroborates this history in a UNESCO publication on the Islamic tradition, writing, 
“Among the collections of hadiths, books are to be found with the title Kitab al-Adab (Book of 
Manners) and they contain the elements of religious and social traits and virtues. From the very 
beginnings of moral, intellectual and political culture, the term adab has been widely used in the 
titles of books on the subject” (43). These “Books of Manners” emerged from scholarship 
 
 
172 
 
addressed to ahadith, and came to describe a whole host of social obligations – what I have 
termed “right relations.” Perhaps given its importance within the work of Islamic hadith 
scholars, the same terminology became a central genre in the early Sufi canon – and it is this 
corpus that provides many of the contours for normative Islam in Indonesia.   
In The Heart of Islamic Philosophy, William Chittick presents the work of Afdal al-Din 
Kashani, a medieval Persian Sufi author who wrote for general Muslim audiences (as opposed to 
the highly specialized audiences who are the typical addressee of much Sufi literature).  In the 
course of introducing Kashani, Chittick neatly summarizes the place of adab in Sufism, as well 
as what Chittick terms, “the general Muslim love for beauty…and the extreme concern to 
observe the adab or ‘courtesy’ of every situation” (31). Continuing this explanation, Chittick 
informs us that, “the word adab, for which we have no adequate English equivalent, refers to the 
proper and beautiful deportment and correct behavior, both physical and verbal” (ibid). 
Expanding, even further, in a footnote, Chittick writes, “It has been suggested that the best term 
for what ‘education’ implied in Islamic society is ta’dib, ‘conveying courtesy,’ since Islamic 
education involved not only the transferal of knowledge (ta`lim), but also the inculcation of the 
proper and appropriate activity (adab) that true knowledge demands” (331). I excerpt Chittick’s 
explanation at such length because of the context in which it is presented – as framing for a text 
intended for general audiences. The technical valences of adab in Sufi discourses have left a 
mark on the normative understanding of the concept for Indonesian Muslims. Understood in this 
light, my contention that adab is both a condition for change and medium for its achievement 
makes greater sense. Moral transformation arrives to those prepared to receive it. Proper 
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relationality (and the agentive self-positioning such postures require) makes one a fitting 
recipient for divine agency. In preparing for the change, however, one already commences it.
130
     
The distinction I wish to maintain between “adab” and “piety” can, of course, be 
overstated. There is considerable pragmatic overlap in terms of prescriptive ethics. Yasien 
Mohamed introduces this argument in his essay “The Ethics of Education” by characterizing 
adab: “The adab of Islamic philosophical ethics was not merely concerned with etiquette, but 
also with the discipline of the self; whereby virtue becomes internal to the human soul through 
habituation” (633-4). This formulation employs many of the elements that distinguish “piety” in 
the hands of Saba Mahmood’s interlocutors in Politics of Piety. This kind of habituation, 
however, is implicated in relationships beyond that between the worshipper and God, or even 
among worshippers. Adab, as also denoting ethics, involves complex imaginings of moral being. 
As Webb Keane observes in “Ethics as Piety,” perhaps especially those internalized and 
habituated dispositions constituting unconscious integration require “constant self-monitoring, 
recurrent pokes at one’s self-awareness” (224). The internalization of adab, as of piety, reflects 
less an achieved form than a maintained state. Adab, with its relationality, requires constant 
maintenance. In the same essay, Keane goes on to assert that, “scriptural monothesisms objectify 
ethics, exerting pressure on them to become consistent and cognitively explicit. But 
                                                             
130
 A Turkish scholar and diplomat, Bülent Şenay, has written about the concept of change in the context of public 
ethics. In an article concerning hermeneutical boundary negotiations within Islamic traditions entitled “Change and 
Changeability,” Şenay writes, “Islam strongly emphasizes that change in worldly life will be led and organized by 
human beings (which perhaps might meant that a certain level of secularity –not ‘ism,’ as in world view – is in 
operation as part of the Divine plan)” (138). In effect, this argument supports a notion of human agency unfolding in 
concert with divine design, an operation that Şenay understand with respect to ethics. The kinds of change Şenay is 
most interested in are changing relationships to the sources of the tradition, along with collective renegotiation of an 
Islamic concept of “the good.” The lack of a consensus inherent in this process, in turn, has other ethical correlates: 
“Disagreement can only be dealt with if there is a proper ethics of disagreement in a particular worldview or 
religious tradition. The Islamic tradition calls it âdâb al-ikhtilaaf (manners/norms/ethics of disagreement)” (153). 
There is a distinct adab, too, of conflict – a right relationality that guarantees the good faith of the contestants, 
whether exegetes or battlefield combatants.  
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objectification also tends to separate ethics from everyday habits” (227). Where we read adab in 
the prescriptive Sufi manuals discussed by Chittick or taught in Indonesian pesantren, there is a 
demonstration of this argument. In the more nebulous intersubjective encounters that are at the 
center of this chapter, however, adab offers something of a corrective to this purifying 
movement. Instead of a singular and consistent ethic, adab tends to emphasize multiplicity. The 
ethical subject is not endowed with a rule that can be uniformly applied, she is hailed by the 
particularities of a given relationship and the rights exerted within it. 
Heeding the Dictates of Adab 
The language of hailing, or interpellation, can be instructive in this discussion of adab. 
The logic of interpellation is familiar from Althusser’s classic reading of ideology, “Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses.” In that text the relationship between the “Subject” and a 
“subject” is traced out with respect to the Christian tradition. Althusser’s selection of religion as 
the example of ideology is not, of course, arbitrary. Given his insistence on the inescapability of 
“ideology,” it is imagined that a religious tradition will be sufficiently objectifiable, sufficiently 
outside, so as to be recognizable. Hailing, Althusser tells, calls a subject into relation (rather than 
being), as a subject:   
In the ordinary use of the term, subject in fact means: (1) a free subjectivity, a centre of 
initiatives, author of and responsible for its actions; (2) a subjected being, who submits to 
a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting 
his submission. This last note gives us the meaning of this ambiguity, which is merely a 
reflection of the effect which produces it: the individual is interpellated as a (free) 
subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in 
order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the 
gestures and actions of his subjection ‘all by himself’. There are no subjects except by 
and for their subjection. (182).  
Althusser is quite clear that there is neither writer nor reader encountering these claims outside of 
ideology. Yet an emancipatory yearning permeates the text. For the Sufi worhsipper, of course, 
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the inverse is true. The fantasy is not escape from this predicament but ever fuller realization of 
it. This is the notion that one might willfully extinguish the will: fana, or annihilation. For 
Muslims more generally, Althusser’s submission is the stated goal of the tradition. The extension 
of this logic to an analysis of adab relies on an operation of recognition – the subject must 
recognize the existence of a relationship in order that she be rightly positioned within it. The 
quotidian dimension of this involves relating not only to God or the state, but to the subjects and 
objects of one’s immediate environs. Having adab, then, is to be constantly (and appropriately) 
hailed into all sorts of subjectivities – positions of right relations relative to other subjects (and 
objects).    
As the discussion of hailing claimed, the purview of adab encompasses also things: there 
are right relations to rocks and trees, and right relations to procedures and processes. Thus 
technical means and approaches also have an adab. Alexandre Caeiro writes about the specific 
kinds of adab cultivated and inculcated in the Islamic juridical tradition. Writing in, “The 
Shifting Moral Universes of the Islamic Tradition of Iftā`: A Diachronic study of Four Adab al-
Fatwā Manuals,” Caeiro compares different fatwa (opinions concerning religious rights, 
obligations or prohibitions) manuals composed in discrete historical moments. Writing about the 
work of Ibn al-Salah al Shahrazuri, he describes the tripartite division of the text: “the shurūt al-
muftī section sets out the qualifications for practitioners; the adab al-fatwā is a discourse on the 
very technology of fatwas; and the adab al-mustafī instructs petitioners on the adequate manners 
and procedures” (664). Both the discussion of the technology – how fatāwā (plural of fatwa) 
relates to the world – and the discussion of the users (how subjects are to relate to the 
technology), are organized beneath the term adab. Of further significance, we can surmise from 
the very existence of these manuals that adab is not simply a matter of intuition. It requires 
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instruction, discourse, to emerge. Although our context is well removed from the intellectual 
world of 13
th
 century Damascus (where al Shahrazuri wrote), the semantic range of adab as 
detailed by Caeiro is still present at IofC. In further confirmation of the enduring significance of 
adab, Caeiro turns to these texts to witness “transformations in conceptualizations of religious 
authority, subjectivity, and agency” (677). That such transformations would be articulated within 
the idiom of adab is precisely my point in focusing so doggedly on the term. As will be 
contended, there is a right way to do everything, even the wrong thing. There is thus also an 
“adab of adab.” 
To say that has a person has adab is to assert that she or he acts in graceful consciousness 
of the rights incumbent upon her or himself with respect to these three axes of relationships: 
vertically to the divine, horizontally to the creation (including other subjects), and internally with 
the self (understood as a complex of soul, heart, appetite and reason). Such a consciousness 
entails recognition of hierarchal orderings (as per the epigraph opening this chapter), at that same 
time as that consciousness is repeatedly re-configured in the context of new relations. For 
example, the adab of a reading a book of Quranic commentary (a state of ritual purity; undivided 
attention; explicit intention to benefit) would be suddenly interrupted by the ringing of a 
doorbell. The arrival of a visitor shifts the ethical imperatives of relationality to this relationship: 
one is hailed into the adab of hosting by the appearance of a guest. The adab of the book, 
dominant before, is closed as the text itself is closed: the final right of the book is respected 
precisely by putting it to the side. Sometimes the adab of a thing demands that it not be engaged, 
since the “rightness” of the relationship also entails the “rightness” of timing.  
Concerning the rights of others – one’s hierarchically-determind horizontal relations – 
adab is understood to be both relative and universal, reflecting values that obtain in a given 
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region or locality in concert with the standards dictated by the Lawgiver. Because of its 
insistence on a “right” within every relationship, adab is the locus of contest between seemingly 
competing norms. This variability allows for its deconfessionalized senses in modern Indonesian: 
the common use of adab for “civilization” (although there is of course a moral character to the 
concept of civilization). Adab becomes part of a constellation of related Arabic terms that enter 
into “neutral” Indonesian as sources of ethics. Grouped with related terms like adat (custom, 
etymologically, that which is done) and `urf (custom, etymologically, that which is known), adab 
exerts its influence even on non-Muslims. Although, adat and ‘urf are both supplementary 
sources of Islamic jurisprudence, the former at least now denotes non-Islamic local custom.
131
 As 
discussed in the opening chapter of this project, what has come to be thought of as the opposition 
between adat and Islam had a particular colonial genealogy. The ubiquity of this supposed 
contest of laws and norms, in contemporary Indonesia, is the outcome of a sustained effort to 
abstract and purify culture and religion.  Despite the Islamic genealogy of the very category of 
custom/culture/adat, it is rhetorically available as a “real” category, that is to say, a stable-and-
pure description. When this category is brought into conflict with the category of Islam, a social 
demand for reconciliation emerges. How can ethics imagined to derive from “adat” continue to 
exert their force when they compete with those imagined to emerge from “Islam?” Adab 
becomes an intersubjective idiom for the negotiation (and re-assemblage) of adat and Islam. 
Salient Islamic imperatives are articulated from within both adat and Islam, and adab allows for a 
conscientious response. Reconfiguring relationship with respect to the dictates of adab becomes 
one more technology of change – changing relations entail changing selves.    
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 For a general introduction to the role of ‘urf, see MZH Othman, “’Urf as a Source of Islamic Law.” For a brief 
history of the incorporation of ‘urf and ada, highlighting their initial adoption by Hanafi jurists, see Gideon Libson, 
"On the development of custom as a source of law in Islamic law.” For this tradition specific to the Malay world, see 
Madya Ishak’s "'URF and Customs as Being Practised among the Malay Community."   
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Adab and Muslim Sociality: You can hug her if you want to 
On joining the IofC community, I was struck by the plurality of relationships to Islamic 
practice and norms. Initiatives of Change is no longer affiliated with any denomination or faith 
tradition, and IofC aspires to emulate the inter-faith posture and theological openness of the 
parent movement. However IofC is a Muslim-dominated organization that engages in activities 
and advocacy from a principally Muslim perspective. And so the lack of isomorphism within this 
close community is somewhat surprising– one member (Abdul Fatah from above) described his 
first impression of the organization: “what I felt was just this family-ness (kekeluargaan; 
kinship) that was really, really awesome at IofC, a family-ness that was really pious (sholeh; 
saleh, pious but also wholesome), you know what I mean.”132 As my friend struggled to 
articulate what drew him to IofC, he identified both the “kin-like” relationships of the 
organization and the moral stature of its membership. Here was a pious family formed by 
volitional association, despite the highly evident differences in the ways the membership 
conceived of Islam. This plurality of postures included varying commitments to the very idea of 
being Muslim. Given the vast array of dispositions towards normative Sunni Islamic doctrines 
and practices evinced within IofC, it’s difficult to hear this one member’s characterization of the 
organization as sholeh and to imagine the ethical self-cultivation we have come to associate with 
the concept of piety. It seems that the wholesomeness and familial atmosphere of IofC are 
collective responses to moral injunctions other than those typically organized by piety. What my 
friend referred to as sholeh may make more sense within a discussion of adab.    
Stripped of my deliberately elliptical language: along almost any axis of the conventional 
proxies for piety (devotional rectitude, supererogatory worship, self-policed chastity and 
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 Interview with Abdul Fatah. “Yang saya rasakan adalah hanya kekulargaan yang sangat sangat bagus di IofC, 
kekeluargaan yang sangat soleh gitu, dan segala macam.” 
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modesty, sartorial choices and their presumed communicative content, and so forth), IofC 
members were diverse. Negotiations between and among their various choices were carried out 
with sensitivity, tact and only ever the occasional jarring or abrasive failure (see my miscue 
below, as well as the anecdote closing this chapter). The longer I interacted with IofC the more I 
came to see it as an experimental space. Participants in the organization were trying out different 
models of change, different versions of a self, and different manners of sociality.  Put in the 
language of interpellation, IofC members were learning to recognize new and different hailings. 
The fluidity of the subjectivities coupled with the complexity of the social forms required a 
seeming surfeit of adab. IofC adopts the language of “safe space” as a self-characterization, and 
for many IofC participants the organization provides just that. Meant as a place free from 
disapprobation – recall that IofC practices placed a premium on self-disclosure – the safety of the 
space was broadly construed. It was an environment where the membership could explore 
different social orderings, different responses to different hails, different ways of being Muslim, 
Indonesian, human.  
In the common settings of the organization (weekly meetings, social events at the 
Secretariat, Youth Camps) IofC members explored different models of personal and public 
behavior, including those at variance with the norms associated with the UIN community, their 
families of origins and their communities of residence.
133
 Although formally a “non-religious” 
(although not secular) space, as mentioned above, IofC Indonesia is a Muslim organization.
134
 
The currently liberal humanist bent of the parent Initiatives of Change movement, coupled with 
                                                             
133
 Recall that the vast majority of IofC members are or were affiliated with the State Islamic University Jakarta 
(UIN).  
134
 I am here following the distinction between an Islamic and a Muslim organization – the former incorporating the 
Prophetic vision of community into its institutional forms, and the latter being characterized by a preponderance of 
Muslims and associated social norms.  As we have seen in terms of the national project of Indonesia and the post-
Independence doctrine of Pancasila, non-Islamic should not be read as “secular.” Instead, the ecumenical character 
of non-religious organizations in Indonesia often reflects deconfessionalized Islamic principles.  
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its historical rhetoric of emancipatory evangelism, require reconciliation with some of the 
prescriptive values of Sunni Islamic teaching. This discussion involves a detour into some of the 
signs of “Islam-ness” that frequently function as a proxy in scholarly discussions for devotional 
rectitude or piety: how people dress, how they touch, what greetings they employ. This means 
addressing the signifying content of clothing, cross-gender communication and contact, and a 
host of interactional practices. The argument is that where some might see a dearth of piety 
within the IofC family we might plausibly recognize the operations of adab. Highlighting the 
role of adab in negotiating among different ethical commitments allows us to discuss Muslim 
performances and behaviors without subjecting them to our evaluation of their Islamic 
legitimacy. We can leave aside the discussion (except where it emerges organically) of how 
“Islamic” an instance of Muslim sociality really is, a dispassionate posture difficult in analyses 
of piety (where even the phenomenological position tacitly entails assessment of others’ interior 
states).  
At IofC I observed no abiding consensus on proper adab as it pertained to cross-gender 
interactions – different members acted in accordance with their own visions of preferred 
relational dispositions, delicately negotiated alongside the desires of their interlocutor. It was an 
incredibly fluid and dynamic environment. Long-time members appeared to operate intuitively, 
meeting their peers where they were, so to speak. Their flexibility was a mark of their adab. They 
bent towards the unique standards of different individuals while simultaneously encouraging 
their fellow members to reciprocate. And in most instances, the membership did, such that 
attending an IofC event was also to witness a cascade of different models of gendered sociality. 
First-time visitors, including this author, were easily confused. By default I aspired to the most 
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“respectful” attitude and practices. 135 My hope was to manage the gendered terrain of social 
relations with the absolute minimum of awkwardness.
136
 The quixotic nature of my approach to 
this ambition was swiftly revealed to me. Reflecting later on the moment described in the 
following brief anecdote (memorable to me, no doubt, because of the chagrin experienced within 
it), I began to recognize the operation of adab.   
In Indonesia, handshakes have come in for sustained scrutiny in recent years.
137
 
“Western-style” handshakes are rejected not only as non-Indonesian, but especially as un-
Islamic. This is even more the case where the parties to a handshake are different genders. In its 
place, several different cross-gender salaman (greetings) have risen to the fore. One can clasp 
one’s hands together in a prayer position and nod, although this seems excessively formal in 
many situations. The current popular alternative appears to be a meeting of hands raised in 
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 It is indicative of my naivety that I characterized the most “conservative” posture as the most “respectful” – this 
misrecognition is itself representative of a failure of adab, an error-strewn misreading of the values at stake in a 
relational field. The classical Sufi manuals on adab discussed by Daphna Ephrat in Spiritual Wayfarers lead her to 
conclude that, “the acquisition of adab is described as more important and praiseworthy than the accumulation of 
knowledge (‘ilm) or prolonged engagement in ascetic practices” (97).  Dr. Sadiq, the scholar cited above in our 
discussion of ikhlas, informed me that it was better to break a voluntary fast than to draw public acclaim for it: that 
even one’s piety should be protected from this-worldly entanglements like recognition. Ostentatiously refusing to 
touch women, then, was reflective of deficient adab: Insofar as I tried not to offend other humans, I was subjecting 
myself to the wrong metric (human approval). Simultaneously, if I did offend others (in either direction) I 
demonstrated my lack of adab.      
136
 The notion that the most austere choice was the right choice brought me in for ridicule on other occasions as well. 
Just as stubbornly insisting on fasting, when one’s hosts are not, demonstrates a lack of adab with the hosts, refusing 
to avail oneself of divinely granted dispensations demonstrates a lack of adab with God. At various points, while 
travelling, traditionally-educated companions rebuked my intransigence on not “joining” (jam’) worship cycles, and 
“shortening” (qasr) worship cycles. You must have adab with Allah, a friend chided me – God loves those who 
exercise the options given them. Adab was far more important than mechanical obedience to an impoverished 
understanding of the tradition. 
137
 Public discussion of handshakes is most often occasioned by the performance of a celebrity or the arrival of a 
foreign leader. For instance, when Michelle Obama visited Indonesia, along with President Obama, in November 
2010, she was greeted by the then-president of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Indonesia’s reformist Muslim 
political party affiliated with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. The fact that Tifatul, PKS’s president, shook Michelle 
Obama’s hand set the Indonesian internet alight. See Republika Online’s coverage of that minor tempest: “Salaman 
Tifatul-Michelle Masih Jadi Gunjingan di Dunia Maya.” (“The Greeting between Tifatul and Michelle Continues to 
be Gossiped about Online”). As a side note, the Indonesian term for “online,” or “the Internet,” dunia maya, is a 
fascinating compound, merging the Sanskritic concept of illusory reality (maya) with the Arabo-Islamic category of 
transient, contingent, this-worldly existence (dunia). To say something takes place in dunia maya is to smuggle in a 
duplicated theological notion of impermanence – the “virtual” world of a virtual world, where virtual is understood 
in its sense of “functionally or apparently true” (but not ultimately true).     
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prayer position. For me, this entailed greeting women with hands pressed together, extended 
before me, without quite meeting the similarly extended hands of the other party (the slightly less 
formal variant involves allow the fingers to overlap with those of your interlocutor before 
drawing them back towards your heart, although this cancels one’s state of ritual purity or 
wudhu, required for performance of worship cycles). This particular greeting, described to me as 
originally Sundanese (and differing from the Javanese sembah that usually involves one party 
adopting a more humbled posture and marking relative social status), has emerged as a general 
strategy in contemporary Indonesia for negotiating cross-gender contact. One sees it on TV, in 
offices and houses across the country. My adoption of this strategy frequently met a favorable 
response. This courtesy was usually appreciated at IofC too, given the variety of dispositions in 
play amongst the membership. At one of the first meetings I attended, however, it was met very 
differently. 
 I was introduced to a young woman (Dewi from above) and gently extended my pressed 
palms. She stared at me with mock seriousness and proffered a single hand primed for a 
handshake. The friend, Abdul Fatah, making the introduction reached his arm around her back, 
grabbed her far shoulder and pushed her towards me. “Why so stuffy [kok kaku gitu]?” he 
exclaimed, “you can even hug her if you want to [dipeluk aja boleh].” It was a minor act of 
social charity of the sort I became accustomed to – clearly I should have known that this was 
someone who privileged interactional equity over the maintenance of gendered boundaries of 
touch. There was some way that this disposition was being communicated that a more careful 
observer would have been attuned to. (And no doubt, embarrassment is what allows for the 
clarity of my recollection of this very minor incident). Like the vast majority of Muslim women 
who participated in IofC, this new acquaintance wore a hijab and what is usually called modest 
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dress. So the signifying content of clothing could not have alerted me (I’m told, even two 
decades ago, dress communicated much more clearly concerning desired modes of social 
intercourse). Furthermore Abdul Fatah, the friend responsible for the introduction (and he made 
hundreds for me over the course of my research) was clearly approving of a similar courtesy 
when meeting other persons, including his sister, mother and girlfriend. But what was frequently 
understood as graciousness here figured as distancing, for reasons wholly obscure to me. Not 
only distancing, but rigid, stiff, unsociable – kaku. I did not possess the adab appropriate to the 
situation. What deserves mention here, however, was not just my personal failure to evince adab 
in meeting Dewi. It is the flexibility of Abdul Fatah in negotiating between his commitments to 
moral conduct and the values of his female interlocutor. It wasn’t hypocrisy that let him clasp her 
– it was his response to an ethical hailing that contingently outweighed his felt obligation to 
maintain ideal gendered separation. And for Dewi, this comfort with touch was part of a political 
project of gender egalitarianism that she understood in explicitly Islamic terms (this latter fact 
only emerged much later in discussion).    
 The minor social awkwardness of the above episode is suggestive of the confusion 
concerning appropriate behavior that proliferated following the collapse of the New Order 
government. Partly this is a question of media. Despite the much-remarked Islamic turn of 
President Suharto’s final decade in power, the rapid expansion of Islamic media began in earnest 
only with the relaxation of press rules initiated by his successor B.J. Habibie. The emergence of 
websites, magazines and especially television shows advocating particular visions of Islamic 
social ethics has fed this confusion. This has occurred in concert with the developments analyzed 
in Expressing Islam, Greg Fealy and Sally White’s edited volume exploring this changing 
cultural and commercial landscape of contemporary Muslim Indonesia. As Carla Jones 
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characterizes it in an article addressed to one element of this new marketplace, “Materializing 
Piety”: “The proliferation and the variety of these goods and services index how the elaboration 
of minute, daily techniques of ethical living and cultivation in contemporary Indonesia intersect 
with the promise of religion, placing virtue, and its anxieties, at the junction of religion and 
commerce” (617). Anecdotally, I’m informed that ethnic-, regional-, class-, and education-
determined norms of cross-gender greetings obtained until relatively recently. Which is to say, 
adab was very much relative along multiple axes into the 1990s (despite the existence of a 
nationalized set of norms endlessly re-performed in the context of state functions). In 2010, in 
many the circles in which I moved, this situation had largely been displaced by efforts to bring 
sociality into conformity with what were imagined to be consistent and unitary Islamic 
standards: something like the category of “piety.” The IofC Secretariat stood out as a place 
where adab was still being actively negotiated – a space disconnected from institutional and 
environmental cues that re-inscribed a singular ideal of social intercourse. It was genuinely 
uncertain where the privileged standard lay, and the ease with which many members operated in 
this space belied the supposed achievement of uniformity beyond its walls. This first introduction 
to adab as a mediator of piety and relational dispositions was to continue in other social settings 
during my fieldwork.  
Adab and Hospitality: You must be so tired!   
The complexities of the overlapping ethical mandates to be god-conscious (bertakwa) 
and to possess right relations, or civilization, (beradab) are especially visible in the realms of 
sociality governed by familial idiom. Islam provides clear definitions of family relationships, 
with attendant rights and responsibilities. Unmediated cross-gender contact is conventionally 
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limited to muhrim (Ar. mahram; those whom one is prohibited from marrying),
138
 the juridical 
category of people covered by an incest taboo. In contemporary Indonesia, discussion of 
muhrim/mahram often concern not just sexual relationships but bodily coverings and proper 
fraternization. Here Indonesian linguistic conventions must be reconciled with Islamic juridical 
categories. These negotiations are differently enunciated, often under the auspices of adab. Some 
elements of this process have been amply observed: although analyses of fictive kinship have 
largely disappeared from the ethnographic canon, attention to kin terms and pronouns remains a 
frequent point of entry to scholarship on Indonesia, Indonesian, and the many vernaculars 
present in the archipelago.
139
 As has been often observed, Indonesia has a wealth of pronouns, 
alongside a rich tradition of pronoun-avoidance.  
 A key window into sociality is language – what sorts of relationships are constituted 
with respect to what sorts of terms. At IofC, terms like gue (I) and loe (you) (both “national” 
slang terms derived from Betawi vernacular) were used in concert with “correct Indonesian” 
terms like saya (I) and kakak (elder sibling), nationalist (but also Sumatran Malay) bung or 
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 The “wrong” vowels of muhrim (in Arabic, one in the ritual state of dress for performing pilgrimage) have been 
widely criticized in Indonesia. Nevertheless, it is still more common to hear “muhrim” rather than “mahram,” where 
the latter legal designation is intended.  
139
 Errington in Shifting Languages, especially pages 92-97 is instructive in this regard, as he contrasts Javanese and 
Indonesian. Another example would Rita Kipp’s “Terms for Kith and Kin,” which is a critical revision of key 
scholarship addressed to Karo Batak kin terms. See also Greg Flannery, “Open and Closed Systems.” If, as we have 
already mentioned in the prior chapter, Indonesian is imagined to be readily objectifiable, this is even more apparent 
when situated alongside vernacular languages, as Zane Goebel argues in, "When do Indonesians Speak Indonesian?” 
The importance of family terms for social organization is of course, widely remarked. Early in Talking to the Enemy, 
in a section addressed to jihadis in Sulawesi, Scott Atran reports his revelation that, “It’s no accident that nearly all 
religious and political movements express allegiance through the idiom of family…Nearly all major ideological 
movements, political or religious, require the subordination or assimilation of the real family (genetic kinship) to the 
larger imagined community of ‘brothers and sisters’” (13). This then leads him to the strange conclusion that, 
“Indeed, the complete subordination of biological loyalty to loyalty for the cultural cause of the Ikhwan, the 
‘Brotherhood’ of the Prophet, is the original meaning of the word Islam, ‘submission’” (ibid). Aside from the 
suspect claim that submission is primarily about a “brotherhood” rather than god, one might also suggest that 
ummah, “community” or “nation,” with its speculative etymology linking it umm, mother would fit this argument 
more closely. Although Frederick Denny in “Meaning of Ummah in the Qur’an” contests this folk etymology (as do 
classical Arabic grammarians), it is frequently provided as an explanation for the “family” of Islam.   
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Jakartan bang (elder brother), English you, Arabic ana (I) and antum (you) alongside Indo-
Javanese slang like masbro (a fascinating conjunction of the Javanese term for elder brother with 
the English “bro,” an ironic joining popularized through television shows). Rather than a strict 
reflection of structured relations, term selection often seemed to evince aesthetic dimensions of 
style – performances that sometimes bore clear social markings and sometimes served to 
demonstrate the speaker’s virtuosic mastery of address. The role of code-switching in stressing 
affinity and intimacy was clearest when a speaker interpellated her interlocutor with a term of 
address from her most comfortable vernacular. Employing vernacular terms of address – 
particularly with an interlocutor with a different ethno-linguistic heritage – was a way to 
establish and maintain immediacy within relationships. Thus mas from a Javanese speaker was 
meant with respect that showed closeness, and akang from an individual with a Sundanese 
background could stress incorporation rather than status (or more precisely, incorporation into 
vernacular hierarchies of status, rather than social distance). This was hardly a unique feature of 
IofC – these linguistic possibilities found similar expression in other social settings across the 
archipelago.
140
 Particular to the IofC context, however, were the moral overlays of family (and 
“family group”) derived from the Buchman-inspired parent movement. Family in Initiatives of 
Change discourse was the primary locus of moral re-direction, not just social intimacy. The 
characterization of IofC as a “pious family,” voiced by Abdul Fatah above, reflects the 
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 In fact, this possibility is where Henk Maier finds his title for his survey of Malay Literature, We are playing 
relatives, drawn from the “fiat kinship” Hang Tuah assumes in the Malay epic, perhaps as a matter of convenience, 
perhaps out of adab. In that text, Maier describes a nineteenth century colonial process of linguistic purification, 
which we might imagine in concert with the efforts to stabilize Islam and adat: “In tune with nineteenth-century 
European idea, scholars and administrators on the Peninsula and the Islands operated from the assumption that a 
distinct language accompanies a distinct culture, and a distinct culture characterizes a distinct nation” (11). This 
linking of language to people was the back of terminological stabilization: “adat and bahasa [language, suite of 
interactional behaviors]: the two terms were given an aura of authenticity and solidity which, subverting the daily 
experience of fluidity, increased the anxieties already widely experienced in the area that was taken to be the 
heartland of the Malays” (8).   
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importance of “family” as site of moral development. But even outside the organizational norms 
of IofC, familial idiom remained a site for related negotiations of takwa and adab. 
Early in my fieldwork, I traveled with Abdul Fatah to visit his family in Bogor. The 
hillside city now marks the southern boundary of the Jakarta metro area, but once upon a time it 
was considered part of the Sunda heartland, a crasser cousin to refined Bandung. We arrived at 
his house in a pleasant middle-class housing development relatively early in the evening. I was 
welcomed by his mother and two sisters, as well as a female cousin who was staying with them 
while attending the pesantren where Abdul Fatah’s mother still worked. We had eaten en route to 
Abdul Fatah’s home but had also picked up food for dinner for the rest of his family. I was 
expecting to eat again, but suddenly Abdul Fatah became very insistent that I must be tired. His 
mother concurred, and I was directed upstairs to the concrete loft where we would be sleeping. I 
wasn’t tired, it wasn’t late and I naively missed the impulse behind this particular courtesy, so I 
resisted longer than was appropriate. After I finally acquiesced, I followed Abdul Fatah upstairs 
and dutifully began to approximate a tired state. It was now clear that being tired was important 
and I did my best to oblige. Once I was sufficiently “sleepy,” he took leave of me and returned 
downstairs to his waiting family. As I sat, alone and in the dark, on the foam mattress of my 
friend’s bedroom I gradually recognized what had transpired. My friend was only in a position to 
visit his family every several weeks and the obligations of hosting would sharply curtail his and 
his family’s normal interactions. My being tired allowed them the option of a more relaxed 
chance to catch up (and to not feed me, a seemingly major slight!). Additionally, since both his 
mother and sisters wore hijab, my being upstairs allowed them to relax their standards of 
modesty as well. It was this latter fact that focused my attention on the ethical dimension of 
adab.    
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 Over several visits spread across a matter of months, I got to know Abdul Fatah’s family 
better and the formalities governing host-guest relations began to be replaced with the manners 
appropriate to family interactions. Once I was very superficially folded into an extended family 
relationship (marked by the Sundanese term of address for elder brother, akang), the obligations 
of modesty began to be experienced and understood differently – first my friend’s sisters, and 
eventually his mother, no longer felt compelled to be fully covered in my presence. There is a 
cynical, and simplistic, reading of these events – their house was warm, head coverings can be 
impractical, logistical exigencies impelled an abandonment of socially-enforced but lightly held 
moral obligations, and so on. It is definitely possible that Abdul Fatah and his family’s 
commitment to normative Islamic values are only partial and still subject to the intrusions of 
adat (imagined as custom external to Islam), convenience or personal hypocrisy. A more 
interesting explanation that reflects the sort of account I could elicit from my friend, however, 
foregrounds the role of adab in this encounter. Being Muslim, and properly so, was very 
important to Abdul Fatah and his family. Being hospitable was not understood as a (non-Islamic) 
adat survival, but as a fundamentally Islamic injunction. Insofar as hospitality was conceived of 
as Sundanese, Sunda itself was seen as Islamic as well. This put the emphasis on hospitality into 
potential conflict with notion of ideal gendered separation. The resolution was found in adab – 
the initial adab that insisted I be “tired” and the eventual adab that I became “akang Saul.” This 
allowed for a familial adab of hosting that felt more acceptable than the formalities imagined to 
inhere to the reception of a foreign visitor.   
Although certain fundamental facts had not changed – I was not now somehow 
mahram/muhrim – clearly other sorts of hosting obligations had risen to the fore. When I pressed 
my friend about this, he refused to entertain an opposition between “indigenous Sundanese” 
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social values and prescriptive Islamic norms. Rather, he made recourse to an argument about 
adab. Thus even as Islamic norms are formally enunciated within legal categories of family, 
adab demands that social interactions adopt an overlapping idiom of family. The scholarly focus 
on piety, meanwhile, has tended to privilege juridical discourse as the final arbiter of the 
boundaries of Islam. Understood in this narrow framework, the lack of maintenance of gendered 
norms is a mark of ill-discipline: deficient piety. Adab allows us to see how the particular hailing 
of an ethical injunction does not abrogate or replace scripturally-authorized norms, it just 
temporarily obtains, a local instantiation of the universal Islamic principles of mercy, justice and 
moral conduct. Adab precludes a conflict between the “letter” and the “spirit” of the law. It is a 
pragmatic approach that responds to one, the other, or both depending on the immediate context. 
Recognizing how and when to do so is one meaning of “having” adab. This is what it means to 
be “civilized.”  
Family is significant to this discussion of adab in a further sense as well. Throughout 
Indonesia, one encounters the prevailing injunction to maintain the ties of kinship. Typically this 
involves an invocation of silaturahmi or silaturahim (both Indonesianized transliterations of the 
Arabic terms silah [connect] and rahim [womb]). There are different common formulations, 
including menjaga silaturahim (guard the ties of kinship), menjalin silaturahmi (“weave” the ties 
of kinship), and in the negative, jangan memutuskan silaturahmi (don’t sever the ties of kinship). 
All of these derive from abundant hadith that attest to the importance of maintaining relations 
with ones kin (often articulated in the context of the non-believing kin of some of the Prophet’s 
companions).
141
 In contemporary Indonesian, this compound “ties of kinship,” functions also as 
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 Perhaps the two most well-known of these are recorded in Bukhari, in the book of Adab. The first has the Prophet 
detailing the path to Paradise: “you should worship Allah and join none in worship with Him: You should offer 
prayers perfectly, give obligatory charity (Zakat), and keep good relations with your kith and kin” (5983). The 
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a verb: silaturahmi ke denotes “paying a visit to” (upholding the bonds of kin) someone.142 This 
someone can be deceased, and thus this phrase becomes another term for minor pilgrimages or 
ziarah, devotional acts performed at the place of interment (or symbol of interment) of a saintly 
figure or ancestor. Thus to silaturahmi ke Gus Dur denotes the act of visiting the grave of the 
former president at Pesantren Tebuireng, his family’s Islamic school in East Java. To do so one 
need not assert genetic kinship, and thus the “bonds of kin” became a cognate for the social 
rights exerted within adab. Every return trip to Bogor, visiting the family of Abdul Fatah, 
became about maintaining the “bonds of kin,” and before my return to the United States I was 
admonished not to “sever” them. 
The importance placed on silaturahmi also illustrates how adab can become a medium of 
change. There is an abiding concept of change, in the Islamic tradition, attributable to 
“association.” Rather than through striving, one can be changed by associating oneself with 
people of enhanced spiritual stature – chiefly, saints, lineal descendants of the Prophet, and 
accomplished scholars. Attested repeatedly in ahadith, this derives from the concept that in the 
life to come, associations made in this-world will continue to obtain. Thus not through effort but 
via grace, associating oneself to spiritually significant individuals can be sufficient to enhance 
one’s own spiritual standing. By asserting “bonds of kin” through practices of silaturahmi one 
can cultivate such efficacious associations. Constituting new relations and paying the dues 
appropriate to existing relations – both elements of adab – becomes a vehicle for transforming 
the self. The mechanism behind the attainment of change through association is divine mercy, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
second is more concise, and framed in the negative: “Narrated Jubair bin Mut`im: That he heard the Prophet (صلى الله عليه وسلم) 
saying, ‘The person who severs the bond of kinship will not enter Paradise’" (5984). 
142
 The KBBI defines silaturahmi as “bonds of companionship” (tali persahabatan), adding parenthetically, 
“siblinghood” (persaudaraan). Thus, elsewhere in Indonesia I’m told that silaturahmi is the term used for a social 
gathering during the feast that follows Ramadhan – an ideal time to maintain those bonds. 
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spillover effect of the grace accorded to higher-ranked individuals. Recognizing who has this 
rank is part of the hierarchal dimension of adab, necessary to activate the potentials of 
association.
143
  
Adab and Others: You just can’t do that! 
 Adab allowed for the negotiation between Initiatives of Change discourses on moral 
transformation and the authorizing tradition of Islam. Under the auspices of adab, relationships 
became a key medium for affecting change. When adab failed, or rather, when the mutual 
recognition of adab was not accomplished, the results could be startlingly confrontational. 
Degrees of foreignness entailed new domains of adab, not all of which could be handled as 
adroitly as handshakes and hugs. The extended visit of an “Action for Life” (AFL) team from 
Initiatives of Change demonstrated this potential. AFL teams, the inheritors of the small mission 
cells sent out by Frank Buchman so long ago, are (typically) multi-ethnic small groups that sally 
forth to share the message of Initiatives of Change. Although the AFL program has been 
discontinued, AFL teams were convened on five occasions between 2005 and 2011.
144
 The team 
that visited during my fieldwork had members from the Indian Kashmir, Lebanon, Australia, 
Vietnam, Kenya and the Ukraine. They were a spirited group, several of whom were already 
acquainted with senior IofC leadership from trainings in India or at Youth Camps in Malaysia 
and the Philippines. The AFL team brought a specific set of workshop materials and participated 
in a variety of IofC outreach efforts over the course of their residence in Indonesia. As the 
                                                             
143
 From one perspective, the practice of sending ṣalawat (Indonesian shalawat or sholawat; prayers and blessings) 
on the Prophet is a part of this logic of association. “Sending” is something of a misnomer, too: praise hymns 
dedicated to the Prophet are actually supplications to God, where God is the agent of the blessing requested for the 
Prophet. By asking God to bless the Prophet, the worshipper honors the adab of both relationships – with God and 
with the Prophet, in the process associating herself with the personage of the Prophet and thus, ideally, being 
gathered in the Prophet’s company in the life to come. This is moral attainment understood as taking place not 
through “deeds” (although the request for blessings is a behavioral action in this world), but through grace.    
144
 For a clarifying first-person account of AFL participation, see Mike Mukia’s “My Experiment with Truth.”   
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beneficiaries of further Initiatives of Change training, they came to inspire, to educate and to 
bring the moral transformations of different national iterations of the movement into conformity 
with the global message. Initiatives of Change, according to itself, is now principally a vehicle 
for conflict resolution, the promotion of peace, and attendant moral transformations. It is 
important to the larger movement that the disparate activities of its many affiliates conform, at 
least in broad strokes, to these objectives.   
 Two incidents, where IofC met the representatives of Initiatives of Change, stand out. 
One is so minor it can be mentioned in passing: the Lebanese volunteer of the AFL team was 
incredulous, and then critical, of the frequency of assalamu’alaikum as a greeting within IofC. In 
Arabic-speaking Lebanon, he informed his Indonesian audience, the non-confessional marhaban 
is the preferred greeting for a religiously-mixed audience. This provoked some surprise amongst 
his audience: how were they supposed to respond to the ethical injunction to greet Muslim 
brothers and sisters appropriately (one of the “rights” a Muslim has is to be properly greeted by 
other Muslims)? The notion that an Arabic speaker would be other than Muslim, while 
superficially obvious, cut deeply against prevailing language ideologies that view Arabic as the 
medium of Islamic authenticity. The Indonesian compromise on the issue of greetings, achieved 
on a national scale in the 1990s, is to string several together (assalamu’alaikum [peace upon you, 
in Arabicized Indonesian], selamat sore [good afternoon, in Indonesian], salam sejahtera 
[prosperous greetings, in Indonesian], a speaker might begin).
145
 It is up to the audience to 
determine which interpellation applies. The multiplicity of “hailings,” in fact, is an important 
feature of Indonesian Muslim discourse – it cuts to the heart of what I am exploring under the 
sign of adab. Different relationships operate in accordance with different rules. Recognizing both 
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 Of course, given the hybrid character of Malay and Indonesian, all three of these greetings are etymologically 
linked to salam in Arabic. Nevertheless, they signify differently – one the language of Islam, one the language of 
deconfessionalized business, and media, and one in the language of nationalistic organizational appeal.  
 
 
193 
 
the relationships and the rules occurs through adab. Thus Islamically-significant hierarchies of 
meaning are maintained while nationalistically encouraged egalitarianism is performed. 
Simultaneous address, whatever real exclusions it might constitute, is imagined as a smooth 
resolution to the problem of multiplicity and pluralism.         
 Far more troubling than greetings, however, was the spectacular failure of adab that 
occurred during the course of an otherwise typical weekly gathering. This failure was produced 
by competing agentive models of change, brought into irreconcilable relief, between an 
Indonesian facilitator and parts of his AFL audience. IofC’s weekly gatherings played host to the 
core institutions of check-ins and quiet time. They were also a venue for IofC participants to 
educate, edify and enlighten their fellow members.
146
 One particular week, with the AFL team in 
attendance, an IofC facilitator named Mabe took charge of the gathering. Mabe was excited to 
share a particular technology of change he had been studying in another context (that technology, 
and that context, are the focus of the subsequent chapter of this project – namely, hypnotherapy 
and Kahfi Motivator School). Mabe didn’t tell us what he was doing. There was no notion of 
consent. Instead he simply dimmed the lights, and in parallel languages (English and Indonesia) 
attempted to perform a mass hypnotic induction. Reading a guided imagery script, Mabe directed 
those in attendance in a program of progressive relaxation. Once the desired state had been 
attained, Mabe changed course from relaxation towards contemplation of guilt, shame and 
personal moral failings. In our relaxed state, he encouraged us to ruminate on our shared history 
of disappointing our parents, failing to respect them, and neglecting their rights. Twenty minutes 
into this process Mabe directed us to express our guilt (many in the gathering were already 
sobbing) and somewhat cumbersomely tried to absolve said guilt by repeatedly invoking the 
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 Reflecting exclusively aspirational character rather than experiential acumen, I offered workshops on time 
management.  
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divine capacity for forgiveness. Then the lights came on and the IofC practice of “sharing” 
(another genre of frank emotional disclosure) began. “Sharing” meant open discussion of current 
experiences, often those provoked by an IofC exercise.  
 One IofC member shared how she really felt, powerfully, her sense of neglect to her 
parents. Her experience with Mabe’s ministrations, she claimed, would motivate her to reach out 
and re-engage with them. Before any more testimonies of this sort were shared, however, the 
AFL team member from Australia spoke up. Peter was incensed. He found the exercise coercive. 
Manipulative. Poorly executed. Intrusive. Totally inappropriate. Amateurish. A mockery of the 
moral awakenings cultivated at Initiatives of Change. Simplistic. Offensive. His indictment was 
sharp, explicit and unrelenting. The Indonesian IofC president spoke next. He explained that 
what had happened was “culture shock.” Mabe, he claimed, was using a locally appropriate 
emotional discourse that Peter didn’t understand. His appeal to cultural relativity fell on deaf 
ears. Peter spoke up again: no, this was not a function of cultural difference. This was 
inappropriate in every context. Now it was Mabe’s turn to defend himself. He weakly repeated 
the claims of the IofC President. I tried to shrink into the wall, terrified that someone would ask 
me to arbitrate between whiteness and Indonesian-ness, a cultural translation I was imagined to 
have entry-level insights into by dint of speaking passable Indonesian. Eyes turned to me, but 
Peter preempted my participation. This kind of intrusive emotional blackmail (his words!) was 
totally unacceptable in Initiatives of Change practice. As a result, he demanded an apology. The 
apology he received, however, was yet one more re-statement of essentialized cultural 
difference, an apology for not bridging a cultural divide. Tensely, awkwardly, uncomfortably, 
the weekly gathering was brought to a close. 
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 From my (not disinterested)
147
 perspective, several forces were implicated in the 
spectacular failure of the above interaction. Certainly culturally salient notions of access to affect 
were at work (acceptance of emotional reasoning is predicated on consent in the dominant Euro-
American model of agentive change). The clumsiness (insistence on guilt) of this particular 
performance also contributed to its abrasive reception by some of those in attendance (the 
Kenyan member of the AFL Team, Medi, and Nur from IofC expressed shared concerns). But 
the stakes were sharpest in terms of the adab of change. Initiatives of Change, in its earliest 
Buchman-directed instantiation, required an individual’s assent to divine grace. God changed 
those who opened themselves to God, clearing away the moral wreckage of past misdeeds. Seen 
from this individual-centered tradition of change, Mabe arrogated that agency to himself. From 
Mabe’s perspective, however, moral intervention could be legitimately spurred from the outside. 
Still reliant on a divine agent to affect change, Mabe employed a concept of change that allowed 
him to access moral interiors. These interiors were not the private possessions of atomized 
individuals, but collective properties with broadly shared features (evidenced by the uniformity 
of guilt ascribed to them). Adab demanded that actors maintain right intersubjective relations. 
When there was not a reciprocal re-positioning, however, sociality collapsed into acrimony. The 
sudden juxtaposition of different agentive understandings of change proved to be a gap too vast 
for the social logics of adab to bridge. Into this gap the adab of mistakes – the socially adroit way 
to elide failure – was incommensurate with the intransigence of one interlocutor. Adab allows for 
multiplicity, but there are some positions too divergent to be reconciled. The failure of adab was 
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 When this event occurred, I was already partway into my study of Islamic hypnotherapy at Kahfi Motivator 
School (Chapter 4). Mabe, a cohort behind me at Kahfi, was mimicking the technique of the instructor at Kahfi, but 
was not yet “authorized” to engage in hypnotherapeutic practice, since he hadn’t studied it. Thus I could fault him 
for a technical violation of adab (accessing unauthorized knowledge) while remaining agnostic about his particular 
performance (which was rather amateurish). Peter’s complaints made sense to me, although I didn’t feel the visceral 
address of Mabe’s ministrations, so I didn’t have the experience of feeling an interior violation.  
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collective – Peter’s inability to bend himself to Mabe, but also Mabe’s infelicitious assessment of 
his audience.     
Adab, too, can be weakened by its explicit invocation. Bringing adab into discourse 
always places adab, as a source of right conduct, in a subordinate position relative to canonical 
sources of social ethics.
148
 The Qur’an and ahadith clearly stipulate the appropriate boundaries of 
gendered sociality as well as the real impossibility of non-Divine agentive action. Adab did not 
constitute an alternative or a suspension of those mandates. If I asked someone directly, the 
“right” answer she or he provided would adhere to those explicit norms. But in the local 
pragmatics of an interaction, one could be hailed by the immediate ethics of adab. In those 
instances, sensitive recognition of the rights and needs of the other were also sources of 
prescriptive ethics. Adab involved micro-alignments of self-and-other that facilitated lasting 
changes. The relational rights exerted in social interaction allowed an individual to change 
through these micro-alignments. Instead of the sudden awakenings of broader IofC discourse 
(and attempted by Mabe above), these were moral transformations of a local character. This is 
the “educational” variety of Adab excerpted at the outset of this chapter. It is the instilling of 
recognition and rights in the souls of individuals. Lost in discussions that allow only for the 
relationship between the worshipper and the divine (the reductive reading of piety), the “adab of 
change” is both prescriptive and descriptive. It is the right way to attempt change and a social 
means through which change is achieved.
                                                             
148
 I am sure that at Abdul Fatah’s family home in Bogor, had I mentioned my non-mahram status, the head-scarves 
would have returned, for precisely this reason.  
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Chapter 4 
Kahfi Motivator School and Islamic Hypnotherapy 
Patience with a limit isn’t patience.149 
-Tubagus Wahyudi  
The Grounds of Hypnosis 
The preceding chapters introduced Initiatives of Change Indonesia, one of the many 
organizations formed or revitalized in the post-Reformasi era. The moral emphasis of IofC is 
broadly shared across diverse groups, although the particular features that mark IofC are unique: 
the four moral absolutes, quiet time, Youth Camp. This chapter addresses Islamic Hypnotherapy, 
as taught and practiced at Kahfi Motivator School. The curriculum of Kahfi Motivator School 
(Kahfi) is allied with IofC in its faith in agentive change and individual moral refinement, but 
they are vehicles for divergent aspirations. Islamic hypnotherapy (IH) is only one element of the 
Kahfi curriculum, although it looms large in students’ accounts of the institution. IH, as 
elaborated here, sits at the nexus of motivational speaking, a particular Indonesian iteration of a 
more global popular psychology and a sustained effort to reimagine Islamic epistemologies. It 
departs considerably from IofC in terms of how change is imagined and attempted. IofC 
participants attend to adab as they try to host divine agency. Adab remains important at Kahfi, 
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 Sabar yang punya batas, bukan sabar. The speaker of this aphorism, the founder and lead instructor of the Kahfi 
Motivator School, the institution at the heart of this chapter, was fond of making such utterances. Beyond its pithy 
concision, Om Bagus was gesturing towards the absolute horizon of divine qualities – As-Sabur, the Ever-Patient, is 
the 99
th
 name/attribute of God, in the conventional listing of Divine names. Hypnosis, in the hands of a skilled 
practitioner, brought the subject of hypnosis ever-closer to the realization of these perfect attributes. Sometimes this 
same thought was expressed in the formulation “Sabar itu ada batasnya. Batas sabar adalah liang lahad” (Patience 
has a limit. The limit of patience is the grave). 
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but the role of the mediator (hypnotist) is front and center. The subjects of IH open their 
subconscious to the ministrations of a skilled practitioner. With divine license, he changes the 
subject of hypnosis. Change comes from without, as well as within, in both instances. But the 
taste of change varies considerably. For IH, the hypnotist makes change and the hypnotized 
subject has change – these two sense of ubah are attached to discrete parties, unlike the IofC 
context where having change is the first step to making change. 
This story is already familiar: a psychological tool (an approach, a technology), with a 
distinct genealogy, comes to be practiced and absorbed in a radically different socio-cultural 
context than that where it first emerged. But the particulars matter, and they matter a lot. The 
story of IH in Indonesia is a part of the story of how knowledge is integrated into Islam. It also 
casts in relief changes in the Indonesian state management of religion and popular responses to 
those efforts. An organization like Kahfi, with its unclear political intentions (none that I could 
recognize, which would have connoted danger in the old regime), was almost unthinkable during 
the decades of New Order rule. The changing organizational landscape in its wake allowed for 
revisions to the boundaries between religion and culture, technology and tradition. Taking up the 
practice of IH provokes, anew, questions of change: what kind of agency allows for change? 
What kind of subjectivity is configured within it? 
 Post New-Order reforms allowed Initiatives of Change Indonesia back into the country. 
They were followed by a host of other formerly banned groups, movements, and ideologies – not 
just the Bahá'í tradition, but also Chinese language print documents, and even Masonic orders. 
The de-regulation of certain aspects of social, cultural and religious life also spelled new 
opportunities for novel organizations. Riding the wave of interest in character building and moral 
reform, groups like Emotional Spiritual Quotient (ESQ) and Manajemen Qolbu (MQ) rose to 
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prominence.
150
 These groups were marked by promises to succeed in both this life and the next, 
melding developments from business leadership seminars with self-help psychology and the 
language and practices of Islamic self-cultivation. The tremendous popularity of MQ, in its 
heyday, along with the enduring dominance of ESQ, has encouraged the development of 
conceptually similar operations. Islamic motivational practice is the explicit focus of the 
subsequent chapter in this project. Here, however, I am interested in the development of IH 
within a much smaller organization. The figures most invested in Kahfi have a vision that 
extends to the sort of broad cultural salience of MQ or ESQ, but they are aware that such a future 
is still far away. In the interim, there is a serious commitment to providing the training and skill 
development promised to the current generation of Kahfi students. This chapter explores the 
scope and nature of that commitment. As such, it is also the story of how Kahfi Motivator School 
enlisted a diverse repertoire of texts to make hypnotherapy meaningfully Indonesian and Islamic. 
 My first introduction to Kahfi came during a Youth Camp run by Initiatives of Change 
Indonesia. One of the IofC facilitators, Mabe, was privately insistent that I accompany him to 
meet his teacher, whom he described as teaching hypnosis alongside other strategies for 
enhanced self-efficacy. I didn’t make the immediate connection to IofC – I didn’t see, at the 
time, how Mabe’s pursuits were part of a concerted effort to remake himself, or that the moral 
reforms of IofC could be simultaneously pursued within a motivational idiom. Instead, only 
dimly cognizant of the moral impetus behind IofC I struggled to understand the relevance of 
hypnosis to Mabe’s other interests. I was, however, gradually enlightened concerning the extent 
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See Rudnyckyj Spiritual Economies and Hoesterey in the forthcoming Rebranding Islam, for recent accounts of 
ESQ and MQ respectively. Rudnyckyj explores how ESQ, the brainchild of Ary Ginanjar, is deployed within the 
Krakatau Steel company as part of a personal-cum-professional development program that Rudnyckyj strongly 
identifies with economic rationalization. Hoesterey explores the meteoric rise of a popular “lay preacher,” AA Gym, 
his equally precipitous fall and subsequent re-emergence (re-branding). Both authors look at the nexus of popular 
psychology, self-help discourse and Islam. The Kahfi response to similar impulses is the explicit focus of the 
subsequent chapter of this project.  
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to which individuals active in one community also participated in the other. There had been 
people involved in both before Mabe, but due to his urgings ever more IofC members became 
involved in Kahfi. Just before leaving Indonesia at the close of my field work, I saw several 
Kahfi students make the reverse trip, and subsequent communications demonstrate a great degree 
of membership overlap. At the time I heard of Kahfi, however, I only grudgingly accepted the 
invitation to meet this teacher. The way Mabe spoke of his teacher – and the fact that he was 
located at a mosque in Bintaro, a suburb of Jakarta neighboring Ciputat – I didn’t expect to find a 
thriving youth-oriented institution. From the information Mabe provided, I imagined I would be 
taken to meet an autodidact preacher. Having already met several figures matching this 
description, I was less than enthusiastic. Besides, it was all clearly Oprah-esque derivative 
business-speak. And I had a clear understanding of exactly what that entailed from my broad 
base of received wisdom and well-honed skills of contempt prior to investigation, as the quote 
misattributed to Herbert Spencer has it.      
Induction 
Imagine a crowded auditorium. There are roughly three hundred people sitting in chairs 
arrayed in a semi-circle. The air is still, wet and very warm. Those assembled perspire through 
dress shirts, blouses and headscarves. They are attended to by facilitators; attired in matching 
black uniforms, white stitching over their breast pocket displaying their names, more stitching 
beneath the back of the collar revealing an identification number. It is Saturday, and the setting is 
the Student Center at the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah (UIN) in Jakarta. Those 
gathered are primarily university students from UIN, with a couple of faculty members and the 
occasional recent graduate. They wear nametags, identifying them as prospective students at 
Kahfi. Their participation in today's seminar on public speaking is the first step in admittance to 
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the program. A middle-aged man, with a warm pleasing voice, is speaking from the center of a 
low-stage. He invites the attendees to relax. He gives them a moment to offer prayer. Speaking in 
strong, even-but-soothing tones, he encourages them to relax further. And then he begins a 
process characterized in the relevant literature as a mass-induction, escorting as many of the 
participants as possible into the relaxed, hyper focused state typically understood as hypnosis.  
The man at center stage is Tubagus Wahyudi, referred to by students at his institution as 
Om Bagus. The institution in question is now the Kahfi Motivator School, although at the time 
this scene took place it was still operating as the Bagus Brain Communication Kahfi School of 
Public Speaking. It is a unique institution, offering a three-year non-accredited degree program 
in Public Speaking, free from any formal tuition besides the mandate to salat lima waktu 
(perform the five obligatory daily worship cycles). When it was founded, in 2003, it was called 
Kahfi al-Karim, and operated out of the annex building of Masjid al-Karim in Bintaro, Jakarta. 
Bintaro is a residential development to Jakarta’s southwest and Masjid al-Karim served the 
largest housing development in the neighborhood called Sector 9. The founders of the school 
settled on “Kahfi,” reflecting the importance of Surat al-Kahf (the Chapter of the Cave), the 18th 
surah of the Qur’an. This surah, recommended for weekly recitation on Fridays, contains the 
narrative of Al-Khidr, an important passage for the Sufi tradition of master-disciple 
relationships.
151
 This surah also describes the experience of youths escaping from a heedless 
town to the sanctuary of a cave, where God gave them respite until the peoples of the town had 
become believers. A place for youths to retreat – al Kahf, the Cave – was the original motivation 
behind the school: several wealthy residents of Bintaro Sector 9 were hoping to establish an 
institution that could educate Muslim youths in a useful science. Given the omnipresent 
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 For more on this, see Hugh Talat Halman’s recently published revision of his dissertation, Where the Two Seas 
Meet; for a fascinating detour, see Nicholas Battye’s “Khidr in the Opus of Jung,” that explores Carl Jung’s 
fascination with this foundational Sufi narrative. 
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temptations of the world, and the shaky economic and religious prospects of 2002, these local 
leaders hoped to provide an alternative. Om Bagus, then a teacher at a for-profit public speaking 
school in Jakarta, possessed the vision and the technical know-how to establish the institution. 
And he was their neighbor, and thus one of the founders. 
Om Bagus, born in 1968 and raised in Makassar by Javanese parents, had a background 
in a technical field – an undergraduate degree in architecture from Universitas Merdeka Malang, 
East Java. He had moved to Jakarta following his graduation from university. Unable to find 
work in his field, he labored as a galon (five gallon water jug) distributor and salesman. He had 
begun to work as a presenter and radio DJ in Malang, and he maintained this interest during the 
subsequent year. Committing himself to the performing arts, he attended a number of auditions 
and slowly began to find success as a commercial voice actor. With a warm, authoritative voice, 
Om Bagus landed a number of parts in nationally televised commercials. At some point in this 
period, Om Bagus moved from what he characterized as zaman belum shalat (the time when I 
didn’t yet perform obligatory Muslim worship) into a more devout posture. He got serious about 
his faith. Then he married a childhood acquaintance from Makassar and relocated back to 
Central Sulawesi. After the birth of his first child, the three of them moved to Bintaro Sector 9. 
Getting regular work in radion and television, Om Bagus’s star as an MC was in the ascendancy. 
It was at this point that he was recruited to offer vocal trainings at a for-profit public-speaking 
school run by an Indonesian celebrity, Tantowi Yahya (famous as the presenter for Indonesia’s 
version of Who Wants to be a Millionaire). As Om Bagus became more versed in the science of 
public speaking, he expanded his interests to hypnosis and other popular pursuits for Indonesian 
motivational speakers. Having acquired this skill-set, he was the natural choice to lead Kahfi al-
Karim when the school was founded in 2003 – declared by wealthy benefactors from the 
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neighborhood who ceded day-to-day administration to Om Bagus, with oversight from the 
principal financier along with the Imam of the Masjid al-Karim.      
By the conclusion of my fieldwork, Kahfi had moved on from its original location. Its 
original patrons had changed, although Om Bagus and one of the other founders continue to 
oversee its growth and development. It now occupies a rented space elsewhere in Bintaro – 
Sector 4.  The institution itself has also seen its name change first to Bagus Brain 
Communication Kahfi School of Public Speaking and more recently, to Kahfi Motivator 
School.
152
 The curriculum at the close of my field work consisted of one semester of study about 
theories of mind and consciousness, broadly incorporated into a program of pembersihan hati 
(cleansing of the heart), followed by one semester of instruction in public speaking, consisting of 
lessons exploring gestures, facial expressions, vocal techniques and other features of effective 
communication. The ordering is intentional: the Kahfi model is predicated on first preparing the 
mental and spiritual grounds for future growth, so cleansing is a necessary first step. The third 
semester focused on contemporary media, training students in everything from radio hosting to 
basic film editing. The fourth semester introduced the formal study of hypnotherapy; the fifth the 
study of psycho-cybernetics
153
 and PowerPoint; and the final semester was devoted to the 
production of an original treatment of a Kahfi-authorized subject, to be presented in both a book 
and an oral form: a “final project” or tugas akhir. This curriculum had changed substantially 
from earlier iterations of the institution, and has since changed further. Hypnotherapy, public-
speaking, and the technical manipulation of media have remained constants through these 
                                                             
152
 This most recent change has to do with the re-incorporation of the organization. A for-profit arm, providing 
seminars to paying customers is Bagus Bina Cendekia (BBC), while the non-profit education arm is the Kahfi 
Motivator School (Kahfi). 
153 Psycho-Cybernetics is a term coined by Maxwell Maltz, and introduced to a broader audience in the 1960 
publication of a text by that name. It is concerned with how humans develop psychological, cognitive and behavioral 
mechanisms to ensure certain desired outcomes. It is a key text in both the vast field of popular psychology and the 
motivational literature industry. In the next chapter, addressed to motivation, Psycho-cybernetics is reconsidered in 
greater detail.   
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different versions. 
Kahfi incorporates a range of teaching materials, including many drawn from Euro-
American authors, especially the materials pertaining to hypnosis and hypnotherapy. That it 
manages to do so without troubling the explicitly Islamic emphases of the institution is a 
testament to a profound set of negotiations carried out in plain view – a serious and systematic 
effort to ensure an Islamic genealogy, and an Islamic objective, for ostensibly non-Islamic 
knowledges. Although the language of epistemology is not discussed at Kahfi, the presentation 
of information is keenly attuned to what are classically considered epistemological concerns: 
what is knowable, how something is known, where and how belief interfaces with knowledge. 
Since Kahfi curricula is addressed to a student imagined to be invested in normative Islamic 
ethics, and attendant beliefs, this concern is most visible in terms of situating course materials 
derived from non-Islamic contexts. Unsurprisingly, the immediate recourse is to canonical 
Sources – Qur'an and ahadith. This entails demonstrating that seemingly secular knowledge like 
that comprising Western hypnosis is not only consonant with Islamic knowledges, but effectively 
presaged by them. The incorporation of these materials requires Kahfi educators to repeatedly 
enunciate theories of change. From the inaugural classes addressed to cleansing of the heart 
(pembersihan hati, preparing for change) through to the capstone project that concludes a Kahfi 
student’s formal studies, Kahfi students seek to be changed and to be changed into agents of 
future change. But first to return to the scene described above. 
Back in the UIN Student Center, the potential students are directed to follow closely the 
verbal cues of Om Bagus. They perform a simple physical induction that involves the sensation 
of weight and weightlessness on opposing hands. Still speaking in even tones, Om Bagus 
encourages the assembled participants to imagine that their left hand is holding an increasingly 
 
 
205 
 
heavy stone, whereas their right hand is increasingly unbound by gravity. About three quarters 
of the participants accede to this instruction, and the room is now dominated by sitting 
prospective students, their left hands bowed towards the floor, their right drawn to the ceiling. 
The weightless hand becomes affixed to a rope dangling from a gas-filled balloon. And now, the 
balloon is bound for the Holy Lands, for Mecca. If three-quarters acceded to the initial 
induction, the vast majority of that number now follows on their balloon voyage, some pulled to 
their feet by the buoyancy of their craft (Figure 1 below). They are encouraged to alight from 
their craft and set foot on the holy lands. As they perform a tawaf (counter-clockwise 
circumambulation of the Kaaba), many are moved to tears. Om Bagus instructs them to 
remember the angle of their view of the Kaaba, so that when they eventually go on pilgrimage 
they will recall that precise vantage. The guidance leaves off additional circumambulations of 
the Kaaba, Om Bagus electing instead to emphasize the affective rewards of this sudden sojourn 
to the Holy Lands. Om Bagus tells them to feel (rasakan) the depths of their sin (betapa 
bersalah). Those assembled are directed to the waters of Zamzam, and then to reflect (ingatlah, 
remember) on their sins and their yearning for repentance, focusing especially on presumed 
neglect of their parents (durhaka pada orang tua, insubordination to one’s parents, a grave sin). 
At this point, most of those in a trance are weeping, many loudly and sometimes violently, and a 
few fall to the floor in sujud, prostration before God. In the space of fifteen minutes, a room full 
of university students has been transported from a banal state marked by nervous laughter, 
splintered attentions and physical discomfort into a powerful and powerfully earnest expression 
of remorse and repentance, into the varied physical manifestations of the desire to taubat, the 
heartfelt entreaty for forgiveness directed towards God (taubat, as I was often reminded, 
involves a return to God). This was Islamic Hypnotherapy at its most elemental. 
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Figure 1  Mass Hypnotic Induction 
This exercise is conducted not simply for the affective benefits described above, but as a 
sort of test – a test designed to check prospective student's “focus.” Focus is the key term for IH 
as practiced at Kahfi. Whereas other hypnosis literature privileges “suggestibility,” in the 
conceptualization of hypnosis adopted at Kahfi, the ability to be hypnotized is a mark of one's 
ability to focus. The higher that focus is, the easier it is to direct it to the stimuli proffered by the 
hypnotist and away from any other sort of sensory inputs that might challenge the hypnotic 
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state.
154
 It is central to the conduct of teaching at Kahfi that the vast majority of students have a 
high level of focus, and those who were unable to follow along the above induction are cut from 
the potential rolls of future students. This is connected to the theory of mind in circulation at 
Kahfi, based heavily on a distinction between conscious mental activities directed by the left 
brain and subconscious activities controlled by the right brain. From this distinction a 
categorical divide is generalized between left-brain inclined individuals (otak kiri=oki) and 
right-brain oriented individuals (otak kanan=oka). Although left/right brain schemata have been 
largely disavowed in contemporary psychological literature, they retain tremendous currency in 
contemporary popular psychology as practiced in Indonesia. At Kahfi, this distinction is 
employed to valorize certain capacities associated with the right brain, rather than as an 
explanatory framework in pursuit of knowledge itself.  
To maintain the educational atmosphere desired at Kahfi, it is necessary that the vast 
majority of students be “oka,” and that only a small sliver of the students be “oki.” Oki people 
are considered unable to relax the critical faculties that interfere with hypnosis, as well as unable 
to receive the sort of spiritual counseling that depends on direct access to the subconscious on 
the part of the counselor. Healing my oki tendencies was a major component of my training at 
Kahfi, despite my status as a special student. By the time I departed, Om Bagus considered those 
efforts a qualified success: I had moved from butet (bukan suyet, not hypnotizable) to sutet 
(setengah suyet, halfway hypnotizable), in the idiom particular to Kahfi. Since all IH 
practitioners require ample practice, it is important that a stable of oka volunteers be at the 
ready. As mentioned above, the first semester at Kahfi consists of pembersihan hati (cleansing 
of the heart), and the few oki individuals fortunate enough to enter the institution are the 
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 Fokus, in this context, is densely related to the quality of khusyu’, or humble concentration – an important 
attribute of worship as correctly performed. Often Om Bagus or other instructors would claim that, “experts” (ahli) 
of worship cycles (salat) were easier to hypnotize, because they had already disciplined themselves to have khusyu’.   
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recipients of extended attentions during this period, to enhance the activity of their right brain in 
preparation for future study of hypnosis, psycho-cybernetics and public speaking.  
The Students of Hypnosis 
The students of Kahfi Motivator School are overwhelmingly drawn from Universitas 
Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah in neighboring Ciputat. That said, of course, there is no 
“typical” Kahfi student. UIN students, generally, are from middle or aspiring middle-class 
backgrounds, and are usually graduates of either the state Islamic school system (madrasah) or 
non-state Islamic schools (pesantren). Although West Java is heavily represented, UIN (and 
thus Kahfi) students arrive from across the archipelago. When asked, students at Kahfi 
articulated a variety of rationales for their participation in the school. Despite the difficulty of 
generalizing, it is useful to provide at least a partial sketch of the people active within the 
institution. In the spirit of addressing the who of IH, I offer a brief introduction to several of the 
students with whom I worked most closely. Three of these participants were from the Kahfi 
cohort I attended (ninth – entering in 2009), one was a graduate from the fourth (starting in late 
2004), and one from tenth (coursework begun in early 2010). Our “senior,” the graduate from 
the 4
th
 cohort, was active in the institution as an instructor and frequently appeared alongside 
Om Bagus in other, outside capacities – as a paid trainer and motivator. Two of the individuals 
from my cohort were in current formal leadership positions at the time I joined – one atop the 
student hierarchy of the institution, and one within the cohort. The individual from the tenth 
cohort was aspiring to a leadership position, which she achieved subsequent to the conclusion of 
my fieldwork. Although they remain identifiable to people familiar with the institution, per my 
agreement with Kahfi I use pseudonyms to refer to each of these figures. 
Feri was an early student at Kahfi, enrolled when the cohorts were small (not exceeding 
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fifteen students) and the curriculum was in flux. When Feri began, the emphasis was still 
strongly on public speaking – in particular, mastery of the vocal and gestural ranges intended to 
be maximally persuasive. Islamic values, broadly conceived, were understood to animate the 
enterprise, but were not a prominent feature of the instructional materials. Feri came from a very 
humble background, and so his participation in Kahfi, then still located in a wealthy residential 
community in Bintaro, facilitated his introduction to a class and a community previously 
inaccessible to him. Feri had started at Kahfi at a younger age than usual – 19 instead of the 22-
24 that typified most of the more recent incoming students. Several months before I returned to 
the United States, Feri opened a small print shop and graphic design studio. Using skills he had 
developed at Kahfi, alongside a long-standing interest in artistic craft, Feri begin taking small 
commissions for custom designed banners, business cards, and posters. Feri was a near-constant 
presence at Om Bagus’s paid engagements and he was also one of the lead instructors for higher 
(11+) cohorts of Kahfi classes. Feri had not yet married, and his enduring bachelor status was 
the subject of sustained commentary and jokes. In all likelihood, he was still assembling the 
capital necessary for a Betawi wedding.
155
 An easy-going presence around the Kahfi classroom, 
Feri was one of the most experienced trainers after Om Bagus. We never discussed precisely 
what drew him to the Kahfi program, but it had clearly provided him with a new range of 
possibilities, both personal and professional.  
Salih was a leader within my cohort of Kahfi students. He also fulfilled a leadership role 
in the broader student assembly that liaised with Om Bagus, alumni and other decision-makers 
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 Amongst the Betawi, in addition to the mahr (the contractually stipulated sum of money or material negotiated by 
the marriage partners and paid to the female spouse), it is still customary to provide a financial gift to the family of 
the female spouse. For my unmarried Betawi interlocutors, this was a common source of consternation. Alongside 
the standard family wisdom regarding ethnicity (marry anyone but a person from Sunda), this capital represented a 
steep barrier to marriage. A basic gift in 2010 was, at a minimum, 1,000USD. This is roughly four times as much as 
the Jakarta specific monthly minimum wage, itself something of a fantasy figure since so few occupations are 
touched by Indonesian minimum wage law.  
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in the organization. He grew up in a small household in a quasi-legal squatter settlement in 
Bintaro, very near to the original Kahfi al-Karim campus. This latter fact was a closely guarded 
secret. The marginal location of his residence, and the associated poverty, were elements of 
Salih’s biography that he preferred not to share with the larger Kahfi community. Before I first 
visited his mother, step-father and grandmother he took me to see his half-sister. She ran a small 
restaurant and had met with comparative financial success. While we ate, he swore me to 
secrecy. Only then did we drop in on his immediate family. Of Betawi ethnicity, his family 
lacked the thing most commonly associated with the Betawi – land. As some of the earliest 
residents of the area that became Jakarta,
156
 the Betawi had incrementally sold family land to 
developers, burnishing a reputation as an insular, protective community in the process. 
According to Salih, his family had, at one point, very minor land holdings in the North of 
Jakarta (Bintaro is far to the Southwest). However his grandfather was that rare creature – a 
Betawi leftist – and was imprisoned in 1965. The survivors fled to the then distant margins of 
the capital, the southwest. Before becoming involved with Kahfi, Salih had been very involved 
with Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Association of Muslim Students). For him, his 
involvement and leadership in the organization comprised a historical irony, as HMI was once 
directly involved in purging individuals like his grandfather. Salih was a rarity at Kahfi in that 
his academic background was in Fakultas Ushuluddin, the Divinity/Theology School at the 
Islamic State University Syarif Hidayatullah. At Om Bagus’s urging, Salih was one of the 
students who took me under his wing when I first started regularly attending classes with the 
ninth cohort. He aspired to be a motivator, and was already landing regular gigs to that effect at 
nearby secondary schools, especially during the busy season leading up to the National Exams. 
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 The history of this creole ethnicity has been well documented. See, for instance, Jacqueline Knorr’s recently 
published Creole Identity in Postcolonial Indonesia, for a carefully documented account of the Betawi relative other 
neighboring and national configurations of identity.   
 
 
211 
 
Well versed in the traditional Islamic sciences, Salih was also very active in a Sufi tarekat 
(order, tradition; path). He was both capable and willing to provide points of meaningful contact 
between the materials introduced at Kahfi and his knowledge of the Islamic sciences. Along 
with his earnestness and enthusiasm, this skill set contributed to this prominence within the 
organization. Salih was self-conscious about others’ possible interpretations of his striving – 
material and social advancement were very important to him, but he hoped to temper their lure 
with spiritual attainment. More so than many of the students at Kahfi, Salih was a true believer 
in the spiritual prospects of the courses offered at the institution.    
Leila, another fellow student in the ninth generation, was a psychology major at UIN. 
The School of Social Sciences at UIN is rumored to be the most academically rigorous, and 
Leila exemplified that reputation. A published author, she was an accomplished essayist and the 
daughter of a noted family of Sundanese and Javanese academics. Gender at Kahfi was often a 
fraught element of sociality. Cross-gender fraternization was formally discouraged and gender 
segregation unevenly enforced. As such, my access to, and interactions with, women were 
relatively circumscribed. Leila was somewhat exceptional in this regard as well, as she was far 
more forthright than many of her female peers. We often spoke candidly about academic, 
literary and purely speculative matters. On one occasion I drove her into Central Jakarta to her 
family’s home in the well-to-do neighborhood of Menteng, discussing Indonesian Islamic 
literary fiction for the duration of the trip. At other points I met with her and her boyfriend for 
dinner (she has since married someone else) and I had the opportunity to read a variety of her 
written pieces. Leila had a minor leadership role in our cohort, but her influence had spread 
across the institution by the conclusion of my fieldwork. She frequently accompanied Om Bagus 
to paid engagements, and was already working as an instructor for “younger” cohorts before 
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even completing the final semester. Her word was often the last, and her analysis of course 
materials generally commanded attention. As much as her family’s presumed wealth, her 
lineage in a scholarly tradition seemed to afford her a level of comfort and authority over-and-
above many of her peers. Given her considerable intellectual openness and curiosity, her often 
somewhat “reactionary” politics came as a surprise, if only to me. She viewed Islam as a 
tradition under siege, and vocally defended organizations and individuals who she felt struggled 
in its service – most obviously, Front Pembela Islam, a vigilante organization that frequently 
enforces its understanding of public morality. Already a comfortable and competent speaker, 
Leila was drawn to Kahfi initially by its efficacious theories of mind: outside her formal study 
of psychology at the university, she hoped to master persuasive tools that would allow her to 
influence others more strongly. Kahfi, for her, was part of a suite of skills development that she 
consciously undertook in concert with her education. 
Syarifah was a student in the cohort after mine. Our interactions typically occurred along 
two axes – English language (she was active in the Kahfi English Club) and Islam. Hailing from 
West Sumatra, Syarifah was very invested in some of the attributes commonly associated with 
Minang ethnicity. Given the place of matrilineality in Minang society, an outspoken Minang 
woman comfortable assuming a leadership role in mixed gender environment is hardly a rarity. 
Syarifah was further concerned with upholding the Minang reputation for piety and exemplary 
Islamic character. This meant her leadership in the Kahfi community often took the form of 
policing conduct in keeping with her understanding of Islamic obligations and norms. This 
entailed at one point correcting my performance of obligatory worship – incorrect positioning of 
my legs visible to her from the vantage of the women praying behind the men, and at another 
point erroneously correcting the English transliteration of an Islamic term (the Indonesian 
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conventions for transliteration vary significantly from those used in English). I was not the sole 
target of her interventions – maintaining gender segregation amongst the “younger” cohorts 
often fell to Syarifah. Syarifah had graduated from university several years earlier and was 
working as a teacher near the UIN campus, actively seeking a marriage partner. (Since my time 
at Kahfi, Syarifah has married and moved back closer to her family in Sumatra). For Syarifah, 
accustomed to behaving as a leader, Kahfi promised her the opportunity to do so in a minimally 
abrasive manner – the technologies of persuasion taught at Kahfi seemed appropriate to 
asserting oneself while possessing adab. During an English Club meeting we spoke pointedly 
about precisely this – the difficulty of enjoining the good while also respecting the rights of ones 
interlocutors. Kahfi, with its celebration of song, movement, and oratory, required participants 
who were willing to enforce a minimal standard of decorum, necessary to preclude rumor, 
gossip and social dischord. The leadership at Kahfi embraced a sensuous Islam, while striving to 
instill recognizably Islamic ethics and norms amongst the community. Syarifah’s efforts were 
central to the successful negotiation of this potential conflict. When an event was really heating 
up, Syarifah made sure it did not get too out of hand and bring disapproval upon the institution.   
Tomo became a close friend and a trusted associate over the course of my time at Kahfi. 
A friendly, outgoing man several years my junior, he brought a physical disability in addition to 
his enthusiasm. One of several blind Kahfi students (including two in the ninth cohort), Tomo 
had begun losing his vision at the end of primary school. By the time he had completed middle 
school, he was entirely unsighted. He was very active at Kahfi, and while attending classes there 
was finishing a degree in special education at UNJ, the State University of Jakarta, probably the 
premier school of education within the capital. Tomo’s disability was the object of considerable 
attention at Kahfi. He was a stock example for instructors (“even Tomo can do it!”), and the 
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frequent butt of simple practical jokes (for instance, re-arranging furniture, forcing him to guess 
who was in the room by remaining silent, misdirecting him). There was an unremarked cruelty 
to these acts, although Tomo was generally a good-natured victim. A staunch advocate of the 
disabled, he was resolutely independent, navigating public transit and public spaces across 
Jakarta. Through Tomo I came to know his mother (of unknown biological relationship, but 
always introduced to me as his mother), and his adoptive blind sister, a slightly older woman 
who had assisted him in adapting to life without vision. Tomo was active in a related community 
of the blind, while volunteering on the side with an Islamic organization dedicated to helping 
“street children” (anak jalanan). Tomo wanted a life of advocacy and activism. Despite his 
outgoing personality, he had difficulty speaking in front of audiences and so the lure of Kahfi 
Motivator School, for Tomo, was clear: here was a place to polish his performance and 
presentation. A fastidious student, Tomo could be relied upon to query the instructor for greater 
details on the minutiae of a specific hypnotic induction or the brainwaves associated with a 
hypnotic state.
157
 
In April 2012 I returned to Kahfi to follow up with friends, acquaintances and 
unanswered questions from my research. Conveniently, the process of accepting new students 
for a fresh cohort was already underway when I arrived. Thus, in concert with a fellow member 
of the ninth cohort, I was able to serve as the M.C. for another public speaking seminar where 
Om Bagus permitted me to film the proceedings, including a mass induction. Additionally, as a 
Kahfi senior, I helped with the formal intake process, reviewing applications and conducting 
interviews. The interviews were short (fifteen minutes), intense sessions where the interviewer 
queried the interviewee about their intentions, aspirations, experiences, and skills. We were 
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 Tomo was also married as a result of his involvement in Kahfi. Om Bagus solicited suitors, and a young woman 
also of my acquaintance volunteered. 
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instructed to press the prospective students about their motivations: why were they so interested 
in learning ilmu public speaking? Asking people to explain the draw of Kahfi, point blank, 
served a valuable function for me in my capacity as a researcher, alongside its utility as an 
evaluative measure for discriminating amongst potential Kahfi students.  
I interviewed eight prospective students over the course of about two and a half hours. 
The majority of the responses assumed a similar cast: she or he was interested in joining Kahfi 
because a) she or he had a friend who was a student; b) she or he was hoping to distinguish her 
or himself to future employers; c) she or he suffered from a lack of self-confidence (kurang p.d. 
[percaya diri]). However, there was one prominent exception: a distressed young woman who 
responded to my questions with an outpouring of tears and a tale of woe. She was estranged 
from her parents, responsible for the wellbeing of a younger sibling, and stuck working at an 
Internet café owned by a relative. Unable to pursue a formal education, she told me that she was 
drawn to the prospect of improving her financial circumstances through the night classes offered 
at Kahfi. When I reported our interview to the admission committee (made up of alumni and 
seniors at the institution), there was considerable excitement over this applicant. No one was 
interested in her explicit desire to develop a more marketable skill base and the associated career 
opportunity. That need was assumed to be met as a matter of course. Instead, the focus was on 
her spiritual ailments: the lack of affective composure, the estrangement from her family, the 
archness and volatility she evinced in conversation. Here was someone who really needed 
healing. This was someone who could benefit from “cleansing of the heart” (pembersihan hati). 
This was a candidate for the moral transformation envisioned by earnest Kahfi students. People 
changers need people to change, and maintaining a sufficient practice population is part of the 
admission strategy at Kahfi.   
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Although there was not set quota, a certain number of Kahfi students were expected to 
benefit from pembersihan hati more than others (roughly ten percent). These individuals might 
have backgrounds that involved substance abuse, they might have particularly abrasive 
personalities (a sign of left-brained dominance in the Kahfi idiom), or they might have a 
physical handicap (the disproportionate number of blind students). Alternately, they might bring 
a special enriching skill (exemplary recitation of the Qur’an, memorization of thousands of 
hadith, for instance). Balancing the different special needs and skills with the bulk of the student 
body (imagined to be motivated by the relatively straightforward desire to be a more persuasive 
public speaker) was the main task of the admission committee. On a practical level, almost 
everybody who applied would eventually get in – either as part of a regular cohort, or a 
“special” once-weekly cohort (with the opportunity to mainstream if she or he demonstrated 
special commitment to the program). Instead of winnowing out candidates, a lot of the 
application procedure was designed to balance the competing mandates within the institution: to 
encourage moral development; to facilitate the attainment of a (presumptively morally neutral) 
skill set; to make sure a critical mass of participants demonstrated sufficient focus (ie, could be 
hypnotized); and a commitment to realizing Islam in the lives and communities of the students. 
These interests required that each Kahfi class included a minimum number of individuals poised 
to be changed, but not so many needing a therapeutic intervention that steady progress through 
the curriculum was at risk of being derailed. 
Kahfi Hypnosis Basics  
Before going too much further, there are a couple of points that need to be emphasized. 
The induction exercise described above was not unique to this particular assembly, but rather a 
standard script used in other contexts (for instance, for paying customers in the form of a 
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professional enhancement seminar conducted on behalf of Tupperware Indonesia™).158 Along 
with separating those with high-focus from those without, it is the first step in a general program 
of “therapy” connected to the previously cited pembersihan hati. (Indeed, the file folder from 
which the photos displayed in this chapter were copied was named terapi by Om Bagus).  To be 
a student at Kahfi is to undergo a therapeutic encounter, one designed to strip away self-doubt, 
dishonesty, laziness and any other hindrance to becoming an effective, morally-grounded public 
speaker. The initial step in this enterprise involved stroking the incredible cultural salience of 
guilt in the face of neglecting one's parents.
159
 In other Kahfi materials as well, presumptive 
guilt at having mistreated one's parents is the door through which immediate affective 
experiences are accessed.
160
 Over time, the simple mention of parents at Kahfi often provokes a 
strong emotional response as the features of this phenomenon are further honed. So all at once, a 
mass-hypnotic encounter described in the day's program as cek fokus, consisted of a first 
therapeutic step for future students, an assessment tool governing admittance to the Kahfi 
program and an outlet for an affective experience consonant with broader cultural patterns of 
guilt and repentance. That such an activity could take place openly, in the Student Center of the 
State Islamic University, was a testament to how much things had changed since Reformasi: 
there was no longer an authority concerned with monitoring the risks such an organization 
might represent (access to state institutions is now presumptively allowed). Emotion, and 
                                                             
158
 A vignette from the Tupperware seminar forms the nucleus of the Afterward to this project.  
159
 Here one recalls the hadith collected in Bukhari and elsewhere, on the authority of Abu Hurairah, that the Prophet 
responded to a query about who is deserving of the best treatment by answering “your mother” three times, followed 
by “your father.” Similarly, the oft-repeated hadith that states that paradise lies beneath the feet of one’s mother – 
already seen in the prior chapter. 
160
 I presented a very early version of this argument at the graduate program in anthropology at the University of 
Indonesia. I am grateful to Tony Rudyansyah for providing that opportunity. I asked the 50 attendees how many had 
participated in an event like the one described above. About three-quarters of them raised their hands, and when 
queried, pointed to ESQ as the venue for their exposure to both mass inductions and guided imagery. Tony 
Rudyansyah himself mentioned later that he had attended a similar seminar, but walked out – the repeated focus on 
the failings of the participants relative their parents felt emotionally manipulative to him. Very occasionally I heard 
of similar responses, although, as in the preceding chapter, they tended to involved non-Indonesians.  
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particularly mass emotion, was no longer the automatic target of regulation. 
The encounter with hypnosis described above derives directly from the pedagogy of, and 
theories about, hypnosis in current circulation at Kahfi. IH at Kahfi provides a glimpse into 
enduring patterns of knowledge integration in Islam, as well as a picture of the kinds of change 
Kahfi participants imagine to be possible. Hypnosis as a classroom subject is introduced along 
multiple axes at Kahfi, but the principal focus of instruction is hypnotherapy, and for this reason 
I discuss IH almost exclusively.
161
 As they pay respect to both parts of the construction “Islamic 
Hypnotherapy,” instructors at Kahfi are forced to grapple with the complicated politics of 
knowledge practices – reconciling an Islamic mission with materials developed within non-
Islamic cultural and social contexts. This requires a kind of adab, in keeping with that discussed 
in the previous chapter. Understanding the ideal relationship between the different elements at 
play in the hypnotherapeutic classroom was a further application of adab. That such a 
negotiation was demanded is explicitly clear fromthe introductory slides in the course sequence 
on hypnosis. Although hypnosis is first introduced in the context of “stage hypnosis,” the course 
materials move quickly to hypnotherapy – the use of hypnotic techniques to aid in physical, 
emotional, mental and spiritual healing. I excerpt a slide directly from these course materials 
used at Kahfi by way of illustration: 
                                                             
161 Other forms of hypnosis include “stage hypnosis,” or “entertainment hypnosis,” as frequently broadcast in 
popular media, forensic hypnosis, used in the criminal justice field, hypno-birthing, as an alternative to more 
medicalized child-birth as well as more nefarious applications of hypnotic techniques mentioned below.  
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Figure 2  Targeted Abilities and System of Instruction
162
 
If hypnosis in the United States is primarily known through stage hypnosis, and perhaps to a 
lesser extent via weight-loss and smoking cessation, in Indonesia “hypnosis” is also closely 
associated with a range of dangerous practices, including black magic and mind control 
techniques designed to part people from their money. (On my way home from Kahfi my first 
night of attending class I passed a large banner posted by the police that stated “Beware of 
Hypnotists,” a warning I elected not to heed). Gregory Simon reports on this phenomenon in 
                                                             
162 This slide lists seven learning goals for audience: 1) understanding the fundamental concepts of hypnosis; 2) 
understanding facts and myths concerning hypnosis; 3) understanding the function and roles of the subconscious; 4) 
understanding similarities and differences between western and traditional hypnosis; 5) understanding self-hypnosis 
procedures; 6) understanding the correct procedure for conducting hypnosis on another person; 7) appreciation for 
one application of hypnosis: stage hypnosis) the slide then reads, 
1) The system used is Western Hypnosis, especially hypnotic methodologies that hinge on verbal and 
non-verbal communication skills. 
2) The system used is free from magical, mystic, esoteric, telepathic, mind power and related elements. 
As a result, in these lessons you will not find processes of: Attunement, Initiation, “Filling,” 
Synchronization, or other terms designating similar meanings, and you won’t be instructed on mystic 
rituals (including prayers and mantra). 
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West Sumatra in Caged in on the Outside: “In stories that circulate widely in Bukittinggi, 
thieves in the pasa [pasar; market] are said to use hypnosis. The thieves initiated seemingly 
proper social interaction, engaging the victim in conversation. This interaction opens up the 
boundaries of the victim to penetration, thus making hypnosis possible” (153). In Simon’s 
account, the malicious penetration of hypnosis is achieved precisely through the mastery of 
social forms on the part of the hypnotist – through an attention to adab. In contradistinction, the 
slide included above confidently asserts that, “the system used is Western Hypnosis, especially 
hypnotic methodologies that hinge on verbal and non-verbal communication skills.” Instead of 
moral relationality, Western Hypnosis is imagined to rely on neutral technologies of intercourse. 
The very fact that hypnosis at Kahfi is “western,” like the use of English at IofC, is a way to 
guarantee the moral availability of a foreign practice: it can’t be implicated in dark arts, since it 
is scientific. Aspersions of bidah and ilmu hitam (black magic) are simultaneously neutralized.     
Hypnosis and brain-washing figures prominently in popular accounts of religious 
exclusivist movement likes Negara Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic State, a successor 
of sorts to the political Darul Islam movement of the 1940s and 50s). Chiara Formichi writes 
persuasively in Islam and the Making of the Nation about the enduring influence of Kartsowiryo 
on the political aspirations of some Indonesian Muslims. The Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) she 
analyzes, however, is only loosely related to the journalist specter of NII repeatedly conjured in 
the popular press since the fall of Suharto.
 163
 In a Jakarta Post article from April 30, 2011, the 
journalist reports on the “Multi-Level Marketing” model of contemporary NII recruitment. The 
article cites an “intelligence expert”: “Wawan said the recruiters would utilize psychological 
tools commonly found in most communication strategies uses [sic] in product marketing, but 
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 NII has emerged as an enduring bogeyman, and it is unclear what the links between the current organization and 
its predecessors actually are. In practice, NII now works more like a pyramid scheme for extracting donations from 
its recruits than like a political effort to overthrow the state.   
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added that the NII also used hypnosis.” This usage of hypnosis – the idea that one’s entire 
agency could be subverted to a malevolent cause – lurks in the margins of the Kahfi 
presentation of IH. To foreclose this possibility, every effort is made to emphasize the scientific 
(again, epistemically neutral) sources of hypnosis. Instead of these disreputable “traditional” 
hypnotic methods, Kahfi adopts the “western methods.” Thus even though NII is imagined to 
use the slick language of contemporary product marketing, as Kahfi presents it, the hypnosis it 
employs is “traditional,” evidenced by its capacity for mind-control. 
Given some Kahfi students fluency with Sufi traditions and practices, ilmu tasawuf (the 
science of Sufism) was a familiar reference point for hypnosis (I knew of several students in the 
tarekat Tijaniyah, as well as several in tarekat Qodiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah). Beyond formal 
participation, many students had a traditionalist academic background, where “ilmu tasawuf” is 
taught (including at the State Islamic University). The visually obvious parallels between 
trance-like states attained in hypnosis and Sufi devotional practices seemed to resonate, but 
there was also the general notion that Sufism can be directed towards healing spiritual ailments. 
I was privy to a number of conversations along this axis, including one conducted online in a 
Facebook chat on the Kahfi page. After a back-and-forth about these parallels, one Kahfi senior 
provided the following summation:  
Whether it’s apparent [disadari] or not, at Kahfi we study a lot about Sufism, and the end 
point [muara akhir; headwaters; destination] of our studies at Kahfi lies in hypnosis and 
therapy. During the hypnosis material, the Sufi inflections [nuansa tasawuf] already 
present for several semesters (semester 1 already “propels” repeatedly [digenjot habis] 
towards unseen/interiority [batin], the brain/mind [otak] and heart [hati]) are very salient. 
As a result we can provisionally claim on the basis of experience and deep investigation 
of Kahfi materials, along with the phenomena found there, that Sufism and hypnosis are 
mutually related [saling keterkaitan] (of course with the deeper understanding of the term 
“hypnosis,” not just “mystic or entertainment” ritual but also its essence).164 
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 Secara disadari maupun tidak, di Kahfi banyak sekali membahas tentang tasawuf, dan muara akhir dari 
pembelajaran di Kahfi terletak di Hypnosis dan terapi. Saat di materi hypnosis nuansa tasawuf yang selama beberapa 
semester (semester 1 sudah di “genjot” habis mengenai batin, otak, dan hati) sangat terasa sekali. Dengan demikian 
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This argument, as will become clear in greater depth below, looks not only to superficial 
resemblances between Sufi trances and hypnotic states. Beyond these points of contact, this 
Kahfi student discerns “essences” in hypnotherapeutic practices (the destination of a Kahfi 
education) within the Sufi canon. The connection between Sufism and hypnosis, then, is really 
about change. Both are understood as mediums of change that involve unseen agency – acting in 
the batin, affecting both the brain/mind (otak) and the heart (hati). Yet hypnosis, unlike Sufism, 
is understood as a meaningfully western scientific technology. This enables its adoption while 
also requiring its emplacement with the meaning-world most central to Kahfi: Islam. Adopting 
the western methods wholesale would pose major problems for an educational organization 
dedicated to developing the moral stature of effective communicators (the mission of Kahfi). It 
must also be demonstrated as already Islamic. So the introduction to hypnosis at Kahfi charts a 
careful course. After first framing the approach endorsed as Western and scientific –and thus 
presumptively morally neutral– hypnosis is quickly re-framed as authentically Islamic. This 
involves explicitly incorporating sources of thought from the Qur’an to validate the hypnotic 
state and the broader therapeutic methodology taught at Kahfi. I take up this operation below, but 
first I must situate IH at Kahfi in relation to the “scientific” genealogy of hypnosis presented at 
the institution.   
The Science of Hypnosis 
In a journalistic history of hypnosis, Robin Waterfield defines hypnosis as, “the 
deliberate inducement or facilitation by one person in another person or number of people of a 
trance state. A trance state is (briefly) one in which a person’s usual means of orienting himself 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
bisa ditarik poin sementara bahwa secara pengalaman dan pendalaman materi di Kahfi serta fenomena2 yang 
ditemukan, tasawuf dan hypnosis saling keterkaitan (tentunya dengan pemahan istiliah “hypnosis” yang lebih 
mendalam, tidak hanya ritual “mistik ataupun intertaint” namun juga esensi. 
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in reality have faded” (xxvii). Struggling for a phenomenological definition of hypnosis, 
Waterfield is forced to move analogically into the language of “trance” and “trance state.” He 
expands further on this model, explaining “trance logic”: “The subject is highly compliant to 
incoming suggestions and capable of role-playing; he has focused, selective perception; he 
allows his imagination greater freedom than usual, and fantasies are experienced, or memories 
re-experienced, with vivid intensity…[he] tends to behave in a way he thinks appropriate to the 
role he is being asked to perform” (xxvii). Waterfield characterizes his history as an agnostic one 
– he is not interested in debunking hypnosis, so much as providing an accessible narrative that 
focuses primarily on famous practitioners and famous practices, from Frans Mesmer to his final 
chapter on “Self-Improvement and the New Age.” There is a lot to this story that sounds familiar 
– that is to say, in keeping with how materials were presented at Kahfi. But where Waterfield 
elsewhere in the text tends to emphasize the openness of the hypnotic subject to hypnosis, Om 
Bagus and Kahfi practitioners overwhelmingly emphasized the focus of the hypnotized subject. 
In both presentations, hypnosis is a co-production of the hypnotist and the hypnotized. However 
the Kahfi school promotes a strong notion of a “hypnotic state” as the explanatory model for 
what happened during hypnosis. (Waterfield eschews this characterization, electing to describe 
the hypnotized subject as “behaving” as if hypnotized in his Introduction). Kahfi’s implicit 
history of hypnosis reached not to the animal magnetism of Frans Mesmer, but to the much later 
19
th
 century “therapeutic” adoption of hypnotic practices in science, attributed to the Scottish 
physician James Braid.  
Following the path taken by Braid’s re-introduction of the phenomenon, hypnotherapy as 
practiced at Kahfi is based primarily on Ericksonian hypnosis. The latter takes its name from 
Milton Erickson, a pioneering psychoanalyst and therapist whose work inspired a variety of 
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hypnosis-related modalities: guided imagery, Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) and 
hypnotherapy. Several years after Erickson’s death in 1980, a round-table discussion on his 
work was published in The Journal of Counseling and Development. The moderator asked, 
“why do you suppose that Ericksonian hypnosis has become so popular in the last 10 years?” To 
which the author and hypnotherapist Mark King replied, “I’d like to rephrase the question. 
Hypnosis has become popular in the last decade because of Milton Erickson. Hypnosis became 
discredited medically because of Freud. Freud was a poor hypnotist, so he rejected it and 
developed free association instead” (87).  If the posthumous narrative is that Erickson rescued 
hypnosis from disrepute, attributed to Freud, Erickson’s own work suggested that his primary 
opposition was not to the Viennese master. Erickson was less concerned with the physicians 
who rejected hypnosis than with the charlatans who besmirched it. At Kahfi, the lingering battle 
over the scientific status of hypnosis is erased. With Erickson as a point of departure, this 
particular question is never acknowledged. Kahfi students never read verbatim Erickson, but 
many of the induction scripts and strategies are translated and adapted from his work.  
 Milton Erickson himself was very much invested in bringing scientific accuracy to the 
fraught world of hypnosis and hypnotherapy. While still a practicing clinician at Wayne County 
General Hospital and Infirmary, in Eloise, Michigan, Erickson reviewed a new book on 
hypnotherapy published in 1947. Writing in the pages of The Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, Erickson castigated the authors of this new volume for their inattention to scientific 
accuracy. He attacks first their reference list: “For example, there are three listings of the 
discredited works of a well-known charlatan. The initial work of the clinically untrained and 
inexperienced amateur is given the same importance as that of well-trained, well-experienced 
clinicians” (409). The mid-century hypnotherapist must distinguish himself both from the 
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charlatans and the amateurs. Doing so is difficult, given the sorry state of the science: “Some 
references are no more than arm chair productions, based not on actual knowledge of or 
experience with hypnotherapy, sometimes not even with hypnosis in general, but on theoretical 
assumption and even misconceptions” (ibid). Into these conditions Erickson toiled to bring 
respectability and scientific reproducibility – although many of his most ardent students and 
followers remained on the margins of the psychological mainstream. When Om Bagus traces the 
method at Kahfi to Erickson, he asserts not only the authorization of this ennobled 
hypnotherapeutic lineage, but also its scientific aspirations. This is “western hypnosis,” and 
within the west, this is the scientific west.   
 Erickson’s understanding of hypnosis stretched back to the first discussion of the 
phenomenon in those terms: the pioneering work of the Scottish surgeon James Braid already 
mentioned above. James Braid has often been considered the “Parent of Hypnotism” as a result 
of the 1843 publication of Neurypnology, wherein he coined the term. Witnessing a performance 
by the mesmerist Charles Lafontaine in 1841, Braid became convinced that the phenomenon he 
was observing could be brought into clinical practice. Working at the forefront of nineteenth 
century medicine, James Braid was excited by the possibilities offered by the hypnotic state to 
affect changes otherwise inaccessible with existing methods.
165
 Braid’s enthusiasm was partially 
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 I cannot resist, at length, citing Braid’s treatment protocol, described in passing, as he suggested the possible 
utility of hypnosis for cases of insanity: 
The day before I had been visiting an insane patient, who entertained the horrible idea, that she must 
murder every body she knew, and then murder herself also; that on placing my hand upon the organs of 
combativeness and destructiveness, in a few seconds, she gave a violent shudder, and seemed greatly 
excited, and becoming perfectly furious. On examining these parts, I found the integuments quite red. I 
ordered leeches, and cold lotion afterwards, but next day she remained equally violent, and the pulse 
between 140 and 150, which it had been for some time, notwithstanding medicines had been given to 
depress it. I now made an incision an inch and a half long through the integuments, and down to the bone, 
and in twelve hours after found her much calmer, and the pulse down to 100, and it remained there for 
several days. There was no such loss of blood as could have acted constitutionally on the heart directly by 
the quantity effused. On again rising, Belladonna plasters were applied – these not having the desired 
effect, recourse was again had to scarification. Behind both ears, and with great success, as in a few days 
she was so calm as not to require the strait jacket, and for two months has been sullen but harmless (121).  
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spurred by the affective dimension of this new practice. Writing in the preface of Neurypnology, 
Braid explains, “that during the nervous sleep, there is the power of exciting patients to manifest 
the passions and emotions, and certain mental functions, in a more striking manner than the 
same individuals are capable of in the waking condition, no one can doubt who has seen much of 
these experiments” (xvii). Already in Braid there is the notion that the hypnotist excites elements 
latent in the mind of the patient – a notion that the changes are already present, but trapped. The 
hypnotist unleashes these potentials. This understanding of hypnosis, in turn, figures 
prominently in the history of Freud’s adoption-and-rejection of the process. At Kahfi, however, 
this possibility is evacuated – the potential for change comes only from God. 
Leon Chertok revisits the place of hypnosis in the conventional narrative of Freud’s 
development of psychoanalysis, writing in 1977’s “Freud and Hypnosis”: “although it was both 
the point of departure and a necessary detour, hypnosis is touched upon only the more 
effectively to recede into the background, on the emergence of the new science” (100). Chertok 
traces the (in keeping with the established account) influence of Jean-Martin Charcot and 
Hippolyte Bernheim, noting that “Charcot regarded hypnosis as a special somatic state induced 
by essentially physical causes, whereas Bernheim considered it to be a psychological process, to 
the point of actually confusing it with suggestion” (ibid). This distinction, albeit articulated in 
new idioms, still frustrates contemporary practitioners of hypnosis. Although somatic induction 
has largely fallen by the wayside (few would use the idiom of animal magnetism today), even 
the contemporary psychological establishment is unsure whether it is a “state” or an 
“imaginative experience.”166 Yet Chertok identifies why this was so central for Freud’s 
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 For a reference actually given to me by Om Bagus, see Nash, Michael R., Grant Benham, and Kyoko Hamada. 
"The truth and the hype of hypnosis." Scientific American Mind 16.2 (2005): 46-53. This is a very accessible 
account synthesizing the (then) current state of psychological and cognitive neuroscience research on hypnosis. As 
the American Psychological Association has struggled to define hypnosis, there have been sharp polemics between 
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subsequent arguments: “he [Freud] apparently sensed that hypnosis implied a relationship 
between the psychic and the somatic, impossible to formulate in the theoretical terms available 
to him at that time. It was essential to liberate oneself from physiology, if it were desired to 
study freely psychological determinism” (108). Freud’s insistence on the psychical could not be 
maintained adjacent to practices with such resilient and observable physical features. In his 
challenging history of psychoanalysis, Revolution in Mind, George Makari writes about this 
conflict, noting an important feature of the critique of hypnosis from Freud’s abusive translation 
of Bernheim’s text: “Freud suggested Bernheim’s readers stop thinking of the hypnotic 
encounter as some interpersonal drama between a wide-eyed hypnotists and a swooning subject. 
Instead, they should turn their attention to the intrapsychic conditions that made a man prone to 
another’s suggestions” (33).  This shift, away from the intersubjective character of the hypnotic 
encounter, had an important implication for the future development of Freud’s own theories: 
“This critical strategy allowed Freud to reduce the overwhelmingly complex problems of how 
two minds interacted, and limit his exploration to the workings of one mind, the patients…Freud 
argued that all suggestions were the result of prior, internal self-suggestions” (ibid.) By 
interpreting the achievements of hypnosis as reflective of already latent possibilities, Freud 
denied the very possibility of change originating outside the mind of the subject. This approach, 
of course, differs greatly from the highly intersubjective theory of hypnosis promulgated at 
Kahfi. Furthermore, the physical-psychical distinction does not represent such a stumbling block 
at Kahfi. Following a classically Islamic framework, the physical is subordinate to the mental, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
the “statist” interpretation of hypnosis and the “imaginative” position. Although thoroughly agnostic on the science 
of it all, I am persuaded by Erik Woody and Pamela Sadler when they write, citing themselves from a previous 
iteration of this same argument, “’the belief that one is hypnotized is itself an altered state of consciousness—that is, 
a state of awareness that one clearly did not have prior to hypnosis.’ In other words, we argued that people’s belief 
that they are in a state of hypnosis is sufficient to infer that they are in an altered state” (112). The stakes of this 
debate – what is a state? – reveal the continued confusion endemic to poorly policed boundaries in the realm of 
science predicated on ever-eroding mind-body distinctions. 
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itself subordinate to the spiritual. Kahfi materials emphasized that hypnosis happens in the brain, 
but (potentially) to the soul. As the scientific character of Freud’s work has receded (we no 
longer turn to Freud as the authority on brain science), hypnosis itself becomes more available to 
a rhetoric that emphasizes the morally neutral grounds of science. Thus Kahfi’s wholesale 
embrace of Milton Erickson allows the institution to sidestep the western critique of the 
scientific validity of the practice.  
There are further insights from Freud, despite his dismissal of hypnosis, which should 
give us pause. Of the “religious” dimension of hypnosis as practiced as Kahfi, we need not 
speculate too far to uncover the Freudian position, at least as expressed in The Future of an 
Illusion: “in how great detail the analogy between religion and obsessional neurosis can be 
followed out, and how many of the peculiarities and vicissitudes in the formation of religion can 
be understood in that light” (72). Freud then adds the knowing aside that, “it tallies well with 
this that devout believers are safeguarded in a high degree against the risk of certain neurotic 
illnesses; their acceptance of the universal neurosis spares them the task of constructing a 
personal one” (ibid). Yet if we turn away from the sneering tone here, Freud has accurately 
described an important feature of change as it is imagined at Kahfi. Insofar as a subject frames 
herself within universal logics, she is freed of the difficulties of the particularities of her 
situation. Hypnosis at Kahfi works, in part, because it allows the universal fitra (the “natural” 
state of created humans, which is to say, in submission to the divine, at peace with the rest of the 
creation) to be restored to the particular individual. Kahfi follows Sunni theology in teaching 
that humans are originally at peace, enveloped in Divine mercy. All manner of psychological 
and spiritual ailments are understood as corruptions of this natural state. The mechanism that 
Freud attaches to neurosis is part of the explicit conceptual machinery of IH at Kahfi.  
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Islamizing Hypnosis 
I introduce these materials in part to interject into a far-reaching discussion concerning 
the “Islamization of knowledge,” (islamisasi ilmu) an unhelpfully vague but very popular 
concept. At least since the Cairo reformers of the late nineteenth century, those laboring along 
with the modernist impulse in Islam have sought to integrate (or reintegrate) Islamic 
epistemologies with the physical and social sciences. At present, these efforts frequently are 
referred to under the catch-all phrase mentioned above – the Islamization of knowledge. This is a 
problematic construction, suggesting that already formed-and-static “knowledge” be subjected to 
the edifying (or threatening, depending on who is asked) operation of Islamization. In its 
simplest iteration, this is the earnest selection of a scriptural corollary for every scientific fact, a 
process dismissively known in Indonesia as ayatisasi, “ayatization.” The obvious implication is 
that where an ayat can’t be found, the unit of knowledge cannot be accepted. A slightly more 
sophisticated relative of this impulse finds a scriptural corollary in loose interpretation for any 
given fact – especially in the physical sciences. Those of a philosophical bent strive to integrate 
Islamic epistemologies with the physical and social sciences, accepting the findings of the latter 
as further evidence of the majesty of the former. There is considerably more complexity to the 
“Islamization of knowledge” than the brief sketch above suggests. Nevertheless the purpose of 
roughly characterizing “Islamization” is to to suggest the extent to which the phenomenon I am 
describing does not fit easily under the term: Insofar as Kahfi “Islamizes” hypnosis, the result is 
meaningfully different from its ostensible original parts.  
On its surface, the presentation of hypnosis at Kahfi would seem to participate in this 
trend, and indeed, some Kahfi functionaries reproduce the language of the Islamization of 
knowledge in their description of their work. However, what is happening with Islamic 
 
 
230 
 
Hypnotherapy at Kahfi is altogether more complicated. It is not the mere Islamic framing of 
standard hypnosis practices, adapted to suit local tastes and mores. When the hypnotic subjects 
are led to the holy lands, as in the hypnosis script described above, and later instructed how to do 
the same with others, the instrument of hypnosis is bent towards a novel end and accorded a 
novel genealogy in conjunction with that end. Counter to the assumptions buried in the rhetoric 
addressed to the Islamization of knowledge, the Kahfi instruction in hypnotherapy suggests that 
the knowledge derived from the (both instrumental and critical) encounter with sources outside 
the Islamic ecumene, yields a fundamentally new knowledge. This is hardly a new phenomenon: 
the intellectual legacy of the Islamic tradition provides strategies and templates for appropriating 
and incorporating diverse sources of knowledge into recognizably and meaningfully Islamic 
practices. Hypnotherapy becomes about the purification of the heart, about the disavowal of 
impulses stoked by Satan (this refers to a specific Quranic verse cited below), which is to say it 
becomes both something new and something very much within an established tradition, 
connected to a vast intellectual and spiritual lineage. In the process of synthesizing this new 
knowledge, the authors of Kahfi materials are forced to engage with the very different operating 
assumptions that motivate its sources. The unbounded “I,” the putative subject of much 
motivational and pop psychological literature, is forced into submission to an all-encompassing 
Divine. This is not just one more manifestation of the global specter of neo-liberalism. The 
results aren’t free from contradiction, but they defy the derivative status that adheres to the 
notion of Islamizing knowledge (and the conservative reading of Islamization practices that 
discovers secular liberal projects beneath every stone). Before returning to the philosophical 
stakes of this discussion, the practices of instruction bear extended treatment. 
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Pedagogy and Islamic Hypnotherapy: The Space of Instruction 
When I began at Kahfi in December 2010, classes were still conducted in the annex 
building of Masjid al-Karim, a medium-sized mosque (typically tens of worshippers for a 
morning service, low hundreds for an evening, and many hundreds for Friday worship) in a 
wealthier housing complex in Bintaro, southwest of Jakarta proper. The single-family dwellings 
making up the housing development were spacious although not opulent, and the residences were 
mostly occupied by white-collar workers and professionals. The mosque was recently built and 
very well maintained, although the annex itself was of more basic poured-concrete construction. 
Classes began following the Isya (nightfall) worship cycle, and so Kahfi students intermingled 
with worshippers on their way off of the grounds. Occasionally, when there was some event 
being held, the mosque remained in use during class hours, but almost invariably Kahfi students 
were the final people to leave the premises – typically around 11.00pm. Some students, 
commuting from across Jakarta, would remain overnight at the mosque, and students freely 
availed themselves of the opportunity to worship in congregation, either for Isya or the next 
morning at Subuh if they stayed overnight. Shortly after I started studying there, for ultimately 
opaque reasons, the position of the Kahfi School at Masjid al-Karim became untenable. This led 
to the cessation of classes at the mosque annex, and so the students met at the home of Om 
Bagus several blocks away.
167
 Class times were shortened to two hours while a more permanent 
location was sought – somewhat of an obstacle, given the financial constraints of a free 
educational endeavor. This situation persisted for two months.  
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 Although I heard several possible explanations, no one “in-the-know” ever communicated the actual reason 
behind Kahfi’s move. One mooted theory held that the students were disturbing other worshippers in the complex. It 
was also speculated that differences of opinion between Om Bagus and two other founders of the institution led to 
the move – by vacating the mosque compound, Om Bagus was thus able to retain control over the content and 
structure of Kahfi instruction. This latter possibility strikes me as most plausible, although again, it was never 
explicitly confirmed.  
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In March, 2011, Kahfi moved to a ruko about 10 minutes away from Masjid al-Karim 
(ruko is a contraction of rumah toko, a shopping complex characterized by a row of single-entry, 
usually open-faced stores, akin to a strip-mall). Coincident with this move, Kahfi underwent the 
first of its name changes, becoming temporarily the Kahfi School of Public Speaking (as 
opposed to Kahfi al-Karim, denoting its earlier residence at Masjid al-Karim). No longer 
operated on the grounds of a mosque, a variety of methods were employed to sacralize the space 
of classroom instruction. One of the first hangings to go up on the poured concrete wall was a 
small plastic sign reading Musholla (worship place; prayer hall), with an arrow pointing to the 
upstairs. In lieu of other carpeting, roll-out sajadah (prayer rugs) were employed for the first 
floor meeting space (Figure 3 below). The first floor bathroom was adorned with a piece of paper 
reading tempat wudhu (place to perform ablutions), instead of WC. The downstairs was further 
decorated with images from Kahfi events (see Figure 4), while the upstairs hosted several 
certificates and a wall hanging of asmaul husna (“The Beautiful Names of God,” pictured on the 
wall in Figure 5. The meeting pictured here is part of the admission planning process for the 
entrance of the 13
th
 cohort of Kahfi students). The wall hangings, floor coverings and sartorial 
choices (more on the Kahfi uniform to follow) were part of a constellation of material practices 
and performances that marked Kahfi as a meaningfully Islamic institution while maintaining its 
distinct character. Some of these were donations from the former location, some were provided 
by current students and many were purchased directly by Om Bagus.   
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Figure 3  Rolling out the Prayer Mats at Kahfi 
 
Figure 4   Decorating the Walls at Kahfi 
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Figure 5   Planning Session Upstairs at Kahfi 
Shortly after moving to the ruko, in late April, Kahfi also held what they termed an itikaf 
(Ar. residence). Although conventionally understood to be a temporary residence or retreat in a 
mosque for the purposes of drawing closer to God (and with an accompanying fast and 
devotional activities), in the Kahfi context itikaf was understood as a collective effort at moral 
purification and renewed submission to God that would bring blessings to the place of its 
performance. Itikaf is an allowable practice on any of the days in the Islamic calendar that permit 
fasting (ie, not feast days), but it is highly recommended during the final ten days of Ramadhan. 
Certainly Om Bagus and the vast majority of the students understood the formal definition and 
practice of itikaf – by transforming it here, they were using devotional energies as a tool to make 
something Islamic.
168
 Instead of beginning before dawn (and lasting 3 days, 2 nights), the itikaf 
at Kahfi began after Isya, the final obligatory worship cycle of the day. It lasted until Subuh, the 
morning worship, of the following day. The intervening hours included a khatam al-Qur’an – a 
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 This recasting of itikaf was not unique to Kahfi. Timothy Daniels, in his multi-part ethnography Islamic Spectrum 
in Java, relates enduring Javanese practices of spiritual retreat in sacred forests: “People generally refer to this time 
spent camping out near these sacred sites as meditation or semedi but some people use the Arabic term I’tikaf which 
evokes the time recommended for Muslims to shut themselves inside mosques during the last ten days of the month 
of Ramadan seeking divine blessings on the Night of Power” (41).  
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complete recitation of the Qur’an. (The text was multiply divided and simultaneously vocalized 
so that the work of the 60 reciters accomplished a complete vocalization in around 20 minutes, 
see Figure 6 below). Supererogatory prayers were performed and a respectful atmosphere 
aggressively self-policed by the gathered students.  Additionally, for several hours students 
undertook puasa bicara (abstention from speech), and wrote out the basmalah ( نمحرلا اللّ مسب
ميحرلا; in the name of God the Beneficent, the Merciful) 300 times. Forsaking speech was 
intended to help students cultivate the quality of khusyu’ (humble concentration) mentioned 
above. The goal was to be fully aware of oneself and one’s debt to the Divine. Humble 
concentration, an attribute of correct performance of worship, was being used to sacralize 
physical space. In keeping with other activities at the Kahfi itikaf, it brought normative 
devotional regimes to the instructional space of the institution. The itikaf contrasted sharply with 
other Kahfi events, which frequently involved song, gaiety and hyper-social interactions. In part, 
this demonstrated to, and for, the students that when it really mattered, Kahfi members could 
aspire to meaningful consort with the Divine.  
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Figure 6  Rapid Recitation of the Qur’an 
 The performance of the itikaf at Kahfi served both rhetorical and practical functions. On 
a conceptual level, it elevated Kahfi to a position closer to a mosque than a school. Although no 
one made this claim in these terms (there are extensive juridical requirements for a space to be 
recognized as a mosque), the fact that a term densely associated with mosques was selected for 
this event lent added spiritual significance to the formerly profane environs of the ruko. On a 
more pragmatic level, the itikaf served to gather the students from diverse Kahfi cohorts into the 
newly acquired space at the same time. Most cohorts met twice a week and at different times, 
and thus a shared identity across cohorts was unlikely to coalesce naturally. The only other 
activity that would draw students from across the years was the staging of a General Class 
(kuliah umum), which was held if a special guest speaker had been booked. During the itikaf, the 
usual hierarchal structures of Kahfi were deemphasized, one more way to mark this moment and 
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place as special and significant. Instead of senior and junior, facilitators and students, there were 
just worshippers.   
The Kahfi environment, through ritual practice and material emplacement, was actively 
curated. Curate seems especially appropriate since it smuggles in vestiges of its ecclesiastical 
connotations – responsibility for souls in a given domain, in addition to the senses familiar from 
cultivated environments like museums and libraries. At Kahfi, much attention was paid to the 
spiritual wellbeing of students, but the physical environs were also carefully manipulated and 
frequently re-calibrated in accord with the overall institutional mission. There was no outside 
authority responsible for the upkeep of the grounds or the internal establishment of decorum – 
these responsibilities were entrusted directly to the current students, the example set by the 
senior-most among them. The maintenance of relative social locations was part of the cultivation 
of space practiced at Kahfi. Irrespective of age, students referred to members of earlier cohorts as 
Kakak or Kak (older sibling), and the principal instructor, as mentioned, was Om (Uncle) Bagus 
as opposed to Pak (Father) Bagus. Younger cohorts were usually addressed by first name, with 
several exceptions.
 169
 This established a hierarchy, but one considerably flattened relative the 
outside Indonesian organization of sociality. As described above in the transition of a retail space 
into a devotional-instructional space, the curation of the Kahfi school relied on a structure of 
marking akin to the framing techniques used to nest secular-cum-Western instructional materials 
in the Kahfi curriculum. Just as mercantile space was accorded spiritual significance through 
carpeting and wall-hangings, an Islamic foundation was ascribed to the appropriated knowledge 
                                                             
169
 This arrangement was not absolute – a special class was convened called “Kahfi Ustad,” and students of this class 
were either Islamic school teachers or “non-traditional students,” including faculty from UIN. Conveniently, this 
allowed all members of this class to be addressed as Ustad or Ustadzah. This maintained the social distance of 
individuals who were greatly older or more titled than their younger Kahfi fellows.  
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that formed the basis of instruction in hypnosis. The process by which hypnotherapy became 
Islamic is the subject of the following passages.  
Pedagogy and Islamic Hypnotherapy: Classroom Practice 
 Instruction of hypnosis and hypnotherapy at Kahfi was structured according to the 
routines established in earlier semesters at Kahfi. Although there were slight revisions 
concerning classroom decorum (assigned roles), there was remarkable continuity across the three 
spaces (Masjid al-Karim, Om Bagus’s home, the ruko) in terms of classroom performance. Class 
began with a collective recitation of asmaul husna, “The [99] Beautiful Names [of God]” (this is 
one of the myriad ways one performs zikir (Ar. dhikr; remembrance [of God]). The recital was to 
be sung by all of the assembled students, whether sitting on the floor (at the Ruko), or previously 
in the chairs of the annex building at Masjid al-Karim.
170
 Of the roughly thirty students in 
attendance at a typical class, the obligation to sing was carried unevenly. The recitation would 
frequently begin with near full participation, but somewhere between Al-Alim (the All-Knowing 
and the 19
th
 name in this ordering) and Al-Khabir (the All-Aware and the 31
st
 name) many of the 
voices would trail off. At this point, the burden to vocalize was borne by four or five students 
(often, but not always the same students). By the time we reached Al-Awaal (the Ultimately First 
and the 73
rd
 name), the majority of the students would chime back in for the duration. This lent a 
familiar rhythm and volume to the recitation – a rise and fall of voice, a final crescendo 
maintained through the sholawat or praise hymn (directed towards the Prophet or earlier 
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 There are two current popular patterns with which asmaul husna are recited in Indonesia – one closely associated 
with ESQ and one most familiar as performed by a Malaysian nasheed group Hijjaz (versions of both can be easily 
accessed on Youtube by searching for “asmaul husna” and “ESQ” or “Hijjaz” respectively). Kahfi employed the 
version used by Hijjaz, in which each name/attribute was preceded by the definite article. In this rendition, the initial 
part of the definite article (the alif-hamza, the “A” of “Al”) is elided for the terminal vowel of the preceding 
attribute. So not “Al-Malik, Al-Qudus,” but “ul-Maliku-lQudus,” etc. The ESQ recitation employs the particle “ya” 
prior to each attribute: ya Malik, ya Qudus. This gives the recitation the distinct air of a supplication, the ya serving 
to beseech God-as-the-particular attribute for the reciter. Although too fine a point could be made of this, the ESQ 
version is to God and the Hijjaz about God.   
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emissaries of God) that followed the 99
th
 name. The voicing of asmaul husna took about four 
minutes and marked the formal commencement of class, and usually heralded the end of side-
talk and chatter that dominated the classroom prior to the recitation (this last point was heavily 
contingent on who the instructor was
171
 – if it was Om Bagus, then full attention was paid. If it 
was one of his former students or deputies, classroom conduct was less uniformly attentive). 
Following asmaul husna, several verses from the Qur’an would be recited – first in Arabic, 
followed by an Indonesian interpretation read by a different student. The next class would begin 
from the verse on which the previous class had concluded, thus ensuring an eventual full 
recitation of the text. Often there would be a brief doa or supplication offered by the student 
responsible for opening the class, at which point the instructor (usually Om Bagus) would be 
introduced by the same designated student. Instruction in the theory and practice of 
hypnotherapy would then commence. Closing the class we would recite sholawat nariyah (this is 
a very popular praise hymn that beseeches God to bless the Prophet, but also to remove all 
earthly needs, agonies and difficulties from the supplicant).
172
 These textual performances 
bracketed the presentation of materials that occurred between them. These frames helped mark 
the space of instruction, not merely the content, as legibly Islamic. This approach also occurred 
in dramatic fashion within the curriculum addressed to hypnosis itself.  
 As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, Kahfi was intent on presenting hypnosis 
as both a global phenomenon and a Western practice. With an eye to forestalling potential 
criticism of hypnotherapy as invoking dark magic, the intercession of djin or other fraught 
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 As a member of the 9th Kahfi class, I was part of the last cohort to be instructed primarily by Om Bagus. There 
were 35 members of my cohort (by comparison, the 10th cohort had two groups of 40, the 11th and 12th had 5 
groups of 40-50). Instruction, after the 9th cohort, was undertaken by graduates of the program, or in the case of 
later cohorts, by the most senior students still at the institution from earlier cohorts. Just as classes are conducted 
free from tuition, teaching was performed without remuneration.    
172
 It has been criticized from modernist-salafist quarters due to the role of the Prophet as an intercessor within the 
text of the salawat 
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activity, the emphasis was repeatedly on the scientific nature of hypnosis. Additionally, similar 
to the processes observed at IofC, the fact that hypnosis was Western was on its face proof 
against the claim of bidah. At Kahfi, however, this ostensibly neutral or even secular practice 
was nested within an Islamic genealogy and directed towards ethico-spiritual ends. The healing 
that was intended by Kahfi hypnotherapy was a restoration of “right relations” with the Divine 
and the creation: one should have adab with God as well, and hypnosis became vehicle towards 
that adab. At the same time, by giving hypnosis a basis in the foundational knowledge of Islam, 
along with using hypnotherapy as a means for moral attainment, Kahfi aimed to repurpose this 
knowledge without falling prey to the accusation of corrupting the Islamic tradition (bidah). The 
repurposing was pursued in a literal fashion with the introductory materials on hypnosis: the 
PowerPoint presentation inaugurating the discussion of hypnosis was culled from a presentation 
belonging to a different, now defunct, organization, the Hypnosis Training Institute of Indonesia 
(HTII).
173
 However, into the HTII slides (which nowhere mentioned Islam) were interpolated 
three slides titled Sumber Fikir dari Al-Qur’an [Sources of Thought from Al Qur’an] (Figure 7-
12).  
The original PowerPoint Slides are Figures 7; 9; 11; and my translations are Figures 8; 
10; 12. The originals included an excerpted verse from the Qur’an (on the left), followed by an 
Indonesian translation of its contents (on the right). Rather than simply provide an English 
language interpretation (translation) of the scripture and assume that it corresponds to the 
Indonesian interpretation, I have elected to provide Muhsin Khan’s recent interpretation (on the 
left) along with my own gloss of the Indonesian language interpretation (on the right). Thus each 
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 Om Bagus had been affiliated with this organization, and it is certainly plausible that he was also the original 
author of the slides. In the teaching files he generously handed over to me, I found both the Kahfi version and the 
HTTI version, with no mention of Islam.  
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passage from the Qur’an appears four times – once in Arabic and Indonesian, twice in English. 
While cumbersome, this is an effort to respect the difficulties of engaging with scripture across 
translation, let alone re-doubled translation. It should further be noted that there are many 
criticisms of the Khan interpretation – especially as Khan relates to the Peoples of Book – but I 
have selected this particular option to provide the clearest contrast with the Indonesian versions 
(drawn from the Ministry of Religion approved translation). Khan’s translation tends to “narrow” 
the meaning, whereas this particular Indonesian translation has a healthy respect for ambiguity. 
In the Kahfi introduction to hypnosis class, the use of these slides with their Quranic 
citations is a little jarring. Coming after the first two slides which introduce the phenomenon of 
hypnosis as it will be studied (in very general terms), there is little context for these “sources of 
thought.” What follows these slides is a more neuro-mechanical explanation of hypnosis (again, 
with no reference to Islam). As such, the Quranic interpolation slides clearly stand alone across 
the presentation. They are not self-disclosing: they required interpretation by the instructor. The 
brief exegesis that follows is partially based on the classroom explanations I heard, with the 
addition of my own observations. Returning to the slides themselves, their contents are 
compelling. On each slide there is a spare interpretation provided by the heading (“About the 
existence of the Hypnotic State;” “about speaking to the soul”), followed by the citation itself. 
These headings, in the classroom, were part of a fascinating argument about the nature of 
hypnosis, the kinds of change it enables, and the processes of knowledge assimilation conducted 
within Kahfi. 
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Figure 7 Sources of Throught from Al Qur’an (1A) 
 
Figure 8   Sources of Thought from Al Qur’an (1B) 
Al-Anfal: 11 
An-Nisa: 63 
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 The initial slide, Figures 7-8, contains two excerpted verses (8:11; 4:63) from the Qur’an, 
the first of which bears the heading “About the existence of the Hypnotic State.” Rather than 
positioning hypnosis as merely lawful (that which is not forbidden is presumptively allowable), 
the author of this slide suggests that the phenomenon itself carries the impress of Divine design. 
Verse 8:11, concerning divine drowsiness, was revealed after the Battle of Badr, and describes 
Divine intervention in the course of that battle.
174
 In the famed Quranic interpretation (tafsir) of 
al-Tustari (d. 896 CE)
175, the elements of this verse are explained, “Drowsiness (nuʿās) descends 
from the brain while yet the heart remains awake [lit. alive]. Sleep (nawm) [only descends] on 
the heart outwardly. That is the rule (ḥukm) [for] sleep. However, the same rule [that applied to 
the heart] regarding drowsiness [applies to] the spirit (rūḥ)” (81). Al-Tustari argues that the 
outward appearance of drowsiness does not impede the internal function of the body and the 
same can be said for the spirit – and here spirit means the soul in both its conscious and 
unconscious dimensions. The author of the Kahfi slide endorses an interpretation akin to al-
Tustari’s, and carries this logic one step further. Just as God induced this state in the warriors 
facing their enemy at Badr, a state where one is open to the reassurances of the Divine and can 
be purified from the interruptions and disturbances of Satan can be achieved through 
hypnotherapy. Thus hypnotherapy is conceived as a Divinely authored state where impurities 
and fear can be stricken – the hypnotist acts not as the Divine, but within the fold of the Divinely 
sanctioned. In the Kahfi reading, it is as if God hypnotized the Muslim forces on the 17
th
 of 
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 The Battle of Badr was a decisive moment in the early history of Islam, where a Muslim force overcame a larger 
Meccan force – with Divine assistance as elaborated in the Qur’an.   
175
 Sahl al-Tustari was an early Persian Sufi scholar of Islam, here translated by Annabel and Ali Keeler. In Ibn 
Kathir’s tafsir of this verse, the distinction is made between sleep and slumber – sleep affects the body, whereas 
slumber affects the mind. That which overtook the greatly outnumbered Muslim forces in the battle of Badr was 
slumber, such that they could act without consciousness, ie, without fear.  
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Ramadhan when they faced their Meccan adversaries in the Battle of Badr. Hypnosis becomes a 
medium through which humans can be changed directly by the divine.  
 The second verse cited on this slide (4:63), which is provided with the heading “about 
speaking to the soul,” is somewhat more straightforward in its connotations. The Kahfi author (or 
compiler) distills from this a generalized principle. Whereas the fourth surah, An-Nisa, is 
commonly held to be revelation that addresses the ethical obligations incumbent on the Muslim 
community (matters of inheritance, treatment of orphans, performance of social roles), the 
specific verse is interpreted by the Kahfi author as a broad maxim concerning “speaking to the 
soul.” Given that the soul only adopts the appearance of sleep, in the hypnotic state of 
drowsiness the hypnotherapist is given license to speak directly to the soul, and is encouraged to 
do so in a manner that will “leave a mark” (or in Khan’s English interpretation of the Qur’an, to 
utilize “effective words”). Rather than the explicit content of this verse – how to address 
hypocrites and non-believers – the Kahfi author arrives at a basic operating principle for the 
conduct of hypnosis. It is assumed that insofar as an individual suffers from a spiritual ailment, 
there is an element of hypocrisy or non-belief within her, an element that can be addressed and 
ameliorated with marking words. This is clearly a theory of change that allows the agent of 
change to affect the changed from without: the intervention of the hypnotist leaves a mark on the 
soul of the person healed. The author of these slides moves on from this theory of hypnosis to its 
actual practice in the context of scripturally-sanctioned knowledge.  
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Figure 9   Sources of Thought from Al-Qur’an (2A) 
 
Figure 10   Sources of Thought from Al-Qur’an (2B) 
  
Taha: 44 
At-Taubah: 15 
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The next slide, Figures 9-10, introduces further Quranic evidence. The first Quranic 
citation (20:44), provided the heading “Therapy with Gentle Speech,” is drawn from the story of 
Moses confronting Pharaoh detailed in the Surat Ta-Ha. As with the directives concerning the 
proper address of souls, here a specific instance is held up as a general exemplar of therapeutic 
practice. The soft speech of the hypnotist is ultimately directed towards helping the subject of 
hypnosis to remember and fear God – the all-important Islamic concept of God-consciousness or 
takwa (Ar. taqwa; sometimes piety). The ayat excerpted by the slide’s author contains that two-
parted definition of takwa – consciousness (memory) and awe (fear) with respect to God. In the 
Indonesian interpretation this is evidenced by the use of the terms ingat (remember) and takut 
(fear). Hypnosis is thus imagined to induce this quality in the subject. Soothing tones are 
enjoined on Moses in his efforts at proselytization. As a guiding principle then, even in more 
prosaic encounters, this principle is being enshrined in IH. And so this is also a claim about 
efficacy, about the possibility of spreading takwa. This slide enunciates the adab of hypnosis – 
the gentleness of speech – and by implicitly enlisting adab, the efficacy of IH as a conduit of 
change is further established. The subsequent verse appearing on this slide is also very much in 
keeping with the broader Kahfi mission, and helps make the transition from the particulars of 
practice to the universal objectives of change: the restoration of fitra. 
Under the heading, “Allah accepts Earnest Repentance,” the slide’s author excerpts a 
verse (9:15) from the surah conventionally referred to as the “Surah of Repentance.” Despite the 
explicitly scientific methodology of hypnotherapy – its focus on brainwaves, theories of mind, 
and mechanics of induction – the ultimate etiology of the distress in the IH encounter is a 
spiritual malady. A core spiritual ailment is understood with the metaphor of space: distance 
from God. As such, the hypnotherapeutic encounter is designed to return the individual to right 
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relations with the Divine. The primary means for re-establishing right relations with God in 
Islam is the notion of sincere repentance: istighfar, or beseeching forgiveness, and taubat 
(Ar.tawbah), repentance, which in Arabic also denotes a return to the grace of God. Hypnosis 
allows the therapist to excite these operations, ideally assisting the hypnotized subject in re-
submitting to Divine Will. However in making this point with the title, the author of this slide 
enters into dialogue with the verse itself, which clarifies the Divine authority of God to make 
reality (and repentance) in keeping with God’s will. The verse doesn’t state that earnest 
repentance is accepted (that is ultimately God’s prerogative). In its titling, the author provides 
guidance on how to align the individual self with the Divine Will: God accepts repentance that is 
earnest, rather than earnest repentance is guaranteed to be accepted. Anger (panas hati or hot-
headed in the Indonesian interpretation) are soul sicknesses, and given the absolute priority of 
humility within the scripture, removing the anger of the believers goes a long distance towards 
restoring the right relationship to the Divine. Change, here, is ultimately a matter of return.  
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Figure 11  Sources of Thought from Al-Qur’an (3A) 
 
Figure 12  Sources of Thought from Al-Qur’an (3B) 
Yunus: 57 
At-Taubah: 14 
 
 
249 
 
 The final slide, Figures 11-12, in the three-slide series providing Quranic legitimation of 
hypnosis as a healing practice begins with a citation of a verse that articulates the spiritual 
efficacy of scripture itself (10:57). Having established that the hypnotic state is divinely 
authored, and that (scientific) hypnotic practice is consonant with ideal moral suasion, the slide’s 
compiler here asserts the role of scripture in affecting a healing of psycho-spiritual ailments. It’s 
not obvious how this corresponds to hypnotherapy at Kahfi; other Kahfi practices help provide 
that context. In learning about hypnotherapy, we were instructed to begin sessions (at least those 
with Muslim clients), with a short recitation from the Qur’an (typically one of the so-called six 
healing verses [ayat al-shifa], including 9:14 above). These served to sanctify the procedures in 
much the way the recitations functioned in the classroom, but the specific verses we were 
encouraged to use were also attributed more particular efficacy. The healing properties of ethical 
speech can be seen in this verse as an endorsement of hypnotherapeutic technique.  
 The final verse (9:14) is given the title the title, “Hypnosis as the Cause, Allah as the 
Agent.” In this last interpolation into the “introduction to hypnosis,” the author again derives a 
general principle from a specific context. Though the explicit text of the scripture references 
battle, it is imagined to allude here to the capacity of the hypnotist to heal the heart of the 
believer. In keeping with the Ash’ari theological position (occasionalism), the injunction is to 
remember that the only independent cause in this process is God. Here the verse is less an 
explanation of the phenomenon of hypnosis and more an admonition to avoid misplaced 
attribution of causality – the hypnotist should avoid attributing any genuine spiritual efficacy to 
her own work, since it is effective only with the grace of God. The hypnotist is merely the vessel 
of Divine agency. Lest the practitioners of IH be confused on this point, they are reminded that 
the changes achieved within hypnosis are done not just by God’s permission, but through God’s 
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agency. Following this slide, the Kahfi author reverts to the materials as they were originally 
presented in their neutral, scientific format addressed to the not-necessarily Muslim audience of 
the Hypnosis Training Institute of Indonesia. Gone are Quranic citations, in their place extended 
discussion of the brain waves associated with different stages of hypnosis. 
My exposition of these slides is indicative of the general educational strategy at work in 
Kahfi. Information is delivered piecemeal, until students are invited to draw correspondences 
between the separate elements and develop a coherent whole. Ostensibly secular materials are 
first introduced, and then systematically re-understood in light of scriptural authority and Divine 
design. Students are empowered to ask questions, and Om Bagus is a master crafter of “Aha” 
moments. The mild confusion, followed by the payoff of recognition and comprehension is an 
integral part of the learning experience cultivated within the school. Counter-intuitive linkages 
proliferate throughout Kahfi teaching materials. In a much less graceful manner, the exploration 
of the slides above parallels their use in practice, although the emphases placed here are my own 
rather than strictly representative of my exposure to these materials in the Kahfi environment.   
The operation of the interpolated slides above, like the use of zikir, Quranic recitation and 
supplication, acts to nest diverse educational material at Kahfi within Islamic frames. Recall that 
every class begins with the Qur’an and ends with a praise hymn directed towards the Prophet. 
These framing practices further parallel the material and spiritual practices used to mark the 
religious probity of the Kahfi school’s facilities. Rather than an “Islamic veneer” or coating, the 
persistence of these efforts and their cascading effect transforms ostensibly secular scientific 
knowledge (hypnosis) into a meaningfully Islamic discipline. The appropriation that takes place 
here involves the attribution of an Islamic genealogy for this knowledge and the direction of its 
attendant practices towards Islamic ends (ultimately, submission to God). This is possible 
 
 
251 
 
precisely because the core materials for IH are attributed to western advancements in morally 
neutral scientific endeavor. Hypnosis, as a process, is re-cast as a universal capacity, divinely 
authored. The technology of accessing this God-given capacity, however, does not rely on 
polytheistic magic, misplaced causality, or any other internal threat to Islamic theological 
consistency. Instead it is imported from the west.  
There is considerable creativity at stake in this endeavor, and the authors of these 
negotiations are explicit about the mental and spiritual work it requires. In the repurposing of 
hypnosis that takes place at Kahfi, very different subjectivities are imagined and cultivated from 
those formed in the promotion and study of motivational strategies that animates other Kahfi 
endeavors. This despite a consistent understanding of “change” as always ultimately the preserve 
of God. This is perhaps even more visible in terms of the application of IH techniques to non-
Muslim audiences and clients. Here Om Bagus would delicately compromise between a 
nationalist-Indonesian impulse to (verbally at least) respect the diversity of faiths and the 
assumption of Islamic hypnotherapy that soul-sicknesses are ultimately understood as distance 
from God. This amounted to deconfessionalizing Islamic hypnotherapy. Om Bagus would 
perform this operation not, as one might imagine, by reverting to hypnotherapy as a morally 
neutral western science. Instead he would translate Islamic concepts into nationalist or 
ecumenical idioms. At a mass-induction for a mixed audience, Om Bagus directed those in 
attendance to fly their balloons to tanah suci (the holy lands), dan bagi saudara-saudari yang 
non-Muslim, kepada tempat yang dianggap suci (and for my non-Muslim brothers-and-sisters, 
towards a place considered holy). I was privy to several instances of this, and failed to discern a 
uniform approach; however, this topic will return adjacent to the more spectacular results (an 
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instance where the fraught character of hypnotherapy is exposed in a case of “near-possession”) 
at the close of this project.  
Pedagogy and Islamic Hypnotherapy: The Subjects of the Educational Encounter 
 
As becomes the focus in the closing chapter of this project, some instruction at Kahfi is 
directed towards a particular sort of idealized subjectivity, consonant with American 
management strategy books and contemporary self-help literature (the I acts on the I in pursuit of 
worldly ends) – and resonant with the economic citizenship of the New Order imagination (work 
hard, pay who you need to, don’t make noise). Some recent scholarly observers have become 
accustomed to referring to these consonant subjectivities as “neo-liberal,” despite the suspect 
analytic utility of this category. And suspicion is warranted. This-worldly pursuits are not 
antithetical to devotional commitment in the Islamic tradition. To the extent that contemporary 
Indonesians continue to asceticize Islam, it is often through their participation in globalized 
discourses of religious purity. These efforts betray the political legacies introduced at the outset 
of this project: attempts to stabilize religion and culture. Both have long been subject to 
regulatory regimes. And so collapsing Islamic hypnotherapy into the secularized pursuit of 
bureaucratic efficiency or economic efficacy would seem to continue, uncritically, this tradition. 
Even where this argument makes most sense (and in places, it does), it doesn’t appear to account 
for IH. There was very little tension between hypnotherapy, as understood, practiced and 
discussed, and the constellation of self-consciously Islamic values privileged within Kahfi. The 
instruction in hypnotherapy contained other sorts of potentials, which lay beyond the claims of 
the national narrative or idealized notions of individual autonomy.  
The subject of change at Kahfi is the recipient of a certain kind of education. Sometimes 
the hypnotist “educates” the subject directly, using words that “mark” her soul. In other 
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instances, it is the hypnotist who must be changed through an engagement with both the 
scientific technology of hypnosis and the authorizing tradition of Islam. To further explore some 
of the possibilities within the Kahfi model of education, I turn to the seminal work of Syed 
Muhammad Naquib al-Attas. In “the Concept of Education in Islam,” revised and reprinted in 
Islam, Secularism and the Philosophy of the Future, al-Attas systematically develops a theory of 
Islamic knowledge. We have already considered a version of this text in the context of our 
discussion of adab, but al-Attas’s arguments also have insights into the general educational 
enterprise at Kahfi. Al-Attas provides a definition of “Islamic knowledge”: 
That is why we have defined knowledge epistemologically as the arrival in the soul of the 
meaning of a thing, or the arrival of the soul at the meaning of a thing. The ‘meaning of a 
thing’ means the right meaning of it; and what is considered to be the ‘right’ meaning is 
in this context determined by the Islamic vision of reality and truth as projected by the 
Quranic conceptual system (178, ital. original). 
 
Al-Attas is attempting to formulate a positive epistemology of Islamic knowledge – there are 
things to be known, and there are furthermore right ways to know the right things. This is the 
adab of knowledge. An enterprise like Kahfi conceives of itself has having the right meanings in 
hand, and sets out to discover the optimal methods by which other souls can arrive at those 
meanings – or that those meanings can arrive in those souls. Bypassing flawed rational 
consciousness, the hypnotherapist is able to deliver right meanings directly to suffering subjects. 
Knowledge, here, is relational as well as propositional. Acquiring this knowledge is a process of 
being changed.   
Building on this understanding of knowledge, al-Attas elucidates its fuller implications 
before arriving at a definition of education germane to this project: “[R]ecognition and 
acknowledgement, progressively instilled into man, of the proper places of things in the order of 
creation, such that it leads to the recognition and acknowledgement of the proper place of God 
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in the order of being and existence” (182). Al-Attas earlier stipulates that the “proper place” 
entails on the one hand, “the ontological domain which includes man and the world of empirical 
things, and on the other to the theological domain which includes the religious and ethical 
aspects of human existence” (180). This multi-partite conceptualization is exceedingly useful for 
understanding the stakes of a Kahfi education, at least as practiced in semester addressed to the 
hypnotherapeutic materials. IH entails understanding the proper place and learning to recognize 
when things are “out-of-place,” and then re-situating them such that the individual undergoing 
hypnosis is left at the inescapable majesty of the Divine. These acts are thus also the operation of 
adab. Recognizing when things are out of place takes adab, and then the effort to remedy their 
placement requires its own adab. The instrumental knowledge necessary to hypnosis – the 
Western method, as it is described in Kahfi literature – is not the object of education. It is the 
means by which students are led to the recognition and acknowledgement of God and 
empowered to lead others, through their hypnotic practice, to the same recognition. This process, 
however, often involves considerable spiritual risk, even though Kahfi materials attempt to 
negate its fraught nature through the emphasis on scientific methodologies. The risk involves 
agency.  
Influenced by Amira Mittermaier’s Dreams that Matter, I was struck with the parallels 
between spiritual efficacy in dreams and the Islamic hypnotherapeutic intervention. I also felt 
liberated from the relentless promotion of piety in recent analyses of Islam. Beyond the 
interpretive associations between sleep and the hypnotic state – interpretations that obtain at the 
Kahfi Motivator School – this is one more domain where “self-cultivation,” in the pietistic cast, 
is not really the model of change. Late in my training in hypnotherapy, I practiced on classmate. 
Having induced Syafiq, I established a link between touching his left leg and persistent negative 
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emotions (trauma in the Kahfi idiom). Touching his right knee, I directed him to recall feelings 
of satisfaction, accomplishment, joy, and acceptance. As I worked my way through the script 
supplied by Om Bagus, I was attempting to elicit and nullify traumatic experiences in Syafiq’s 
life. Each time my hand clasped his left knee, his body quivered and his face contorted into a 
grimace. Sweat beaded along his forehead and he whimpered, barely audibly. Shifting my 
attention to his right knee, his entire body slackened, his breath slowed, and the lines around his 
mouth relaxed into a soft smile. Back and forth I alternated between eliciting pain and hailing its 
release. Then I grabbed both knees and allowed the affective contest to course through his body. 
He stiffened, wracked by sobs, until slowly his body stilled. Releasing his left, I retained my grip 
on his right, softly asserting a litany of positive experiences – several of which had been offered 
by Syafiq in the pre-hypnosis interview the practice demanded. The goal was to heal trauma, to 
rally positive affect and to neutralize persistent intrapersonal challenges. To the extent it worked, 
Syafiq was returned to a fitra of greater peace and spiritual equanimity. Indeed, after we finished 
he referred to himself as tenang, calm; serene; quieted. He achieved this not through diligent 
self-discipline, but through grace, occasioned by the application of a scientific technology. If the 
nesting theology of this encounter insists that, ultimately, it is only the Divine that acts upon the 
individual, that does nothing to dilute the importance and the explicit causal mechanism by 
which the hypnotist bends the subjectivity of her patient. Signs of success reverberate not only in 
the reflective understandings of Kahfi students, but in the profound affective experiences they 
induce in others. The tears of the repentant are the sign of the restoration of the right order of 
things, the lived instantiation of adab extending from God all the way down to the smallest detail 
of creation. This is something we do to, and for, each other with divine permission. 
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Chapter 5 
Kahfi, Motivation, and Motivasi 
 ّقَلَْخَْلأا َّحلاَص َم ِّمَُتّلأ ُتْثُّعب اَمَّّنإ َمَّلَسَو ّهْيَلَع ُ َّاللّ ىَّلَص ّ َّاللّ ُلوُسَر َلاَق
176
 
Said the Messenger of God, Blessings of God and Peace upon Him: I was sent to perfect 
righteous character.  
In the previous chapter on Islamic Hypnotherapy, I argued that the interventions of the 
hypnotherapist complicate recent analyses foregrounding ethical self-fashioning. Certainly a 
related operation is at work in Kahfi, with the important qualification that the technologies 
employed are frequently other-oriented. Earlier, in the context of IofC, I established how another 
ethical demand – to have adab – eludes the exclusive focus on the relationship between the 
worshipper and the Divine that features so prominently in many discussions of piety. Here, in an 
exploration of the motivational speaking curriculum at Kahfi Motivator School, I claim that 
“motivasi” is put to service in settings that may once have called for other models of 
intersubjective efficacy (especially magic), and that the motivator can be profitably understood 
in the light of the charismatic. Before advancing these claims, I detail the interpretive strategies 
through which a key motivational text was incorporated into the educational setting of Kahfi 
Motivator School, a process that involves the borrowed mantle of science, a scientific truth 
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 Reported by Malik (“Muwatta Malik” 1643). This hadith is among those most frequently cited in moral 
exhortations during Friday sermons (khutbah). At Kahfi, this was the exemplary character to which the students 
were directed to aspire. The best way to emulate the Prophet, then, was to perfect one’s character – or, for the 
motivator, to perfect others’ character.  
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effect, as it were. This scientific truth effect recalls the neutral epistemology ascribed to 
“Western” hypnotherapeutic practice in the preceding chapter, as well as the instrumental use of 
English in the IofC context. Throughout this chapter I draw a distinction between “motivasi” and 
“motivation,” where the former is understood as an inspired iteration of the latter, denoting 
discrete if overlapping fields of desire, efficacy and action.  
Motivation and the Self-Help Canon 
Recent literature addressed to self-help and motivational practices have begun to take 
seriously mass phenomena that have long eluded sustained scholarly inquiry.
177
 Beyond the 
dismissive cultural assumptions embedded in common sense accounts, there are serious 
theoretical gaps that prevent careful analysis of motivation (and motivasi). One is a problem of 
specificity – twelve-step movements like Alcoholics Anonymous or Overeaters Anonymous, for 
instance, share a genealogy with the First Century Christian Fellowship and Oxford Groups 
discussed in Chapter 2. It makes little sense to talk about the practices of twelve-step group in 
concert with the recent meteoric rise (and equally rapid disappearance) of a self-help 
phenomenon like the Secret. The Secret is a 2006 film with a companion book written by 
Rhonda Byrne. The text posits natural laws that guarantee outcomes for an efficacious self. 
Borrowing a scientific idiom (quantum mechanics), the authors of the Secret promise to provide 
the conceptual tools to deliver their readers (or viewers) to the future they desire. This is a model 
of transformation premised on an agentive capacity for self-on-self change. Twelve step 
movements, by contrast, demand a posture of submission and surrender. Twelve-step theories of 
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 See, for instance, Alison Falby’s biography of Gerald Heard, Between the Pigeonholes. Heard was an important 
figure in the development of many of these discourses. For perhaps the best recent general critical treatment, see Eva 
Illouz’s Saving the Modern Soul. The already frequently cited contributions by Howell, Rudnyckyj and Hoesterey 
are Indonesian-specific examples of this. A general social-science approach is advocated in McGee, “From 
Makeover Media to Remaking Culture.” For one of the most widely cited “dismissive” accounts (self-help as neo-
liberal state control), see Rimke “Governing Citizens through Self-Help Literature.”  
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change (theologies?) rely on the fundamental incapacity of the individual, who lacks the power 
to re-order herself. As discussed with reference to Initiatives of Change Indonesia, which shares 
in the heritage of twelve-step movements, this means that the practitioner adopts a posture 
ideally configured to “host” divine agency. The active assumption of a passive position – 
willfully being acted upon – relies on practices and logics quite discrete from the self-on-self 
activity featured in other motivational materials. Yet both The Secret and Overeaters Anonymous 
are understood with reference to “self-help” and “popular psychology.”    
In common usage and scholarly analyses alike, “self-help” refers to at least two related 
but discrete activities. In its broadest usage it denotes activities undertaken without the 
mediations of a state, an organization, a professional or an expert. In the Indonesian context, this 
has frequently involved research addressed to arisan (pooled finances) and simpan pinjam (save-
borrow) schemes.
178
 Because arisan are organized, typically, by neighborhood collectives, they 
are understood to be “self-help.” Thus Hotze Lont writes about these schemes in an essay 
entitled “Financial Self-Help Organizations in Indonesia,” collected in Household Strategies for 
Survival 1600-2000. In detailing the operations of arisan, Lont uses the common sense “self-
help” to refer to the non-state character of these collective operations. Lont later turns a much 
more critical eye to these organizations in Juggling Money, demonstrating how membership is 
based on both conscription and exclusion and embedded within other structures and exercises of 
social powers. Lont is, understandably, unconcerned with the ascription of self-help since in this 
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 Struggling for a convenient gloss for arisan, I turn to the Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia: “the activity of 
collecting money or equal valued belongings amongst multiple people, next a lottery amongst them determines who 
receives it, the lottery is held at regularly scheduled meeting until all members receive [the collected money or 
goods].” Thus arisan refers to the collected money, the meeting where it is collected and distributed as well as the 
entire process: kegiatan mengumpulkan uang atau barang yg bernilai sama oleh beberapa orang kemudian diundi di 
antara mereka untuk menentukan siapa yg memperolehnya, undian dilaksanakan dl sebuah pertemuan secara berkala 
sampai semua anggota memperolehnya (“arisan”). Or, more succinctly as one critic explained it: “rotating credit 
scheme.”   
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analysis the term denotes bottom-up organization rather the constitution of the self-helping 
subjects. This “self-help” can be contrasted with the “self-help” that is imagined to be employed 
by the liberal individual: one emphasizes autonomous collectivities, the other autonomous 
individuals. 
 Other recent literature has focused on the (neo)liberal individual subject of “self-help.” In 
this work the neo-liberal subject is thought to be the autonomous agent at work in their own lives 
beneath the aegis of broad projects of economic liberalization. In this way individual 
performance is seen as a supplement to global corporate as well as state efforts to achieve 
efficiency, reduced drag on trade and end nationalized industries. In such literature, instead of 
the relationship to the state or formal non-state actors, “self-help” emphasizes the imagined self-
efficacy of an intervention performed “by oneself,” where that self is a liberal agent. Daromir 
Rudnyckyj is most invested in these valences of “self-help” in his path-breaking study of ESQ, 
Spiritual Economies, first introduced in our discussion of hypnosis. Describing the enlistment of 
moral-improvement rhetoric into economic rationalization, Rudnyckyj writes, “ESQ and other 
manifestations of spiritual reform, such as life-coaching and self-help genres in North America, 
approached living a life as a technical problem that could be addressed through rational 
interventions” (121). For Rudnyckyj, the appeal of ESQ in Indonesia is structurally parallel to 
the attractiveness of life-coaching and self-help in North America. Not only are they parallel, 
they are really the same thing: Given Rudnyckyj’s frequent characterization of Manajemen 
Qolbu and ESQ as participating in self-help traditions,
 179
 it is unsurprising that the selves here 
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 See also Hoesterey, “Figures of Modernity” and “Prophetic Cosmopolitanism.” In the latter essay, Hoesterey 
situates popular preachers as aspiring cosmopolitans, enunciating a vision of the Prophet as the ultimate 
cosmopolitan. They do so through their media savvy and technological literacy, often in service of “consumerist” 
aims. Hoesterey is ultimately much more cautious than Rudnyckyj. Whereas Rudnyckyj confidently collapses ESQ 
into already familiar phenomenon, Hoesterey flirts with the endoxa of neoliberal subjectivity without ever reducing 
the subjects of his research to mere “symptoms.”  
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helped are imagined to be the liberal subject of autonomous moral and economic intervention. 
Self-help, in this account, needs no introduction.  
Taking a page from this widespread theorization, Lyn Parker and Pam Nilan, in 
Adolescents in Contemporary Indonesia, write about the “hybrid Muslim – the neoliberal 
discourse of personal improvement.” Under this heading, they discuss the ubiquity of the 
framing of personal improvement as an aspect of “human resource” (sumber daya manusia) 
development: “Young people have learned the SDM (human resource) discourse, and many talk 
the American talk of self-help or self-improvement, usually mixed with the discourse of Islamic 
personal development. Book stores are awash in Islam self-help books, many of them targeting 
youth” (170). The language of sumber daya manusia (human resources) is instructive, precisely 
because it echoes the language of material resources: sumber daya or sumber daya alam (natural 
resources). Yet this categorical collapse requires greater scrutiny – I am unfamiliar with the 
“American talk of self-help or self-improvement” that speaks of humans primarily as natural 
resources to be developed. In the rush to see the similarities, the humanistic idiom of Euro-
American self-help is fully identified with the business epistemology of resource management. 
We should not be so certain that these are the same things: not just in Jakarta, but on the now 
silent stage of Oprah’s long-time Chicago studio as well. The ease with which disparate 
phenomena are grouped beneath the heading of “self-help” demands greater skepticism. 
In an article that constructively enlists many of my key terms here, Muhammad Khan and 
Naeem Nisar Sheikh argue for an “Islamization” of human resource practice. Working under the 
title, “Human Resource Development, Motivation and Islam,” they argue, apropos my claims 
throughout this project, that “Before discussing Islam…we need to first discus the nature of the 
present secular world (of science and matter). We understand that science and technology and its 
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knowledge and development are amoral in nature. Technology is not an end itself; it is means to 
an end and the nature of that end is determined by moral and spiritual character of human 
agents” (1025). The development of Islamic logics of personal empowerment, and their 
recruitment into business projects of economic efficiency, are truly global phenomena: these two 
scholars are writing about business strategy from a Moroccan university, although their words 
would resonate at Kahfi. But we should take seriously, if not the epistemic neutrality of science, 
at least the attempt to instrumentally employ science towards Islamic moral horizons. Why 
assume that a hybrid discourse of economic rationality and Islamic ethics is reducible to neo-
liberalism? There is a strange hubris at work in the insistence that one’s home discourse is 
necessarily more fundamental.   
Across highly differing accounts, part of the rationale for the collapse of “agency” with 
“resources” has to do with the instrumentality with which agency is imagined to be managed 
within these discourses.  Rudnyckyj, in Spiritual Economies, describes how ESQ practitioners 
targeted their interventions towards individuals to maximize economic efficiency: “proponents of 
spiritual reform sought to inculcate an ethic of self-management, which they termed ‘built-in 
control,’ to eliminate corruption and facilitate privatization by making the company more 
attractive to outside investment” (153). While reflective of the concerns at Krakatau Steel, no 
doubt, there is an attribution here that mistakes a technology for an end. Built-in control 
mechanisms – the servos of the psycho-cybernetics idiom below – are not, automatically, 
enlisted in Weberian projects of economic rationalization. Subjectivities other than liberal, too, 
imagine themselves as benefiting from a self-correcting process.
180
 Establishing systems to 
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 Early in Christian Moderns, Webb Keane mentions that what he terms the “moral narrative of modernity” has 
taken many forms – that although the liberal form is perhaps most influential, it is hardly exclusive (6). Too often, 
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modulate and moderate behavior were abiding areas of interest for medieval Muslim theologians, 
not to say anything of the Greek ethicists – neither tradition of which is easily characterized as 
neo-liberal.   
In their work on Indonesian youth culture, Parker and Nilan give attention to both the 
Islamic motivations (these are not secular pursuits, they remind us) and the novel personal and 
intersubjective formations envisioned by participants and consumers of new media. 
Nevertheless, they remain fundamentally recognizable, or even derivative: “Islamic novels, 
articles, and self-help books share many aspects of the American discourse: a generally upbeat 
tone (you can become anything you like), the offering of encouragement, empathy and 
understanding, the generation of hope and insight, as well as practice advice and techniques for 
problem-solving” (174). In this account, Islam becomes merely the idiom for the expression of a 
fundamentally unchanged American discourse. On one hand, the valorization of efficacious 
individuals is definitely one dimension of these movements and literatures in Indonesia, and 
certainly doesn’t seem unfamiliar in the Kahfi context. On the other hand, there is a substantive 
excess unaccounted for by this somewhat too convenient reading. My interlocutors at Kahfi were 
very interested in enhancing their material prospects, but very seldom did it seem that their 
spiritual interventions were primarily subservient to those aspirations, or simply the working-out 
of a logical trajectory supplied by foreign discourse. Given the epistemological conceits that 
accompany the presentation and reception of “self-help” materials at Kahfi, it seems especially 
hasty to endorse either their chiefly derivative status or their supposed liberal objectives. Julia 
Day Howell, in “‘Calling’ and ‘Training,’” supports my intransigence on this matter. In her 
analysis of how Muslim lay preachers appropriate elements of “secular culture,” she describes a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
even in the exuberance of the literature addressed to the notion of multiple modernities, the idea that the liberal 
trajectory is but one configuration of modernity eludes recognition.  
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contemporary “eclecticism” defined as “the melding, worked by religious entrepreneur in new 
roles, of Islamic and denominationally neutralized religious communications with strategically 
selected secular elements of global culture, the immediate origins of which are primary in North 
Atlantic countries” (401). For Howell as for this analysis, the selectivity and strategy with which 
deconfessionalized discourse is appropriated and the aura of scientific neutrality marshaled, 
belies a simple characterization as derivative. There is something new here, and even where there 
is something old, it need not always be neoliberalism. Instead there are novel assemblages that 
borrow from available rhetorics to approach aims external to those rhetorics. 
From Self-Help Literature to Motivator School 
In the following pages I critically examine a specific set of pedagogical practices and 
performances organized with respect to “motivation” and “motivasi” as they are understood and 
engaged in one community in contemporary Jakarta, Indonesia. My argument ultimately relies 
on leveraging these observations into a broader discussion about what is at stake in a 
motivational encounter. Doing so invites the standard furies of terminological imprecision. Many 
of the motivational texts discussed at Kahfi Motivator School recognizably belong to a tradition 
conventionally referred to as “self-help,” the imprecision of which is argued above. Additionally 
many of the strategies employed within the practices associated with these materials resemble 
“popular-psychology”: in both instances, the bulk of the materials consist of translated American 
texts. Contemporary self-help is heir to perhaps the Stoics but at least to Samuel Smiles’ 1859 
text, Self-Help. It is, one finds, a wonderfully catchall designation. Suffice it to say, that over the 
course of the past century and a half, the moral and material improvement championed by Smiles 
has expanded to include a suite of personal enhancement procedures conducted without the 
mediating guidance of a socially, professionally or administratively sanctioned authority. The 
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selves helped via this supposed genre of texts and practices vary from one to another, as do the 
fundamental theories of agency and efficacy on which such interventions lie. Smiles, an ardent 
Scottish Liberal, shaped the conventions that so closely associate “self-help” with projects of 
liberal individualism. However, the wider notion of non-expert intervention has come to be 
employed in a host of illiberal and non-liberal activities. 
During my time studying motivational speaking in Indonesia, one clear injunction was 
repeated across the various educational settings in which I was invited to intervene: “Motivate!” 
The forms of this injunction were myriad: Dimotivasi! Kasih motivasi, ya! (Di)Beri motivasi! 
Motivate, provide motivation, give motivation – whatever the form, my interlocutor assumed 
that motivation was a quality, a character, an affect or a substance that I possessed, and 
possessed in sufficient quantity to pass on to my audience – or perhaps, to impress upon them, if 
we invoke the therapeutic language of the Qur’an and the notion of “words that mark” 
introduced in the previous chapter on Islamic hypnotherapy. I was confronted with this command 
before addressing primary school English classes,
181
 high school students facing their national 
exams,
182
 worshippers beginning their post-dawn lives,
183
 and state employees in the Taxation 
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 Since a large part of my research was conducted with IofC Indonesia, which draws the core of its membership 
from the School of Education at the State Islamic University, I knew many English Language Education 
majors/graduates. This resulted in a steady stream of invitations to visit English classes at area schools. My protests 
that a singular performance of “native speaker” English was unlikely to advance students’ understanding of English 
were met with the counter-claim that, in fact, what was requested of me was not English but motivation.  
182
 Motivational speakers do brisk business in the lead-up to the Ujian National, or National Exams. A Kahfi 
Motivator School classmate invited me along to his paid seminars at a private Islamic school near where we both 
lived, where I was met with the now familiar injunction to motivate.  
183
 There are multiple genres of post-worship speech popular at mosques and prayer halls. Two common Indonesian 
variants are the kuliah subuh, or kulsub (dawn class) and the kuliah tujuh menit or kultum (seven minute class). 
Whereas the kulsub may be a weekly or monthly didactic performance, the kultum is often a simple exhortation or 
testimony, and is a popular genre during the auspicious months of the Islamic calendar, in particular, during 
Ramadhan.  Requested to offer a kultum at a small mosque in Pelabuhan Ratu, on the south coast of West Java, I 
proclaimed my (truthful) ignorance of the tradition. My inadequacies as a preacher were neatly discarded – just 
“motivate” those assembled, I was told by the young man inviting me to take hold of the microphone.  
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Directorate.
184
 Perhaps most dramatically, the warden responsible for prisoner education at 
Lembaga Pemasyarakatan Cipinang (the Cipinang Penitentiary) asked me to motivate a foreign 
national awaiting a death sentence – a service I was unprepared and unwilling to provide.185 In 
this particular setting, I pressed the warden about his desire: about what was I supposed to 
motivate the condemned man? The warden wasn’t sure, but he was certain that the condemned 
needed motivation, whether to repent, to achieve acceptance of his lot, or towards some other 
unknowable aim. He voiced all of these possibilities, settling on none of them. What was clear 
was that everybody needs motivation. 
My particular identity-pegs – as a foreigner, as a man, as white, as an enthusiastic 
practitioner of a faith tradition – certainly play a part in my potential recruitment as a motivator. 
The white foreigner, and especially the American, is a recognizable social figure in Indonesia. In 
addition to associations with wealth and privileged access, there are assumptions about linguistic 
mastery (English) along with highly valued cultural mastery (native comfort with eye contact, 
large gestural range, etc.) that recommend the white American as a public speaker and motivator. 
The convert, too, is considered a pregnant source of testimony, imagined to possess a narrative 
that reaches hearts. But the sheer fact of difference doesn’t begin to account for the ubiquity of 
the request, nor, of course, for the existence of an institution with the name Kahfi Motivator 
School. The appetite for motivation is vast, and the demands upon the overloaded term 
extensive. In multiple speech settings in contemporary Indonesia, motivation is being enlisted to 
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 I was part of the teaching entourage for a paid motivational seminar held at the central offices of the Finance 
Ministry’s Directorate General of Taxation. Our seminar was part of in-service training in April, 2012 for a business 
taxation unit within the Directorate. 
185
 As of this writing this individual has not been executed and is a likely candidate for a commutation – although 
the 2014 election of Joko Widodo has seen a renewed push for narcotics-related executions in Indonesia. 
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do a lot of different work. In charting some of that work, I don’t pretend to begin to exhaust the 
term or its salience for Indonesian audiences.
186
  
Motivational speaking in Indonesia is a local iteration of a globalized genre of discourse, 
a relationship I mark by the use of “motivasi” and “motivation” for the local and global 
respectively. But the actual motivational encounters I participated in belied a simply derivative 
status. The suites of practices imagined with reference to the term were quite heterogeneous. The 
range of texts employed in motivational work stretch from classic tomes of Euro-American (and 
really, American) self-help to the biography of the Prophet (sirah nabi). Canonical hadith and 
nationalist history are equally considered reservoirs of motivational learning. The methods 
adopted include PowerPoint presentations, illusionist performances and the careful management 
of collective affect around such salient experiences as guilt, shame, despair and forgiveness. A 
linear reading of the genealogy of self-help and motivation, given in its Euro-American context, 
could easily coalesce around market demands for certain kinds of rationality and business 
aesthetics, around particularistic work ethics and atomized alienated individuals. Accurate to a 
point, no doubt, such analyses lose the affective commitments that structure so many 
participants’ engagement with these discourses (not just in Indonesia, motivation is a strange 
beast all over the place). And in Indonesia, the neo-liberal reading accounts for still less of the 
phenomena. Popular psychology remains that rare domain where the vulgar Marxist reading is 
presumptively accurate. The attention to the economic implications of motivation has much to 
recommend it – it alerts us to the possible motivations of both the industry that claims to supply 
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 Part of this salience is probably accounted for by what Hélène Giroux terms “pragmatic ambiguity,” introduced 
in her article “It Was Such a Handy Term.” Pragmatic ambiguity, in her analysis, allows for the rapid uptake of a 
new management fashion over-and-above its efficacious utility. Synthesizing literature addressed to “strategic 
ambiguity,” “interpretive viability,” “boundary objects” and “umbrella constructs,” Giroux offers the minimal 
definition of pragmatic ambiguity as, “the condition of admitting more than one course of action” (1228). Thus 
terms like motivasi spur action without stipulating what that action entails – a feature of motivasi no doubt doubly 
true given it etymological linkage to motion.  
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it and the individuals who see, in motivation, the path to economic success. However to reduce it 
to pure false-consciousness is to blind oneself to what it does. A huge number of people, in 
diverse countries and languages, access these discourses to attain desired results in their lives, 
and with some success.  
The Kahfi Motivator School, introduced in the preceding chapter, is one instance of a 
related, and vastly wider, movement addressed to moral interventions.
187
 The hadith that is cited 
as an epigraph to this chapter was one of the key organizing texts for the Kahfi school 
community: emulating the life of the Prophet involved “perfecting” one’s moral stature. The 
motivational materials taught and studied at Kahfi were understood explicitly as the technologies 
through which character could be perfected. Thus the study of motivasi was also an attempt to 
conform to the exemplary behavior and personhood of the Prophet. There is a key distinction in 
the self-identity of the Kahfi school relative its moral activist peer institutions, however. This is 
its tuition structure: free, with the requirement that every student complete the five obligatory 
sequences of Muslim worship, salat lima waktu, in Indonesian.
188
 As a result, the financial 
survival of the school depends on a sister organization (currently called Bagus Bina Cendekia) 
that offers many of the same materials in short course form, available for contract with 
corporations, schools, government offices and private individuals or parties. The support staffs 
for these paid events are made up of current Kahfi students, who donate their time in exchange 
for the valuable professional experience on offer. Many Kahfi students also moonlight as 
motivators on their own terms, often addressing school audiences in anticipation of exams. 
Motivational materials are woven throughout the six (when I was a student, four) semesters of 
                                                             
187
 This post-Reformasi trend has been extensively analyzed. In addition to the citation of Hoestery and Rudnyckyj 
above, see Fealy 15-39; and Howell “Modulation of Active Piety,” 40-62. 
188
 Manajemen Qolbu, ESQ, and many other “training” organizations all charge for their services. While televised 
performances are, of course, free of charge, actual seminars require participants to pay. Manajemen Qolbu, in its 
heyday, was so effectively monetized that it offered an entire accompanying suite of services and products. 
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the Kahfi curriculum. Motivasi is repeatedly enunciated in these various contexts. The 
penultimate semester, immediately following the semester on Islamic hypnotherapy, deals with a 
particular technology of motivasi: psycho-cybernetics. 
Psycho-cybernetics, PowerPoint and the Mechanical Production of Truth 
The second-to-last semester of Kahfi instruction was dedicated to a careful collective 
reading, interpretation, and presentation of Psycho-cybernetics Mutakhir (“The Latest Psycho-
cybernetics”). Psycho-cybernetics, as one might imagine, is the extension of cybernetic 
explanation to the realm of human behavior and consciousness. Cybernetics itself was first 
popularized by its pioneer Norbert Wiener in his 1948 volume, Cybernetics: Or Control and 
Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Broadly construed, cybernetics is the study of 
systems that incorporate regulatory mechanisms. It remains a field of experimentation and 
theory, separate and distinct from “psycho-cybernetics” as will be discussed here. In cybernetics, 
the particulars of the system are typically abstracted – whether neurological, mechanical or 
biological, the emphasis is on a system that changes in response to stimuli produced within the 
system. In the domain of psycho-cybernetics, however, practitioners articulate a mechanistic 
theory of consciousness that allows for programmability, re-programmability, and the 
systemization of human behavior. Psycho-cybernetics, despite employing the idiom of 
cybernetics, is uninterested in abstracting the particulars of the systems it describes – on the 
contrary, human behavioral identity is central to the discourse: Psycho-cybernetics doesn’t 
pretend to describe a general theory of operation; it is addressed to the specifics of human 
adjustment.   
Psycho-cybernetics at Kahfi is understood chiefly through a revised and updated version 
of Maxwell Maltz’s seminal self-help (in both senses!) 1960 text: Psycho-cybernetics. At Kahfi, 
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we used a recent translation entitled Psycho-cybernetics Mutakhir, based on the revised and 
expanded 2002 version of Maltz’s text authored by Dan Kennedy: The New Psycho-
cybernetics.
189
 Psycho-cybernetics, as envisioned by Maltz and practiced at Kahfi, represents the 
extension of cybernetic principles to human consciousness and behavior. For many authors 
working within this idiom, cybernetics represents precisely this: an idiom. Cybernetic metaphor, 
rather than cybernetic processes, governs the essentially agentive desire for adaptation and 
actualization of autonomous human selves. Maxwell Maltz, in the 1960 text, vacillates between 
the metaphoric position and a strong belief in the mechanisms he identifies. The Kennedy text, 
on which the Indonesian translation is based, falls more clearly in the cybernetics-as-metaphor 
camp. Arvin, the translator, writes, “If we imagine the human brain and nervous system as a sort 
of automatic control mechanism, that operates in accordance with cybernetic principles, we 
acquire new insight into the how and why of human behavior... I must repeat, Psycho-
Cybernetics doesn’t state that the human brain is a computer. Rather, it is that we possess a 
computer that we [can] use” (55). The brain contains a computational machine, but it also 
exceeds it. This model doesn’t seem particularly strange on its face, and my Kahfi peers seemed 
to readily accept it. But there is a lurking anxiety concerning the computational model: who had 
access to the computer and how those agents could affect its processes. Clearly of divine design, 
the notion that its circuitry could be re-programmed created a possibility that called out for 
divine authorization. And that authorization was to be found in our application for the 
“computer-within-the-brain”: to disseminate the elusive motivasi. Motivasi, at Kahfi, was a self-
contained moral good, a precondition for the development of perfected character.   
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 The Indonesian translation of the title is probably best glossed as “latest,” as in, “The Latest Psycho-cybernetics”: 
mutakhir (latest) is a presumptively stronger claim on the present than baru (new).   
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For Kennedy, human tendencies and habits can be understood as analogs to servo-
mechanisms (error-sensing and incorporating systems). When we make a repeated mistake, that 
mistake becomes a looping process delivering us to ever more error. Guidance systems and 
“automatic mechanisms” (conveniently, in Indonesian mekanisme otomatis) represent points of 
access to fundamentally self-on-self activity. By activating already existing “mechanisms” such 
as the “success mechanism” and thwarting the “failure mechanism,” the willing (again, both 
senses) practitioner of psycho-cybernetics re-orients herself towards desired outcomes. In 
Kennedy’s framing, we (individually) hold the levers that govern our mechanisms. “Success” 
here is understood not simply as the smooth operation of the mechanism, but as an overarching 
goal. The success mechanism is a technology of realizing our dreams, that we ourselves possess 
the capacity to activate. This is a logical system put in service of decidedly human ends. All of 
this would seem to fit nicely with widespread notions of the striving subject
190
 – except that at 
Kahfi, self-help texts were being mined for therapeutic insights designed to be directed at others. 
We weren’t studying Psycho-cybernetics Mutakhir just to realize our own dreams. We were 
learning about ourselves as models in the hopes of future intersubjective intervention. 
Pyscho-cybernetics, at Kahfi, was not just the fraught setting for new understandings of 
agentive action and efficacy. This material was also the center-piece of a seemingly unrelated 
challenge for the students: mastering PowerPoint. In the deft hands of the lead instructor, Om 
Bagus, facility with the popular presentational software was densely allied with the exegesis of 
Psycho-cybernetics Mutakhir. This twinned pedagogy initially struck me as strange, no doubt 
fueled partially by my unease with the hegemony of PowerPoint and the tendency of its users to 
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 It’s a mark of the interpretive strength of Saba Mahmood’s Politics of Piety and Charles Hirschkind’s The Ethical 
Soundscape that I think first and most resonantly about the self-fashioners of pietistic enterprise that they each 
describe. Nevertheless, Kahfi technologies are not typically directed at the self – after a trial-period of self-
experimentation, these are fundamentally technologies to change others.  
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(or at least fall prey to the desire to) re-produce discrete units of easily digested knowledge, 
inevitably preceded by a bullet point and characterized as a take-away, or worse still, the take-
home point. Misplaced snobbery aside, the sequential logics authored by PowerPoint and the 
mechanistic theories of consciousness imagined within psycho-cybernetics resonate. Before 
returning to a discussion of just what might be imagined under the sign of motivasi, and its 
relationship to charisma, I follow out the interpretive strategy addressed to psycho-cybernetics, 
its relationship with PowerPoint, and ultimately the re-intrusion of the Divine into processes of 
agentive change.  
Psycho-cybernetics, at Kahfi, is inextricably bound to the media through which it is 
disseminated. The pairing of Psycho-cybernetics Mutakhir with classes on the effective use of 
PowerPoint was further solidified within the interpretive strategy to which the psycho-
cybernetics text was subject. Figure 13, below, contains the formula through which the text was 
distilled from multiple chapter synopses down to three axioms. The sixteen chapters of Psycho-
cybernetics Mutakhir were reduced by two (the final two chapters, according to Om Bagus, were 
repetitive). The remaining fourteen chapters were assigned to groups of two or three students. 
Each group was responsible for meeting and arriving at a shared understanding (consensus or 
mufakat) of their assigned chapter. This collaborative reading was then presented to the class as a 
whole, having first been rendered into a seven-slide PowerPoint presentation. Each presentation 
was allotted half of a class – slightly more than one hour. This was an opportunity to practice 
within the presentation software, but it was also a demand to articulate the contents of the 
chapter in a highly regimented fashion. The final slide of each presentation was required to 
contain a distillation of the chapter into three axioms. These three axioms were presented to the 
class and subjected to a process of musyawarah, or deliberation, to arrive again at consensus on a 
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single axiom to represent the contents of the chapter. After all chapters had been presented by 
their respective groups and distilled to single axioms by the class as a whole, another deliberation 
was convened. In this final deliberation, the axioms representing all fourteen chapters were 
reduced to three axioms that stood for the entirety of the texts. This interpretive strategy, as a 
process, bears the impress of the technology through which it was performed: PowerPoint.  
 
Figure 13  A PowerPoint-Mediated Interpretation of Psycho-cybernetics 
 PowerPoint structured not just the original presentations of the Psycho-cybernetics 
Mutakhir chapters, but also the subsequent deliberations. Using a whiteboard and a dry-erase 
marker, the students in my class replicated the bullet point format of PowerPoint within our 
discussions. If we take seriously Friedrich Kittler’s account in Gramophone, film, typewriter the 
systemization of information co-authors the information it stores. Media do not lag the cultural 
productions they record or transmit; rather there is a generative capacity and productive 
constraint at work in new technical means. PowerPoint is not just a repressive apparatus stifling 
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the infinite creativity of expression: it constitutes new domains of expression and knowledge 
production. Within a computational world, we are not dealing with the thinkable, or even the 
articulable, but the PowerPointable. PowerPoint exists first as a record of knowledge (as 
storage), only secondarily as the electronic means through which it enters intersubjective 
relations.
191
 PowerPoint may be a part of a business epistemology that eschews ambiguity, 
valorizes efficiency, and privileges clarity over-and-above comprehensiveness. However it is not 
only that.  
PowerPoint relies on aphorisms (the axiomatic readings of Psycho-cybernetics Mutakhir 
above) masquerading as propositional logic. Figure 13, despite its austere form, does not actually 
represent a logical process. As much as an effect of ordering, this is also an effect of a user 
interface that authors connections graphically that need not correspond logically. Instead, what is 
represented is a narrative or sequential process of knowledge production, adorned with the 
trappings of logical entailment. This is the scientific aesthetic of PowerPoint. The visual effect of 
bullet points, coupled with the sequential ordering of slides, suggests logical exigency where 
none need reside. Hardly a feature of PowerPoint exclusively (the same charge could be made of 
narrative writ large, where sequentiality obfuscates contingency), what is novel within this 
medium is the pseudo-scientific truth effect: we believe things because they follow, one after 
another, presented as discrete units of information. Unsupported assertions stand in austere relief 
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 This is a key distinction for Kittler. Before PowerPoint can be used communicatively, it first records (unlike oral 
production, the primary articulation of which is already intersubjective and communicative). Kittler charts how the 
hegemony of writing was disrupted by technologies like the gramophone, which produced a material imprint (the 
grooves) of reality, instead of a linguistic relation. The visual presence of PowerPoint is digital – instead of a 
material impress knowledge is now one governed by numerical logics. The author of a PowerPoint slide creates a 
digital simulacrum of her ideas. That digital simulacrum is then copied –still digitally – to a magnetic spinning disk 
(if a hard-drive), or translated into electrical impulses (if a projector’s cord) and then displayed through the 
manipulation of light and shadow. Seeing the light instantiates yet an additional relation, this time with the visual 
copy of the electrical signal of the digital rendering of the physically typed mentally conceived notion. If Kahfi loves 
science for the prospect of pure communication, Kittler directs us to the ever-proliferating set of relations emerging 
from technological advancement.  
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to their background (in the default settings), ostensibly the units of truth leading towards 
necessary conclusions. PowerPoint, like English and psychological science before it, is morally 
neutral.  
In the development of the exegesis of Psycho-cybernetics Mutakhir, PowerPoint did not 
constrain the interpretation; it produced the frame that rendered it legible to the audience in the 
first place. Psycho-cybernetics lets us be more like PowerPoint: positive input + positive process 
= positive outcome. Embedded links and sequential slides deliver us towards predetermined 
ends. Into this elegant system intrudes a rather large metaphysical wrench. The logically prior, in 
the Kahfi context, is God. The cybernetic frame, insofar as it occasions self-on-self efficacy, 
allows only for Divine design, not intervention. Kahfi students initially addressed this potential 
problem through a postural reading of psycho-cybernetics: positive input + positive process = 
positive outcome if and only if God wills it. But simply appending insya Allah was not sufficient. 
Further authorization was required.  
Psycho-cybernetics, along with similar self-help derived materials, flirts with a 
threatening theological prospect for the community at Kahfi Motivator School. Namely, a 
slippery notion of agency that conflicts with the normative assumptions actively promulgated 
within the institution. Contemporary normative Sunni theology – both the Ash’ari school which 
dominates in Indonesia and the Maturidi school which prevails in South Asia and elsewhere – 
relies on an analysis of agency that can be fairly termed occasionalism. This is the notion that 
while humans have (contingently, ultimately illusory) free intentions, the singular independent 
cause is God. Majid Fakhry’s still classic Islamic Occasionalism defines this position at the very 
outset of the text: “the belief in the exclusive efficacy of God, of whose direct intervention the 
events of nature are alleged to be the overt manifestation or ‘occasion.’” (9). Changing oneself, 
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self-help in its liberal-garb, looks suspiciously like the misattribution of divine agency to a figure 
of the creation. In the immediate pragmatics of the motivational context, this isn’t necessarily a 
problem, but if the efficacy of the self is increasingly valorized the conflict becomes 
unavoidable. There is no “I” that can change absent the Divine Will. Nesting educational 
materials at Kahfi within legibly Islamic frames (starting class with the recitation of the Divine 
attributes, closing with praise hymns directed to the personage of the Prophet) goes some 
distance towards easing this potential error, but these practices are not thought to reconcile the 
competing epistemes entirely – several student voiced objections to these technologies of the 
self. In some instances, Om Bagus had a ready answer, in others he deferred to the greater 
Islamic traditional learning of some of his advanced Kahfi students. It was in this role that Salih, 
introduced in the previous chapter, really shined. Into this context, psycho-cybernetics as a 
mechanical intervention assumes new potentials. The potential tension is further mediated by the 
direction of the psycho-cybernetic intervention towards others. The explicit intention of the 
original English-language authors notwithstanding, psycho-cybernetics is deployed as a 
technology for healing others, for channeling Divine efficacy (in the Kahfi context) into other 
humans’ aspirational projects. 
  Psycho-cybernetics is understood as an other-oriented technology of agentive change. 
They are also repeatedly framed within a larger project of motivasi. The history of Kahfi, from 
its early days as Kahfi al-Karim Public Speaking School in 2003 to its eventual reincorporation 
as Kahfi Motivator School, is partially the history of the gathering solidity of its key term, 
motivasi. According to Om Bagus, as narrated for my benefit, the operation of the school led to a 
dawning awareness that what really distinguished an effective public speaker was motivasi – the 
ability to impart this precious quality to her or his listeners. Breaking from his explanation, 
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motivasi can be understood as having meaningful overlap with two categories of familiar social 
analysis: charisma and magic. Here we have the problem ofcompounded familiarity. I am 
proposing to understand “motivation,” which is seldom ascribed “depth” in academic literature, 
in light of “magic” which has been extensively charted. But motivasi isn’t motivation, and the 
anthropological categories of magic still permit further exploration. So what sort of verbal magic 
allows for the communication of motivasi? 
Charisma and the Motivator’s Gift 
There is no substitute for watching the deft crowd-bending skills of an accomplished 
motivational speaker. Time and again, before highly varied audiences, I watched listeners 
acknowledge and accede to Om Bagus’s authority. At least in common usage, the quality that 
induces and compels the audience is charisma. For such an understanding, of course, we are 
indebted to Max Weber and his protracted engagement s with notions of power, order, dominion, 
leadership and authority. The Herrschaft (leadership which induces obedience)
192
 typified by 
charisma relies on that denoted in the Greek kharisma, which is to say, a gift of grace. Weber 
traces out these qualities most clearly in the Chapter Three of Economy and Society (212-254), 
although the classic translation suggests “domination” for “Herrschaft.” The gift of charisma, so-
accorded, is not easily transferred (Weber, 246): in the classic typology attempts to fix or solidify 
such a relational attribute slide either into ratio-juridical Herrschaft or traditional Herrschaft. 
That does not mean, for Weber or many of his interlocutors, that this ostensibly Divinely-
                                                             
192
 I am grateful to Ira Allen, an accomplished German translator as well as a rhetorical theorist, for insisting on this 
particular sense of Herrschaft (compelling obedience). The search for corroborating evidence drove me back to 
David Warren Sabean’s Power in the Blood. Sabean explores Weber’s categories in early modern Germany, an 
examination that finds “an inner connection between the feudal forms of Herrschaft as concrete institutions and 
modern Herrschaft in industrial nation states” (24). Sabean continues this argument, writing, “Words such as 
‘power’ are too amorphous to be of much analytical value for investing the relationships under consideration here. 
‘Domination’ in turn expresses on the carrying through of one’s will. What Weber has offered as the central defining 
element of ‘Herrschaft’  at once gives the concept its analytical value and provides a program of research running 
through Western history – namely Herrschaft as the evocation of obedience” (ibid).   
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accorded capacity cannot be achieved through this-worldly actions – the key constitutive element 
is the assent and ascription, the relationship, between audience-cum-followers and the 
charismatic.  
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Figure 14
193
   Om Bagus on Public Speaking in the Conceptual Era 
Om Bagus, see above in Figure 14, crafted the coursework on motivation and public 
speaking, aiming to teach charisma, in order that his students may have the Herrschaft necessary 
to motivate. Cultivating Herrschaft, at Kahfi Motivator School, is a central objective animating 
the curriculum: the ability to produce authority that compels the audience to accede to the 
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 This image, used with permission from Om Bagus’s website, is a poster advertising his book, Public Speaking in 
the Conceptual Era. The poster promises that the text, “reveals, in a detailed fashion, the secret of successful 
speaking, [via] with frameworks of thought & the brain’s mechanism of operation, hypnosis, the unconscious, and is 
further augmented with guides to practicing gestural expression, mimicry and vocal training.”    
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speaker. During my time as a student at the school, studying public speaking, Islamic 
hypnotherapy and psycho-cybernetics, my particular assent to the charisma of Om Bagus was 
inextricably bound to the roles I was asked to perform within the institution. My recognition was 
a further demonstration of Om Bagus’s Herrschaft (look, even the foreigner is in thrall!). I was 
also accorded a minor reservoir of prestige and potential charisma myself (the gestural range, 
English competency and racial privilege mentioned above), that nevertheless failed to coalesce 
into the Herrschaft capable of molding an audience to my whim. Although my focus here is not 
on how Kahfi pedagogy was filtered through my identity, it did come into play concerning 
motivasi – privileged difference produces an effect not unlike charisma, although it rapidly 
diminishes with familiarity. Charisma, however, is best understood with an enduring air of the 
enchanted. This sense shapes the concept, and helps explain how motivational speaking, despite 
its origins (filtered and translated American texts), continues to promise possibilities outside of, 
and irreducible to, liberal and/or secular projects.  
As stated at the outset, the motivasi/motivation that I studied at Kahfi is hardly limited to 
the Indonesian archipelago. The materials we encountered in the classroom and the 
demonstrations to which we were privy participated in a globalized circulation of both text and 
concept that shaped the available practices and understandings of motivasi. Most of the core 
content at the Kahfi Motivator School was developed outside of Indonesia. The process through 
which it came to be meaningfully and recognizably accepted as locally appropriate is in keeping 
with the processes discussed earlier with reference to hypnotherapy. At Kahfi, motivasi was 
provided with novel genealogies that were read onto canonical Islamic texts. These were then 
coupled with new aspirational ends for motivational practice, also conceived in explicitly Islamic 
frames. These operations helped situate this domain of knowledge as acceptable, salient, and 
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worthy of study. Similar to James Hoesterey argument in “Prophetic Cosmopolitanism,” at Kahfi 
the Prophet was re-framed as a master motivator.    
 Working in a seemingly distant context – contemporary Sweden, characterized as 
extensively secularized – Anne-Christine Hornborg has described related phenomenon under the 
aegis of “re-enchanting secular society.” Hornborg traces this process in two linked articles, “Are 
We All Spiritual?” (bringing her native Sweden into conversation with her fieldwork with the 
Mi’kmaq Indians in Canada) and "Designing Rites to Re-enchant Secularized Society.” In the 
latter article she explores the proliferation of organizations and methods addressed to the desire 
for a “personally transformative experience” in contemporary Sweden. She constructs a list of 
key elements of these experiences, elements that seem familiar from the motivational practices I 
observed in Indonesia: “individual-centered rites; the imperative to realize one’s authentic Self; 
self-appointed leaders … and the radical transformation of one’s being as an intensely emotional 
experience” (403). Such a list resembles the attributes Parker and Nilan ascribed to the 
burgeoning market in “Islamic self-help,” which further accords with Hornborg’s focus on the 
“commercialization” of these practices as a key feature of their emergence. For Hornborg, these 
movements and practices are best understood against a backdrop of secularization – her chosen 
frame was the expanding Euro-American trend, organized around a self-definition by 
participants as “spiritual-not-religious.” Into these movements she recognized a desire that had 
been displaced from a more traditional religious framework onto an ostensibly secular goal of 
self-improvement. From Kahfi Motivator School in the outskirts of Jakarta, however, the secular 
backdrop strikes one as less germane. A densely interrelated set of desires and practices have 
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emerged precisely within the fold of what is considered the properly religious.
194
 Kahfi, with its 
insistent Islamic self-framing, seems a poor candidate for “spiritual-not-religious,” yet it 
participates freely in related technologies of change.   
One key element, as identified in Hornborg’s analysis, is the intense emotionality of the 
personal transformative experience. The affective dimension of change – how it is occasioned, 
how it is recognized, how it is subjectively experienced – is one of the well-scrutinized features 
of the Indonesian example. Rudnyckyj, in Spiritual Economies refers to these practices in 
concert with the notion of “governing through affect.” Rudnyckyj discerns in this affective 
modality the operations of neoliberal economic logics and social orderings. For Rudnyckyj, this 
amounts to a partially rationalized charisma: participants in management seminars experience the 
affective dimensions of the course but those experiences are leveraged towards rational 
economic goals (paramount among them, productivity). For James Hoesterey in the forthcoming 
Sufis and Self-Help Gurus, by contrast, the aims of these practices are perhaps not so obvious. 
He observes in the nexus of piety, civic engagement and popular psychology a novel 
phenomenon. The affective rewards to, as well as the affective commitments of, participants in 
these projects deserve greater and more careful attention. At the heart of motivational speaking is 
a rhetorical strategy relying on the affective modality of communication. Although common 
usage now suggests that rhetoric be understood in terms of cognition, at least since Aristotle 
pathos has been a part of the rhetorical canon. George Kennedy, in his translation of Rhetoric, 
lists the tripartite division of demonstrations (pisteis): “for some are in the character [ethos] of 
the speaker, and some in disposing the listener in some way, and some in the speech [logos] 
                                                             
194
 Julia Day Howell made precisely this argument a decade ago in “Muslims, the New Age and Marginal Religions 
in Indonesia.” There she explored the adoption of “New Age” movements by urban Muslims, understood in the 
context of the new possibilities allowable in post-New Order Indonesia.  
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itself, by showing or seeming to show something” (38). The affective modality, at least 
according to Kennedy’s translation, consists not in a “base” appeal to emotion, but rather in the 
successful “disposing the listener in some way.” Motivasi, at Kahfi, is highly interested in an 
allied theory of efficacious speech. If political liberalism would level the charge of demagoguery 
at emotional reasoning, in the hands of a skilled motivator, the emotional register is the key to 
the audience’s heart; to real persuasion – to change.  
Motivational speaking is illiberal speech. It crosses boundaries that the liberal political 
imaginary has erected between legitimate argumentation and demagoguery. Of course, 
motivational speaking is a technology, not an end in-and-of itself. Motivasi, on the tongue of the 
skilled practitioner, is morally neutral, or for Kahfi students perhaps even evocative of the moral 
example of the Prophet. Effective public speaking relies on an affective modality that invites the 
rebuke of charlatanry and manipulation – and then obviates it, by the assent of the audience. It 
feels true. Internal to motivational speaking discourse, the affective commitments of the speaker 
are markers of honesty and truth – not signs of manipulation at all. Furthermore, the rationality 
from which affect is criticized only makes sense within a framework of Cartesian dualism. 
Muslims in Indonesia have alternative epistemologies at their disposal. Kahfi Motivator School 
incorporates texts heavily marked by a Cartesian impress, but its actual engagements with these 
self-help materials do not always reflect their origins. In normative accounts of consciousness, 
Muslims often conceive of the mind as an organ subservient to the heart. Appeals to the heart, 
then, are potentially superior to purely ratio-cognitive argumentation. The locus of meaningful 
persuasion lies not in the brain, but in the quasi-sensory organ most receptive to the Divine and 
the divine attribute of truth: the heart (at once a seat of base emotion and refined spirit). 
 
 
283 
 
Where the rationalizing impulse appears in Indonesian motivational practice, it is not at 
the level of modality but rather strategy. We can see this strategy in the naming practices of 
moral transformation organizations. Consider the cases explored by Daromir Rudnyckyj (ESQ: 
emotional spiritual quotient) and James Hoesterey (Manajemen Qolbu, management of the 
heart). Quotient, in the first instance, invites science to mediate between emotion and spirit, 
suggesting a technical relationship. Management of the heart, too, suggests that neutral 
(management) operations of relational mastery are germane to the governance of the heart. This 
naming strategy is visible in other, related enterprises. Just down the road from Kahfi, in Ciputat, 
a spiritual counseling business operates under the header Bengkel Rohani (spiritual maintenance, 
where maintenance is the same term used for an automotive repair garage). What these three 
examples suggest is not that affective changes are purely matters of mechanics, management or 
mathematics. Rather the naming strategy brings the scientific-truth effect, the reproducibility of 
their technologies, to the fore. The actual locus of the change, however, remains the heart: a 
realm close to the divine, subject to affect over-and-above logic.   
Motivational materials, borrowing the mantle of scientific technologies, are disseminated 
with an eye towards reproducibility (which is to say, one version of rationalization). However, 
the targets of the materials at Kahfi, at least, are resolutely non-rational. This too is in keeping 
with the original Weberian typology. As one recent reader of Weber notes, “In fact, Weber refers 
to irrationality as ‘anti-rational’ and stresses that the charismatic leader believes and is believed 
in especially because it goes against what we know” (Adair-Toteff, 195). Because we need to be 
convinced, our belief is that much stronger once we are convinced. There is an instrumental 
adoption of this logic in currency at Kahfi: the “counter-intuitive reveal,” Subverting an 
audience’s logical expectations, in concert with an “affective appeal,” are key elements in the 
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motivator’s arsenal. Charisma, as embodied and modeled at Kahfi Motivator School, frequently 
relies on counter-intuitive pronouncements, and even outright anti-rationality. The emphasis on 
“divine arithmetic” (the exhortation to expand one’s aspirations in keeping with the power of an 
unlimited Divine) is an example of the latter, while the technical insight that the key part of a 
speech is best delivered at one-quarter volume (the sudden drop in volume compelling the 
audience to lean in, to focus) an example of the former. Charisma, in the exercise, must exceed 
the bounds of logic that may play a role in producing it. The heart can be managed, the spirit 
repaired, but despite the rationalization and reproducibility of these processes, their actual 
conduct depends on an affective modality. Mastery of that modality corresponds to the ultimately 
unquantifiable – to charisma, itself an after-image of the Divine. And so motivasi eludes the 
rational back to the safe reaches of the ineffable.  
Motivation and Magic 
At Kahfi, as well as during the truncated lessons offered by Bagus Bina Cendekia (Bagus 
Makes Scholars, the for-profit sister enterprise) for paying customers, “ice-breakers” are an 
important tool in pursuit of motivasi. Ice-breakers are short performances, which engage, relax or 
convene an audience – demands for attention that win one’s listeners to one’s side. Examples 
practiced by Kahfi students included riddles, jokes, simple call-and-response patter, or 
entertainment magic, in particular, sleight-of-hand (sulap). In Kahfi classrooms, stage magic 
(sulap) was carefully distinguished from the illicit magic of sorcery (sihir). Sulap relied on 
mechanical dexterity and easily fooled perception, sihir on the enlistment of superhuman and 
malevolent energies – illicit agencies that broke the Divine demand to accord efficacy only to the 
Divine. Om Bagus is an accomplished master of sleight-of-hand and Kahfi students are 
instructed so as to become reasonable practitioners of several simple illusions. This was one 
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more avenue where I could only ever disappoint. Unable to carry a tune at karaoke (a common 
Kahfi decompression activity after stressful events), I could barely force my fumbling fingers 
over the concealed locking mechanism on a trick-box. But I saw the illusions work their magic, 
time and again.   
Graham Jones, an anthropologist of Christian preaching, has observed similar 
phenomena. Writing in “Magic with a Message,” he describes a tradition he refers to as 
“Christian conjuring.” Jones writes about the special techniques employed by Christian stage 
magicians as they navigate the potentially fraught worlds of gospel evangelizing and magic 
entertainment. The effect of the novel syntheses they strike are intended to be more convincing 
to their audiences than other modalities of testimony. Towards that goal of persuasion, in their 
performances, Jones writes, “the magician hybridizes domains that may seem otherwise 
incompatible: spectacular entertainment and ritual speech, popular culture and religion, and—
most impressively—magic and Christianity” (194). The performers ability to “hybridize 
domains,” identified by Jones, has real parallels in the Kahfi context.  
Incorporating stage magic into Islamic motivational practice runs some of the same risks 
as Jones’s Christian conjuring because similar domains are interwoven in the encounter. This is 
perhaps less true for the first two opposed terms: Spectacular entertainment and ritual speech are 
not obviously in competition for Indonesian Muslims. Nor do popular culture and religion 
necessarily compete – at least, not at the present moment since the two domains are (imagined to 
be) densely interpenetrated. All of the efforts to purify adat and Islam (Chapter 1), conducted by 
successive political regimes, fail to defeat the creative assemblages that continue to employ them 
as available parts. However, the last opposition is more salient. Magic and Islam require careful 
negotiation – and often explicit disavowals. One of Jones’s interlocutors, speaking to the 
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normative ethics of Christian conjuring, insists before each performance that, “I’m an illusionist, 
not a miracle worker. I believe in miracles because I believe in God, but I don’t do miracles, I do 
tricks. I keep the secrets, but I tell you the truth” (203). At Kahfi, Om Bagus had no such 
compunction about the tradecraft. Although he shared the insistence on the illusory quality of his 
virtuosic performance, he happily divulged all of the secrets of their accomplishment. It was 
clearly important to Om Bagus in these performances that no one displaced special or extra-
human efficacy onto the performer – preempting one potent reservoir of potential critique.  
Jesse Shipley, writing about preachers, comedians, and logics of speech in contemporary 
Ghana, details how the, “threat of fakery both haunts and mobilizes pastoral authority” (534). 
Something akin to this is also at work with motivasi. The existence of charlatans, of fakes, is 
what secures the authenticity of the audience’s experience. Other people’s inauthentic experience 
adds to the richness of one’s own affectively testified authentic experience of motivation. In 
Shipley’s account, preachers’ response to this peril works on two registers. First, directly 
acknowledging that others may be faking inoculates the speaker against this charge. Then, by 
transgressing speech norms, the preachers demonstrate their authenticity: “charismatic preaching 
challenges the indirect speaking characteristic of Ghanaian public life, emphasizing immediacy, 
sincerity, and directness as metacodes for moral authority” (534). Both of these axes are 
pertinent to motivasi at Kahfi. “Fake” motivators offer hollow affective experiences that do not 
yield meaningful transformations in the lives of their listeners. This fact is admitted within a 
motivational performance. Additionally, as discussed in the context of IofC patterns of self-
disclosure, Indonesian language ideologies privilege the supposed indirection of Indonesian 
speakers. By violating socially valorized indirection, Om Bagus asserts the moral urgency of his 
claim. We know this, because he is charismatic, thus his transgressions have communicative 
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content other than social failure. For Om Bagus and his Kahfi students, in addition to the 
rhetorical functions described below, candor about the performance of speaking, directly 
addressed to a fresh audience, confers moral authority.  
Many of the illusions taught at Kahfi rely on simple props (boxes with counter-intuitive 
opening mechanisms, fake thumbs with a recessed storage area, marked cards). These props are 
for sale at most Kahfi speaking engagements, and business is usually brisk after Om Bagus has 
explained each of the illusions he performs. As an audience-engagement strategy, the magic-trick 
followed by the detailed explanation is near-genius. The audience is first impressed by the 
virtuosity of the illusionist, then flattered by their inclusion in the select company that 
understands “what’s really going on.” The broader effect is itself rhetorical sleight-of-hand: 
understanding is a poor proxy for capacity. The exposed mechanics of the illusion promise its 
reproducibility, but absent extensive practice, it’s a rare audience member who having acquired 
the necessary props can produce the same illusion. This realization, however, is usually 
precluded by a rapid transition into other material. Wow them with magic, invite them into the 
club, talk about something else. The point isn’t, of course, the sleight-of-hand. The point is 
motivasi. 
The magic tricks taught and performed at Kahfi seem to operate in parallel to the broader 
notions of motivation-charisma. Motivational speaking training does not offer the transfer of the 
reproducible properties of charisma. Rather it traffics in the promise of charisma, and its success 
in this regard is an effect of the motivational speaker’s capacities. Motivation, as an object of 
desire, may be cast in procedural terms, demystified and rationalized. But the continued salience 
of the motivational speaker herself, of the embodied charisma holding an audience in thrall, 
belies its operationalization as a marketplace good. Magic, of course, is an enduring object of 
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scholarly inquiry.
195
 In his captivating 2005 work, Kupilikula, Harry West describes the 
operations in the unseen realm through which malevolence is countered, the term for which is the 
title of the work: “Thus, power is an unending series of transcendent and transformative 
maneuvers, each one moving beyond, countering, inverting, overturning, and/or reversing the 
one preceding it” (7). This is part of West’s larger claim that none of his interlocutors would (or 
even could) admit to sorcery – rather, the magics they practiced were more properly understood 
as counter sorcery. This insight echoes the foundational analysis of E. Evans-Pritchard in 
Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande: “we shall not understand Zande magic, and 
the differences between ritual behavior and empirical behavior in the lives of the Azande, unless 
we realize that its main purpose is to combat other mystical powers rather than to produce 
changes favourable to man in the objective world” (199). Evans-Pritchard concludes the chapter 
with twenty-two reasons why magic is not discounted – including the memorable observation 
that magic helps it rain in the rainy season, and prevents the rain in the dry season, ie, that magic 
augments empirically probable events. This does not limit magic to prophylaxis, nor to purely 
restorative interventions in the material world – but it does pose a vexing question for my 
suggestion that motivation be understood, in part, in its magical dimensions or aspirations. 
Magic, in the anthropological canon, becomes the discourse of power in the unseen realm, 
directed above all at other movements within the unseen realm. Towards what is motivation, in 
the unseen realm of intersubjective affect, directed? What is the other of motivation? Answers, 
such as they are, might be found in the kind of social encounters where motivasi is introduced – 
                                                             
195
 Reading Randall Styers Making Magic, I was struck by the thought that if the truest salafi is the Euro-American 
scholar of Islam, the greatest magician is surely an anthropologist. By this I mean that the relentless focus on piety 
distinguishes scholars of Islam from even its most ardent practitioners, and a faith in the efficacy of magic (even if 
it’s an explanatory efficacy) probably predominates amongst anthropologists relative the magic using peoples they 
study.  
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where a failure to act on the part of the audience constitutes a moral failing, and thus galvanizing 
their action a moral victory.  
A lot is being asked of motivasi. Motivasi comes to be the mark left on the selves, on the 
spirits, of the charismatic’s audience. It is a plea for personal transformation: change me! It is felt 
with the affective intensity. It is a kind of verbal magic. And here we are back to the 
supernatural, the mystical, the irrational core of the charismatic Herrschaft. The gift, given by 
the Divine, of charisma cannot be understood exclusively on its material basis – and the demands 
made on motivation reveal an investment in it that exceeds the this-worldly goals of its 
instantiation. Perhaps motivation, seen in the North Atlantic as a salve for the disenchanted 
liberal subject, never fully dispelled the magic it is presumed to displace. Certainly in Indonesia, 
where “spiritual-but-not-religious” practice is directed towards Islamic personal aspirations, the 
situation is more complex than a linear theory of secularism can account for (and here I have 
inadvertently returned to Julia Day Howell’s argument in “‘Calling’ and ‘Training,’” cited 
above).  
The Source of Motivasi 
Already we have seen that the tremendous appetite for motivasi appears in diverse 
Indonesian contexts. As an object of desire, it permeates educational and popular spiritual 
discourses. It appears to promise material advancement without sacrificing spiritual attainment. 
In addition to the speech settings that called for motivasi introduced at the outset of this chapter 
(primary school audiences, mosque-attendees, condemned prisoners), colleagues report similar 
injunctions whether invited to an undergraduate history course or guest lecturing at an Islamic 
seminary. Motivasi, in the face of these imperatives, is not simply enacted, but has a weight, a 
substance-like quality that can be imparted to a receptive audience. Motivasi is an affective 
 
 
290 
 
disposition, but also a transferable property. It is furthermore opaque – perhaps most of all to its 
enthusiastic promoters. Twice I asked, point-blank, how will I know when my audience has been 
motivated? In both instances, my interlocutor had no response but to repeat the injunction: 
dimotivasi. Motivasi is self-disclosing, and seeing it is knowing it   
One of the great resources available to anyone interested in contemporary Indonesia is 
the rapidly proliferating repositories of undergraduate theses called skripsi. An institutional 
requirement for bachelor’s degrees (sarjana 1, S1), skripsi vary in detail, original content and 
readability, much like their counterparts produced in American universities. Along with 
fascinating original research conducted for the production of these documents, they also provide 
a searchable snapshot of concerns broadly salient to college-aged students. Unsurprisingly, 
“motivasi” appears with great frequency in the titles of recently submitted skripsi. Two particular 
clusters emerge: skripsi detailing school-based instruction and skripsi concerned with Islamic 
teaching and learning. One particular skripsi, produced at Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) 
Walisongo Semarang in 2008 (now UIN Walisongo Semarang), provides an excellent point of 
departure into the recent etymology of “motivation.” 
  In completion of his S1 degree, Sholikul Hadi wrote a case study of “Children’s 
Religious Motivations,” (Motivasi Keberagamaan pada Anak) set at a mosque in a neighborhood 
adjacent to the IAIN Walisongo campus (Purwoyoso in Ngaliyan, just west of Semarang). 
Helpfully, he defined motivasi at the outset of his second chapter, drawing first on Indonesian 
educational researchers, and then from one of the most popular English-Indonesian dictionaries 
(Echols and Shadily). Sholikul writes, “motivasi originates from the word motive that means 
‘everything that pushes [mendorong] someone to act to do something.’ In English, the word 
motivasi originates from the word “motivation” that means “inner [batin] power [daya] or urge 
 
 
291 
 
[dorongan]” (15). There are several compelling features of this circular definition. One is the 
adoption of the John Echols and Hassan Shadily gloss of motivation as daya batin. This 
particular translation smuggles in Indonesian connotations of interiority, esoteric knowledge, and 
of a suite of meditation practices already denoted by the compound daya batin. Additionally, the 
ubiquity of dorong (push) suggests just how much work is being done by motivation. In modern 
Indonesian, mendorong has come to possess manifold senses: to push; to impel; to encourage; to 
promote; to spur; to incite; to prompt; to exhort; to pressure; etc. There is a sense of physical 
propulsion through the material world alongside a vast range of psychological inducements to 
activity.        
As Sholikul continues to elaborate his arguments in his skripsi, he further synthesizes 
available resources on motivasi:  
From several existing understandings of motivasi we can conclude that literally [secara 
harfiah] motivasi means urges [dorongan], reasons [alasan], intentions or desires 
[kehendak atau kemauan], whereas as a technical term [istilah] motivasi is the power of 
mobilizing force [daya penggerak kekuatan] within a person that impels her 
[mendorongnya] to do a certain activity and provides direction towards the achievement 
of goals, both those compelled [didorong] or stimulated [dirangsang] from without as 
well as those from within (15-16).   
 
Motivasi, for Sholikul, can be “stimulated” from outside, but fundamentally refers to an internal 
feature of a human. As he explains, “other people can provide inspiration [ilham], influence, or 
even order us to do something, but what becomes motivasi is decided within and by ourselves 
[yang menjadi motivasi adalah diri kita sendiri yang menentukannya]” (16). Reflecting the 
findings of a Pakistani scholar available in translation,
196
 Sholikul distils the three qualities of 
motivasi as he intends to analyze it amongst the children at the mosque used in his case study. 
Motivasi mobilizes (menggerakkan); gives direction (mengarahkan); and sustains (menopang) 
                                                             
196
 Cited by Sholikul as Muhammad `Usman Najati, Jiwa Manusia (Dalam Sorotan Al-Qur`an). Trans Ibnu Ibrahim. 
Jakarta: CV. Cendekia Sentra Muslim, 2001. Print. 
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(17). This cascade of argument to situate the key term for his study suggests yet another feature 
of motivasi: Motivasi is also an incitement to discourse – it demands explanation, elaboration, 
demonstration. Hundreds (if not thousands) of skripsi can be found that trace out the origin and 
meanings of motivasi in contemporary Indonesia.  
The Nature and Use of Motivasi 
 Motivation, in its psychological usage, is of very recent coinage in English and 
Indonesian alike. In the current Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesi, the noun “motivasi” is, “the urge 
[dorongan] that emerges within someone consciously or unconsciously to take an action towards 
a specific goal.” 197 The verb, memotivasi, meanwhile, denotes “giving motivasi; creating fertile 
conditions for the emergence of motives.”198 In the Oxford English Dictionary, the English-
language history is not particularly long – following its translation from literary analysis into 
psychological interiority (a well-traversed 19
th
 century argument), motivation picks up “[t]he 
general desire or willingness of someone to do something; drive, enthusiasm” only in post-World 
War II scholarship. Enthusiasm here is instructive. “Beri motivasi” has largely replaced the older 
Indonesian instruction to “beri semangat.” Semangat, or spirit; life force; enthusiasm, retains its 
potency as a marker of nationalist commitment. But semangat revolusi, or revolutionary fervor, 
now contains bloody remnants of the leftist entanglements the Indonesian nationalist cause 
became subject to in the latter years of Soekarno’s presidency. And so motivasi enters: 
deconfessionalized, de-nationalized, scientific-psychological, and politically neutral. Motivasi 
carries, strongly, the aura of epistemic neutrality. This makes the magic demanded of it all the 
more striking.  
                                                             
197
 “Dorongan yg timbul pd diri seseorang secara sadar atau tidak sadar untuk melakukan suatu tindakan dng tujuan 
tertentu” (“motivasi”). 
198
 “Memberikan motivasi; menciptakan suasana yg subur untuk lahirnya motif” (“memotivasi”). 
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From the perspective taught at Kahfi, Indonesian Muslims need motivasi because they 
are afflicted with a constellation of spiritual ailments that distance them from their Creator, from 
each other, and from an honest internal relationship with self. Distance from God is not a new 
affliction, but motivasi is a new remedy. Motivasi discourse maintains that it is continuous with 
the moral suasion practiced by the Prophet. Externally, as a tradition in these terms, it’s about 
thirty-years old. Without motivasi, people are imagined to be consigned to a life characterized by 
stasis, misdirection (or lack of direction) and unsustainability. The verbal magic of the motivator 
ignites innate (ie, Divinely ordained, rather than self-possessed) capacities for action, guidance 
and stamina. Listen as Om Bagus exhorts a school-aged audience, from a lecture given in 
February 2014.
199
 Having walked the audience through his argument on the necessity of 
“motivasi pola pikir,” (the motivasi of mindset, a motivasi paradigm), Om Bagus revives their 
flagging attention with a light-hearted illusionist display right around the hour mark. “[I] use[d] a 
device!” he exclaims,200 breaking down the technique for seemingly changing a small bill into a 
larger unit of currency. Om Bagus then smoothly transitions to a larger message: “That used a 
device ma’am,” he tells a woman towards the front of the audience. “So we aren’t stupid or 
deceived by people [as he removes the fake thumb through which the illusion was 
accomplished]. So that that Muslim communities (masyarakat Islam) won’t be stupid. Because 
now Islam is opposed by, firstly, ignorance. Secondly, poverty. And the third enemy of Islam is 
conflict. So those three things. Stage magic (sulap)? Pull back the curtain! (bocorin, reveal it, 
release it).”201 Om Bagus’s rhetorical strategy authorizes the audience’s enjoyment of his 
                                                             
199
 Given at a mosque in the private housing development Bumi Serpong Damai (BSD), in Tangerang, southwest of 
Jakarta, this is a relatively representative lecture. Om Bagus is wearing the relaxed uniform appropriate to the venue 
(batik and peci) and speaks in a moderated form of his often highly-animated stage persona given the setting within 
a mosque.  
200
 Pakai alat! 
201
 Jadi dia pakai alat Bu, he tells a woman towards the front of the audience. Supaya kita nggak bodoh dan tidak 
ditipu orang [as he removes the fake thumb through which the illusion was accomplished]. Supaya masyarakat Islam 
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gratifying performance (laughter accompanies each illusion from the off-screen audience in this 
video posted to YouTube). Being amused, he asserts, is no threat to Islam – ignorance, poverty 
and conflict are the enemies. By closing this particular lecture with an “ice-breaker,” Om Bagus 
is able to send the audience home on a high, having witnessed and enjoyed the performance. The 
affective modality here is employed not in pursuit of a personally transformative experience, but 
rather in the anchoring of specific communicative material (the real threats to Islam) to a 
pleasing affective state (mirth). Mastery of affect is not just delivering an audience to wracking 
sobs and quivering tears – as in Aristotle, it is “disposing the listener in some way.” This, too, is 
motivasi. And this is change that originates from outside of the self.  
Motivasi and the Military Aesthetic  
It was after 1:00am when we faced down the unit leaders of the fresh recruits. I was 
confronted by tired eyes, several looks of confusion, a stern gaze that might harbor defiance. The 
unit leaders, alongside their charges, had spent much of the past hour on the asphalt, staring up at 
the night sky, rolling over or enduring repeated bouts of verbal abuse. We had set out late: 
plowing through driving rain in dilapidated buses, heading for the hills that loomed past Bogor, 
venturing to Jakarta’s far south. I surveyed the makeshift camouflage uniforms of the eight 
young men standing before me. Their hair was rain-streaked, makeup and dirt smeared across 
their cheeks. I was tasked with further jarring them from their complacency, with instilling a 
sense of camaraderie and discipline. And so I went for the time-honored technique of the riddle, 
demanding from each of the unit leaders an account of what was wrong in their unit. I did so, as 
instructed, in English, with the aim of adding further confusion to their experience. Regardless of 
the response, I informed each of them that no, that was not what I had in mind. Two uniformed 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
tidak bodoh. Karena sekarang Islam itu bermusuhan oleh pertama kebodohan, kedua kemiskinan, [pause]. Dan 
musuh Islam yang ketiga adalah conflict. Jadi tiga hal itu. Sulap? Bocorin… 
 
 
295 
 
compatriots, wearing black berets, stared over my shoulders, holding makeshift newspaper 
batons aloft, as if to strike. Everyone was tired. Everyone was wet. And it would be three more 
hours before permission to sleep was granted, itself brief respite for an hour terminated by the 
morning call to worship.  
No, this was not paramilitary training – although it borrowed the aesthetic. We were not 
preparing to wage war. This was Orientasi Studi dan Pengenalan Kampus (Course Orientation 
and Campus Introduction), or ospek as the Indonesian acronym has it. Ospek is the now 
ubiquitous orientation for university students, conducted not only by departments, but also by 
extracurricular clubs and student organizations. Beyond “orientation” as it might be imagined in 
other university contexts, ospek has come to resemble the ritualized inductions of fraternity 
pledging or membership in secret societies. As subsequent generations of “seniors” devise ever-
more exacting forms of hazing rituals, the practice has come in for widespread condemnation.
202
 
Maiming and even deaths have been attributed to ospek,
203
 although the most recent controversy 
concerned a seemingly heretical “theme” for the ospek: Tuhan Membusuk,204 or “Rotting God.” 
In Indonesia, as the fall semester begins, another season of sensationalist news accounts prepares 
to inform the wider public of the new horrors being perpetrated on university students. Along the 
                                                             
202
 “Ospek Berbau Kekerasan di UNILA Terekam Video Amatir.” Liputan6. September 13, 2014. Web. March 15, 
2015. This report is titled, “Ospek with a whiff of violence at University of Lampung is recorded in an amateur 
video.” 
203
 Ramadhan, Mitra. “Balon Gas Meledak Saat Ospek, 4 Mahasiswa Unis Terluka.” Merdeka. September 13, 2014. 
Web. March 15, 2015. This headline, from Merdeka, reads “Gas balloon explodes during Ospek, 4 students of 
Islamic University of Shaykh Yusuf injured.”   
204
 For an opinion piece explaining both the intentions of the organizers and the controversy, see Fikr, Ghazwal. 
“Perlukah Membela ‘Tuhan Membusuk’.” Hidayatullah.com. September 8, 2014. Web. March 12, 2015. For other 
coverage concerning the mobilized response to this theme, see “Usut Kasus Ospek Bertema "Tuhan Membusuk", 
Polisi Periksa Sekjen FPI Jatim.” Kompas. September 22, 2014. Web. March 12, 2015.  
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way the term has jumped from its campus context to motorcycle gangs,
205
 entering contemporary 
Indonesian as a broad designation of ritual induction into a group or organization.  
Ospek at Kahfi Motivator School, according to interlocutors who were veterans of 
multiple ospek, wasn’t especially excessive. There was a mud course, eight stations 
testing/promoting different features of the Kahfi curriculum, and an awful lot of yelling.
206
 As a 
Kahfi student of the 9
th
 cohort, I was partly responsible for organizing the Ospek for the 13
th
 
cohort. This, however, posed a number of problems for the Kahfi community. On one hand, I 
wasn’t eligible to mengospek (subject others to ospek), since I had never been diospek (subjected 
to ospek). It seemed unfair that I would just waltz in and debase others without the tacit 
knowledge that I had been the recipient of ostensibly similar prior debasement. On the other 
hand, the Kahfi negotiation of status typically shunted high status individuals (established 
professionals, professors, religious instructors) into one of the special cohorts of Kahfi 
mentioned in the previous chapter on hypnotherapy: Kahfi Ustadh. If I seemed a poor candidate 
for mengospek, many members of the Kahfi community were equally uncomfortable with the 
notion that I might be diospek. And so, for one night only, I was inducted as an honorary 
member of Kahfi Ustadh. Along with two actual Ustadh (teacher, in Arabic, in Indonesian, 
Islamic studies instructor), I was tasked with manning one of the eight stations: the religion 
station (pos keagamaan). And so I spent the bulk of the ospek quizzing new students on 20 Sifat 
                                                             
205
 Nugraha, Candra. “Geng Motor XTC Bantah ada Ospek Kekerasan.” Tempo. January 11, 2014. Web. March 12, 
2015. This report, in Tempo, reads “Motorcycle Gang XTC denies [having] a violent ospek.”  
206
 There was also “pos nol,” or “zero post.” This post was attended only by those prospective students who were 
especially oki, or left-brained – that is, those who evinced skepticism or difficulty acceding to the social logics 
imposed on them. Here people were “broken down” (dibonkar; demolished, broken apart), such that they could be 
reassembled in configurations more conducive to the Kahfi curriculum.    
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Wajib bagi Allah,
207
 Shalawat Nariyah,
208
 and Asmaul Husna.
209
 Perhaps I was given this role 
because of my presumed moral force (as a foreign Muslim convert), but it is just as likely that it 
was assumed I could do the least damage here. The fact that I myself had not, at the time, 
memorized the 20 Sifat Wajib did nothing to dissuade the Kahfi facilitator who assigned me to 
the post.  
                                                             
207
 20 Sifat Wajib dan Mustahil bagi Allah, or “The 20 Necessary and [20] Impossible Attributes of God” is a 
concise statement of Ashar`i doctrine: it is a highly condensed version of the “Sanusi creed.” (See Watt, Islamic 
Creeds, 90-97). 
208
 Shalawat Nariyah, discussed in Chapter 4, is also referred to as Shalawat Tafrijiyyah and Shalawat Kamilah. It 
has been criticized for its invocation of the Prophet as an intercessor (instead of direct appeal to the Divine).  
209
 As we have already established in the materials on Islamic Hypnotherapy, Asmaul Husna are a devotional litany 
of divine names/attributes. Their recitation is considered a performance of zikir (dhikr), remembrance of, and 
reflection on, God.  
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Figure 15  Recruits and Facilitators at Kahfi Ospek 13 
The theme at Kahfi Osepk Angkatan 13, as it often is for ospek, was military (see Figure 
15 above). Those wearing camouflage in the center of the image are the prospective students 
subjected to the ospek; the smiling women in the foreground are part of the team conducting the 
ospek. The military represents an enduringly popular visual idiom for collectivities as convened 
in Indonesia. The expression of this idiom can be found in myriad social settings. Uniforms are 
ubiquitous, whether for an in-service day at the office, spent removing litter from a public park, 
or for a public performance of praise songs recited by a choral group drawn from an orphanage. 
As Gregory Simon argues in Caged in on the Outside for Minang speakers, in terms of mannered 
performances and ritual speech (basa basi), there is a tremendous value placed on being part of a 
group (76-85). Simon is following an argument in Frederick Errington’s Manners and Meaning, 
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also built around an analysis of Minang sociality. Both authors identify how erasing outward 
markers of individuality neutralize potential threats of intersubjective injury and corruption. The 
rewards are not purely defensive: both authors relate how the correct maintenance of surfaces – 
the adab of sociality – is a source of satisfaction, status and esteem. Similar claims have been 
made for Bugis speakers (Murni Mahmud, “Ritual of Politeness”), and could easily be advanced 
for Javanese and Indonesian as well. Not standing out, in language or appearance, is a 
meaningful commitment – whether motivated by objectified cultural norms, Islamic notions of 
adab, or attempts to protect the self. The military represents the apogee of this impulse: pure 
regimented collectivity. As such, the military may not represent itself. Martial organization 
suggests the fantasy of collectivity, but not necessarily investment in the particular structure of 
power and influence exercised by the Indonesian military. The willful embrace of this aesthetic 
offends many observers’ sensibilities (both domestic and foreign) because of the difficulty in 
parsing its instrumental use from other values assigned to the military, especially in light of a 
decades-long military-dominated dictatorship (some of the folks at IofC would have looked 
askance at military dress-up).     
The visceral appeal of the military as a marker of not only collectivity but also efficacy 
can be seen in other aspects of Kahfi performances. Student leadership at Kahfi (appointed by 
Om Bagus rather than elected), in conjunction with Om Bagus, frequently re-designed the 
graphics used in promotional material for the school. For a brief period, the graphic employed 
was Figure 16 below. At the time, Bagus Bina Cendekia (the for-profit arm of Kahfi) was still 
“Bagus Brain Communication” (clearly seen in the image), but Kahfi School of Public Speaking 
had already become the “Kahfi Motivator School.” It’s a fascinating image; the exuberant 
outstretched hands of Om Bagus, bedecked in full Kahfi regalia, anchoring the left side of the 
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banner graphic. Allah, in Arabic, is central, flanked on each side by images of helicopters lifted 
from posters or marketing material from the film Apocalypse Now. The right side of the image is 
peopled with senior Kahfi figures, two from my cohort, one from the third cohort (holding the 
plastic model carbine) and one from the 11
th
 cohort, wearing a headset as if somehow 
coordinating the movement of troops. The “block K” Kahfi logo is visible between the 
student/troops and the rightmost helicopter. Beneath the large print “Motivator School,” the 
poster reads in Indonesian, “The First Motivator Academy in Indonesia – D3 Plus” (D3 being a 3 
year associates degree). From American shores, it may be difficult to imagine the audience for 
this particular poster.
 
 
Figure 16   A Military Aesthetic at Kahfi 
The picture selected of Om Bagus, perhaps trying to capture his charisma, in conjunction 
with the military aesthetic, calls to mind first Benedict Anderson’s critical revision of the 
concept of charisma, occasioned by his analyses of Soekarno’s speeches invoking Adolf 
Hitler.
210
 There Anderson contests the utility of the category, particularly as it is stripped from 
                                                             
210
 Apropos our discussion here, Anderson characterizes Soekarno’s regard for Hitler as “technical” in nature. After 
claiming that Soekarno had no use for the language of charisma, Anderson write, “It is exactly the same reason that 
an expert conjuror, speaking about another conjuror, may well talk about technique, new tricks, style of patter, 
manual dexterity, stage presence, and so on but will never talk about…magic” (Language and Power, 87-88). Om 
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Weber’s emancipatory projects. Charisma survives in sociological analysis, Anderson claims, 
first because it allows anticolonial nationalism to “be given a socially pathological taint, and its 
vocal representatives figured as cynical or self-deluding charlatans” (Language and Power, 90-
91). The second reason is because it allows Euro-American modernity to “other” its own 
exemplars as aberrations, to “highlight Hitler’s ‘uniqueness,’ his demonic person, his teja…as 
opposed to his political skills, diplomatic dexterity, and intelligent support for the innovative 
economic policies of Hjalmar Schacht” (92-93). If Anderson feels the need to defend the “third 
world Big Man” from the derision of the post-World War II social scientific establishment (itself 
the vanguard of the new American liberal economic regime), we need maintain no such 
compunction. Om Bagus enjoys and employs the language of charisma. In practice and in 
representation, he marshals the efficacious associations of the military, widespread in Indonesia, 
to frame a project of largely moral renewal. Motivasi adheres not only to personal projects of 
moral transformation, but also to collective enterprises.      
There are many in Indonesia who might be repelled by this image. But for many in 
Kahfi’s primary audience the tools of military violence (the helicopters, the fake carbine) are 
interpreted first as symbols of adept orchestration. At the Kahfi Motivator School campus, in the 
ruko described in the previous chapter, the student volunteer responsible for the front desk (pos 
keamanan; security post) was obliged to wear a mock sheriff’s badge and a large plastic 
revolver. These symbols did not evoke violent repression – instead they marked the 
subordination of their individual bearer into the role assigned to her. Ranks and insignia were 
imagined to mark hierarchy while erasing individuality. This adopted a military logic while 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Bagus, however, is a teacher of motivasi. He draws not on essentially Javanese (despite his nominal Javanese 
ethnicity) theories of power, but on globally circulating discourses of self-efficacy. And he is, of course, a conjuror 
himself.  
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directing it towards an Islamic ethical end. While these symbols could be read as threatening, the 
role assigned to the security post at the ruko was to answer phones and ensure that entering 
students lined up their shoes appropriately. Instead of a tool of domination, the military regalia 
were understood as props for performances – the security post was about idealized conduct, not 
about safety or enforced hierarchy. The military, too, was understood as a technology that could 
be employed towards novel ends.  
The Graduates of Motivasi 
On May 19, 2013, Kahfi held the graduation ceremony for the 9
th
 cohort (my classmates), 
the 10
th
 cohort, and the 4
th
 and 5
th
 cohorts of Kahfi Ustadh (the special classes of Kahfi offered 
once weekly for educators). As part of the ceremony, the assembled students (each wearing their 
black Kahfi uniform, having shed the graduation robes) were led in an oath (Figure 17 below is a 
still image from the video of the proceedings): 
I testify that there is no god but God and I testify that Muhammad is the Messenger of 
God [the shahada, or testimony of faith for Muslims]. 
We, graduates of Kahfi Motivator School, swear to: 
One, as alumni of Kahfi, we will always protect the good name of our alma mater. Strive 
to develop knowledge of Islam/Islamic knowledge and devote it to the interests of 
religion, the nation, the state and humanity.  
Two, as Muslim graduates, we will be loyal and obedient in practicing the teachings of 
Islam and always aware of our responsibilities towards the welfare of the ummah [the 
community of the believers], the future of the nation and the Indonesian state based on 
the Qur’an and sunna rasulullah [the exemplary speech and actions of the Messenger of 
God].  
Three, as good citizens of the Republic of Indonesia, we will carry out our tasks and 
obligations to the best of our ability, giving priority to the interests of religion and the 
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nation, beneath the protection of Allah Subhanahu wa ta’ala [all Glory to God the Most 
High].
211
  
 
Figure 17   Kahfi Motivator School Graduation for Cohorts 9-10 
Watching a video recording of the proceeding, listening to the martial air (recalling Figure 16 
above, as well as Figure 17) with which the oath was read, it struck me as a quintessentially 
Kahfi moment. The oath foregrounded dual, and complementary, fealty to the nation and to 
Islam, articulated in such a manner as to pre-empt any possible conflict between these loyalties. 
This pattern is familiar from other mainstream Muslim organizations in Indonesia that make a 
habit of acknowledging the centrality of the state: a public argument that good citizenship is 
                                                             
211
 The complete oath:  
Asyhadu alaa ilaaha illallaah wa asyhadu anna muhammadar rasuulullaah 
Kami, sarjana Kahfi Motivator School, bersumpah: 
Satu, sebagai alumni Kahfi, kami akan selalu menjaga nama baik alma mater. Berusaha mengembangkan 
pengetahuan Islam dan mengabdikannya kepada kepentingan agama, bangsa, negara dan perikemanusiaan. 
Dua, sebagai sarjana Muslim, kami akan patuh dan setia melaksanakan ajaran-ajaran Islam dan selalu sadar 
akan tanggungjawab kami terhadap kesejahteraan umat, masa depan bangsa dan negara Indonesia yang 
dilandasi al-Qur'an dan sunna rasulullah  
Tiga, sebagai warga negara republik Indonesia yang baik, kami akan menjalankan tugas dan kewajiban 
sebaik-baiknya, mengutamakan kepentingan agama dan bangsa, di bawah lindungan Allah subhanahu wa 
ta’ala 
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coterminous with religious performance. Here, this was coupled with the explicit injunction to 
preserve the reputation of Kahfi, a moral obligation to reflect kindly on one’s teachers. The 
graduates of this ceremony had received motivasi and were charged with demonstrating that 
receipt in these key domains of public life. This oath, as a publicly undertaken commitment, 
doesn’t just evince aspirations – it is designed to function as prescriptive reality. This is what 
having motivasi is supposed to look like.   
The ambition of this oath – again, this was read for the graduation from a public speaking 
school – was in keeping with the lofty values encouraged at Kahfi, but geared towards an ethic of 
religious citizenship. This stands in opposition to an economic disposition that sometimes shapes 
other Kahfi enterprises – mastering public speaking in pursuit of a promotion or compensation. 
The goal of motivasi is not ultimately to improve material prospects (although that is one 
legitimate end). Instead the experiences of the students at Kahfi Motivator School are imagined 
to have delivered them to a certain adab. The repetition of elements within the oath, and the 
attention paid to the order of those elements, was about proper placement: the correct locations 
of action within the created world. Even during graduation Kahfi leaders were intent on 
advocating for correct notions of agency and the change it could provide. As such, reciters of this 
oath reserved the final invocation for God. “Within/Beneath the protection of God,” a stock 
formulation (dalam perlindungan Allah/di bawah lindungan Allah), occupies interesting 
rhetorical space in an oath. As a genre of speech, the oath is about accountability – an 
articulation of a public commitment. The supplication implicit in the formulation that closed the 
oath – akin to the generic “God Bless America” of American political discourse, or perhaps more 
aptly, “so help me God” of courtroom proceedings – sits somewhat uneasily in this context. It’s 
not clear from the recording what is encompassed within God’s protection. Given the pauses 
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necessary for accurate recitation (marked by the comma between “nation” and “beneath” above), 
as speech the protection of God rests uncertainly: it could be the nation which is under that 
protection, or the whole enterprise of fulfilling one’s civic responsibilities.  But despite this, it 
still feels necessary. It comprises the recognition and acknowledgement of God and cements the 
ethical aims of a Kahfi education: to move through the world cognizant of the protection of God, 
and the rights and responsibilities that devolve from that protection. This, then, is the adab of 
motivasi.  
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Afterward 
Closings 
This dissertation has explored specific practices of moral intervention in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia. This has entailed tracing-out how “change” is imagined and attempted within two 
contemporary organizations, Initiatives of Change Indonesia (IofC) and Kahfi Motivator School 
(Kahfi). The practices within these communities are shaped by Muslim theological horizons and 
broad Indonesian socio-political possibilities. The relationships to the divine articulated in their 
moral projects reveal models of agency other than those implicated in analyses of pietistic self-
fashioning. Pursuing this argument has meant interpreting the processes through which the 
“foreign” becomes accessible, acceptable, and familiar. The flexibility with which members of 
IofC and Kahfi incorporate diverse bodies of knowledge is, I have argued, partly an outcome of 
historical processes dating to Dutch colonialism. At the same time, current nationalist discourses 
with similar genealogies sharply constrain the prospects of change available to contemporary 
Indonesians. The prevalence of scientific and psychological models of change in these 
communities should not, I contend, suggest a derivative status – instead these discourses are 
employed as morally neutral vehicles for the expression of enduringly Islamic aspirations. 
Throughout this project remains attentive to the bi-directionality of change: as discourses of 
moral transformation are assimilated by novel communities they are necessarily changed, but the 
agents of that assimilation also undergo reciprocal re-alignments. Neither the knowledge nor the 
subject survives the encounter unaltered.      
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In the first chapter I offered a whirlwind history through a set of linked sketches. Tracing 
how Islam was imagined and managed in the Dutch colonial enterprise gave way to a broader 
conversation about administering, channeling and controlling change. The paired opposition, 
adat and Islam, central to post-Diponegoro War colonial knowledge production, became 
progressively more reified over the course of the nineteenth century. Faced with Muslim 
adversaries in Aceh, however, the Dutch East Indies administration was forced to re-examine its 
understanding of the Islamic tradition. Triangulating between the purified categories of religion 
and culture, foreign Islam and domestic adat, colonial administrators launched a third way, the 
so-called Ethical Policy. Directed towards moral uplift amongst the inhabitants of the 
archipelago, the Ethical Policy imagined a secularized Muslim elite, capable of thwarting 
Muslim political aspirations. By the twilight of colonial rule, these divisions were so well 
established as to render opaque the political demands advanced by Muslim activists in the fermet 
of the revolutionary period. The achievement of formal independence for Indonesia augured 
further revisions in the state’s relationship to moral projects. 
 Independent Indonesia, constitutionally founded on a compromise between Islamic 
universals and pluralist demographics, has continued to re-assemble the core elements of policy 
left by the colonial legacy. From the outset, nationalist leaders sought a deconfessionalized 
middle-ground that nevertheless affirmed fundamental Islamic propositions. The result, an 
explicit state ideology called Pancasila, has shaped the horizons of religious expression and 
political participation ever since. In the shift from left-wing to right-wing totalitarianism, that 
state ideology was re-sacralized and granted transcendental properties. Conflicts between this 
rigid expression of the state’s moral sovereignty and Islamic political actors resulted in a re-
Islamization of the state (or the nationalization of Muslim politics, depending on one’s 
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perspective). Meanwhile, the fate of other moral projects, like the foreign-based Moral Re-
Armament Movement (banned in 1962), was subject to the shifting political winds in the 
archipelago. The collapse of Suharto’s New Order government seemed to promise new 
possibilities for organizations and moral reform alike. Despite the new openings forged during 
the Reformasi window, state apparatuses have continued to exert their definitional proclivities. 
This tradition is exemplified by the Ministry of Religion and its ongoing efforts to bound and 
channel religious aspiration. This fraught history delivers us to the particular concerns, conceits 
and convictions of Initiatives of Change Indonesia and Kahfi Motivator School.  
We turned to the first of these organizations, Initiatives of Change Indonesia, in the 
second chapter. This organization was founded in Ciputat, just outside of Jakarta, only after the 
regulatory reforms enacted during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. It had changed 
substantially since its predecessor, the Moral Re-Armament Movement, was banned in 1962. 
Gone was the language of Christian evangelizing and gone too the almost monomaniacal focus 
on defeating communism. Instead the international Initiatives of Change movement promised its 
new Indonesian adherents the rhetorical technologies to achieve moral transformations. These 
awakenings were predicated on a deconfessionalized notion of agency and divine grace, 
theologically acceptable to the principally Muslim audience found in the shadows of the State 
Islamic University. Through sophisticated practices of translation and adaptation, the Indonesian 
members of the organization assimilated core practices taught by the broader movement. 
Throughout they were aided by the availability of a secularized discourse of change – Initiatives 
of Change Indonesia practitioners were heir not only to the presumed epistemic neutrality of 
modern science, but also to the hard-fought successes of Dutch efforts at categorical purification 
that introduced the concept of secular progress to the Indies.  
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 The metapragmatic role of Islamically-inflected adab, the idealized “right-relations” 
structuring sociality, forms the heart of the third chapter. Eschewing the language of “piety,” I 
found that adab offered rich explanatory potential. Exploring right-relations revealed ongoing 
negotiations of competing ethical demands, conducted in plain view. In this, the social worlds 
convened within the walls of the Initiatives of Change Indonesia Secretariat were both unique 
and reflective of wider Indonesian possibilities. Gendered social interactions at Initiatives of 
Change Indonesia demonstrated the flexibility afforded by the moral stature of the organization 
alongside a shared flexibility offered by the notion of adab. Seemingly irreconcilable moral 
injunctions were responded to as discrete hailings, emphasizing subjective relationality. One core 
set of adab-relations is that which is expressed through the language of kinship. Familial idioms 
highlight the operation of broad Islamic imperatives (be merciful) in the context of particularistic 
intersubjective standards (maintain gender segregation). As individuals positioned themselves in 
accordance with idealized relations, adab became both a condition and a medium of change. The 
right adab must be possessed for meaningful change to occur, but the process of cultivating that 
adab delivers its own moral progress.  
 Islamic Hypnotherapy, its practice and pedagogy, comprises the fourth chapter of this 
dissertation. Moving from Initiatives of Change Indonesia to the Kahfi Motivator School, I 
elaborate some of the compelling features of the latter institution. Teaching “Western” hypnosis 
within the ambit of the Islamic imperatives structuring the Kahfi School entailed frequent 
epistemological navigation. Kahfi instructors accorded hypnotherapeutic technologies novel 
Islamic genealogies and ensured that their practice was directed towards explicitly Islamic 
spiritual ends. Suturing hypnosis to an Islamic past and an Islamic future emphasized the 
epistemic neutrality on which the science of hypnosis was imagined to rely. Through the 
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adoption and dissemination of hypnotherapy Kahfi Motivator School became a site for a 
different agentive model of change. Rather than a striving subject, Islamic Hypnotherapy reveals 
the abiding interest of individuals in the prospect of outside-in transformations. Using divine 
license, the practitioner of hypnosis at Kahfi is understood to affect change within the souls of 
their spiritual clients. The markers of that change are phenomenally apparent through affective 
performances: in the sweat and tears of the subjects of hypnosis. 
 The fifth chapter sets out to take seriously motivational practices organized beneath the 
sign of “motivasi.” Exploring the tortuous analytic status of “self-help,” I discuss some of the 
myriad settings in which motivasi is invited to intervene. I contend that a scientific truth effect, 
conceptually linked to both the computational models of psycho-cybernetics and the ubiquity of 
PowerPoint as a medium of expression, enables the deployment of motivasi as an efficacious 
discourse. Motivasi is directed at altering the interior conditions of an audience as much as that 
audience’s exterior behavior. Thus I advocate a reading of motivasi performances that decenters 
the scholarly focus on neo-liberal subjectivities. Instead of mere recruitment into processes of 
economic rationalization, the motivasi performances that capture my attention retain an illiberal, 
enchanted core. Islamic motivational practices continue to make agentive demands on the divine: 
asking for souls to be healed, relations restored, and disposition cultivated, not through effort but 
via grace. The continued relevance of God in motivasi practice, in turn, suggests that there is an 
adab, an idealized right relationality, to motivasi as well. Once more the conceptual separations 
bequeathed by successive political regimes have been re-assembled in novel configurations.   
In this dissertation I have demonstrated some of the ways in which the foreign becomes 
local. Set in contemporary Indonesia, amongst small-scale Muslim organizations, this has often 
meant following out how knowledge becomes assimilable, Indonesian, and Islamic. Along the 
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way I have endeavored to dramatize the thinness of our collective familiarity – the ways in which 
“our” locals are also already foreign to “us.” Change, as a project of moral renewal and 
advancement, depends on leveraging the foreign and the local, the strange and the familiar. It 
happens in Jakarta, as everywhere, within history. The state management of religion, in its 
colonial and postcolonial iterations, shapes the horizons within which moral changes are 
conceived. The proponents of change rely on technologies assembled from rhetorically available 
discourse. These practices and knowledges include both those stabilized within Indonesian 
national projects and those imagined to be stable (morally neutral) from the outset. The results 
are far from uniform. In point of fact, the juxtaposition of the paths charted at IofC and Kahfi 
demonstrate the rich complexity of this conceptual terrain. 
Technologies of change are adopted and adapted at Kahfi Motivator School and 
Initiatives of Change Indonesia via related modalities of appropriation. They are employed in the 
pursuit, however, of discrete ends. IofC, like the parent Initiatives of Change movement, 
encourages emancipatory politics of a particular sort. The language of “rights” is alive within the 
IofC Secretariat – especially as it concerns religious minorities, personal expression and 
individual moral accountability (as opposed to prescribed or enforced morality). The kinds of 
changes aspired to at IofC are expressly understood as the means to attain just leadership, social 
equality and peace. Personal moral awakenings are understood as the precondition for large-scale 
social health, and commitment to projects, however minor, of social improvement are key 
markers for moral enhancement: IofC members want to have change, but to make it too. The 
members of IofC want to be leaders in their society, but failing that they are content to be 
instruments for the achievement of the greater good. Despite diverse political and religious 
backgrounds, most IofC members come to express pluralist commitments – whether framed in 
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terms of “universal” rights or Islamically-inflected notions of fairness and justice. Although the 
language of Indonesian nationalism is frequently invoked, the overall orientation is 
simultaneously local (the neighborhood around the Secretariat, UIN, Ciputat) and international 
as well. Personal moral attainment is thus always understood as having extensive social 
ramifications. 
During the course of my fieldwork, several members of IofC started classes at Kahfi. 
This overlap predated my arrival in Ciputat, but it accelerated at the urging of Mabe, a vocal 
proponent of both organizations. The IofC members taking Kahfi classes did not, in our 
conversations (Mabe excepted), think of Kahfi as a related enterprise to IofC. Whereas IofC was 
about leveraging personal moral awakenings into the attainment of social good, Kahfi was about 
about individual mastery of persuasive arts. The moral character of a Kahfi education, from their 
perspective, was the generic cast of an Islamic institution – familiar to most of them from their 
formal education and prior organizational memberships. From this vantage Kahfi espoused 
Muslim norms, but moral transformation was not a key component of the curriculum. Just before 
I returned to the United States, two Kahfi students made the reverse journey. According to one of 
them, a young man who had recently graduated from the economics program at UIN, IofC was a 
good idea without a sufficiently strong Muslim identity. What I had marveled at as a 
demonstration of adab he interpreted as a lack of devotional commitment. Addressing a weekly 
gathering at the IofC Secretariat, he repeatedly began his remarks with a generic apology (maaf 
ya) followed by the invocation of hadith to support his personal observations attained during 
Quiet Time. Privately he related to me that the person who had invited him had misrepresented 
what IofC really was. Although this young man felt that IofC was too pluralist in its operation, 
for ardent IofC supporters this ecumenical orientation allowed for the marriage of their Muslim 
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identities to their often liberal politics. The organization was imagined as a vehicle for the 
realization of this ambition.     
The circumstances at Kahfi do not reveal similar clarity of purpose. Kahfi Motivator 
School is a compelling environment. Its activities often privilege enjoyment alongside moral 
enhancement – moral exhortations early in the evening give way to karaoke late at night. The 
personal figure cut by Om Bagus is relentlessly charming and engaging, a consistent delight that 
was not at all lost on this author. The moral project at the heart of the school, to graduate 
Islamically-grounded effective public speakers, is of a piece with related enterprises dating to 
Indonesia’s recent history. It is part of a tradition that aligns psychological discourse with 
Islamic practice. However the broader ends were never quite as explicit as the commitments 
voiced at IofC. Some students wished to have change, some to affect change, and some to invite 
both operations. The desired outcome of participation, in hayz outline, invited a couple of related 
questions: Was efficacy as a public speaker, while anchored to Muslim norms, mostly a project 
about economic advancement? Was Om Bagus’s political caution (his refusal to support party 
politics) really an enduring form of quietism consonant with the political stasis demanded by the 
New Order? Om Bagus’s, and thus Kahfi’s, openness was considerably narrower than that of 
IofC. Embracing Sufi parallels to hypnosis, Om Bagus was just as willing to embrace Habib 
Rizieq, the leader of the Front Pembela Islam, the vigilante organization founded nearby in 
Ciputat (and of course, Habib Rizieq himself claims membership in a Sufi order). Om Bagus, in 
his very refusal to draw lines among Muslims, arguably occupied the political position most 
amenable to the entrenched interests of the old regime – and the status quo. If it wasn’t just about 
enhanced job prospects, what was all this hybrid discourse really about? In place of a strong 
generalization, I turn to a startling anecdote, a sharp illustration of the complexity of change as it 
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is experienced and witnessed in contemporary Indonesia. This, too, is a story about continuity, 
although it stretches not to old political orders so much as to enduring spiritual possibility.  
Eruptions 
 Returning from Indonesia late in the fall of 2011, I was heartened and chastened, all at 
once, to read Daromir Rudnyckyj’s Spiritual Economies: Islam, Globalization and the Afterlife 
of Development. In my observations, Tubagus Wahyudi, the spiritual entrepreneur behind Kahfi 
Motivator School, struggled to emerge from the shadow cast by Ary Ginanjar and ESQ (the 
organization at the center of Spiritual Economies). As it is in real life, now so too in doctoral 
dissertations. Rudnycky’s argument about novel re-assemblages, about the spiritual extension of 
rational economic impulses, was compelling indeed. The Weberian contours of his project 
reconciled epistemes of Islamic self-efficacy and globalized circuits of capital. And then it was 
suddenly clear, of course, where our accounts diverged. My interlocutors in this dissertation are 
fiercely invested in material advancement. Efficiency is an important governing value, if a 
seldom-realized organizational attribute. Yet their this-worldly strivings are assumed to take 
place within the embrace of God. Repeatedly Divine Will interrupts their efforts at ordering 
themselves and the world about them. No mere detail, divine agency draws sharp edges on the 
changes imagined and attempted within the organizations I joined and studied. Subjects of a neo-
liberal economy, they resolutely evince a variety of illiberal subjectivities.  
 Rudnyckyj, late in his volume, details a fascinating account of possession. Comprising 
the opening anecdote to his final chapter, Rudnyckyj relates how one participant in an ESQ 
training seminar was suddenly carried off by seemingly malevolent forces (189-190). The nature 
of this possession, however, is ultimately revealed to be an existential crisis forged by the 
sectarian ethnic politics of the New Order, as re-imagined in its aftermath. Over ten pages (200-
 
 
315 
 
210), Rudnyckyj reveals how this participant, of partial Chinese descent, was acting out the 
irreconcilable demands of his Muslim faith and his Chinese ancestry. In the wake of uneven 
authoritarian pluralism, Rudnyckyj claims, this multiplicity of identities became untenable: 
“Individuals of plural identity such as Arfan were no longer publicly called on to proclaim their 
allegiance to the nation but rather to Islam” (211). The development rhetoric of the nation has 
been replaced by the economic rationalism of New Islam. Without disputing this cogent 
argument, I would like to introduce a markedly similar vignette and draw a vastly different 
conclusion: in lieu of explanation, I intend only perplexity.          
In February 2011 I accompanied several of my Kahfi Motivator School peers, a few 
alumni, and Om Bagus to Glodok, a mercantile neighborhood in North Jakarta. I went to assist in 
a seminar commissioned by a paying customer, Tupperware™ Indonesia. Outside the not-for-
profit activities of Kahfi, Om Bagus frequently held workshops and seminars for paying 
customers, usually business units or government offices. These workshops covered a range of 
materials from the Kahfi curriculum, but were generally oriented towards public speaking, 
motivation and business success. As such, hypnotherapy was seldom a major element of the 
presentations. Instead of teaching about hypnosis, hypnotic practice tended to be employed 
instrumentally: late in the typical seminar, Om Bagus would guide the attendees in a short 
hypnotic script designed to deliver them to a “sealing” affective experience – the personal proof 
that something had taken place within them, demonstrated in sweat and tears.  
The location of the seminar was not accidental. Glodok is a traditionally Chinese 
neighborhood in Jakarta and plays host to a variety of shopping centers and emporia, in keeping 
with its fame as a major retail center for Indonesia. For three days we operated out of a midrange 
hotel; conducting our trainings in its banquet hall. The participants were from all across 
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Indonesia, flown in to Jakarta as a reward for their success in selling Tupperware™ products. 
This was both a prize for reaching sales quotas and designed as in-service that would facilitate 
future retail success. The materials covered each day were the same – only the participants 
changed. Thus every attendee was given the opportunity to avail herself of the neighboring malls 
and warehouses in addition to her receipt of inspirational training. There were roughly forty-five 
people per session. It’s hard to imagine a setting in contemporary Indonesia more bedecked with 
middle-class sensibilities than a nice hotel playing host to a workshop for successful 
Tupperware™ merchants. However on the first day of the workshop this veneer was punctured 
in spectacular fashion in a manner casting considerable light on the still-fraught agentive terrain 
of Kahfi Motivator School practices.  
  Our audiences on all three days were primarily middle-aged women – two men, in total, 
took part in the training. These attendees were overwhelmingly Muslim, although several 
Christians and a Hindu or two also took part. Early in the afternoon of the first day, having 
covered a range of techniques and practices associated with public speaking, Om Bagus 
announced that he would like to check the focus of the assembled participants. Cek fokus, as it is 
neologized in Indonesian, is the process whereby one’s level of focus (tingkat focus) is assessed 
through the use of guided imagery or hypnotic induction. Once mass hypnosis is performed, it 
should be clear to observers who amongst the attendees has acceded to the guidance and who is 
unable to do so. On this occasion Om Bagus used the script discussed earlier in Chapter Four – a 
balloon flight to the holy lands. Given the religious composition of the audience, brief asides 
were made as an effort to include non-Muslims (dan kepada saudara-saudari yang non-Muslim), 
who were directed to travel to “places you consider holy” (kepada tempat-tempat yang engkau 
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anggap suci), as opposed to Mecca. The induction proceeded smoothly and a solid two-thirds of 
the room appeared to be in the sway of Om Bagus’s guidance. All appeared to be well.  
Having accomplished the flight to the holy lands, Om Bagus began to describe the 
cleansing of the soul enabled by the waters of Zamzam (performing ablutions at this most sacred 
well). At this point one woman began to shriek significantly louder than the others. While many 
wept, and a few wailed, there was a much shriller tone emanating from this particular participant. 
Her cries were urgent, insistent and demanding. Several of my fellow facilitators moved swiftly 
to her side and initiated the standard response to a pronounced affective experience during 
hypnosis (re-gaining control of the hypnosis through “deepening” followed by a swift-but-
soothing “termination”).  The wails of the distressed woman showed no sign of abating. 
Somewhat more abruptly than usual (without the extended opportunity for affective engagement 
with the prospect of forgiveness), Om Bagus terminated the mass-induction (“woke” everyone 
up), and moved to assist the facilitators who attended to the woman. By this point she had started 
cursing those around her (anjing mu, “you dog!” she howled, a phrase that bears significantly 
more violence than its English gloss suggests). Next she fell backwards out of her chair, writhing 
on the carpeted surface of the banquet hall. In a much louder voice she began to shout. Instead of 
the wails of earlier, now her voice took on a new timbre. “Ini bukan aku, aku Allah,” (This isn’t 
me, I’m God) she proclaimed repeatedly. Murmurs of kesurupan and kerasukan (two of several 
terms for “possession”) ricocheted across the room. Groggily, many of the participants turned 
their attention to the scene. After they recovered their full senses, they watched with visible 
alarm and earnest whispers. Om Bagus declared a short break (istirahat sebentar) and 
encouraged those assembled to adjourn, assuring them that the situation was under control. 
Several participants, ignoring this entreaty, discussed the nature of the woman’s malady. One 
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went so far as to insert herself into the crowd surrounding the distressed figure, at which point 
she tried to palpate the body, trying to ascertain the location of the djin she assumed was 
possessing the body. Om Bagus interrupted her and sternly sent the rest of the watchers from the 
room.   
 As the Tupperware™ merchants filtered from the room the cries changed to the more 
succinct “aku ini Allah,” “I am God,” or perhaps more accurately, “This Me is God.” Along with 
the majority of the facilitators, I left the banquet hall. Steeped in the academic literature of 
Sufism, I was unable to resist the obvious connection to al-Hallaj.
212
 I muttered something to this 
effect to my friend and co-facilitator Salih, hoping to impress him with my (admittedly very 
basic) Islamic bona fides. Our discussion was interrupted when another facilitator announced her 
intention to seek medical assistance for the distressed woman. Before anyone was dispatched, 
word came from the now quiet banquet hall. It was over. Shortly thereafter she exited under her 
own power. Fifteen minutes later, as the session was set to resume, Om Bagus was summoned – 
apparently the woman had relapsed into her prior state and his ministrations were needed in her 
room. He told us not to worry and left. A Kahfi alumni rose to continue the presentation. Half an 
hour later, Om Bagus returned and interrupted the discussion of vocal modulation to briefly 
acknowledge and explain what had happened. He spoke explicitly against the building consensus 
amongst the participants that the woman had been possessed (kerasukan). Instead, he insisted, 
the woman’s complaints were fundamentally psychological. In the relaxed state of hypnosis 
these ailments had surfaced from the woman’s subconscious. Om Bagus assured us that he had 
alleviated the symptoms by following them to their root. Someone started to question this 
                                                             
212 Mansur Al-Hallaj was a 9th and 10th century Persian Sufi, famously executed for his heresies, which tracked the 
logic of monotheism to its radical end. Although he is most famous for, in a state of ecstasy, announcing Ana al-
Haqq, (I am the Reality/Real/Truth, where Reality is one of the 99 Beautiful Names of God), he was put to death 
after a lengthy trial that focused on his teachings and written output far in excess of this one remarkable 
pronouncement. 
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assessment, but Om Bagus reiterated his point, and launched into a short diatribe against the 
rapidity with which we, collectively and foolishly, ascribe malevolent supernatural forces to 
psychological ailments. It was clear that this diagnosis was not up for discussion. There were a 
few murmurs, and the seminar moved on. Later, without remark, the woman rejoined her cohort.    
 Later that evening the facilitators assembled in Om Bagus’s room to re-cap the day’s 
events, perform the evening worship cycle and engage in spirited games of dominoes. Om Bagus 
offered a fuller explanation of what had taken place. He walked us through the psychological 
narrative that accounted for all of the manifest symptoms. He related that he had performed 
“waking hypnosis,” (akin to talk-therapy and accompanied by a chaperone to forestall fitnah). 
Once more Om Bagus was careful to discredit any notion of possession. He was clear that such 
possession can take place, but adamant that what is called possession is frequently just the 
misrecognition of an affliction originating in the subconscious or psyche of the individual. I 
mentioned al-Hallaj again, fishing, and someone else volunteered Siti Jenar, the equally (locally) 
famous mystic accused of many of the same crimes during the time of the wali sanga, the nine 
saints of Java credited with proselytizing Islam in pre-Colonial Java. If both al-Hallaj and Siti 
Jenar represent shades of heresy to many believers, it is also acknowledged, in certain quarters, 
that they spoke the truth – they simply spoke in inappropriate venues, without sufficient attention 
to audience. Their crime was not against reality, it was against adab.  
In Om Bagus’s room it was decided (or announced, really, by Om Bagus) that the 
unfortunate participant of that afternoon’s session was not, in fact, in the grip of mystic 
revelation, just as she was not possessed. The alacrity with which this verdict was obtained was a 
little disappointing, at least for me. For Om Bagus, and thus for Kahfi, it was important to 
enunciate this experience within the safer confines of ostensibly neutral psychology. Of course, 
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however rationally this woman’s suffering might be narrated, it was still understood within the 
framing context of a relationship with the Divine. Disavowing spirit possession was not an 
embrace of disenchanted psychology, but instead an ongoing negotiation between Divine agency 
and profane tools.   
Only later did I realize that Om Bagus’s reliance on a scientific discourse of psychology 
was not intended to be persuasive. Instead it was a defensive rhetorical maneuver. By isolating 
the eruption of enchantment, bounding it within the paradigmatic possibilities of morally neutral 
science, Om Bagus sought to defend the prospect of hypnotherapy from Islamic critique. Of 
course there were djin. And of course, sometimes, the hypnotherapist encountered them. 
However hypnosis relied not on djin-agency but on borrowed divine agency, on the Godly-
authorization of moral intervention, pursued through the neutral technological means of Western 
hypnosis. As Kahfi students we were meant to understand this, indeed, our entire Kahfi 
education was designed to deliver us to the possibility of this and related insights. The relentless 
promotion of scientific methodology was a rearguard action, imagined to protect its practitioners 
not just from Islamic critique but from the grave possibility of introducing corruption into the 
tradition. These negotiations were part of an inaudible debate, raging within and among the 
ostensibly stable categories of religion and culture, Islam and adat, foreign and local. None of us 
knew what was really happening – that was the magic. We performed the scientific incantations 
and tears fell to the floor, souls re-assembled and relationships were restored. In a cultural-
political world that still denied the very possibility of structural intervention, the authenticity of 
systemic critique, here was the medium for social transformation: changes, one heart at a time.   
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